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ABSTRACT
WEAK LINKS IN A DANGEROUSLY FRACTURED REGION: FRAGILE STATE AS GLOBAL
THREATS
Tasawar ul-Rahim Baig 
Old Dominion University, 2014  
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty
In the post-9/11 period a common belief emerged that fragile states are 
launching pads for unprecedented and unconventional transnational threats. The rise of 
state fragility or state failure as a paradigm surfaced after the end of the Cold W ar, but 
their high risk factor was noticed only later. This is because increased 
interconnectedness allows information to spread faster and intensifies threat 
perceptions.
This study recognizes that the idea of weak states, small states, and political 
decay existed before, and that the notion of state fragility has been widely used in 
recent years. The conventional wisdom about political decay refers to  the 
ineffectiveness of institutions and corrupt governance structures which enfeeble the  
state, and which is similar to the current literature focused on domestic factors. To 
understand the fragility of statehood, the study answers the following research 
question: "Under what conditions do weak and fragile states continue to fail?"
The analysis explores two core factors: endogenous and exogenous. The 
academic literature primarily focuses on endogenous factors, mainly political, security, 
economic, and social performance of states, to  determ ine state capacity and 
capabilities. However, this study adds geography, or geopolitics, as an exogenous factor
causing state fragility in many cases. Therefore, the study suggests a new category, 
"weak pivot states" in which fragility is not only the outcome of domestic factors but is 
also due to its geography and position as a "pivot." The evidence suggests that the  
impact factor of "weak pivot states" is higher than other weak and fragile states, as they  
are more susceptible to great power struggles.
As "weak pivot states" sit at the crossroads of major and regional powers' 
interests, one of the findings of this dissertation demonstrates that m ajor powers have 
often supported undemocratic forces, with centralized authoritarian regimes benefiting 
the interests of a hegemon. The reduction of the threat level requires the provision of 
stability and the implementation of an effective political order. The findings suggest that 
fragile states need to reorient their constitutions and laws so as to create opportunity of 
equality and inclusiveness to its populations. In addition, the dissertation recommends 
the creation of "spheres of socialization" at intra-state and inter-state level that will 
allow education for democracy towards state building and establishing accountable 
political systems instead of interventions in weak and fragile states; and also facilitate 
an integration process at sub-regional, regional and then global level to tackle the 
burden of geography respectively.
©  2014 Tasawar ul Rahim Baig. All rights reserved.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The weak states are cracks in the very foundation of our international 
system. Left untended, they can and they will threaten the entire edifice of 
political and economic stability ... The threats to our security from  weak and 
failed states are very different from the threats we are used to, and very different 
from the threats we are prepared fo r ...Those states can destabilize their 
neighbors and whole regions, creating humanitarian crises as severe as any 
natural disaster... We have both a humanitarian obligation and a national 
security mandate to pay attention.
Senator Joseph R. Biden1
The post 9 /1 1  period changed the security dynamics of the entire world. W ith  
the emergence of new spheres of influence on a global scale, 9/11 has raised numerous 
questions about the complexities of our tim e and the ways to govern new insecurities. 
Fragile states, trans-national movements, and geopolitical recasting breed 
unprecedented threats to traditional norms of political life. Among these threats, state 
fragility and failure are portrayed as bogeymen. Dealing w ith state failure resembles a 
swinging pendulum between an agenda of necessity and an agenda of choice for policy 
makers and states themselves. The decision to choose the best available option is 
always linked to  its cost, whether political or economic.2
If we delve back into the past, the history of international relations is witness to 
the rise and fall of political systems, whether traced in city-states, empires, or in
1 "Nations on the Brink," (Center for Global Development, 2004).
2 Simon Serfaty, A World Recast: An American M om ent in a Post-Western Order (Lanham, Md.: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 73.
contemporary nation-states whose constant rise and fall are causes and consequences 
of various intra-state and inter-state factors.
It is important to understand the conventional wisdom that political decay is a 
substantive process that emerges because of a lack of political order, mainly 
characterized as ineffective institutional capacities in a nascent or malfunctioning aging 
state. The institutions of malfunctioning aging states are too deeply fractured to 
develop a mature and viable political system. This means the malfunctioning aging 
process, festered with prolonged chronic political ailment, causes the decay of a political 
system and potential breakout of the state. Both strong and at-risk societies are always 
sensitive to essential ingredients that can provide good health to function smoothly. 
Political order is a core ingredient that is needed to  sustain the system to work 
efficiently. For any political system, the absence of order in a state means a higher level 
of fracturedness and patent weak bounds within the state's political institutions. As a 
m atter of truth, every state is susceptible to political decay. Surely the typology of a 
state, meaning its nature, type, and category determines the level of susceptibility.
Yet the weak states are troubled with a wide range of domestic and external 
security issues that are mainly driven by fragile nationhood, a lack of governability, 
higher levels of political corruption, the rise of sub-level ethno-nationalism, sectarian 
and inter-religious clashes, weak economic growth, the absence of accountability in the 
system, lawless borders, geopolitical challenges, and other forms of socio-economic and 
political fears. Consequently, for the citizen of fragile states, the meanings of the social 
contract gradually diminish, and the weak government holds an increasingly ineffective
control over its territory.
Every state and its political system experiences a constant input (new demands 
and support for demand) and output (decisions or policies) processes; the domestic 
state's structure tries to  synchronize demands and realities.3 A successful 
synchronization between input and output processes reflects maturity and the viability 
of the system and its resiliency to cope with the persistent change processes, while a 
desynchronized process in the system tends to lead towards alteration, failure, or 
decay.4
In recent times, political discourse refers to the notion of failure or decay in 
connection to nation-states and their domestic systems. The political systems in 
Afghanistan, Congo, Haiti, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and many more states in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, abound with vivid examples of political decay and state 
failure. Interestingly, in recent times the issues of state fragility and failure em anate  
from the weakness of states in the developing regions of the world, while most of the 
developing states embarked on the journey of nation building and developm ent as a 
result of a massive wave of decolonization process following the Second W orld W ar. 
Subsequently, most of the political leadership in newly independent societies has faced 
troubling issues of effective authority and governability in "how to exercise power over 
their (newly shaped) territories given the incomplete and highly invariable
3 David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political System," World Politics 9, no. 3 (1957): 384.
4 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rd e r: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 1st ed. 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 7.
4administrative system" from colonial legacy.5
This study aims to  discuss issues related to fractured statehood in weak, but 
geographically pivot states. It helps to draw a new category calling "W eak Pivot States." 
This study first presents a theoretical fram ework designed to  develop a basic 
understanding and explanation about the causes and consequences of fracturedness in 
weak states. Next, the case studies apply theoretical explanations and seek solutions to  
fix the gaps through dealing with contagious intra-state and geographical troubles in 
weak states. The core arguments validate the colonial legacies, domestic factors, and 
state policies as reasons for continued state fragility. Therefore, the discussion involves 
the historical and political development of weak and fragile states, which suggests 
establishing a viable and effective political order that may resolve domestic challenges.
The study questions the notion that domestic factors are the only reasons for 
state fragility. In this context, the work also re-visits the notion of political geography 
along historical lines, which re-affirms that geography still matters in a tim e of complex 
interdependence. A careful observation reflects that the historical geopolitical mapping 
and contemporary process of virtual re-mapping of the world puts a burden on a weak 
state. Some studies inform that the burden of geography can cause "state death," due 
to external intervention.6 Specifically, the sensitivities and vulnerabilities of virtual 
geopolitical propositions of a globalized world creates higher political risks for fragile 
states, because it has already "spurred the rebirth of localisms, built in many cases on
5 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa : Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton 
Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 97.
6 Tanisha M . Fazal, State Death : The Politics and Geography o f Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 17.
5ethnic and religious consciousness," which further widens the exiting institutional gaps 
of a fractured statehood.7 The rise of ethnic consciousness gradually awakens the  
ethno-nationalistic fervor that becomes a cauldron of deprived and repressed anger, 
waiting for the right tem perature to boil over.
ROOTS OF FRACTURED-NESS: PAST, PRESENT, AND WHAT NEXT?
The historiography of pre-colonial status of fissures in weak and fragile states 
shows the very existence of fragmented identities, weak institutions and incompatible 
structures for state formation; it is for these reasons that many of these fractured 
statehoods are referred to as fragile, weak, failed, or quasi-states that could not manage 
to evolve towards matured political entities.8
In the early years of the post-colonial phase, the idea of self-determination  
gathered more attention and higher preference than giving a serious effort to  
developing a political system for a long-term survivability through political development. 
Subsequently, in later years gradual anarchic conditions become favorable for "civil 
strife, government breakdown, and economic privation."9 Observing the state formation  
during the post-colonial period depicts th a t many developing states perceived 
modernization as a political will to attain the socio-economic and political goals, 
believing it as the reason and modus operandi for the pattern of higher-level political 
and economic development practiced in the developed countries.
7 Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge o f Geography: W hat the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the 
Battle against Fate, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2012), 35.
8 Seth D. Kaplan, Fixing Fragile States : A New Paradigm fo r  Development (W estport, Conn.: Praeger 
Security International, 2008), 36-37.
9Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy 89(1992-1993): 3-4.
According to Karl Deutsch (1963), the processes of modernization helped 
accelerate the rate of social mobility, while social mobilization offers multiple positive 
outcomes that somehow link to political developm ent and a higher level of participation 
as well. Modernization is also explained as economic development; for instance, in the  
developed world, the higher level of economic growth provided benign conditions for 
political participation and democracy to flourish.10 In contrast, the recent history of 
developing states tells us how the colonial legacies, corrupt polity, and ill-planned 
policies towards modernization deeply affected the process of political development, 
resulting in the establishment of quasi-democracy, armored democracy, or the absence 
of civil society in democratic transitions. Hence, the effects are "directly responsible for 
the deterioration of political institutions" in developing states.11
Forever, it seems, many developing states ignored the nation-building process as 
well as eschewed strengthening political institutions, which is why all weak and fragile 
states do not now have benign conditions to establish favorable values for "democratic 
state, rule of law, and system of accountability".12 In this connection, Samuel 
Huntington (1965) observed that in most developing societies "the rates of social 
mobilization and participation are high, (but) the rates of organization and 
institutionalization are low."13 As an outcome, a majority of developing countries took 
the path of modernization assuming it would provide a way to the political development
10 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and Developm ent: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 
1950-1990, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 88.
11 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics 17, no. 3 (1965): 405.
12 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rder: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 16.
13 Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," 386.
7of these states, contrarily it "produce[d] not political development, but political 
decay".14
A broader scale consensus undertakes that the  political decay of the system is 
primarily driven from  within, and the decay process gradually widens the gaps within  
the boundaries of a nation-state. Moreover, an inquiry beyond the nation building 
process suggests that the "path dependency" set by the culture of colonial legacies 
inherited to certain state institutions, i.e. feudal lords, tribal lords, family dynastic 
politics, civil-military bureaucracies, led to corruption from dictatorial democracies or 
authoritarian regimes and witnessed some frequent recurrences of military coup 
d'etats.15 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) forward a different perspective 
and believe that prosperity and poverty conditions of a nation are not due to their 
geography, cultures, or leadership; rather, it is the nature o f institutions they possess 
that matters most. These institutions can be inclusive economic and political institutions 
or extractive economic and political institutions.16 In addition, we could see radical 
approaches from the dependency school of thought, which "believes that the role of 
external factors (is responsible) in the creation and maintenance of weak states".17
14 Ibid.
15 Douglass North explains that in many cases the survival o f societies is dependent on efficient 
institutions. These institutions survive even in low performing societies because they are comparatively 
and actively efficient. Based on Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, North elaborates the "path 
dependency" through Darwin's idea on institutions and writes that, "over time inefficient institutions are 
weed[ed] out, efficient ones survive, and thus there is a gradual evolution of more economic, political and 
social organization." See, Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 
The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 92.
16 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations F a il: The Origins o f Power, Prosperity and  
Poverty (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 79-83.
17 Barry Buzan, People, States, and F e a r: An Agenda fo r International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
W ar Era, 2nd ed. (Colchester, UK ECPR Press, 2007), 94.
Specifically, over the years, most developing states witnessed the influence and 
strength of a system set on praetorian oligarchy or praetorianism. The praetorian 
oligarchy empowered the civil-military bureaucracy to  shape the state institutions vis-a- 
vis the political culture of state and created a "praetorian society".18 Amos Perlm utter 
(1974) believes that "praetorian governments develop when civilian institutions lack 
legitimacy", while "praetorianism has existed in all historical periods."19 In modern 
times, praetorianism is considered one of the fundamental factors of political decay of 
democratic institutions. In order to reduce the powers of the military in the political 
arena, Samuel Huntington suggested the maximization of civilian power and 
maximization of military professionalism, which would become a firewall between the  
military and society, so the professional military would stay out of "institutional, class, 
and constitutional politics."20 Professional soldiers do not have any inclination or 
ambitions for intervening in politics; mainly, the institutional constraints and norms limit 
any tendency of intervention.21 Otherwise, the decrease in civilian power lets the 
praetorian structures gain a deeper role in politics and obviously "military interventions 
frequently outweigh ... the electoral process as a means of regime change."22 Looking at 
Myanmar's military that benefited out o f the weakness of political institutions and 
absence of norms restraining the military elites; as a result, Myanmar became a garrison
18 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 
195.
19 Amos Perlmutter, Egypt, the Praetorian State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), 5.
20 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics o f Civil-Military Relations (New  
York: Vintage Books, 1957), 80-83.
21 Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett, The Political Influence o f the M ilita ry : A Comparative 
Reader (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 3.
22 The Political Influence o f the M ilita ry : A Comparative Reader (N ew  Haven: Yale University Press, 1980),
state and since 1962 continued to influence politics. Similar patterns can be observed in 
many other pivot states like Egypt, Pakistan, while in the recent past a vivid example can 
be Turkey. Therefore, it would not be wrong to blame praetorianistic regimes for 
weakening the political capacity of democratic institutions and further creating 
fractured systems as an inherited colonial legacy in Third World societies.
In sum, at the domestic level, tw o prone societal behaviors can be witnessed 
during the post-colonial period along with institutional legacies of colonialism in newly 
independent states or today's developing, yet weak and fragile states: a) searching for a 
political system, be it democratic or authoritarian b) modernization or economic 
development. A misinterpretation between the political system (lack of developing a 
political order) and economic development via the modernization process weakened  
the foundations of statehood.
Consequently, providing a socio-political vacuum in weak societies, social 
movements got some space to re-emerge and tried to fill the vacuum. For example, 
from the Pakistan case study: In 1994 the decision to abolish colonial legal laws in 
Malakand, w ithout immediate replacement or the introduction of state's legal system, 
created a vacuum which allowed local cleric Sufi Muhammad to launch Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e- 
Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) demanding Sharia law and courts for Malakand. His 
movement gradually engulfed the entire region including Swat and resulted in two  
military operations in 2007 and 2009 in Swat to curtail rising influence of radicals in the 
region. Hence, it is visible to account that searching for a political system and social 
movements go hand in hand in post-colonial societies. It provided a venue for
10
contentious politics, where "interactions in which actors make claims bearing on 
someone else's interest, lead to coordinate efforts on behalf of shared interests or 
programs, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third 
parties."23 Interestingly, the other instances, compared to traditional social movements, 
are gradually being replaced with new forms of social movements under the leaderless- 
leadership of the digitized world of blogs and social media to vent-out frustration and 
achieve demands. These trends were widely witnessed during the Arab Spring in late 
2010 and the following year's vis-a-vis the other socio-economic and politically oriented 
uprisings across the world gave a new twist to the social movements with transnational 
effects.
The traditional dynamics of intra-state affairs with sovereign autonom y within its 
territorial scope has changed dramatically too, which infers a higher level of 
transnational influence upon a state's domestic political affairs. Particularly, the post- 
Cold W ar period is a crucial and unique moment for the state system. It is crucial not 
only because of the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9 ,1989 , the demise of the 
Soviet Union on December 31, 1991, and the emergence of a unique unipolar 
international system, but also because of the rise of a highly globalized world. The new 
globalization sketches a different picture of the international system, which is in 
contrast to what was established after the Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and 
confirmed with the Concert of Europe (1815) period.
It is worth noticing that a globalized world passes through a constant "process of
23 Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder, CO.: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 4.
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shifts, surges and feeds on the dynamic relationships" within and between state 
structures.24 During this period, the phenomenon of state fragility gathered a wider 
range of attention than ever before and had any higher levels of serious deliberations 
about its linkages to emerging security threats. Primarily the nature and threat of inter­
state conflict shifted to intra-state conflicts, so that the threats posed to others are 
driven from within state groups. Moreover, the consideration of domestic threats are 
also gradually transitioning from humanitarian threats to national security threats and 
then expanding to trans-national threats driven by non-state actors.25
The transition scenarios vindicate that international politics turned to be residing 
in a complex period of a highly interdependent world, where time and space is 
compressed in a world within a super-connected epoch. On the one hand, the epoch 
facilitates the individuals and ideas to flow  actively and freely in "both geographic 
locales and scalar spaces that have been socially constructed," and on the other hand, it 
becomes an "era of pervasive contradictions that give rise to polarities subject to  
diverse normative judgments."26 The outcome we see w ith the dawn of an emergent 
epoch has transformed the world with "uncertainties, perplexing, ambiguities, and 
unending contradictions fostered by a wide range of dynamics, not the least being 
newly empowered individuals and expanded roles for non-governmental agents of
24 Ersel Aydinli, "Seeking Conceptual Links for Changing Paradigms," in Globalization, Security, and the 
Nation-State: Paradigms in Transition, ed. Ersel Aydinli and James N. Rosenau (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2005), 231.
25 Stewart Patrick, Weak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 6.
26 James N. Rosenau, Distant Proximities : Dynamics Beyond Globalization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 7-8.
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change".27
The transformations further help us to witness the creation of new social 
geography and a spatial network that has entered in a new epoch, where the traditional 
Hobbesian notion about the state as the monopoly o f the legitimate use of violence is 
shifting towards abiding with legal international norms, which proves a gradual 
transition of authority from state to international regimes.28 These patterns of 
transitions portray a great deal of changes at the intra-state and inter-state level, 
especially for the newly empowered individuals whom  are more politically awakened  
than ever.29 Therefore, the compression of tim e and space set both new challenges and 
opportunities. The political fates of weak and fragile states are among some serious 
challenges, and state fragility anticipates some urgency to  deal with "the dynamics of 
nation-state failure (that) have become central to critical policy debates".30
As highlighted earlier, this study also evaluates the geopolitical dynamics of state 
fragility. As far as domestic political order is concern, it is true that political order helps 
in sustaining the viability and efficiency of political institutions, maintains the 
implementation of rule of law at the domestic level, and also manages to control the 
effects of trans-national activities. Equally, geopolitics is another im portant factor that 
should be taken into consideration, first by understanding that geopolitics "is the
27 Distant Proximities : Dynamics Beyond Globalization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 
3.
28 Serfaty, A World Recast: An American M om ent in a Post-Western Order, 2.
29 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision : America and the Crisis o f Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 
2012), 26.
30 Robert I. Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time o f  Terror (Cambridge, Mass.; 
Washington, D.C.: World Peace Foundation ; Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 1.
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relation of international political power to the geographical setting."31 Secondly, the 
spatial or geographic connection to international power relations traces the effects of 
geopolitics on state fragility. Therefore, the role of geography and its impact on weak 
states is significant in many ways, particularly if the geographic location of the state is in 
the "central location of a system or subsystem and this location of strategic importance 
to the powers" lends to conflict for fragile states.32
Arguably, at the tangible (physical) level the significance of geopolitics reflects 
two dimensions: a) resource rich geography and b) geo-strategic significance of state. 
The intangible (mind) level of a surge of "geopolitics of emotions" and the "mapping of 
emotions" may solace the existing domestic and external frustrations of societies.33 
Throughout history the cultures of emotions have faced various tides of gains and loss; 
therefore, at this particular junction emotional satisfaction remains prem ature.34
Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997) highlighted the significance of "geopolitical pivots" as 
other political geographers and political thinkers did in early stages of their conceptual 
framework. These pivot states have an importance and influence on major events which 
"is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location 
and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of
31 Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided, 2d ed. (New York,: Random House, 
1963), 24.
32 Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System (London ; New Jersey: Frank Cass, 1981), 
76.
33 Dominique Moisi, The Geopolitics o f Emotion : How Cultures o f Fear, Humiliation, and Hope Are 
Reshaping the World, 1st ed. (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 5-16.
34 Simon Serfaty, "The Folly of Forgetting the West," Policy Review no. 174 (2012): 44.
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geostrategic players."35 Many weak pivot states are fragile, not because they are located 
at an important geostrategic location or possess resource richness, but because the 
region itself is situated on a significant, though highly-shattered, geostrategic region. 
Political geographer Saul Bernard Cohen explained these shattered zones as "shattered 
belts" which are highly fragmented within and trapped in great power struggle.36 During 
the Cold W ar era the Middle East and East Asia, two im portant Asian regions, were 
considered shatter belts or crush zones due to both a higher scale of fragmentation and 
a greater power competition over these regions.
The geographic significance of a state's locality gives an edge to that state over 
others and valorizes it as a geographically im portant pivot. These pivot states can be 
significant for access to important regions for their resources, and in some cases they  
can become a defense shield (offshore balancing, buffered regions or bandwagon(ed) 
ally) against potential hostile states. These pivot states may also have significant 
influence on states that may result significant "political and cultural consequences for a 
more active neighboring geostrategic player."37 For example, the Eurasian pivot states 
have remained significant throughout history.
Finally, looking back to the recent past, the contemporary political map no 
longer shows Austro-Hungary or the Soviet Union: the phenomenon of decay can not 
only end a domestic political system, but also leads to the collapse of the whole state as 
a unit. Interestingly, the decay or collapse observed over the past decades followed the
35 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New  
York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), 40.
36 Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics : The Geography o f International Relations, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 44.
37 Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 40.
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birth of a number of new states. This means after every decay, there can be a possible 
birth or reincarnation of some new and old political entities. The birth process of states 
can be both natural (indigenous political struggle) and surgical (external engineering to 
create a buffer region) too. If that is the case, then what are the criteria for the political 
decay of a state? W hat are the domestic conditions that make a state become weak, 
failed, or collapsed? In contrast to domestic reasons of failure, one cannot eschew the 
possible consideration of external interference or foreign occupation as a factor for a 
state weakening or collapsing, as referenced earlier. Has any political entity ceased so 
far, due to any occupation?38 There are a number o f gray areas that need appropriate  
inquiry, explanation, and prescription through the use of an integrated approach.
WHAT'S THE RATIONALE?
W e are standing at the historic crossroads of interregnum. This junction is characterized 
as a complex period in human history with acute levels of unpredictability. In particular, 
the gloomy pictures of institutional fracturedness in weak and fragile states are 
experiencing a tremendous amount of challenges along w ith contagious force. Gramsci's 
words aptly portray the situation of the interregnum that "the old is dying and the new  
cannot be born; in this interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid symptoms." 
Morbid symptoms in a fractured statehood show a lack of political order and no definite 
political system, resulting in administrative and coercive incapacities of state. Failing 
political entities become "incapable of fully projecting power within their national
38 Buzan, People, States, and F ear: An Agenda fo r  International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W ar Era, 
65.
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boundaries."39 That is why weak and fragile states are more institutionally fractured  
within and prone to instability with a long history of autocratic regimes, (dominantly 
praetorian-oligarchy) chronic and endemic corruption, the threat of nuclear 
proliferation, the barbaric nature of terrorism, meager implementation of rule of law, a 
lack of accountability, lawless ungoverned spaces, unbridled demographic m omentum, 
and the rise of ethnic and religious tensions.
The rationale for this study is to find the reasons why weak states fail to 
establish a viable political order and how fractured statehood can be transformed into 
sustainable states with higher social cohesiveness. To what extent has political order 
remained important for a weak state in the past, but also in the present and future?
How does the political economy of a weak and fragile state work? This research further 
seeks to develop an integrated approach through conceptualizing, rather than 
contextualizing, the phenomena of fractured statehood in weak pivot states. In some 
ways the notion of fracture points towards existing gaps in the structure of a weak state. 
These fissures can also be characterized w ith "gaps in the social, cultural, economic, 
psychological, and political spheres," as in the 1960s and 1970s when these gaps were  
referred to as underdeveloped societies.40 Hence, both at the theoretical and practical 
scale, there is a need to frame an integrated work that can bridge the conventional 
wisdom and contemporary changing dynamics with new realities. It will help to develop 
a consensus between disciplines, so a better understanding and prescription can be put
39 James A. Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?," 
International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2008): 470.
40 Leonard Binder, "Crises of Political Development," in Crises and Sequences in Political Development, ed. 
Leonard Binder (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 29.
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forward. Possible attem pt through borrowing varieties of notion from "different 
disciplines can be applied a n d /o r  be cross-fertilized in order to create new hybrid ideas, 
hypotheses, theories, and approaches' to deal with research problems and prioritize the 
factors involved in cause and effect."41
In the post-Cold war period the notion of state fragility has caught attention and 
is being discussed under various themes, including fragile states, weak states, quasi­
states, failed states, or collapsed states. In real terms, we see a great level of fractured­
ness appear within state structure or within political institutions that make them  
considered fragile. However, the post 9 /1 1  era set a different draft towards state failure 
due to the changing nature of intervention in weak states for reasons ranging from  
humanitarianism to security goals driven by global and regional interests. Believing in 
the transitory nature of global interest, this study discussed the classification or 
typology of the failed state and historiography of weak states rooted in pre-colonial and 
postcolonial timeframe. Following an integrated approach that includes comparative 
politics, transnationalism, and geopolitics, this discussion structures a basic 
understanding of the root causes and consequences of state fragility. A prognostic 
attem pt built upon discussion and analysis will be a useful attem pt to avoid further 
cracking of the weak and fragile state.
The aforementioned introduction provides grounds to understand that there are 
a number of cases available all over the developing world to  discuss state fragility. 
However, this study has chosen tw o case studies, namely Myanmar and Pakistan, to
41 Steve Yetiv, "History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches: Thinking About Greater 
Interdisciplinarity," International Studies Perspectives 12, no. 2 (2011): 96.
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understand from  their experiences of nation-making to state-making processes and vice 
versa from state-making to nation-building processes. More significantly, understanding 
the nature of institutional fracturedness, its origin, challenges, and implications of 
selected case studies and their relevance to debates about state fragility is also 
considered. The study intends to incorporate theoretical explanations, which tell that 
both endogenous and exogenous factors can cause decay. Revisiting the theories of 
geopolitical pivots brings additional perspective to the study.
The core objective of any doctoral research is to contribute to the existing 
literature pertinent to the subject m atter. Similarly, this project is also m eant to  
contribute to the literature discussing state fragility and seeks to bridge the gaps 
between the existing literatures. The existing literature mainly discusses the causes and 
consequences of the state fragility and failure within the confines of one discipline, 
while ignoring the explanations emanating from other disciplines of the social sciences 
and humanities. Jean-Germain Gros (1996) highlights that "it is neither moral, practical 
nor politically feasible to ignore the problems in failed states, there is a serious lack of 
knowledge of how best to help solve these problems"42 of state fragility. In addition, this 
project further tries expanding the knowledge with new inputs, in order to fix or 
manage the fracturedness in weak states. The theoretical framework, analysis, and 
results can be helpful to understand other similar cases all around. It is also important to 
notice that generalization is one of the great challenges to answering the variety of each 
unique case pertinent to state fragility.
42 Jean-Germain Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, 
Liberia,Rwanda and Haiti," Third World Quarterly 17, no. 3 (Sep. 1996): 466.
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Generally, the problem lies with our monolithic attitude of thinking of failed 
states. Therefore, tim e and space matters while comparing the cases. In addition, each 
selected case study has a great diverse structural setting, barely achieving m erit as being 
considered a state. Every case study requires an in-depth area-based approach to study 
domestic dynamics and understand failure phenomena accordingly. After all, "failure is a 
fluid,"43 a term that means states can go forward and backward to failure and weak  
conditions. Thus, it is a graduating process depending on how the socio-political 
cohesion of fragile states structure and m eet the basic needs of security and the  
material well-being of their peoples.
RESEARCH QUESTION
The above discussion helped to fram e a basic research question followed by 
number of supporting questions to find out a better explanation from literature and real 
life political developments from selected case studies. This research work is primarily 
trying to answer these questions: Under what conditions do weak and fragile states 
continue to fail, and how might the fractures of statehood be fixed? To answer the 
questions, the discussion will stay around the concept of state polity based on 
traditional and modern approaches of explanations. Following traditional prescriptions 
to develop an effective political and social order, fixation means reinvigorating or
43 Robert I. Rotberg explains that "Failure is a fluid halting place, with movement forward to weakness 
and backward into collapse always possible. Certainly, too, because failure and collapse are undesirable 
results for states, they are neither inevitable nor unavoidable. Whereas weak states fail much more easily 
than strong ones, that failure is not preordained. Failure is preventable, particularly since human agency 
rather than structural flaws or institutional insufficiencies are almost invariably at the root". See, Robert I. 
Rotberg, When States F a il: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 
10 .
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making a Leviathan stronger as a "symbol of law, order, power, the state, domination, 
and social control" against the Behemoth as a "symbol of lawlessness, chaos, disorder, 
anarchy, heterodoxy, and deviance," traceable in weak and fragile states.44 If that is the  
case, then in a period of high globalization, a strong Leviathan becomes the issue of 
"state repression and human rights violation."45 Visibly, authoritarian regimes enjoy 
more controlled and highly militarized systems to use the monopoly of violence as a tool 
of repression against legitimate voices seeking basic rights of citizenship.
Furthermore, it is mentioned earlier that if failure or collapse is a real and final 
destination for a weak state, then why do these weak states not collapse instantly? To 
unfold the question further, the following subsidiary questions help to go into an in- 
depth understanding: 'what factors keep the states surviving and slow progress towards 
failure? W hat are the challenges to manage continued failure? How should states cope 
with these challenges? More importantly, do these challenge matter to  the global 
community? If yes, then how has the global community discussed fixing them? The issue 
is equivocal and imprecise for the majority, despite a silent acceptance and realization 
about the threat and spillover effects of the issue area.
The aforementioned questions diametrically look at broader vis-a-vis specific 
aspects of the issue area. Two hypotheses of research are framed to discuss issues of 
governability, capacities, and challenges of state fragility: 1) The absence of an effective 
political order (institutional ineffectiveness and bad governance) causes a gradual decay
44 Mark I. Lichbach, "Contending Theories of Contentious Politics and the Structure-Action Problem of 
Social Order," Annual Review o f Political Science 1(1998): 402.
45 Christian Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," ibid.10(2007): 1.
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of state structure. 2) The burden of geography and geopolitics is more likely to  affect 
state fragility.
The first hypothesis mainly looked into domestic factors causing fragility, and 
primary variables were picked and discussed within the political, security, economic, 
and social domains. These domains helped to answer the research questions about state 
fragility pointing at variables such as colonial legacies, praetorian-oligarchy, family 
dynastic politics, ethno-nationalism, and religious violence to see their effects on state 
fragility. The second hypothesis helped to know the external factors affecting the  
capability of the state, and the geography or geopolitics (overlapping at various 
instances) is taken as a core independent variable. The structure and proposition of the  
literature review on understanding statehood, state fragility, the factual discussion on 
the case studies, and the comparative analysis is systematically outlined to determ ine  
the causal effects.
METHODOLOGY
The research is discussing the issue of historical lines digging into colonial 
legacies, as explanations of comparative political and area studies suggest adopting a 
qualitative research approach further based on case studies. First of all, the qualitative 
research provides leverage maximization, meaning "we want to explain as much as 
possible with as little as possible."46 To do so, the qualitative research methodology also 
allows to select descriptive analysis to understand and explain the research problem,
46 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 29.
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because "description often comes first; it is hard to develop explanations before we 
know something about the world and what needs to be explained on the basis of what 
characteristics."47
Notably, the "case studies are essential for description ... [and they] provide an 
insightful description of complex events."48 The case studies provide a testing ground 
with practical examples to justify the causal relation and explanation of research. This 
project has followed a systematic study to discuss the issues related to challenges of 
statehood in weak states. Discussing typology, the historical explanation of fragile or 
weak states, and changing dynamics of security and the globalized world anticipates and 
revisits, as traditional explanations face limitations to the current realities o f world  
politics. Therefore, research disputes with one-dimensional explanation most of the  
work done so far focused on the domestic state of affairs. This dissertation project has 
incorporated multiple approaches to seek mending the gap between disciplines vis-a-vis 
providing a prognostic solution for cases selected or similar issues in other parts of the  
world. The multiple approaches include a) bridging contending theoretical discourses of 
comparative politics b) incorporating transnational dimension into discussion c) 
providing geographical pivots as a base.
Before embarking on the theoretical discussion on weak states, this dissertation 
has revisited the literature on the nation-state, in order to develop an in-depth  
understanding about the notion of state, its roles, and duties. It also helps to
47 Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 34.
48 Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 44.
understand the process from nation-making to state-making on one hand. On the other 
hand, different forms of political systems and identities show the social mobility, 
conflict, and commitments towards their political identities. This procedure included 
various theoretical explanations about small powers and small states to construct a 
consensus to define the phenomena of weak states in the context of today's fragile 
state. In addition, by doing so it provides an understanding about the differences and 
categories of nation-states. The analytical part also discusses garrison states, predatory 
states, hybrid states and their structural linkage within weak states. It also makes the  
case easier to differentiate between various categories of states and further 
classification of weak states. The lessons try to  discuss why some states are weak and 
fragile with tendencies of becoming parasites on others, while by contrast, some states 
are strong and function normal with a higher level of social cohesion and effective 
political institutions.
Sovereignty and territory are some of the core ingredients in the making of a 
modern nation-state; sovereignty matters most for all states, but transnational 
networks, porous state frontiers, and frequent interventions affect the sovereignty of 
fragile ones. First, it is easy to penetrate a fragile state and subdue its sovereignty for 
greater interest as a "primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and 
security."49 Second, it is observed that fragility always becomes a justified intervention  
to fix the domestic problems of weak state, while ruling elites of weak states also 
anticipate foreign intervention to root out elements that may threaten their rule and
49Age Eknes, "The United Nations and Intra-State Conflicts," in Subduing Sovereignty: Sovereignty and the 
Right to Intervene, ed. Mariannne Heiberg (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 97.
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others' interests too by lending or compromising sovereignty.50 Therefore, Jeffrey 
Herbst called the sovereignty of fragile states nothing "more than legal fiction."51
Despite the earlier identified specifications, in general the changing nature of 
territorial settings from hard boundaries to soft boundaries are becoming ubiquitous 
and pose issues to rethink with increasing clarity about sovereignty, self-determination, 
nationalism, and citizenship rights. Yet, there is still "resistance to re-conceptualize the  
static units of the inter-state system of Westphalian sovereignty, (as) there is significant 
nostalgia for the notion of national identity."52 Above all, over the period of history, we  
observe that up to this point states have achieved a great variety of structural changes 
with inner and outer shells of their formats. These various kinds and types of states 
interact in the real world and continue to  construct norms and cultures of the  
international state system.
There are some benchmarks that were followed to pick the case studies. 
Generally speaking, case studies are important because the literature review and 
theoretical discussion can be employed and tested on the selected cases. The above 
section under the theme "what's the rationale?" mentioned two selected case studies 
for this research project: Myanmar (East Asia) and Pakistan (South Asia).
The criteria to select the cases w ere based on the consideration of several 
important factors. Primarily, it is im portant to mention that there are many weak and
50 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1999), 127.
51 Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," International Security 21, no. 3 (W inter 1996- 
1997): 122.
52 Julie Mostov, "Soft Borders and Thin Bonds: Citizenship and Transnational Democracy," Global Studies 
Review 2, no. 2 (2006).
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fragile states located in Africa and Latin America other than Asia. Moreover, by and 
large, African states are suffering with ultra-poverty conditions. So, the question is, why 
choose cases from Asia? Despite the harsh realities of Africa and Latin America, it should 
be acknowledged that Asia is not only the largest continent, but most importantly, it 
hosts about 60 percent of the world's population. Asia is the fastest growing region in 
the world, but at the same tim e, is a highly volatile continent ranging from the Middle  
East to Far East, and from South Asia to Central Asia. Waves of violence, global acts of 
terrorism, and desperate poor people seeking safety and security all coexist in the Asian 
hemisphere.
The second factor is the growing importance of Asia in the current century, both 
for economic and geo-strategic reasons. It is widely discussed how the twenty-first 
century is the Asian Century, and in 2011 then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
advocated in her think piece published in Foreign Policy that "the future of geopolitics 
will be decided in Asia ...[and] harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to  
American economic and strategic interests."53 Following the rising importance of Asia in 
global politics, U.S. and Western countries gradually became keen on region, and 
occasions like easing sanctions on M yanm ar and restoring diplomatic ties speaks for 
themselves. President Obama, during his historic visit to Myanm ar in November 19, 
2012, stressed the geostrategic, economic, and cultural importance of M yanm ar in the 
region. His speech at University of Yangon emphasized the importance of the country 
because of its location "at the crossroads of East and South Asia, [which] border the
53 Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Foreign Policy, no. 189 (November 11, 2011): 56-57.
most populated nations on the planet... and the ability to help determine the destiny of 
the fastest growing region of the world... [And] M yanm ar is famous for its natural 
resources, and they must be protected against exploitation."54
According to the Asian Development Bank's edited volume report, the Asian 
economy will share the global gross domestic product (GDP) to 52 percent and regain its 
economic position globally, as it had during eighteenth century before the industrial 
revolution.55 It provides the fundamental justification that state fragility in the Asian 
continent will have a severe global impact, due to Asian pivot-ness in global geopolitics. 
The growing market economy in Asia and its large population will become the largest 
consumers as well, setting an ideal place for economic activities. In addition, lately the  
debates around the "rise of China," and the "new influential" like India attracted foreign 
policy shifts towards Asia too. The Obama administration has shown its com m itm ent 
towards "pivot to Asia" policy, which intends to "rebalance" the power dynamics in the 
Asia. In October 2013, speaking at the Annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
Secretary of State John Kerry guaranteed that "there is nothing that will shake the 
commitment of the United States to the rebalance to A sia ,... which we are all a part of, 
[it] is by far the largest, the fastest-growing, and the most dynamic economic region in 
the world."56
Although Asia has become a "factory Asia ... [and] global hub for manufacturing 
and information technology services," the fact is that the "world's fastest growing
54 "Remarks by President Obama at the University of Yangon," http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- 
office/2012/11/19/remarks-president-obama-university-yangon.
55 Harinder S. Kohli, Ashok Sharma, and Anil Sood, Asia 2 0 5 0 : Realizing the Asian Century (Los Angeles: 
SAGE, 2011), 2.
56 "Remarks at the Apec Ceo Summit," h ttp ://w w w .state.gov/secretary/rem arks/2013/10/215176.htm .
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region remains home to majority of world's extrem e poor" who face complexities of 
traps.57 Be it poverty traps, geographical traps, traps of bad governance, conflict traps, 
and so on.
On strategic grounds, China is trying to revive its historical m aritim e power and 
gradually wishes to gain a leadership role in its Near Seas and possibly in Indian Ocean, 
which includes the coastal waters of the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, 
and growing presence in and around Indian Ocean vis-a-vis Arabian Ocean. China's slow 
and steady projection through putting strings of pearls in the  Near Seas and Indian 
Ocean via developing seaports in the region alarms the U.S., India, and U.S. allies in the  
region. On the other hand, China considers the twelve-nation regional trade pact called 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) a U.S. strategy of containment, while the U.S and its 
allies in the region are seeking to frame some maritime codes of conduct under 
International Law to become applicable on the Near Seas to tame growing China's 
assertiveness in the waters.58
Keeping in mind the growing influence of China, a number of accounts believe 
that "the new era of military competition in the Pacific will become the defining 
geopolitical contest of the 21st century."59 The U.S. policy o f rebalancing Asia will need 
careful consideration and, the investment of extra time and energy, though not at the  
cost of other regions like Europe. As the allies in the region consider the U.S. as a 
security guarantor, any imbalance of power structure in the region may possibly prompt
57 Asia 2050 : Realizing the Asian Century, xxiii.
58 Simon Denyer, "Kerry Worried About Asia's Sea Disputes, Citing Moves by China," Washington Post 
February 17, 2014.
59 Geoff Dyer, "Us V China: Is This the New Cold War?," Financial Times February 20, 2014.
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the Japanese and South Koreans to pursue their own nuclear program, making them  less 
dependent on external support. Therefore, the Asian case is serious in this nature to  
retain checks and balances.
The final criterion of selecting the case studies of Myanmar and Pakistan is based 
on the countries' high ranking in fragility status, and most importantly, their geopolitical 
roles in the developing scenario relevant to the Asia pivot. The geopolitical and geo­
strategic significance of the two cases qualifies them  to m eet the criteria of "weak pivot 
states." Both Myanmar and Pakistan are located directly or indirectly at the crossroads 
of interests of major and regional powers. For instance, Myanmar's geopolitical and 
economic role between the United States, China, Japan, India, and others is significant 
to consider. Similarly, the case of Pakistan portrays an important position for future  
economic and geopolitical scenarios. Pakistan has been considered an extended  
wing/arm  of the United States in the Middle East; shifting U.S. policy towards East Asia 
further signifies Pakistan's role. China's eye on the deep-sea port at Gwadar, Baluchistan 
for its future trade activities and possible use for security purposes will have a significant 
impact on rebalancing the Asian continent. India's high-energy demand for its economic 
viability will also rely on benign relations w ith Pakistan to get access to Central Asian 
and Middle Eastern oil and gas energy facilities.
Apart from the policy of the United States to  "rebalance in the Asia pivot," the  
Asian countries dream of making the twenty-first century an Asian century will only 
remain a dream if the hostile relations between Asian countries are not resolved. 
Alarmingly, three nuclear powers, China, India, and Pakistan, sit next to  each other with
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hostile memories to date. The other factors, in addition to  geography, the colonial 
legacy, praetorian society, state capacity, governance, political economy, security, and 
social issues are carefully and thoroughly discussed in the research project. It is worth  
mentioning here that the conclusions of the case studies and discussion can be 
observed and applicable to other weak pivot states located in African and Latin 
American context.
ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH
The dissertation is framed into five chapters including the introductory chapter. 
The first chapter holistically outlines state fragility and the birth of its paradigm during 
the post-Cold W ar period. The section briefly sketches the issues related to state 
fragility and its regional as well as global impacts on peace and stability. In view of 
conventional wisdom, the research agrees with general understanding about the poor 
performance of states due to their lack of political capacity and capabilities, but at the  
same tim e includes other explanations like "state death" due to geographical factors. 
Therefore, a significant part of the work is trying to  introduce the concept or category of 
weak and fragile states called "weak pivot states." To be clear, the research has already 
clarified that the discussion on state fragility in this work is actually referred to as "weak 
pivot states."
The idea of the "weak pivot state" is not familiar in or referred to in the debates 
of international relations. Recent literature talks about fragile, weak, failing, quasi-state, 
failed and collapse states for poor performing states and there is also currently enriched
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with contributions on pivot states, rising in flu en tia l, and so forth for those states with  
promising capabilities. The contribution of this project is the attem pt to blend two  
categories, i.e. weak states with their geographical pivot. Based on the categorization, 
the research question tries to seek an answer to the question 'under w hat conditions do 
fragile (weak pivot) states continue to fail?' The chapter draws a road map through the  
qualitative method, picking case studies in the next chapters to find the answer both 
from endogenous and exogenous factors involved in "decapitating" the state.
Following the road map, chapter II provides a conceptual base to understand 
statehood and state fragility. In addition, it thoroughly tracks the literature discussing 
the endogenous and exogenous factors causing the fragility. Revisiting the rich historical 
and current literature on intellectual genesis, the nature and duties of the state provides 
an intellectual depth to understand the role and responsibilities of the state. W ith  
reference to conventional argument, the traditional state was referred to as a 
"Leviathan" retaining a "monopoly of [the] use of violence" to project a symbol of law  
and maintain order in society against the "Behemoth," a symbol of lawlessness and 
disorder. In fact, in many ways, today's fragile states show symptoms of being a 
"Behemoth."
The theoretical prism of chapter II highlighted the administrative and 
institutional limitations and origins, due to colonial legacies, poor governance, 
kleptocracies, inability to accommodate political participation, prolonged military rule, 
ethno-religious violence, and geographic factors. The political, security, economic, and 
social indicators of state fragility shows that states are weak due to various traps, i.e.
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"the conflict trap, the poverty trap, the natural resources trap, the trap of being 
landlocked with bad neighbors, and the trap of bad governance." Some of these traps 
are situational and some inherent. Situational traps can be overcome w ith improvement 
through socio-political and economic transitions, but inherent ones are almost 
permanent and challenging to handle. Stewart Patrick (2011) and Jean-Germain Gros 
(1996) have vividly drawn the trajectories and taxonomy of state fragility, which makes 
it easier to test and apply various situations in categories.
Chapter III and chapter IV are the case studies presented on M yanm ar and 
Pakistan. Two cases have been done with major discussion following the roadmap 
drawn earlier and analysis of the indicators of fragility. The discussion looked through 
factual and chronological ways to analyze political development since the colonization 
period to the most recent time period, validating the argument of "path dependency." 
The two cases are unique for many similarities as both enjoyed a colonial tim e period 
under British rule and inherited much of the British military and bureaucratic structures. 
Both Myanmar and Pakistan witnessed prolonged military rule undermining civilian rule.
The praetorian oligarchy became powerful in the tw o states, which have 
gradually shifted their interests into the business sector to own much of the land, 
resources, and industrial units, other than higher annual defense budget. Though the  
patterns and mechanism of military interventions and policies in both countries are 
similar on larger scale, the military orientation is different because Myanm ar's military 
(Tatmadaw) was established to liberated Myanm ar from foreign occupation, which later 
suppressed other ethnic minorities. By contrast, Pakistan's military was raised as a
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British Colonial force, which was later inherited by India and Pakistan after their 
creation. The creation of the British colonial force was on racial grounds, as in Myanm ar 
it ignored the majority of Burmans and recruited minorities into the force. On the Indo- 
Pak sub-continent, the phenomena of martial race picked Punjabi and Pashtun Muslims 
from  today's Pakistani side and Punjab's Sikh from India side. In both cases the racial 
oriented militaries left the scars of a social divide in the post-colonial period still 
affecting the states today.
In addition, the bad governance and high level of corruption affected the states' 
political capabilities. In Pakistan's case, family dynastic politics rule has been one factor 
that caused bad governance and made political compromises with undemocratic forces. 
The argument suggests that with these undemocratic processes undermining the 
political development over a period of time, the result in Myanm ar is an "armored 
democracy," while Pakistan is a "compromised democracy" between civil-military 
oligarchies.
The case studies also elaborate in detail the geopolitical and geo-strategic 
importance of both states and identify the nature of regional and global interests in the 
region. China and India are the main contending regional players seeking their best bids 
and bets over Myanmar and Pakistan, while Japan is a secondary regional player. The 
U.S. and its allies brings a global dimension to the study.
Finally, chapter V is based on a comparative analysis and conclusion discussing 
the two assumptions based on endogenous (lack of state capacity) and exogenous 
(geopolitics) factors, recalling the discussions on the conceptual fram ework and
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evidence displayed in case studies. First, the study objects to  the idea which believes 
state fragility or related explanations are a recent origin. The research has already 
undertaken various historical studies or explanations about weak societies, small states, 
and small power that show that fragility always remained in international relations. 
However, the research endorses the fear that regional and global insecurities are much 
higher due to higher levels of interconnectedness, which was not the case in earlier 
epochs.
Second, the study also observed that various studies suggested different ways to 
tackle the problem of fragility through military, economic or democratic interventions, 
while interventions always suffered mostly due to  issues of sovereignty. Setting aside 
the strengths, weaknesses, successes, and failures of interventions, the study makes a 
claim that the economic aid to support these fragile societies did not work properly, as it 
had been thought. Why? The political elites in weak societies manipulate the traditional 
duty of state, which is the "extraction of resources" through taxation, and in return of 
taxation, state should guarantee the safeguarding of basic rights and the wellbeing of 
citizens on equal grounds. However, in weak and fragile societies, where political 
corruption is rampant, political elites know exactly how to extract local resources 
through taxation, but at the same time and following domestic patterns of extractions, 
political elites "extract foreign resources and aids" which in most cases goes directly to 
their personal benefits.
The other crucial conclusion is the state enforced or indirectly constructed 
narrative that threatens the equal rights and protection of minorities. In Myanmar,
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religious minorities fear the revival of Buddhist nationalism, and in Pakistan the  
deliberate usage of blasphemy law to seek political victimization of the minorities or 
political oppositions, which undermines the prospects of democratic transitions 
happening in both countries. Therefore the indoctrination of religious and ethnic based 
narratives later is causing insecurity in the form of terrorism and ethno-nationalistic 
hostilities. Interestingly, most of the security challenges in the two case studies resides 
in areas where minorities are larger in number, and they hold more resourceful 
geographic locations within their respective countries. Geopolitically, w ith the rapidly 
gripping notion of the Asia pivot and rising regional in flu en tia l with geopolitical 
interests now know that the best bid to safeguard the interests of powers is to  extend 
their support to "praetorian-guards," who are ruling these countries and will eventually 
set back the prospect of future democratization processes. Therefore, future stability 
and peace is certainly linked with taming fragile conditions through facilitating a vibrant 
civil society to establish a political culture based on inclusive and pluralistic democratic 
norms. In addition, on the regional and global scale, creating "spheres of socialization" 
can engage these weak and fragile societies to interact at a higher frequency, make 
them learn the evolving global norms, and help them  to assimilate, accommodate, and 
integrate into the global system. This will ensure the best pay off for all players, without 
risking the interests of others.
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CHAPTER II
UNDERSTANDING STATEHOOD AND STATE FRAGILITY
After ha lf a century o f imperial rollback and exaggerated warnings o f 
neoimperialist resurgence, postcolonial sovereignty ceases to be a historical 
entitlement: it must be earned again -  and again by quasi or contingent states 
that the form er imperial powers created in error fo r  their own gains and  
convenience, and around a religion, a clan, a tribe, a dynasty, or even fo r  an 
army. Lacking legitimacy a t birth, these fractured countries are a t the mercy o f  
centrifugal forces that pull them apart and which the state cannot m anage or 
fix.
Simon Serfaty 1
In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States' 
safety and security-a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist a tta c k -  
are likely to emanate from  states that cannot adequately govern themselves or 
secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in 
many ways, the main security challenge o f our time.
Robert M. Gates, Former Secretary o f Defense 2
The strength of statehood is dependent on the political capacity of a state. The 
effective political capacity of a state helps to maintain a viable and effective 
relationship between intra- and inter-state levels. However, the stability and smooth 
political functioning of a state relies primarily on its domestic performance. Thus, the  
higher the synchronized nature of the relationship at an intra-state (state and society) 
level, the higher the probability of keeping state subjects in control, obeying the rule of 
law, and norming the accountable governance system performing under a legitimate 
political order or authority. Eventually, this process advances towards a durable
1 Serfaty, A World Recast: An American M om ent in a Post-Western Order, 73.
2 Robert M . Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance," Foreign 
Affairs 89, no. 3 (May/Jun 2010).
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political development of society, which plays a significant role in strengthening a state's 
political capacity vis-a-vis establishing an effective political system. The differences 
between the performance of political institutions and the political capacity of strong 
democracies and authoritarian regimes are clear.3 For instance, many weak states are 
characterized by "aliberal (illiberal forms of governability) and authoritarian" (despotic) 
rule, which become predatory of their own masses."4
STATE: A LEGITIMATE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE
Understanding the state or statehood in a highly interconnected world is not 
the same as it was during the Westphalian era. The early shape of states was portrayed 
through the writings of Thomas Hobbes' in his work Leviathan, which referred to the  
state, the most powerful political entity, as sovereign and holding a centralized 
administrative control of a given territory.5 This earlier notion set rules for political 
thinkers to define the state and seek the "duties of state," its role, and its relation with  
society.6 Over a period of tim e, the state evolved through its dual responsibility of 
domestic "pacification and external warfare," and lately, the nature of state-society 
relations has been further transformed.7 The transformative episodes proclaim that the
3 Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler, Political Capacity and Economic Behavior (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1997), 11.
4 Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, Governing the Global Polity: Practice, Mentality, Rationality 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 177.
5 Thomas Hobbes and E. M . Curley, Leviathan : With Selected Variants from  the Latin Edition o f 1668  
(Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1994), 3-5.
6 See, "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States," Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/pl5897.
7 Louise Andersen, Bjprn Mpller, and Finn Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, 
Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 7.
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states are gradually transformed into modern or post-modern states with new  
obligations. New obligations mean the state has become significantly accountable, 
both at domestic and global levels, to politically informed (awakened) citizens' vis-a-vis 
to institutions as contrasted to traditional functions of the state. Aligning w ith new  
realities, the modern or post-modern states become flexible, and notably the nature of 
state capacities shifts to cope with changing patterns and complex political dynamics.
In a period of complex interdependence, historicizing and conceptualizing the  
state is a complicated task to undertake. Yet, the exercise helps to develop a better 
understanding about the fragility of states when looking at the formation, 
sustainability, or political decay of institutions in modern states. In this regard, the  
notion of nation-state is perceived through various perspectives as an abstract, 
ideational form, and its objectives are explained depending on various forms of states. 
In the early years of the conceptual development o f state discourse, the state is viewed 
as bound between its authority and subjects or "image and practices."8 Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), and John Locke (1632-1704) 
referred to this bond as "social contract/ social compact."9
8 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society : Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
Another (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 16. Migdal explains that the '(1) 
image and (2) practices' shape the state, while holistically portraying the state formation. Migdal puts it 
as "(1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the  
people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts."
In addition, According to Buzan, the "Conception o f state in terms of territory/population  
(body) and socio-political character (mind)" that helps to understand the nature and behavior of state. 
Buzan further insists that the "States must have a physical base of pollution and territory; they must 
have institutions of some sort which govern the physical base; and there must be some idea of state 
which establishes its legitimacy in the minds of its people", see, Buzan, People, States, and F e a r: An 
Agenda fo r International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W ar Era, 68-71.
9 The concept of social contract provided some early stage intellectual explanation to understand the  
ideational essence of state. A Hobbesian understanding of social contract refers to a human's natural
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As a reality, "the state as normative order" persistently engages in a
"pathological homogenization" or "ethnification" of its "imagined communities," in
order to retain a "symbiotic" relationship with society to assert its legitimacy and seek
"obedience" from its subjects.10 Barrington Moore (1966), Theda Skocpol (1979), Atul
Kohli (1986), Charles Tilly (1992), Michael Mann (1993), and Joel Migdal (1988, 2001)
have contributed extensive explanation of the dynamics of state structure, state
power, and its relationship with society. As a broader consensus, an understanding can
be traced to Charles Tilly's (1970) definition of state, as it:
"... controls population occupying a defined territory is a state in so far as 1) it is 
differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; 2) it is 
autonomous; 3) it is centralized; and 4) its divisions are formally coordinated 
with one another."11
Hence, statehood can be depicted through "collectivities of officials" that
tendency of seeking personal interest, which provides a base for a contract with the state, which seeks 
to fulfill those interests. In contrast, Rousseau agrees that the state is to  provide basic common goods to 
the citizen in return for social contracts, which legitimizes the state's authority. In addition, Locke further 
supports the state's duty to protect the natural rights o f the citizen’s part of the contract. Thomas Franck 
explains the social contract through the Hobbesian understanding that it is an "imagine[d] contract 
between person in the state of nature intends to provide the parties with such benefits as security of 
person and property," so the contract safeguards the allegiance between state and society, see Thomas 
M . Franck, The Power o f Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 8.
10 Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," 
Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (Jan 1984): 224; Heather Rae, State Identities and the Homogenisation o f 
Peoples, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14; 
Philip Roeder writes that the nation-states try to "ethnify the nation, that to, propagate a myth of 
common origin", which actually justifies a legitimate popular plebiscite in favor of the existence of 
nation. See, Philip G. Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From : Institutional Change in the Age o f  
Nationalism  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 31; Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism, Rev. and extended ed. (London ; New 
York: Verso, 1991), 6.Anderson refers imagined communities to nation because, the "members of even 
the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, m eet them, or even hear of them , yet 
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion; Crispin Sartwell, Against the State : An 
Introduction to Anarchist Political Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 24; 
Obedience means, state seek allegiance from the citizens and state can get it through coercive and 
voluntary ways. For more explanation, see in Harold Joseph Laski, Authority in the Modern State 
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968), 32-42.
11 Charles Tilly, The Formation o f National States in Western Europe, Studies in Political Development 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 70.
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enable the "capacities of state" to achieve its goals, specifically from the "actual or 
potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant 
socioeconomic circumstances."12 This practice justifies the idea that "states are 
founded on forces," while it establishes statehood in a defined territory through 
"compulsory political association with continuous organization ... and its administrative 
staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate force in 
enforcement of its orders."13 In successful conditions, the state first becomes efficient 
in "the authoritative allocation of social values" and then enjoys the "enforcement of 
order through institutionalizing" the social and political pow er.14 The reason that the  
state establishes an "institutionalize^] political power" is because it helps the 
"governmental institutions of coercion to maintain a stratified social order."15
Gianfranco Poggi (2001) writes that "if the political power is to act as guardian 
of the social order" then it has to institutionalize that power.16 It further provides a 
legitimate base to hold the monopoly of violence as well as to enforce "the 
effectiveness of the political arrangements."17 According to Gianfranco Poggi, three  
processes are involved in the "institutionalization of political power," namely,
12 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge 
Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 9.
13 Max W eber and John Dreijmanis, M ax Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations 
(New York: Algora Pub., 2008), 156; Max Weber, A. M . Henderson, and Talcott Parsons, The Theory o f 
Social and Economic Organization, 1st American ed. (New York: The Free Press; Oxford University Press, 
1947), 154.
14 David Easton, The Political System, an Inquiry into the State o f Political Science, 1st ed. (New York,: 
Knopf, 1953), 129; Gianfranco Poggi, Forms o f Power (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity Press ; Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001), 4-18.
15 Forms of Power, 29; R. Brian Ferguson, The State, identity and Violence : Political Disintegration in the 
Post-Cold War World (London ; New York: Routledge, 2003), 9.
16 Poggi, Forms o f Power, 42.
17 Ibid.
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"depersonalization (power no longer stays with one person as decisive force), 
formalization ("the exercise of power becomes more oriented to rules, procedural 
arrangements, rituals"), and finally the integrated (codified norms and rules become 
"increasingly integrated into broader, encompassing order") power relationships."18 
Eventually robust codified procedural arrangements can deliver better political goods 
to citizens, strengthen statehood, and enhance the political capacity of the state itself 
to protect its subjects.
In contemporary world politics, the democratic and stable states have 
successfully institutionalized political capacity, while weaker ones struggle with  
formalizing the process. In a broader sense, George Sorenson (2005) has identified  
some features of states, such as functions of government, nationhood, and economy of 
stable or successful (post-modern states) and weak states, presented in table 1. 
Empirical evidence shows that successful states have achieved higher levels of 
transparency in governance, nationhoods with collective loyalty in mind, and vibrant 
economies to sustain the smooth functioning of the  state. Weak states are hampered  
by inefficient and corrupt institutional orders that are further weakened by the 
domination of diverse ethnic or religious communities, resulting in diverse groups 
extending their support and loyalty to their own ethnicities or religious affinities.
The fragile nationhood scenarios develop favorable conditions for dominant 
ethnic or religious groups to attain sway over state power. Ethnic and religious divides 
draw power struggles on the basis of majority and minority; unfortunately, in weak
18 Ibid.
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states, minorities are always the target of "discrimination and victimization."19 it is 
important to take into account that the politics of ethnic and religious divisions also 
occur in stable and highly democratic states; however, weak and undemocratic states 
experience the "deadly outcome" of these divides.20 For instance, during the 1990s, the 
Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups engaged in mass scale genocide in Rwanda, Burmese 
nationalists persecuted non-Burmese ethnicities, and Pashtun and non-Pashtun civil 
war erupted in post-Soviet Afghanistan. These are considerable examples which echo 
that ethno-nationalism significantly weakens statehood on the one hand, while on the  
other side the "minority or suffering ethnicities feel their right to spark ethno- 
nationalistic fervors to protect their rights" dwelling in a fragile but "imperial state."21 
The challenge of fragile statehood is missing phenomena of unified nationhood, which 
means weak and fragile states are continuously in search and making of a unified 
nationhood.22 As a m atter of fact, creating a common identity as a nation is becoming 
more complicated in recent years than it would have been perceived in an earlier pre- 
and post-decolonization period. This is because, multi-ethnic nation states in the  
developing world are failing to accommodate and assimilate minority groups through 
developing inclusive political culture, and are, rather, adopting exclusive policies
19 Rita Manchanda, States in Conflict with Their Minorities : Challenges to Minority Rights in South Asia 
(New Delhi, India ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2010), 15.
20 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 144-45.
21 Nil S. Satana, Molly Inman, and Johanna Kristin Birnir, "Religion, Government Coalitions, and 
Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 1 (2013): 32; Buzan, People, States, and F e a r: An 
Agenda fo r  International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W ar Era, 78.
22 Paul James, Nation Formation : Towards a Theory o f Abstract Community (London ; Thousand Oaks, 
Calif.: Sage, 1996), 14-15.
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undermining the rights of minorities.23 Despite the complexity of political situations in 
weak states, a sincere political effort can help weak states to mend their problems. At 
an initial stage, humanitarian-based interventions involving international regimes (such 
as the UN) could coerce and help in resolving the "state-minority conflicts and 
strengthen ethno-cultural pluralism."24 At a later stage, they could m otivate ruling 
elites in weak states to show their viable com m itm ent towards democratizing the  
system of governance, which possibly requires "guardianship" by the international 
community in extreme cases e.g. Somalia and Afghanistan.25 The nature of 
guardianship may also act as a "surrogate sovereign," if a weak state is on the verge of 
a complete breakdown, so the zones of weakness in a state can be fixed.26
23 Harris Mylonas, The Politics o f Nation-Building : Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities (New  
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 21-22.
24 Stephen D. Krasner and Daniel T. Froats, "Minority Rights and the Westphalian Model," in The 
International Spread o f Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake and Donald 
Rothchild (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 250.
25 Amry Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," The Journal o f 
Politics 26, no. 2 (May 1964): 296.
26 peter Lyon, "The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship," The Journal o f  
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 31, no. 1 (March 1993): 106.
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Table 1: Modern, Postmodern, and Postcolonial Weak States
Government
Nationhood
• - ' ■ / . i s
The
A centralized system 
of democratic rule, 
based on a set of 
administrative, 
policing, and military 
organizations, 
sanctioned by a legal 
order, claiming a 
monopoly of the  
legitimate use of 
force, all within a 
defined territory
Theftost-Modern
State
Multilevel
governance in several 
interlocked arenas 
overlapping each 
other. Governance in 
context of 
supranational, 
international, trans- 
governmental, and 
transnational 
relations.
Supranational
|jte  Weak, PostcolowaB 
States
Inefficient and corrupt 
administrative and 
institutional structures. 
Rule based on coercion 
rather than the rule of 
law. Monopoly on the 
legitimate use of 
violence not 
established.
'Predominance of local/
rV '-ie^omiCTi
S § i5 Ii
Economy
r * ' : -'-togetner.
A segregated 
national economy, 
self-sustained in the 
sense that it 
comprises the main 
sectors needed for 
its reproduction. 
The majority part of 
economic activity 
takes place at 
home.
laway 
•%|i^ iJfeestate.
Deep integration: 
the major part of 
economic activity is 
embedded in cross- 
border networks. 
The national 
economy is much 
less self-sustained 
than it used to be.
-level of state  
legitim acy.
Incoherent 
amalgamations of 
traditional agriculture, 
an informal petty urban 
sector, and some 
fragments of modern 
industry. Significant 
dependence on the  
world market and on 
external economic 
interests.
Source: George Sorenson, State Transformation and New Security Dilemmas, 85-89.
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While making a comparison between strong and w eak states, it is im portant to 
note 'institutionalized' state capacities and legitimacies of political order that enforce 
and retain the bond between the state's image and practices. In addition, the  
geographic location and resources of the state will provide a valued addition to 
determ ine the pivot-ness of the state.27 It consolidates a balanced viewpoint to 
understand endogenous and exogenous factors causing state fragility.
As mentioned earlier, states, whether strong or weak, still hold the position as 
primary unit among other potential components o f the international system.28 
However, it is necessary to  remember that in the post-Second World W ar period, a 
gradual shift shows that "power is decentralized, the once homogenous system is 
broken down into a number of subsystems, the number of actors is large, and the  
factors determining their policies are innumerable."29 Therefore, the recurrence of 
transformative global political episodes, their sequences, and significantly, their 
relationships, has changed the nature of states as well. Specifically, during the late 
tw entieth century, most of the debate has been focused around the role and future of 
the state. The political debates paid less attention to issues of weak and fragile states 
or issues of post-conflict development in warring societies centered in the Third World.
In the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, democracies rejoiced and 
announced the end of history; however, some scholars proposed new security agendas,
27 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 51.
28 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1962), 4-24; Gabriel A Almond, "The Return to the State," The American Political Science Review 
82, no. 3 (Sep. 1988): 856.
29 Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles; or, the Setting o f American Foreign Policy, 1st ed. (New York: 
Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill, 1968), 57.
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such as Samuel Huntington's (1992) 'Clash o f Civilizations/ believing future problems 
would emerge from  cultural differences. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner (1992-1993) 
suggested that failed states would become a high priority on the security agenda, and 
Robert Kaplan's (1994) alarmist work 'The Coming Anarchy' suggested an outlook 
towards the environment, stating that resources and over-population would potentially 
trigger security dilemmas.
The post-Cold W ar era is considered an "age of optimism;" however, the tragic 
events of September 11th 2001 shook the confidence of optimism with new waves of 
security threats.30 Also following were "political anxieties," particularly with the 
"erosion of rule of law" in many weak states.31 Gideon Rachman (2011) emphasized 
four new forces that determine future security agendas. First, global political problems 
emanate from a variety of common issue areas; these are the environmental issues of 
climate change, terrorism, economic recession, or stagnation. Second, the weak and 
controversial global governance system hampers resolving global political problems. 
Third, the gaining momentum and renewed confidence of authoritarian powers is 
another challenge, specifically backed by Russia and China. Finally, there are an 
increasing number of failed states with non-traditional threats rooted in failed 
societies.32 Failed societies are more susceptible to adopting authoritarian forms of 
governance, becoming ideal places for terrorists to reside, proliferate chemical and
30 Gideon Rachman, Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age o f Anxiety, 1st Simon & Schuster 
hardcover ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 174.
31 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rder: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 4.
32 Rachman, Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age o f Anxiety, 174.
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nuclear weapons, and present poor economic activity that all together lead to  
humanitarian crises and human rights violations.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, policy makers and academics started to  
seriously investigate the proposed alarming and complex issue areas highlighted above. 
Initially, the notion of state failure did not gather momentum; nevertheless, when the 
traumatic events of 9 /11  shocked the global community, the realization that policy 
makers and the international community now faced an unprecedented type of threat 
from non-conventional structures of transnational elements elicited renewed interest 
in the subject.33 Therefore, the psychological and emotional fear was obvious, because 
no one knew the severity of transnational threats of stateless forces and the effects of 
a state failure. Even if one asked a layperson to list the countries "most geopolitically 
irrelevant to our interests because of their being so remote, poor, and weak, the list 
would surely have begun with Afghanistan and Somalia ... [BUT] today the world no 
longer faces just the circumscribed risk of an Easter Island society or Maya homeland 
collapsing in isolation, w ithout affecting the rest of the world."34 The effects have 
multiple dimensions and political, economic, and social implications. At political scale, 
after the horrific events of 9 /11 , transnational threats stemming from weak and fragile 
states gripped many parts of the world with new modes of violence, specifically linked 
to terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. The economic cost of transnational threats 
after 9 /11  has soared. In 2012, the cost of dealing with violent insecurities across the
33 Andersen, M ille r , and Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, Security, and 
Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, 16.
34 Jared M. Diamond, Collapse : How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Penguin Books, 
2006), 519.
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world reached to $9.45 trillion, which is 11% of global GDP. Subsequently, the notion of 
fragile states reached a crescendo and it quickly came under the radar of the global 
community to deal with the issue of state fragility with urgency.
This research section develops an understanding about the challenges to 
statehood prevalent in the fragility of states through a theoretical prism, which paves 
the way to identify and assess the existing gaps in the administrative and institutional 
structures of weak and fragile states. Many of these gaps are linked to colonial legacies, 
while many of the problems are linked to domestic governance issues; highly 
corrupted, centralized political structures are especially troubling factors in weak 
states. It further seeks to explain how the widening structural gaps turn weak and 
fragile states into decapitated states with higher institutional ineffectiveness and 
incompetency in governance. In addition, the impact of institutional fracturedness 
within weak states answer the question 'why does it m atter?' In this regard, the core 
theoretical framework and explanations are developed and derived from  theories on 
weak and fragile states, political order with reference to governability, political 
capacity, political capability with reference to political economy of weak states, and 
geopolitical approaches with reference to the concept of the resource curse and geo­
strategy.
The theoretical framework is categorized into two parts. The first part primarily 
builds on the literature on weak and fragile states, which provides a base to  understand 
under what conditions weak or fragile states continue to fail or become fractured  
within. The second part of the theoretical literature provides a ladder or tool towards
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fixing the state fragility to tackle issues such as economic stagnation, endemic 
corruption, political instability, weak institutions, and social conflicts (due to a polarized 
socially structured society). The entire exercise helps in understanding, explaining, and 
extrapolating the research agenda, significantly contributing to the field of study.
ORIGIN AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF STATE FRAGILITY
In this study fragility is actually referred to as the 'weak pivot states;' like 
others, weak pivot states also potentially face the challenges of state fragility or quasi­
states in contrast to completely failed or collapsed ones. They are weak and fragile 
because their political institutions are fractured or ineffective to deliver political goods, 
and their societies are highly polarized by deep fragmentation within the nationhood.35 
Significantly, they are 'pivot' due to the geo-strategic and geopolitical importance of 
their location or resources, which are lacking in many other weak and fragile states. In 
general, while the outcome of state failure is the same, whether a weak state is a pivot 
or not, but the impact factor is significantly different in both cases.
If weak states were placed in a continuum and facing challenges of state 
fragility, they could be demoted to a "Fourth World" category from their current 
placement in the Third World grouping.36 The origin of fragile states is not new. 
Throughout history states have faced domestic challenges, regional issues, and 
international pressures that eventually posed political deadlocks. In a few  accounts,
35 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 180.
36 Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, 
Liberia,Rwanda and Haiti," 455.
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nature driven factors, such as floods, earthquake, hurricanes, etc. beyond human 
control, have also raised existential threats to various societies. Hence, societies have 
suffered with both "man-made" factors as well as "nature made" factors like ecocide 
(polluting the environment).37 History demonstrates the diverse experiences "of a 
society's birth, growth, peak, senescence, and death" that continues on a constant 
basis.38
A weak state demonstrates an inability to tackle the  duties and challenges of 
statehood. Such a lack of ability causes cracks within its political institutions and 
subsequently weakens the state's political capacity to retain its authority. A num ber of 
political historians, scholars, and analysts like Paul Kennedy (1987), Jared Diamond 
(2006), and Peter Turchin (2003) explain the rise and failure of societies, governments, 
and even stronger empires that have met a similar fate. In recent times, specifically 
during the post-Cold War, the global community has been exposed to non-traditional 
and unpredictable challenges and security threats.
In a way, these non-traditional security threats either stem from non-state or 
'stateless'39 actors (more likely residing in fragile states) or from the contagious effects 
of state fragility itself that pose threats to the rest by creating "bad neighborhoods"40 
that end up becoming "ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned"41 spaces. Alarming 
situations emerge once territorial integrity becomes "politically disordered," gradually
37 Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time o f Terror, 22; Diamond, Collapse : How Societies 
Choose to Fail or Succeed, 7-8.
38 Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, 6.
39 Jakub Grygiel, "The Power of Statelessness," Policy Review, no. 154 (Apr/May 2009): 35.
40 Michael Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," Dissent 49, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 117.
41 Patrick, Weak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 5.
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shattering the bounding features of statehood.42 Ungoverned social spaces are "social, 
political, and economic arenas where states do not exercise effective sovereignty or 
where state control is absent, weak, or contested."43 Hence, the fragile statehood of 
weak states provides fertile ground for non-state or stateless actors to use 
geographical spaces to thrive, reside, and act against host states vis-a-vis foreign 
territories, because of the weak states' "deficit in the efficacious display of state 
power."44
Furthermore, the vulnerability and sensitivity of fragile statehood potentially  
triggers regional and domestic conflicts. Some of these conflicts are witnessed in Africa 
stemming from ethno-nationalistic fervor, which led to mass genocides and human 
rights violations during the 1990s. The ethnic conflicts in Myanmar, Rwanda, Bosnia, 
and Afghanistan raised the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee 
issues which led to mounting political and socio-economic burdens on neighboring 
countries.
The origin of the concept and the acute nature of the political problem of a 
state's fragility in today's world can be linked to original work of Gerald B. Helman and 
Steven R. Ratner. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner coined for the first tim e the 
terminology "failed states" in their article "Saving Failed States," published in late 1992. 
The article emphasized that many of the newly independent states which colonization 
had left with "no tradition of statehood or practice in self-government" ... showed a
42 Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces : Alternatives to State Authority in an Era 
of Softened Sovereignty (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 17.
43 Ibid.
44 Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia,
Liberia,Rwanda and Haiti," 458.
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"lack of experience in government, weak civic institutions, limited economic prospects, 
and ethnic strife," making them  fragile and possibly failed societies.45 Over the years, in 
most cases their com m itm ent to govern themselves gradually decayed, and they  
became 'client states'46 to look for their day-to-day survivability and to resist any move 
towards de-recognition of statehood. Interestingly, in some cases like Myanm ar, if a 
weak state holds a pivotal geostrategic location, and retains client state status, then  
geography becomes a burden. In contrast, if a weak state gradually improves its status 
then the state can enjoy the "power of the weak" as leverage over other influential 
states.47 For example, the Cold W ar, the Vietnam W ar, and the Afghan W ar 
demonstrated that the "power of the weak" developed a harsh, but negotiated order 
between weak states and superpowers.48
Early works by Arnold Wolfers (1962), Robert Rothstein (1968, 1977), Thomas 
Franck (1968), Marshall Singer (1972), Michael Handel (1981), Robert H. Jackson and 
Carl G. Rosberg (1986), and Joel Migdal (1988) help conceptualize the phenomena of 
fragility and fracturedness within the framework of weak and fragile states. These early 
academic contributions further noted the domestic problems of weak states and also 
the weak diplomatic positioning of these states in the international system. Moreover, 
in later years, the significant contributions by Robert Jackson (1987, 1990), I. William
45 Helman and Ratner, "Saving Failed States," 5.
46 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 41 ,132-33 .
47 Arnold Wolfers emphasized that most likely the weak but geo-strategically im portant countries enjoy 
some political leverage in world politics, e.g. during Cold W ar period, Cuba and Albania retained an 
advantage over great powers; therefore, the "power of the weak stems from the relationships among 
the great powers themselves". See, Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, 
111.
48 Serfaty, A World Recast: An American M om ent in a Post-Western Order, 21.
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Zartman (1995), Jean-Germain Gros (1996), Jeffrey Ira Herbst (2000), Antony G.
Hopkins (2000), Robert I. Rotberg (2003, 2004), and Seth D. Kaplan (2008) significantly 
provided an intellectual base that has outlined the basic indicators required for 
effectively performing states. The literature helps to  categorize and develop taxonomy 
of troubling states and puts forward lessons learned from these weak societies to seek 
viable solutions.
From the outset, it has remained a daunting challenge to define, categorize, and
draw a clear distinction between various categories of weak states. Similarly, in
retrospect and broadly speaking, the major and small powers phenomena or
categorization remain in usage instead of strong and weak states. Small powers were
considered relatively weaker compared to major powers due to insufficient capabilities
in retaining social cohesion and in deterring major external threats. Robert L. Rothstein
(1968) developed an acceptable definition for small powers that in many ways can be
applicable to today's weak or fragile states too. The author defines small power as:
"... a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its 
own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, 
institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the small power's belief in its 
inability to rely on its own must be recognized by the other states involved in 
international politics."49
Similarly, the literature shows that the small states also share some 
commonalities with small powers. Primary among them is being insufficient in power 
capabilities, which frequently encounters a small state with a sense of inferiority at the  
systemic level. Amry Vandenbosch (1964) portrays small states with following quote:
49 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29.
53
"A small state is a vacuum in a high pressure area. It does not live because of its 
strength but because nobody wants its territory, or because its preservation as 
a buffer state or as a weight in the balance of power is of interest to a stronger 
nation. W hen the balance disappears, the small state usually disappears with 
it."50
In these circumstances, weak positioned small powers or states ideally look for 
"neutrality" or "non-aligned movement," as they are arguably incapable o f resisting 
any coercive attem pt by much powerful states.51 As an instance, before W orld W ar II, 
Belgium ensured its neutrality from then great powers. W hile, India during its early 
years of independence preferred to join the non-aligned movement as a more 
attractive policy to secure its survivability. Those weak states, which realized neutrality 
is an inexpedient option in Realpolitik and "wish to survive," dare to come out of 
neutrality because the weak states "are more preoccupied with survival."52 In most 
cases, the decision to say farewell to neutrality forced small states or powers to 
bandwagon with great powers in order to accrue their relative power capabilities 
against their archrivals. Many weak states enjoyed the support of major powers while 
balancing their archrivals, and it is a win-win situation for both weaker and stronger 
states. Note, the dynamics of weak and strong states in global political systems 
revolves around balancing, buffering and bandwagoning.
The established relationship between weak or fragile states and strong states is 
usually an asymmetrical power relationship. The general understanding about weak 
and fragile states is that they opt to bandwagon, because the anarchic nature of
50 Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," 294-95.
51 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 243.
52 Kenneth Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 54; 
Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own 
Backyard," British Journal o f Political Science 25, no. 2 (1995): 175.
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systemic pressure prompts them to do so. In contrast, weaker states are rational actors 
too; despite fragile and weak conditions, weaker states rationally calculate the  
available options to maximize the gains. In this regard, weaker states also try best to  
exploit the interests of great powers and develop bargaining options. These 
bandwagoning bargains become "bandwagoning for profits," as the stronger states, 
driven by the desire to avoid losses, are more interested in balancing, while the weaker 
states are comfortable with bandwagoning, which provides maximum opportunity for 
gain.53
It is witnessed during the Cold W ar period that Pakistan allied with the United 
States, which helped Pakistan to balance India through acquiring military and economic 
support. In a way, Pakistan's status as a weak state during its time of birth maximized 
its gains while offering to protect U.S interests to contain communism in the region. 
Observing these historical guidelines, w ithout external support and alliances for 
security arrangements, a weak state trying to exert power is like "the mouse that 
roared" in real world scenarios.54 Finally, there are few states advocating for liberal- 
institutionalism to safeguard their interests under systemic pressures. These 
institutionalists heavily rely on the support of a "super-leviathan" or take shelter under 
the umbrella of international organizations, e.g. UN, NATO, Warsaw Pact, EU, AU,
53 Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International 
Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 74.
54 Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World o f Powers: The Dynamics o f International Relationships 
(New York,: Free Press, 1972), 368.
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ASEAN, etc., for legal protections provided through a "negotiated order, bargaining 
order, or imposed order" of "international regimes."55
Recent studies have led to overlaps when analyzing the weak states category 
because the notion of weak states itself is discussed under a number of titles, such as 
small states, fragile states, quasi-states, failing states, failed states, and so forth. In 
some cases, malfunctioning and human rights-abusing weak states are considered 
rogue states, praetorian states, garrison states, or predatory states as well. Therefore, 
there is a blurred distinction between vaguely used phenomena in the literature. In 
addition, each study undertakes different parameters to judge the strength and 
capacity of a state. On the one hand, the procedure provides multiple criteria to  
understand and evaluate diverse cases of contemporary weak states, but on the other 
hand, it fails to develop an agreeable path to tackle the problems of weak states or 
generalize the issue area. Similarly, it is hard to suggest any generalized description for 
all fragile states, because there are many factors that contribute to determining  
fragility, and each case study has its own uniqueness. However, this study inculcates 
various distinctive explanations into one comprehensive study for an in-depth 
understanding and prescribes some fundamental guidelines to improve the fragile 
conditions of weak states.
55 Hoffmann explains that there is no super power above states due to the absence of a super-leviathan, 
which means the absence of formalized international norms and values, which may retain anarchic 
realities of world politics. See, Stanley Hoffmann, Chaos and Violence : What Globalization, Failed States, 
and Terrorism Mean fo r U.S. Foreign Policy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield 2006), 43; Oran R. 
Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall o f International Regimes," in International Regimes, ed. 
Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 99-101; Stephen D. Krasner, International 
Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 36-39.
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Despite the variation in titling the subject matter, it is understandable that 
weak states can be distinct from strong or successful states on the basis of 
psychological and material grounds. On that note, most of the explanations on the 
subject affirm that the weakness of states means a substantial lack of effectiveness in 
mobilizing its tangible and intangible factors of power in contrast to stable ones. This 
means the "major components (tangible) of power were considered to  be wealth, 
organization, and status," while weak states considerably lack them or are not fully 
capable of harnessing them .56 According to Kenneth Waltz, the differentiations 
between strong and weak are based on "power capabilities," which require every state 
to behave under anarchic conditions to follow "self-help or decline and perish."57 
Subsequently, a state's lack of economic, military and diplomatic power also weakens 
its international posture among global members as an effective unit to enforce its 
persuasive diplomatic agenda.58
Similarly, at the domestic level, the "scope" of state empowers state institutions 
to enforce the rule of law in order to retain a legitimate monopoly of power.59 The 
rationale of the state's legitimacy is linked to "the state's unique ability to provide a 
territorially-centralised form of organization."60 Therefore it becomes possible through
56 Singer, Weak States in a World o f Powers: The Dynamics o f  International Relationships, 368.
57 John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 23.
58 Singer, Weak States in a World o f Powers: The Dynamics o f International Relationships, 73; 
Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," 302.
59 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 2004), 6.
60 Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," European 
Journal o f Sociology 25, no. 2 (November 1984): 185.
the "strength of state power, or the ability of states."61 Historically, in many societies, 
the monopoly of violence was achieved through "despotic powers" which m eant "the 
range of actions with which the elite is empowered to undertake w ithout routine, 
institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups."62 W ithout much surprise, the 
comparable type of despotic power mechanism is also practiced and wielded in many 
of the authoritarian systems in contemporary political settings. In fact, in the case of 
weak and fragile states, it rather holds "an inability to maintain a monopoly of the  
internal means of violence," proving to be a more fractured political system.63 In 
contrast, in modern democracies, the legitimacy of power is retained through 
"infrastructural power" of state institutions.64
DESCRIBING THE ESSENCE OF FRAGILITY
Seeking the essence and describing the fragile conditions of a state primarily 
rely on literature explaining weak states, failed states, and collapsed states. 
Additionally, to understand the fragility, it is especially important to understand the  
normative ontology of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The performance of 
both the state and the nation offers some common characteristics and indicators of 
fragile statehood that are equally traceable in weak, failed, and collapsed states. In 
contrast to stable and strong states, others faced with fragile conditions are considered
61 Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 7.
62 Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," 188.
63 Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," 117.
64 The infrastructural power, according to  Michael Mann: "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate 
civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm." See, Mann, "The 
Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," 189.
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as weak states with unpromising coercive and non-coercive state capacity. The extreme 
condition of weak states is that of a failed or collapsed state. There is a transition that 
can move a state from  strong to weak, weak to failed, and failed to collapsed.
Political scientist William Zartman (1995) argues th at the fragility of states 
should be referred "to a situation where the  structure, authority (legitimate power), 
law, and political order have fallen apart."65 It is pertinent to  note that every collapsed 
state reached its status of breakdown after experiencing the  transition of failed and 
early fragile statehood. But it is not mandatory that every weak state m eet a similar 
fate; a weak state can be resilient and improve its fragile conditions. The later part of 
the discussion on political development in weak states, establishing political order for 
an effective political capacity, elaborates on how weak states can undertake efforts to 
improve their status of weak statehood.
Senior Fellow and Director of the International Institutions and Global 
Governance Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, Stewart Patrick, defines a 
weak state as "one that struggles to fulfill the fundamental security, political, 
economic, and social functions that have come to be associated with sovereign 
statehood."66 Most weak states face tremendous challenges and gaps in four areas; i.e. 
security, political, economic and social arenas identified in an earlier definition. Once a 
state struggles with performing its basic functions, it shows the symptoms of weakness 
and state fragility. According to Zartman, when fragile statehood reaches its apex, then
651. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority 
(Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1995), 1.
66 Patrick, Weak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 8.
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"the basic functions of the state are no longer perform ed."67
Once a state becomes incapable of performing its basic functions, then the 
bond between citizens and the state becomes an unfulfilled social contract. Stephen 
Baranyi and Kristiana Powell's work based on Robert Rotberg and W illiam Zartman's 
literature suggests that the notion of state fragility, weakness, or failure is based on 
tw o ideas: first, the "states' inability and /or unwillingness to  provide essential public 
goods like protection from external threats, rule of law and basic social services to 
most of their citizens;" and second, fragility is a m atter of degree -- ranging from  states 
that have ceased to exist in all but name and cannot provide protection or welfare to  
anyone, to certain states that can deliver most public goods to most of their citizens."68
The wide-ranging body of literature on fragile statehood agrees that when  
states fail to ensure the provision of political goods to their citizens, the concept of 
statehood shatters. Failure to m eet these basic requirements causes a gradual loss of a 
state's credibility, at which point the idea of "being a citizen becomes meaningless" for 
the political community of a state. 69 Subsequently, the breach of the social contract 
between citizens and the state also leads to a "loss of control over political and 
economic space."70
Analyzing the nature and hierarchy of political (public) goods, Robert Rotberg 
has explained that political goods:
67 Zartman, Collapsed States : The Disintegration and Restoration o f Legitimate Authority, 5.
68 Stephen Baranyi and Kristiana Powell, "Fragile States, Gender Equality and Aid Effectiveness: A Review 
of Donor Perspectives," (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 2005), 1.
69 Tonya Langford, "Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the Politics of Intervention " International Studies 
Review 1, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 62.
70 Zartman, Collapsed States : The Disintegration and Restoration o f Legitimate Authority, 9.
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"... are those intangible and hard to quantify claims that citizens once made on 
sovereigns and now make on states. They encompass expectations, conceivably 
obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give content to the  
social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of 
regime/government and citizenry interactions ...therefore...political good 
enables citizens to participate freely, openly, and fully in politics and the  
political process. This good encompasses the essential freedoms: the right to 
compete for office; respect and support for national and regional political 
institutions, like legislatures and courts; tolerance of dissent and difference; and 
fundamental civil and human rights."71
IS FRAGILITY A COLONIAL BAGGAGE?
The lack of provision of political (public) goods due to weak state capacity is 
rooted in post-colonial state structures in Third World societies. Most of the weak and 
fragile states gathered anti-colonial m om entum  to establish new nation-states through 
nationalistic fervors.72 However, they paid less attention towards nation building and 
establishing an effective statehood. In other words, enjoying the spirit of self- 
determination through the UN charter did not assure any viable political support to the 
challenges of 'sovereignty' and adopting new models of a state system. Gerald Helman 
and Steven Ratner narrate the situation that the "UN made the self-determination of 
peoples -a right enshrined in the U.N. Charter-a primary goal. Self-determination in
71 According to the author, the provision of security is the most critical hierarchy of political goods, 
because, it "prevents cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to  eliminate 
domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any 
related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their differences with the 
state and with their fellow inhabitants w ithout recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion." 
See, Rotberg, When States Fa il: Causes and Consequences, 2-3.
72 Yale H. Ferguson, "The State Concept and a World of Polities under Perpetual Siege," in The State, 
Identity and Violence: Political Disintegration in the Post-Cold W ar World, ed. R. Brian Ferguson (London 
; New York: Routledge, 2003), 82.
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fact, was given more attention than long-term survivability."73 The new models
adopted by the newly independent states in the Third World were in process of
replacing traditional structures of political societies or colonial experiences, as they
were explicitly a "repudiation of the old" system.74 W alter Opello and Stephen Rosow
portray the final movements of Colonial dynamics:
"The colonial encounters complemented and clashed with local conditions, 
generating certain spaces in which sovereignty was contested ... Ethnicity 
provided an alternative identity around which political life could be organized in 
and against the new territorial state. Ethnicity should not be thought of as a 
given attribute of people; it is an identity that people come to adopt under the 
conditions set by the struggles for independence, and just as with nationalism, 
its specific features, such as language, racial characteristics, shared histories, 
and religion, are constructed under modern circumstances."75
Newly independent weak states in Asia, Africa and Latin America grappled with  
new forms of challenges. Relying on outside support to ensure state sovereignty and 
the provision of basic security and political goods to its population developed a notion 
of dependency on external help.76 Jeffrey Herbst emphasized that granting sovereignty 
to many of decolonizing states was unexpectedly got quicker due to decline of colonial 
powers and sovereignty became "little more than a legal fiction," because soon after 
independence they got entangled with greater scale of socio-economic and political 
hardships.77 The early foundation of statehood was already shattered with non­
preparedness to project effectiveness in governance structure. The non-preparedness
73 Helman and Ratner, "Saving Failed States," 4.
74 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States : Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge 
England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1.
75 W alter C. Opello and Stephen J. Rosow, The Nation-State and Global O rder: A Historical Introduction 
to Contemporary Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 203.
76 Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, 186.
77 Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," 122.
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can be reflected through "postcolonial forms of authority [that] were from the outset 
partial, fragmented, and unsettled ... [and, the] structure o f governance was deeply 
bifurcated between rural and urban forms of governance."78
The political elites not only manipulated the fragile conditions of statehood, but 
also collaborated with military institutions to form a new power alliance. This alliance 
justified the military rule to stabilize the security threats posed both on a domestic and 
external scale. It can be agreed that most weak states received domestic support in the  
conduct of foreign policy, while society remained fragmented over domestic issues. 
Robert Rothstein writes that during the post-independence period, "unity on foreign 
policy seems much easier to achieve than unity on domestic policy. Domestic conflicts 
may be sharp and pervasive, but contending groups can usually agree on the elements 
of an external policy: economic nationalism, anti-colonialism, nonalignment, and so 
forth."79
As a result, political leadership exploited the notion of fear from foreign 
interventions with the use of bitter examples of their colonial past. These political 
manipulations helped the political elites to retain their despotic power through 
"redistributing wealth to themselves and their cronies [rather] than creating growth 
and wealth for [the] nation, and used [the] state apparatus to stay in power."80 Right at
78 Andersen, M 0 lier, and Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, Security, and 
Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, 8.
79 Robert L. Rothstein, The Weak in the World o f the Strong : The Developing Countries in the 
International System (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 110.
80 Andersen, Mpller, and Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, Security, and 
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the beginning, the political culture and institutions of state building were corrupted.81 
Over the years, the legitimacy of political power under military rule was mostly 
retained through the justification of providing domestic stability and protection from  
existential threats posed by neighbors. These justifications to  stabilize the country 
witnessed frequent military interventions in Third W orld politics and became a routine 
fashion of the day.82
Military interference in political life impacted political development as military 
coups proved to be more politically repressive of popular discontent. The expression of 
political and socio-economic repercussion can be seen in the form of "low governance 
effecting provision of goods needed for economic growth causing economic 
stagnation."83 Ultimately, it will not long last as the world awakens politically, and weak 
states with a long history of military interventions will be prompted to think "beyond 
sticks, stones, and severing limbs"84 against mass discontent.
In these circumstances, when military interventions become regular, the 
establishment of democratic norms of political development and political participations 
gradually w ither away and crises of political development evolve. Frequent and 
continuous crises of political development in weak states widen the "gaps in the social, 
cultural, economic, psychological, and political spheres," whereas in strong states these
81 Kayode J. Fayemi, "Governing the Security Sector in a Democratising Polity," in Governing insecurities: 
Democratic Control o f M ilitary and Security Establishment in Transitional Democracies, ed. Gavin 
Cawthra and Robin Luckman (London; New York: Zed Books, 2003), 62.
82 Mahfuzul H. Chowdhury, Democratization in South Asia : Lessons from  American Institutions 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 51.
83 Yoshihiro Nakanishi, Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution : The State and Military in Burma, 1962-1988  
(Singapore; Japan: NUS Press, Kyoto Univeristy Press, 2013), 13.
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gaps are generally absent.85 Whilst authoritarianism paved the ways for Praetorians to  
establish their own forms of political order, a praetorian-framed political order 
gradually undermines the political participation in post-colonial societies, so a process 
of decay affects political institutions and the effectiveness of statehood. The late 
Samuel Huntington emphasized the historical roots of oligarchic praetorianism and its 
evolution towards radical praetorianism, which undermines political institutions 
resulting in decapitation of the state. He further elaborates that a "praetorian society 
lack[s] community and effective political institutions" because the authoritarian  
regimes and military dictators do not allow political communities to flourish and 
participate. If political institutions are allowed to flourish in society, then in an 
"institutionalized society the participation" becomes an important feature in a political 
system to establish an efficacious political order. 86
The inefficacy of political orders in weak and fragile states is also due to the 
direct or indirect control of authoritarian regimes. These regimes have self-justified 
legitimacy to intervene in a political system as saviors of sovereignty and internal 
security. It is significant to mention that the role of military is equally im portant in 
every society, but the nature of civil-military relations more importantly determines the 
nature of the political system of the state. In strong states, the civil-military relations 
are comparatively different than in the weak and fragile ones. To put another way, in 
strong states, the civilian control of institutions, including the military, is effective. 
Samuel Huntington has answered the question of civilian control in tw o ways: 1)
85 Binder, "Crises of Political Development," 29.
86 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 197-98.
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Subjective civilian control through maximizing civilian power means em powerm ent of 
governmental institutions, social classes, and constitutions that can restrain any 
possible military influence in politics.87 2) Objective civilian power through maximizing 
military professionalism means "the distribution of political power between military 
and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes 
and behavior" o f officers in corps.88 Hence, the end result of subjective civilian control 
is "civilianizing the military (making them  mirror of state),"while objective civilian 
control tries for "militarizing the military (making them  as tool of the state)."89 
Huntington further clarified that in objective civilian control, the core essence is "the 
recognition of autonomous military professionalism," and for the subjective civilian 
control, the core essence is "the denial of an independent military sphere."90 W hat 
happens in weak states is that the less fear there is of any constitutional or institutional 
restraint, the military actively involves in political spheres. In modern times, frequent 
military interventions are observable in various regions of world, specifically in the 
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and have always undermined the electoral processes.91
To understand the role of the military in strong and weak states, the typology of 
civil-military relations helps to portray the significant involvement of the military in the 
political system as a partner; dominant or hegemonic determines the maturity and 
viability of political process.
Ayesha Siddiqa's work M ilitary Inc. explains six topologies of civil-military
87 The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics o f Civil-Military Relations, 80-81.
88 The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics o f Civil-Military Relations, 83.
89 Ibid.
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91 Perlmutter and Bennett, The Political Influence o f the M ilita ry : A Comparative Reader, 4.
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relations, which are important to understand the differences between strong and weak  
states. They are: 1) civil-military partnership, in which the military is subservient to 
civilian rule, and the military gains advantages from this partnership. 2) Authoritarian  
political party-military partnership: in this type the military is still dependent on civilian 
rule, while enjoying the benefits from the dominant political party. The difference 
between the first tw o types is the assertive/participatory and controlled civil society, 
because a dominant political party mostly controls the society. 3) Ruler-military, which 
believes itself to be a guarantor of the state's security and has the right to control the  
state. 4) Arbitrator-military, this type provides a justification that the military's 
legitimate monopoly as a political and social arbitrator is to fix the governance issues 
created by political leadership. 5) Parent-guardian military, in which the military 
employs constitutional and legal rules to strengthen its roots as a perm anent political 
actor in domestic and external politics. 6) Warlord, the final type, is the extreme  
condition of an anarchic situation of state, in which military partners with dominant 
political/civilian ruling elites loot and plunders the society.92 The evolution of military 
interventions started soon after decolonization; however, the cases and justification of 
each case varies from  region to region. The commonality among all the cases is that 
these interventions are legitimized as saviors of newly born states from internal and 
external threats.
Since decolonization, the entire effort of creating new nation-states looks only 
like a political struggle to join a consortium of the international state system, while
92 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Military Inc. : Inside Pakistan's M ilitary Economy (London Ann Arbor, Ml: Pluto 
Press, 2007), 34-36.
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there is no serious effort made to fill the domestic political vacuum in the actual 
political transitions. It projects a dichotomy between traditional and modern formats, 
which were "modified and reconstituted" political cultures for newly born nation­
states.93 Louise Anderson emphasized that even earlier attempts of creating new states 
after decolonization was actually a "failed universalization of the imported state within  
the postcolonial world."94 Anderson further explains that there is a dire need to find 
ways that can show "how to deal with degrees of statehood and zones of statelessness 
not insisting on helping by (re) constructing states that w ere never truly states in the  
modern sense of [the] word anyhow."95
The journeys of the creation of new states did not halt after the decolonization 
period. Recent reports show that there are more than "300 developed or emerging 
national groups without their own state worldwide, known as stateless nations,"96 and 
some other studies have also pointed to almost "8000 potential ethnically pure states" 
that can struggle for sovereign territorial units.97 Many of them  have launched non­
violent political struggles for their independence, while many rely on armed struggles. 
For instance, the Kurdistan issue could involve Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria in a regional 
conflict. Interestingly, the majority of all national groups are weak and fragile and 
surrounded by hostile neighbors.
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W hat should have been done? The literature suggests for tw o options. The UN 
could have mandated that then super powers stop the creation of new weak states, 
whose weakness and fragility could create more "anarchy and disorder."98 Or, 
alternatively, agreement might have been reached to create a compatible, effective 
and self-reliant political order in fragile states. Instead, new independent states 
emerged on a fragile foundation of statehood and were troubled with difficulties of 
self-governance.
Actually, many newborn weak states end up immediately experiencing issues of 
"dispersed domination" (in which the state lacks capabilities in achieving country wide  
domination) rather than "integrated domination" (in which state establish broad power 
and acts in a coherent fashion).99 It would not be wrong to admit that fragile and weak  
links in state structure and incapable political institutions leave the idea of sovereignty 
in doubt. The question is w hether weak states can continue to survive for long, when  
the fragility is a constant feature of their existence and may pose an existential threat 
to them at any stage.
Political scientist Robert Jackson's earlier work term ed the fragile statehood 
with "negative sovereignty" and called them "quasi-states."100 Robert Jackson writes 
that quasi-states "lack the institutional features of sovereign states."101 He further 
emphasized that, due to negative sovereignty and limitations of statehood, the fragile
98 Rotberg, When States F a il: Causes and Consequences, 314.
99 Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, State Power and Social Forces: Domination and  
Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994),
9.
100 Jackson, Quasi-States : Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World, 1.
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state's "populations do not enjoy many of the  advantages traditionally associated with  
independent statehood. Their governments are often deficient in political will, 
institutional authority, and organized power to  protect human rights or provide socio­
economic w elfare."102 The reason is that the populations of weak states do not enjoy 
political, social, and economic advantages because the state institutions are highly 
exclusive in its nature. American economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson 
stressed the need to strengthen the capacity of the state through developm ent of 
inclusive political institutions for effectiveness of state capabilities.103 The phenomena 
of inclusiveness will harness greater support from the population and vice versa, the  
population will in turn be able to gain political, social and economic benefits.
BURDEN OF GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS: A CRITICAL FACTOR OF STATE FRAGILITY 
Above explanations about state fragility explained th at the ill-preparedness and 
weak capabilities of state power feature its fragility, which possibly becomes or is 
considered an endogenous or domestic factor of failure, i.e. insufficient provision of 
security, prevailing political corruption, structural weakness, controlled and 
malfunctioning economy, misadministration, and so forth. However, its exogenous or 
external forces, such as macroeconomic and political policies, diplomatic ties, and 
foreign interventions due to geopolitical reasons, cause fragility too .104 Stewart Patrick
i°2 Ibid.
103 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations F a il: The Origins o f  Power, Prosperity and Poverty, 458.
104 Chiara Giorgetti, A Principled Approach to State Failure: International Community Actions in 
Emergency Situations (Boston: Brill, 2010), 44.
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calls it the "external environment" that can possibly "mitigate or exacerbate the state's 
vulnerability."105
Describing the distinction between three concepts i.e. geography, geopolitics, 
and geostrategy, Jakub Grygiel writes that the "geography is the physical reality" and 
geological features of earth, i.e. includes mountains, rivers, and so forth. W hile the 
geopolitics and geostrategy engages at systemic and state level respectively.106 
Geopolitics engages with the "human factor within geography, [means] it is geographic 
distribution of centers of resources and lines of communication, assigning value to 
locations according to their strategic importance."107 And, finally, the geostrategy is 
linked with "geographic direction of a state's foreign policy" that shows the power of 
concentration (both, the hard power (military) and the soft power (diplomatic)) of a 
state towards a geographic location.108 The change patterns vary among all three  
concepts. The geopolitical changes takes times to shift, even it can take centuries, 
because it depends on the "rise and decline of centers of resources and shifts in routes, 
placement at inter-section, ideological affiliation; in contrast, geography is more 
constant or permanent unless a natural calamity hits and changes, while geostrategy 
can be expected to shift rapidly.109
Among all the possible exogenous factors, it is particularly im portant to 
understand the systemic image of world politics and geopolitical maneuverings that
105 Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 39.
106 Jakub J. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
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substantially weaken a state. It is not only weaker states that have suffered due to 
geopolitics. In a number of cases great powers have suffered too, as shown for example 
with Paul Kennedy's thesis on "imperial over-stretch."110 Weaker powers suffered 
worse, however, because power struggles completely disfigured the state institutions 
and social order. For instance, during the nineteenth century, the core aim of great 
power involvement was the strategic management of regions like Central Asia, the 
Middle East, South-East Asia, and South Asia. These regions were im portant 
geostrategic zones that were central to the great game rivalry "on the chessboard of 
Imperial diplomacy" between Russia and Britain.111 Even during the Cold W ar the two  
super-powers supported their client states to keep their influence in various regions of 
the world, which resulted in undermining democratic transitions, as authoritarian  
forces were allowed to suppress dissidents.
Moreover, historians share the notion that the great powers engaged in surgical 
partitions while carving out the geopolitical map of the world, e.g. the decolonization 
period offers many instances of surgical partitions. Hans J. Morganthau has called these 
power struggles "power politics into the periphery of the earth."112 In other contexts it 
was considered to be a contest for the "heartland-dominated land power" (Halford 
Mackinder), or even the contest for the "maritime-oriented Rimland" (Nicholas John
110 Paul M . Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers : Economic Change and M ilitary Conflict from  
1500 to 2 0 0 0 ,1st ed. (New York, NY: Random House, 1987).
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Spykman).113 W hether it is a land or maritim e contest, such great power struggle 
affected the future stability of weak states. Though in recent years, contrary to the  
past, territorial expansion through colonizing a peripheral region has changed, the 
"private logic of the global economy' still relies on "territorial expansion [as] a route to 
control over new productive assets."114
The geopolitical or geographical factor provides a distinction between a "weak 
pivot state" and other weak or fragile states. It has already been mentioned that in 
both categories they share some indicators of fragility, but in addition, the "weak pivot 
states" face fragility due to geographical reasons that may not be the case for other 
weak or fragile states. The recent debates on geopolitics or geographical contest have 
been given less attention due to  the erosion of time and space phenomena in a highly 
inter-connected globalized world. Still, the return of geopolitics at this particular tim e  
can be traced to "a certain serendipity in the convergence of political semantics and 
international relations."115 Although the significance of geography remains constant, 
and "human society is still related to the facts of geography," each phase of history has 
had its own perspective on geographical explanation, while we witness crises and 
sequences of political development, the "view of the geographical realities is colored 
for practical purposes by our preconceptions from the past."116
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Even during the recent past, like in the Cold W ar period, the bipolar power 
struggle competed over regional gains. The bipolar power competition around 
shatterbelts left severe impacts of state fragility on countries located in or around 
these zones. For instance, in the late 1970s Soviet invasion over Afghanistan, the US 
containment of Soviets in Afghanistan affected the peace and stability of the entire  
region. The concept of "Shatterbelts" help us to understand the dangerously fractured  
regions or zones, in which fragile states have very weak links to sustain the regional 
peace and sustainability of its own risky society. According to Saul Bernard Cohen, 
shatterbelts are also referred as "Crush Zone" or "Shatter Zone," these zones are 
"strategically oriented regions that are both deeply divided internally and caught up in 
the competition between Great Powers of the geostrategic realms."117 The Middle East 
and East Asia remained the suitable examples of shatterbelts during the Cold W ar 
bipolar rivalry between U.S. and form er USSR. In the post-Cold W ar period, however, 
the political remapping of regions and sub-regions demarcated new zones of 
insecurities i.e. Middle East transformed into the greater Middle East. On similar lines, 
the notion of "new Global Balkans" also expands the traditional boundaries of Balkan. 
According to Former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the new Global 
Balkans are:
"... Extending from Egypt's Suez Canal to China's Xinjiang region, from  
northern Kazakhstan to the Arabian Sea, the Global Balkans of today mirror the  
traditional Balkans of the nineteenth and tw entieth centuries in that they are 
internally unstable and their geopolitical importance causes foreign rivalries.
The contemporary "New Global Balkans" inhibited by about 500 million people, 
are burdened by internal instability derived from ethnic and religious tensions,
117 Cohen, Geopolitics : The Geography o f International Relations, 44.
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poverty, and authoritarian governments. Ethnic conflict within the Global 
Balkans involves 5.5 million Jewish Israel and 5 million Arab Palestinians; 25 
million Kurds and their partitioning states of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria; and 
between India and Pakistan in the dispute over Kashmir, as well as numerous 
potentially severe ethnic and minority conflicts in Iran and Pakistan. Religious 
conflicts involve the Muslims and the Hindus, Muslim Shiites versus, and a 
variety of others. In 2005, unemployment was as high as 50 percent in the Gaza 
Strip, 40 percent in Afghanistan, 25 percent in Iraq, and 20 percent in the West 
Bank, and 18 percent in Kyrgyzstan."118
In this regard, the geographic factor is critical to fram e a rationale, as Michael 
Handel (1981) highlights the critical role of geographical location of weak states in the  
international system. Handel notes that it is a disadvantage for weak states to be 
located near a "large number of bordering countries, more powerful and with 
conflicting goals that build high border pressure."119 For example, M yanm ar suffered 
both during the colonial and post-colonial tim e period due to frequent external 
interference in its domestic politics. Despite the fact that, in recent years, the direct 
threat from a neighbor coming over to capture territory has largely diminished, the  
threat cannot be ignored. In that sense, many weak pivot states are fragile, and they  
face high amounts of indirect interferences.120 Myanmar's neighbors India and China, 
to return to the example, have sponsored the armed ethno-nationalist movements 
against the state itself
If they cannot handle the geostrategic threats, weak states face "state death" 
due to the burden of geography and geopolitics. Tanisha Fazal's research has focused 
on the politics of geography, suggesting that in earlier times conquest and occupation
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has caused the decay of states. Fazal defines state death as "internal state collapse or 
failure, regime change, conquest, or division" meaning "loss of sovereignty."121 Fazal 
emphasizes that it is foreign intervention that causes the loss of sovereignty, and as a 
result, the state further loses its domestic capabilities, which means a state formally  
loses its "foreign policy making powers" as w ell.122
In addition, many weaker states present an abundance of natural resources like 
oil, gas, gold, and diamonds, which can be considered either a blessing or a curse.123 
The post-colonial history of Africa shows that form er colonial powers re-engaged in the 
region to exploit its natural resources. In order to extract these, form er colonial powers 
constructed new relationships with non-democratic forces. These relationships gave a 
fair amount of legitimacy to intervene with the approval of the local leadership, and in 
return, major powers endorsed the despotic authoritarian leadership. W eak states 
were already experiencing frequent clashes between rival ethnic groups fragmenting  
the nation with increased turmoil. W ith the primary interest in extracting resources, 
such internal turmoil became an opening for direct involvement by major powers in the 
name of stability.124
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Table 2: Salient Features of Weak Pivot States
Security
Political (Governamentality)
Nationhood
Economy
Social
Pivot of Geography or 
Resources
instabiiity^nd Mplenee due to lack
I groups;
; statesthu^gles^o establish
il^ l^ fre^ ie i^ iiii^ o vem ed
Excessive Burdens on Governing Capacity of 
institutions; Political malfunctioning and Flabbiness 
degenerating legitimacy of authority; 
Institutionalized Political Corruption undermine the 
integrity of basic state institutions; ineffective rule 
of law; absence of transparent judiciary; and if state 
is authoritarian and weak then state becomes 
repressive and predatory violating human rights. 
Predominated by ethnic divides; lack of .cohesive 
national identity, minority versus m ajoritypower
a uthority through seekinghelp from transnational 
advocacy networks (TAfcl)or through armed 
struggles, e.g. irredentist movements.
Extractive political capacity relying on heavy 
taxation; ruling elites establish a corrupt political 
economy to exploit state fragility to extract foreign 
aid, donations and loans for personal wealth  
accumulation; Based of traditional agricultural 
sector, fledgling industrial and urban sector with  
acute shortage of power supply effects production. 
Weak social cohesion; deeply fractured society; 
Compromised dignity o f humans through human 
rights violation; T>atrimomattzati0 n;f acktif access to  
health and education; improper infrastructure; 
human trafficking; poor water & sanitation; 
malnutrition; high rnortality.
Geo-Politics; Geography becoming burden with the 
direct or indirect external involvement, either due 
to geo-strategic location or resource curse or could 
be of two.
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The decay of societies is part of world politics; we have witnessed numerous 
decays throughout the political history of world w ith the rise and fall of city-states and 
empires. Now, possibly, some dysfunctional nation-states will face the same fate. 
Krasner writes that "conflict prevention must become a routine element of 
policymaking ... [because] State death as a result o f external invasion, common before 
World W ar II, has almost disappeared since 1945. The lack of good governance in weak  
states means they often do not have the ability to deal w ith disaffected or criminal 
groups within their own borders."125 Among many scenarios, countries like 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Sudan, and M yanm ar are victims of external and 
internal troubles, which certainly demand further inquiry into endogenous and 
exogenous reasons of fragility with reference to geopolitics. The consequences of the  
endogenous and exogenous factors, weak states encounter a number of dire 
challenges; in his work People, States and Fear, Barry Buzan (2007) has identified the 
following conditions that prevail in weak states. According to Buzan, first, the intensity 
of political violence is relatively higher in weak states. Second, the freedom  and liberty 
of citizens is always at stake, since there is a conspicuous role of political police in the  
everyday lives of citizens. Third, in weak states the core political conflict is over which 
ideology will be used to organize the state; this is visible in Pakistan between  
secular/liberal and non-secular forces. Fourth, there is an identity vacuum that is the  
reason for a lack of a coherent national identity, or the presence of contending national 
identities within the state. Fifth, the chaotic struggle for domestic political hegemony
125 Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual," Addressing State Failure," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (2005): 
155.
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shatters the legitimacy; as a result, state structure feels a lack of a clear and observed 
hierarchy of political authority. Finally, freedom of expression is subject to censorship 
in failing states. W ith various intervals, failing states feel a protective or legitimate right 
to have a light degree of state control over the m edia.126
Both the endogenous and exogenous factors help to develop a balanced 
understanding that describes state fragility. After reviewing the above literature and 
looking at the effects of state fragility and the political decay of state institutions, it can 
be understood that weak states are grappling with issues of governamentality. These 
issues arise when a state is incapable of enforcing its political order, and such 
enforcement depends on political capacity or state's capacity. In other words, political 
order, political capacity, and governamentality are interdependent. The above 
explanation concludes that weak states are required to establish an effective order, so 
it can tackle domestic challenges, which ultimately help to use pivot of geography, not 
as a burden but rather an opportunity.
GLIMPSE ON THE INDICATORS OF FRAGILITY
Drawing some broader lines from the literature discussed above, we can 
identify four domains where a weak state suffers from fragility or fracturedness. These 
are critical for stability and improving the conditions of any state, namely security, 
political, economic, and social arenas. Moreover, these four domains are basic 
functions as well as indicators that measure the performance of a state. Normalcy in
126 Buzan, People, States, and F ear: An Agenda fo r International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W ar 
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these four areas is a prerequisite for any stable country to ensure that its citizens are 
enjoying basic rights anticipated out of the four spheres.
As previously mentioned, security is a top priority on the hierarchy of political 
goods that every citizen of a state seeks. A state's primary purpose is to "ensure basic 
social order and protect inhabitants from the threat of violence from internal and 
external forces."127 Due to a lack of effective security arrangements in weak states, 
citizens feel insecure from criminals and terrorists and fear for the safety of their 
private belongings. As a state also fails to impose its monopoly of the use of force, it 
can feel insecure on its frontiers due to a mirage of existential threats from neighbors 
and seem less interested in imposing an effective political order. Highlighting the  
importance of the security dimension, the form er Resident Representative o f UNDP in 
Ghana and Nigeria, Alfred Fawundu, feared that fragile and violent societies produce a 
negative outlook for their own people and neighbors too. He stressed that, while the 
"security of states worsens, the proliferation of small arms flourishes, and as the arms 
proliferation flourishes, the conflicts expand across boundaries."128
On political grounds, a state is responsible for providing "legitimate, 
representative, and accountable governance under the rule of law."129 As a result, a 
transparent system helps citizens to enjoy a greater deal of freedom, and their 
fundamental rights are protected. In contrast, the fragile statehood of weak and
127 Patrick, Weak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 24.
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"decapitated" states fails to create proper institutional checks and balances.130 
Eventually political corruption empowers chronic and despotic leadership, and these 
corrupt political elites then enjoy political freedom without any fear of accountability.
The higher the position these elites occupy, the higher the desire to stay longer 
in power. The desire for reaching higher and staying longer in power encourages 
corrupt political elites to prepare for "grabbing and retaining power at all costs, 
forming alliances, and taking decisions with longer personal objectives in m ind."131 
States in Africa, Asia, and Latin America witnessed a prolonged permanence of despotic 
and corrupt elites, as they legitimized their corrupt rule through constitutional 
amendments. Michael Comer and Timothy Stephens, whom have done extensive work 
on corruption focusing both on least developed and developed countries, quote John 
Mukum Mbaku while describing the ramifications of poverty and corruption on African 
polities, explaining that the "internal causes of poverty in the African continent, which 
significantly outweigh external ones, includes excessive control of economy, massive 
and pervasive corruption, merciless exploitation of the peasantry and ethical violence 
verging on genocide."132 With the passage of time, corruption becomes 
institutionalized exacerbating the coercive corruption, which undermines the "integrity
130 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 198.
131 Michael J. Comer and Timothy E. Stephens, Bribery and Corruption : How to Be an Impeccable and  
Profitable Corporate Citizen (Burlington, VT: Gower Pub., 2013), 12.
132 Bribery and Corruption : How to Be an Impeccable and Profitable Corporate Citizen (Burlington, VT: 
Gower Pub., 2013), 14.
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of basic state institutions."133 So the entire society becomes a victim to the completely 
unjust and no speedy justice system.
The economic sphere is the third im portant domain of a state's responsibility, 
that is, to "create a legal and regulatory fram ework conducive to economic growth and 
development."134 The economic fram ework process enables a market to  grow, attract 
foreign investment, create favorable conditions for entrepreneurs, and enrich human 
capital. The state defines a set of rules and regulations so private entities and investors 
feel attracted to market friendly policies. The political economic conditions of fragile 
and weak states are always fluctuating and remain doubtful to domestic and foreign 
investors.
The development economist and form er director of the Shell Foundation, Kurt 
Hoffman, explicitly refers to the problems of corruption that cripples domestic 
economic conditions and discourages entrepreneurs support initiatives that would 
counter poverty and help fragile economies. Hoffman writes that the "entrepreneurs 
and businesspeople can help governments and the major donors map out the value 
chain of activities and stages where corruption or lack of government capacities 
impinges on enterprise creation."135 As common features in weak states, such as
133 Louise I. Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism," in The Illicit Global 
Economy and State Power, ed. H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (Boulder, New York: Rowman &  
Littlefield, 1999), 26.
134 Patrick, Weak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 25.
135 Kurt Hoffman, "Placing Enterprise and Business Thinking at the Heart of the W ar on Poverty," in 
Reinventing Foreign Aid, ed. William Easterly (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2008), 492; Bertram Spector 
also explains the ways "the corruption impedes economic growth" and discourage foreign and domestic 
investment... See, Bertram I. Spector, Detecting Corruption in Developing Countries: Identifying 
Causes/Strategies fo r  Action, 1st ed. (Sterling, V a.: Kumarian Press, 2012), 26-27; Charles Funderburk, 
Political Corruption in Comparative Perspective : Sources, Status and Prospects (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2012), 2.
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frequent capital flights, bankruptcy, and seeking bribes from foreign investors become 
customized traditions, unemployment and poverty increase.
To sustain the state's costs, a state becomes involved in "extraction of 
resources" through taxation and imposition of duties.136 However, political elites and 
decision makers can also engage in additional "extraction of foreign resources" i.e. 
foreign aid and loans. In the case of weak states, most of the foreign extracted  
resources "may be sought to pay off supporters," or used for personal wealth  
accumulation through justified means.137 In other words, the chronic political economy 
of weak states establishes various ways of legitimate corruption, where domestic 
taxpayers fund as well as "aid funds are misappropriated through patronage-swollen" 
(meaning, the misappropriation of resources under the legitimate protection of corrupt 
political elites).138 The notion of legitimate corruption and tactics used at international 
forums to extract foreign resources can be understood in the following words, as the  
author writes that;
"Domestic instability, or the fear thereof, tempts insecure leaders to use foreign 
policy as a supplementary resource in their political [and economic] struggles. A 
rising defense budget, or efforts to secure high levels of military assistance, may 
be a way to keep the army happy.... Foreign aid may be sought to pay off 
supporters, not to raise domestic investment rates ... use meetings and 
speeches at the UN may be designed to alleviate psychic insecurities, not to  
deal with substantive problems."139
Corruption can be controlled if political and legal institutions become stronger
136 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States : State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 4.
137 Rothstein, The Weak in the World o f the Strong : The Developing Countries in the International 
System, 111.
138 William Easterly, Reinventing Foreign Aid (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008), 11.
139 Rothstein, The Weak in the World o f the Strong : The Developing Countries in the International 
System, 111.
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and economic entities enjoy more open and orderly access to the political decision­
making process.140 Due to the absence of effective judicial structures, the 
accountability system could not succeed to curb the menace of corruption.
Interestingly, in most weak states, a judiciary exists, but it is either under the control 
government or there is too much of a gap between implementation and enforcement.
The social sector is the final arena where weak states fail to provide social 
services to society. Society expects that a state provide "basic social welfare" to its 
inhabitants, which is considered one of its primary functions.141 That includes access to 
proper health care and education, w ater and sanitation, environmental protection, 
access to the Internet, means of communication, infrastructure, etc. In retrospect, 
history proves that social issues of malnutrition, starvation, ultra-poverty, diseases, and 
societal violence are deeply rooted in poor and decapitated societies.142 Overall, the  
fragile conditions of weak states do not allow them to provide basic goods and perform  
their functions in all four arenas. Some weak states present strength in one sector or 
another, but lack symmetrical strength, which ultimately translates into an overall poor 
performance.
Many crimes and transnational security threats also stem from issues of ultra­
poverty. When a person sees the degradation of human dignity and when his/her 
family and friends suffer with illness, hunger, and material deprivation, the individual 
becomes frustrated and feels pushed to rebel against the system. Ted Gurr refers the
140 Funderburk, Political Corruption in Comparative Perspective : Sources, Status and Prospects, 3.
141 Patrick, Weak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 25.
142 Jared M. Diamond, The World until Yesterday: W hat Can We Learn from  Traditional Societies? (New  
York: Viking, 2012), 286-300.
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societies with high scale deprivation accumulates aggregate frustration, and eventually, 
it can be observe that the greater the intensity of deprivation, the greater the 
magnitude of violence can be anticipated.143 Around one-sixth of the world population 
(1 billion) lives in extreme poverty and destitute conditions, called the "poorest of the  
poor," and roughly 1.5 billion more face difficulties in attaining basic social rights. By 
and large, the greater portions of this 2.5 billion population live in weak states, whose 
populations are "caught in a poverty trap, unable on their own to escape from  extrem e  
material deprivation."144 On moral grounds, it is unfortunate to see the "bottom  
billion" suffering on "large islands of chaos," when the rest of the world is enjoying the  
benefits of an interdependent globalized economy which generates zones of comfort 
and establishes islands of peace.145 These zones of chaos actually become "zones of 
silence" proving the geopolitical (and economic) unevenness of globality ignored the  
root causes of Third World societies.146 The growing feelings of transnational 
insecurities, stemming from the zones of chaos, are finally seeking attention to resolve 
the fundamental socio-political and economic problems.
According to statistical data, around "17 million of the world's youth are 
refugees or IDPs, 130 million are illiterate, as many as 300,000 fight as child soldiers,
143 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University Press, 1970), 9.
144 Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities fo r  Our Time (New York: Penguin Press, 
2005), 18-19.
145 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion : Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and W hat Can Be Done About 
It (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3-4.
146 David Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations (M alden, Mass.: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 171.
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and collectively, young people make up almost 60 percent o f the world's poor."147 
Alarmingly, the age groups most involved in criminal activities are youths, a majority of 
which belongs to these strata of global poor. Expressing the acute importance of 
tackling poverty, Former Secretary of State Colin Powell stressed that "the United 
States cannot win the war on terrorism unless we confront the social and political roots 
of poverty."148
The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) acknowledge the notion that 
poverty contributes to many criminal and violent activities across the world and desire 
to tackle the issue of poverty. Tackling the issue of poverty before a state exterminates  
the root cause may be only a cosmetic fixation not endured for long. Bertram Spector 
develops a correlation between corruption, bad governance, and poverty in a society. 
Spector writes that "corruption has direct consequences on economic and governance 
factors, intermediaries that in turn produce poverty."149 Similarly, Jaffrey Sachs' work 
also illustrates that most of the "poverty trap" is due to bad governance and corrupt 
leadership of weak and poor societies. Consequently, "the poor face structural 
challenges that keep them from getting even their first foot on the ladder of 
development."150 In most of African countries, corruption is one of the basic factors 
that contribute to causing poverty and negatively affecting socio-economic conditions 
of the continent, and the similar conditions prevail in Asian and Latin American context
147 Lael Brainard and Derek H. Chollet, Too Poor fo r Peace?: Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 
21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 11.
148 Quote in, Too Poor fo r Peace?: Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 2.
149 Spector, Detecting Corruption in Developing Countries : Identifying Causes/Strategies fo r Action, 25.
150 Sachs, The End o f Poverty: Economic Possibilities fo r  Our Time, 226.
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too .151 Paul Collier defines the leaders of these poor societies as "psychopaths who 
have shot their way to power, sometimes crooks who have bought it, and sometimes 
brave people who, against the odds, are trying to build a better future."152
There are numerous external efforts made through various agencies to bring 
some structural reforms to poor performing states. However, most socio-economic 
reforms promoted by external donors develop a vertical hierarchy in which domestic 
agencies are more accountable to donors, which again fail to  achieve a horizontal 
output, or the impact factor is not known.153 Since 1991 $ 8 billion have been invested 
in Somalia in an attem pt to give life to its society and strengthen its fragile 
statehood.154 Yet the world community has had troubles w ith Somali pirates, and 
militants have used Somalia as a safe heaven. In September 2013, Al-Shabab, a Somali 
militant terrorist group, crossed into neighboring Kenya and terrorized locals and 
foreigners by taking them hostage in one of Nairobi's busiest shopping malls. The 
militants brutally killed more than 60 innocent people, injuring more than 200 civilians, 
with dozens remaining missing. A country which has been the focal point of the 
international community's attem pt in improving its security situation became one of 
worse cases of failed states.
The above-mentioned example dramatically vindicates the real threat scenario 
that emanates from failed states with its transnational affects. The entire effort to fix
151 The End o f Poverty: Economic Possibilities fo r Our Time, 191.
152 Collier, The Bottom Billion : Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 4.
153 Easterly, Reinventing Foreign Aid, 27; Jessica Cohen and William Easterly, W hat Works in 
Development?: Thinking Big and Thinking Small (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 7.
154 Seth Kaplan, "Rethinking State-Building in a Failed State," The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2010): 
81.
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Somalia's failure seems in vain. A possible reason could be that an externally 
engineered process to implement and test new formats on a traditional society is not 
viable. The models of improvement could be incompatible for such a society, or society 
itself could not be socio-politically mature enough to synchronize with modern norms.
A number of African countries have tried to establish a "hybrid state" th a t may 
temporarily help to tackle domestic security challenges and territorial integrity.155 
However, w ithout engaging local stakeholders, and w ithout devolving responsibility 
back to the state itself, the task to fix the state fragility is not a viable option.
Evaluation of the security, political, economic, and social aspects of weak and 
fragile states portrays a frightening image of increased inequality, unemployment, and 
poverty that worsens the situation in weak states, and ultimately breeds favorable 
grounds for transnational crimes through "new authoritarianism" and violence.156 One 
limitation of weak states can be predicted through its dealing with crime and violence 
in society. Noticeably, weak states remain oblivious to the fact that "unpunished 
violence by organized crime groups is perhaps the most visible sign of state 
impotence."157 It is highly possible that most criminal groups emerge due to higher 
rates of poverty, and these groups are likely to embrace crime and become 
perpetrators of violence activities.158 The UNDP Human Development Index has vividly 
highlighted the worsening conditions in Third World societies, which host most of the
155 Ken Menkhaus, "Local Security System in Somali East Africa," in Fragile States and Insecure People?: 
Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Louise Andersen, Bjdrn M 0ller, and 
Finn Stepputat (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 88.
156 Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism," 31.
157 "Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism," 46.
158 Hillier and Wood, "Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control," 25.
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internal conflicts and human rights violations due to the absence of effective 
governance systems and high frequency of social fragmentation.
CLASSIFYING STATE FRAGILTY
Facing a problem of legitimacy and centralized order exists in all fragile states, 
whether they are weak, failing, failed, or on the verge of break down. The difference 
can be measured through hard and loose forms of centralized authority over the 
physical features of a state, i.e. territory and population. Jonathan Hill argues that 
there are three forms of state categories: successful states, which are effective in 
providing political goods to its citizens; weak or quasi states, which face some serious 
levels of difficulties in the provision of political goods to their subjects; and failed or 
collapsed states, which are completely unable to perform their basic function as states, 
with their subjects hardly receiving any political goods.159
Similarly, it is hard to view all weak and fragile states with the same standard; in 
fact, each fragile state has its unique characteristics and features of fragility. A common 
problem among all is legitimate forms of governance and authority. Stewart Patrick 
(2011) and Jean-Germain Gros (1996) have outlined the taxonomy or typology of fragile 
states into various formats, specifically on the basis of pessimistic and optimistic 
scenarios of state performances (see table 3 & table 4).
159 Jonathan Hill, "Beyond the Other? A Postcolonial Critique of the Failed State Thesis," African Identities 
3, no. 2 (2005): 145.
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Table 3: Weak State Trajectories
a.State Collapse
- 1. ■
^  ,,Ji b. Endemic Weakness
l.Chromc Situation
2. Deteriorating Situations
ic. ftesource-ricb Poor 
Performers
d. Brittle Dictatorship
a. Prolonged Political 
Crisis
b. Conflict-ridden 
Countries
a. Post-Conflict 
Recovery
b. Democratic 
Transitions
Source: Stewart Patrick, “W eak Links: Fragile States, 
S e c u r i t y . " ___________________________________
Statefaces challenges of 
complete breakdown,
bf central authority,
’* > JpSj^Jpc mechanism
■■_>«^ B^shed at domestic level 
tbsprotect local communities 
Aid dependent countries, 
with less chance of violent 
situation. W eak economic 
conditions are driving force, 
e.g. Bangladesh 
Client state, possess rich 
natural resources, while 
corrupt political elite harness 
resources for personal gains, 
e^ ig. Nigeria
Praetorian system, fragile 
states ruled by military 
dictators or experience 
authoritarian regimes, e.g. 
North Korea, M yanm ar 
Dwindling performance of 
political institutions, 
economic stagnation, 
increasing violence, e.g. 
Pakistan
Center losing much control of 
its territory to fighting 
groups, e.g. Tamils in Sri 
Lanka, Kurds in Syria, Sudan, 
Yemen
Negotiated settlement or 
decisive victory after political 
deadlock or prolong conflict,
e.g. Mozambique
Governments progressive 
reforms; overcoming 
authoritarian system, military 
coups, and controlling bad 
economic policies, e.g. 
Georgia after Rose Revolution 
Global Threats and International
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Those states have a long history of weakness and the "chronic situation" of the  
worst among them  generates more "anarchic" conditions, as in Afghanistan, Haiti, 
Somalia, Rwanda, and Congo. The next group of weak states face a deteriorating  
situation with long, internal armed struggles and stagnant economic conditions which 
cause the "deteriorating situation" of state fragility. These are "anaemic states."
Many global insurgency movements are taking root in anaemic states, further 
creating chaos for these host states. Militancy in Pakistan has sharply deteriorated its 
security conditions, while law and order are at high risk. Stewart Patrick singles out a 
category of states whose conditions are significantly improving due to democratization, 
economic reforms, and conflict control. However, Jean-Germain Gros has discussed a 
new category called "mediate states" for those states making serious efforts to 
improve their fragile conditions. Gros also identified the "aborted state," a scenario in 
which a state experiences failure before its formal creation, as with Bosnia.160
160 Patrick, Weak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 36-37; Gros, "Towards 
a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia,Rwanda and Haiti," 458- 
61.
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Table 4: Taxonomy of Failed States
The Anarchic
The Phantom
;|Wartords dominates the 
ace, most likely leads deafh-squads of teenagers and 
^^tdacmally immaturejycwng'fightersio gain control of 
sto& ^lc buildings/cities or regions, e;g.Somalia, Liberia, 
Afghan Warlords during civil w ar in 1990s.
The Phantom states are also referred as mirage state, similar to 
anarchic state. The central government retains some sort of 
authority over limited areas, for instant protecting head of 
state or core political leadership, e.g. Zaire.
its political capacity 
ifloendingcou nte r-insurgency 
1 ways o f power or authority. 2  nd, 
ssedand never 
jsgrcw^h assert 
demandson archaicjstwctures/ e,g. Haiti, Cambodia has 
experienced theanaemic Situations.
The Captured Holds a strong centralized authority, but political power is 
captured by rival groups and engages in ethnic cleansing or 
executing most of political rival group affiliates, e.g. one million 
killed during Rwandan genocide.
The Aborted i, e.g. Traumatic 
events in Bosnia, form er Soviet Georgia experienced a quasi­
federation status to independence.
Source: Jean-Germain Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World 
Order."
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PUTTING THE WEAK STATE IN ORDER
The narratives of state weakness include the episodes from pre-colonial to post­
colonial epochs, which primarily try to evaluate the capabilities of the state and 
performances of the nation. During these periods, weak and fragile states have 
experienced a variety of political transitions, experimented with various forces of 
economic structures, and modified societal customs multiple times. Every changing 
moment forms a new political identity, however, cultural and institutional 
transformations took a while to change, based on path dependence. The path 
dependence is a significant consideration because it helps the evolution of institutions 
that occurs on constant interaction between political and social groups, interests, and 
exchange of ideas. These interactions rely on historical contexts as a path to define the  
nature of institution.161 These frequent external and internal inputs in the system 
weaken social cohesion with deeply fractured societies and provide the basis for 
malfunctioning political systems. This means "political institutions develop, often 
slowly and painfully, overtime, as human societies strive to organize themselves to 
master their environments ... political decay occurs when political system fail to adjust 
to changing circumstances."162
Putting the weak and fragile states in order germinates a few  questions, such 
as, what does order mean? W hy establish an order? And how are orders established?
In rapidly changing times, one cannot rely on a single factor to solve the problem of
161 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 92-93.
162 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rder: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 7.
93
fixing the "political system."163 In fact, the earlier discussions and indicators show that 
there are multiple ingredients that cause statehood weakness and fragility. Political will 
as a first step to strengthen nationhood and democratic decision-making processes 
through establishing inclusive and pluralistic political culture can play a key and 
pragmatic role in building a society, its infrastructure, and future growth. The process 
will further ensure fortifying the viability of social cohesiveness because political will 
instigates a determination to deal with "traps" in order to leave behind the baggage of 
weakness and fragility. Paul Collier presents four traps that keep society backward and 
poor in all aspects of development and are core factors of fragility: "the conflict trap, 
the natural resources trap, the trap of being landlocked w ith bad neighbors, and the 
trap of bad governance."164 Some traps are tem porary or situational, while others like 
"the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbors" are inherent. Both of them  need to  
be tackled in subtle ways. According to Robert Rotberg, weakness is inherent because 
of "geographical, physical or fundamental economic constraints." Conversely, states 
are temporarily or situationally weak or fragile (situational ones seems more strong, 
which should not) due to the "internal antagonisms management flaws, greed, 
despotism, or external attacks."165 Most domestic antagonism and tensions are 
generated by flaring up the ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other inter-communal rifts.
163 The political system that includes the state as a "legally empowered and legitimately coercive 
institutions-but it also included these new extralegal and paralegal institutions of political parties, 
interest groups, media of communication, as well as social institutions such as family, school, church, and 
the like, in so far as they affected political processes." See, Almond, "The Return to the State," 855.
164 Collier, The Bottom Billion : Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 5.
165 Rotberg, When States F a il: Causes and Consequences, 4.
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Overcoming the problems of weak states requires establishing an effectual 
order in domestic politics. In this study order is referred to as "political order" at the 
state level that helps to retain the domestic political, social and economic life in order. 
And the domestic stability can create equilibrium with external pressures or 
geographical burdens. Therefore, the concept of order is crucial in political, economic, 
and social life at the micro and macro level. It means the notion of order is applicable 
both at intra- state and inter-state levels, called political order and world order 
respectively.
Hedley Bull's work "the Anarchical Society" primarily discusses world order, and 
his work relies on the social life or social order as a basic principle to explain his main 
thesis. However, Bull's explanation of social order is pertinent to understanding 
"political order" as this study also seeks to trace or establish order in weak societies. 
Bull emphasizes that, in Hobbesian accounts of the state of nature, individuals live in a 
condition of "fear and insecurity;" in response to the fear, insecurity, and uncertain 
social conditions, societies set some goals to preserve social safety and personal goals. 
Bull identified three elementary or primary goals which by and large societies have 
recognized: "a) Societies seek certain measures to secure their selves against violence 
b) Societies seek to maintain and undertake the promises made under various 
agreements with each other c) Possession of property will remain stable to some
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extent and will not be subject to challenges, which in a way constant and w ithout 
lim it."166
Keeping the nature of social life in mind, Hedley Bull tracks the linkage
(relationship) between social life and order. He defines the relationship,
"... to rules, or general imperative principles of conduct. Social order is 
sometimes defined in terms of obedience to  rules o f conduct; sometimes it is 
defined, more specifically, as obedience to  rules o f law. In fact, order in social 
life is very closely connected with the conformity of human behavior to rules of 
conduct, if not necessarily to rules of law ."167
Francis Fukuyama's recent work The Origins o f Political Order argues that three  
sets of institutions "the state, the rule of law, and an accountable government" 
together sustain an enforcing political order.168 Fukuyama bases his arguments on 
Samuel Huntington's earlier work "The Political Order and Political Development" and 
notes that:
"Political order emerges as a result of the achievement of some equilibrium  
among the contending forces within a society ... change occurs internally and 
externally: the actors established the original equilibrium themselves evolve or 
disappear; new actors appear; economic and social conditions shift; the society 
is invaded from outside or faces new terms of trade or imported ideas ... 
preceding equilibrium no longer holds, and political decay results until the 
existing actors come up with a new set of rules and institutions to restore 
order."169
It infers that the rule of law is a core ingredient that retains the order in a viable 
state. The establishment of rule of law itself is a long process that engages "extensive 
construction not just of laws but also of courts, judges, a bar, and enforcem ent
166 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2002), 3-4.
167 The Anarchical Society : A Study o f Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 6.
168 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rder: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 16.
169 The Origins o f Political O rder: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 139.
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mechanisms across the entire country."170 Emphasizing the importance of the rule of 
law, Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart note that the "rule o f law is a glue that binds all 
aspects of the state, the economy, and society" through establishing "governance 
arrangements decision rights, processes, accountabilities, freedoms, and duties."171 
The troubling factor is that neither the conformity of human behavior to rules of 
conduct, nor the rule of law are properly executed in weak states. Primarily it is 
because most weak states are in postcolonial settings where they "are still struggling to 
define and identify their statehood vis-a-vis other social institutions and actors."172 
Moreover, the ethnic, religious, and inter-communal violent incidents are gradually 
"eating away society from within, which subsequently tear the system of state order.173
In successful states, the established order provides a political capacity to the 
state and its organs that ensures the rule of law, provides security to it citizens, and 
ensures protection of their property. In order to strengthen state capacity, "states 
fundamentally extract resources (mainly taxation and duties) from society and deploy 
these resources to create and support coercive and administrative organizations."174 
Hence, the state extracts, regulates, reaches, distributes, and seeks responses towards 
whole processes, which show legitimate authority and political capacity by the state. 
Therefore, once a state establishes a legitimate order, society can notice the state's
170State-Building : Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 59.
171 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States : A Framework fo r Rebuilding a Fractured World 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 125.
172 Andersen, Mpller, and Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, Security, and 
Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, 7.
173 Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," 117.
174 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions : A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 29.
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capabilities, which effectively "penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract 
resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways."175
Already known political problems like corruption, weak governance, unjust 
systems, and so many other socio-economic troubles, are daunting challenges of weak  
states. M ore likely, as the daunting challenges become more acute, weak states further 
rely on "extractive economic and political institutions," while successful states succeed 
with flourishing democratic norms and facilitate their subjects through "inclusive 
economic and political institutions."176 A political order with an inclusive institutional 
system empowers institutional capacity, in Francis Fukuyama's words, this capacity is 
to "formulate and carryout policies and enact laws; to administrate efficiently and with  
a minimum of bureaucracy; to control graft, corruption, and bribery; to maintain high 
level of transparency; and accountability in government institutions; and most 
important, enforce of laws."177
Once a state has the capacity to regulate and execute policies effectively, it 
shows a higher level of social cohesiveness. In contrast, if a state faces problems of 
execution and "failures of implementation," this means a state is lacking the capacity to 
enforce.178 Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tammen's edited volume The Performance o f 
Nations agrees that the political capacity of a state revolves around extraction, reaches 
(government influences and penetrates into society), and then allocates resources.
175 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States : State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third 
World, 4.
176 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations F a il: The Origins o f Power, Prosperity and Poverty, 79-83.
177 Fukuyama, State-Building : Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 8-9.
178 Joel S. Migdal, "Strong States, Weak States: Power Accomodation," in Understanding Political 
Development, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (Illinois: Waveland Press, 1994), 394.
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Measuring the processes involved in extraction, reach, and allocation can help evaluate 
the political performance of a state. Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tammen note that an 
"effective government will achieve desired policy outcomes; a weak one will not," 
(because), "political performance emulates in the political and institutional arena," and 
weak states encompass weak political structures and poor performing institutions.179
Why is it that the political capacity of weak states seems lacking in resilience or 
show no signs of improvement, yet these states still survive against all odds? Samuel 
Huntington's early works on political development noticed that in the wake of 
decolonization, most of the newly independent states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
adopted the path of modernization as the only way out to achieve political stability and 
economic viability. As a result, modernization processes supported mobility in society, 
and urbanization and some efforts towards industrialization become visible in weak 
societies. Samuel Huntington argues that "economic development and political stability 
are two independent goals and progress towards one has no necessary connection with 
progress toward the other," it rather created an illusion among weak states.180
i
To create an order, there is need of sincere efforts by weak states themselves 
(meaning all stake holders, including civil society) to take serious responsibility, and 
there is also a need of "close collaboration" by the international community in fixing 
zones of fragility that lies with governability.181 A transparent governance system that 
maintains order, rule of law and legitimate monopoly, in addition to strengthening
179 Jacek Kugler and Ronald L. Tammen, The Performance o f Nations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2012), 9.
180 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 6.
181 Priscilla Magrath, "Beyond Governmentality: Building Theory for W eak and Fragile States," 
Anthropology Matters Journal 12, no. 2 (2010): 3.
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governance system, is important for other functional sectors of state, i.e. development, 
defense, diplomacy.
There are some serious but ad hoc efforts made indigenously in Africa. Such as, 
when Somalia faced collapse, with death squads and militias threatening its population, 
the local population used cultural or tribal codes to  establish "an alternative system" of 
order (with deterrence mechanisms against possible threats by rival clans/ tribes) 
called a hybrid "mediate state."182 The ad hoc but hybrid political order in a scenario of 
collapse shows a promising step through the establishment of an indirect government 
structure, while the center fails to form a formal order, stabilize political conditions, 
enforce rule of law, and establish its legitimate monopoly into peripheral areas.183
The role of indigenous associations in diffusing the social space is significantly 
important in improving the conditions of weak statehood. These associations, which 
reside in civil society, can become a resilient force in creating a viable order by laying 
the foundations for democratic norms. Subsequently, these norms provide a healthy 
base for "ethno-cultural pluralism," so the fruits of the entire process can bring 
different ethnic, tribal, and religious groups together to think on collective and 
congenial grounds to strengthen nationhood. Strengthening the nationhood will 
support the shaping of a political identity because both nation-building and nation- 
making are a very important dimension of a nation-state. They help to define the  
state's future course of action and what objectives and ambitions it has for potential
182 Menkhaus, "Local Security System in Somali East Africa," 68-70.
183 Andersen, Mpller, and Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, Security, and 
Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, 6.
growth as a unified nation.
Though it seems quite an idealistic narrative, the above example of hybrid 
political order makes a rational case that weak states could utilize the "symbiotic 
relationship between state and civil society,"184 as it proves that, even in the cases of 
"complete collapse of order" in a state, the "reemergence of intermediate social 
groups,... have come together with the definition and reassertion of state capacities, 
highlighting the close connection between civil society and stateness."185 In fact, the 
age of communication can facilitate to speed up the process, which ultim ately  
produces a political system that respects accountability as a part of renewed social 
contract.
The role of the international community is significant as well in establishing a 
close collaborative effort to support and monitor the improvement of weak states. As 
discussed earlier, international support in weak or fragile states has not achieved what 
was expected at the time of conception for developmental projects, even though 
support is witnessed through security and humanitarian interventions. The security 
interventions in the Bosnia war, Iraq war, and Afghan war are examples of this recent 
history. Similarly, humanitarian interventions w ere carried out in response to a number 
of natural catastrophes and violent conflicts within the states, for example, the number 
of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa to protect local populations who are at constant 
risk of ethnic/ tribal fights. The other substantive examples of humanitarian
184 Naomi Chazan, "Engaging the State: Associational Life in Sub-Saharan Africa," in State Power and 
Social Forces : Domination and Transformation in the Third World, ed. Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and 
Vivienne Shue (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 258.
185 Herbst, States and Power in Africa : Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, 255; Chazan, 
"Engaging the State: Associational Life in Sub-Saharan Africa," 278.
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interventions made were after natural calamities, such as the  one that hit Pakistan in 
2005, with 7.6 magnitude earthquake and 100,000 deaths, and Haiti in 2010, where a 
7.0 magnitude earthquake caused 100,000 to 316,000 deaths.
When considering interventions in conflict, it is a m atter of fact that w ar is a 
constant phenomenon in international politics. As Charles Tilly noted "war made the  
state, and the state made w ar."186 However, the tendency of major wars has reduced in 
the post-Cold war period, while intra-state level conflicts, rooted in ethnic or religious 
differences, have increased and pose greater threats to regions. The shift in the nature 
of war or conflict also changed the state's national interest priorities, which ensures 
future "trade expectations" and economic activities should not be disrupted.187 After 
all, states fundamentally extract resources and run state machinery depending on the  
smooth functioning of economic activities. Commenting on Charles Tilly's famous 
quote, Michael Mandelbaum explains the contemporary nature of intra-state conflicts 
and notes that:
"... institution with which war historically has been connected is the state", and 
it's the "sovereign states remain a central presence in human affairs at the end 
of the twentieth century. But in the societies that waged the modern era ’s 
major wars, the state has found a different purpose. It has become an economic 
institution. To spur production and manage redistribution has become its twin  
missions.”188
Interventions to support states are not always successful, but they have 
significance in controlling the spillover effects. Criticizing international organizations
186 Tilly, The Formation o f National States in Western Europe, 42.
187 Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," 
International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 6-7.
188 Michael Mandelbaum, "Is Major W ar Obsolete?," Survival 4, no. 4 (winter 1998-99): 25.
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and their lack of effectiveness and issues of powers, Peter Lyon argues that:
"...problems of trusteeship were the problems of power, of the responsibilities 
of the strong towards the weak. The unequal distribution of political and 
economic power in the world, which was the  fundamental basis of colonialism, 
has not been suddenly abolished by the accession of most colonies to political 
independence.... But the rich and powerful countries of the world are not 
thereby absolved from further responsibility towards those countries."189
In general, interventions are helpful and considered as "moral justification" to
assist a weak or a state in extreme need of help.190 These interventions provide legal
protection to insecure populations, and most of these "protected jurisdictions are
characteristic of post-colonial international society and also to a lesser extent of post-
Soviet Union international society."191 Interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq
(2003) were justified to change the repressive and tyrant regimes.192 W hen it comes to
humanitarian interventions, they "are selectivity on the basis of the 'national interests'
of the interveners."193 Many interventions face huge resistance with issues of violation
of sovereignty, and in some cases, the interventions are referred to as steps towards
"securitization of development," when external support should help in "Regulation of
sovereignty."194
Despite the limitations of interventions, whether it is a warring situation or
189 Kenneth Robinson quoted as, Lyon, "The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International 
Trusteeship," 106.
190 Alex J. Bellamy, "Ethics and Intervention: The Humanitarian Exception and the Problems of Abuse in 
the Case of Iraq," Journal o f Peace Research 41, no. 2 (Mar. 2004): 139.
191 Robert H. Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World o f States (Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 205.
192 Bellamy, "Ethics and Intervention: The Humanitarian Exception and the Problems of Abuse in the 
Case of Iraq," 141.
193 "Ethics and Intervention: The Humanitarian Exception and the Problems of Abuse in the Case of Iraq," 
145.
194 Andersen, "Dilemmas of Engagement in Fragile States," 37; Opello and Rosow, The Nation-State and  
Global O rder: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics, 205.
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humanitarian need, supporting international interventions through the UN and
creating surrogate sovereignty in collapsing or failing states, Peter Lyon writes:
"It is in the desperate situations of state collapse or near-collapse that the  
United Nations, or some other international body, is invoked to  act as a 
surrogate sovereign and support system in the face of anarchy and human 
misery - and the signs are that such situations are currently on the increase ...
UN trusteeship would almost certainly be an improvement on the anarchical 
conditions of the several quasi-states the world has now."195
The point of departure here is to stress that domestic efforts are needed to be
made by weak and fragile states through engaging its civil society or using a "state-in-
society" approach to build viable support. In the m eantim e, democratic societies can
assist in political development of institutions and democratic norms. It is im portant to
note that "democratizing societies" are always at risk of getting hijacked or losing the
democratization tempo under the influence of traditional "praetorian guards," "non-
democratic forces," or potentially "quasi-democratic," but cronies of corrupt political
elites. Thus proper nurturing and monitoring is needed to sensitize the population.
Today, most weak states are enthusiastically adopting democratic principles as
part of their constitutions, but they need to get rid of historical institutions of
domination specifically inherited from colonial times. If given support or a chance to
develop parliamentary institutions, democracy is more likely to endure and fragile
states can be "rescued by democratic" norms.196 Establishing a democratic order
requires patience and gradual devolution of power to state institutions. The order will
eventually create checks and balances between state pillars.
195 Lyon, "The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship," 106.
196 Paul Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, 1st ed. (New York: Harper, 
2009), 48.
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SUM UP: DILEMMAS OF FRAGILITY
The literature explains serious statehood deficiencies in the domains of services 
that are shaped through the provision of political goods primarily linked with security, 
political (governability), economy, and social welfare. The capacity, autonomy, 
legitimacy, and effectiveness of states determ ine their ability or willingness to provide 
basic public goods. Unwillingness to perform the basic functions of state certainly rings 
the alarm bells that something is wrong with state capability.
The dilemmas of weak pivot states are two pronged. The first, endogenous 
dilemmas are strong and enduring domestic troubles along the lines of the burdens of 
colonial traditions. The second, exogenous dilemmas, are inherent to the geographical 
pivot and become an inescapable factor; a "geo" phenomenon invites frequent 
external interferences and makes geography a burden on the state. The dilemmas of 
the weak state's fragility are influenced by multiple elements within the endogenous 
and exogenous realms, such as "political system, military and police, bureaucracy, pre­
colonial, colonial, and post-colonial histories, economic structure, cultural traditions, 
and relative position in the regional and international systems [which] shape[s] the 
extent of state control over social groups and the extent that social forces reshape, 
reinforce, or undermine state strength."197
The reviewed literature thoroughly identified prominent indicators such as 
corrupt incumbent political elites (wealthy and feudal) or praetorian guards (military  
dictators) manipulating state authority w ithout being checked and frequently using
197 Peter Dauvergne, Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies (Canberra, ACT: Allen & Unwin, 
1998), 2.
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violence to deter opposition and shun voices speaking for freedom and rights. 
Unfortunately, suppression was a means used by colonial rulers; once colonial rulers 
left, the power shifted to political elites or a praetorian system. Colonial powers 
retained their better relations with the new ruling elites, so the status quo was 
sustained. The tragic factor of weak statehood is a divided population with many weak 
states' nationhood shattered from the early days of independence when ethnic, 
religious, sectarian or inter-communal clashes erupted into violence and spread, which 
shows a divided society has weakened the nationhood due to regular violent clashes.
Despite all the transnational security fears emanating from weak and fragile 
states, the review shows that, first, fragility affects within the boundary of the weak 
state, because, even failed states are safer today from formal takeover by neighbor or 
regional force.198 This means "the crippled Leviathan, whose life-support system might 
give way at any tim e. But reports of its near-death seem decidedly prem ature -  state 
weakness has not meant state collapse."199 It implies that state weakness is essentially 
bad for the state itself, first, due to its own vulnerabilities, and then for others.
As a m atter of fact, the globalized world gets credit for helping nations to 
become more politically informed, awakened, and connected to other political 
communities or associations across the world. In times of awakening, states and 
incumbent political elites are well informed that the traditional policies of state based 
on exclusive authority will not get popular support. This is suggested by the recent
198 Jeffrey Herbst, "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice," in When States F a il: Causes and 
Consequences ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 308.
199 Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, 
137.
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turmoil in the Middle East, particularly, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, where the  
authoritarian regimes lost their power to mass mobilization.200 Mass mobilizations and 
constant political changes facilitate the establishment of new political orders. These 
recent trends of political participation show the growing democratic trends; however, 
the trends need careful treatm ent to establish an effective state order respecting the 
rule of law and supporting a transparent system.
To m eet the exigencies of a complex world, weak states will be favored if 
adopting the culture of global norms practiced widely by the global community, i.e. 
institutionalized market economy, democratic rule, and human rights norms.201 It will 
support the weak states to create an effective order prone to ethno-cultural pluralistic 
and democratic norms (pluralistic political culture). The reason to support the  
argument that most weak and fragile states also face challenges is due to their multiple 
nation or heterogeneous societies; such diversity should in fact be viewed as a 
strength, not a fragmenting and centrifugal factor. The fragmenting and centrifugal 
forces emerge due to weakness in the state's capacity and political vacuums in certain 
regional settings within the state. Therefore a thriving, pluralistic political culture is 
strongly advocated, which involves participatory and inclusive forms of governance. In 
this regard, international cooperation is crucial to nourish a viable democratic political 
culture. Therefore, international support and cooperation will facilitate "global 
awakening to the better things available" to needy states, so that they can adopt some
200 Serfaty, "The Folly of Forgetting the West," 39.
201 Neumann and Sending, Governing the Global P olity : Practice, Mentality, Rationality, 178.
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useful norms and lessons from  enriched democracies.202 The process ends up not only 
enhancing the capability o f a weak state, but also supporting the building global 
capacity.
202 Serfaty, "The Folly of Forgetting the West," 36.
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CHAPTER III
CASE STUDY - MYANMAR: IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL IDENTITY, OBSOLETING PARIAH AND 
GARRISON STATE TO RECAST DEMOCRATIC NORMS
"If the arm y shoots, it has no tradition of shooting into the air. It  shoots straight 
to kill."
General Ne W in1
"I would like every country in the world to recognize the fact that the people of 
Burma are being shot down for no reason at all."
Aung San Suu Kyi2
“We will extend a hand if  you are willing to unclench your fist. And over the last 
year and a half, a dramatic transition has begun, as a dictatorship o f five decades 
has loosened its grip. Under President Thein Sein, the desire fo r  change has been 
m et by an agenda fo r  reform. A civilian now  leads the government, and a 
parliam ent is asserting itself. The once-outlawed National League fo r  Democracy 
stood in an election, and Aung San Suu Kyi is a M em ber of Parliament. Hundreds 
o f prisoners o f conscience have been released, and forced labor has been 
banned. Preliminary cease-fires have been reached with ethnic armies, and new  
laws allow fo r a more open economy.
President Barack Obama3
INTRODUCTION
On February 12,1947, the Panglong Agreement established the Union of Burma, 
now known as the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. At Panglong, the representatives 
of the Shan, Kachin, and Chin ethnic states agreed with the government of Burma to  
unite the fragmented or autonomous principalities into a union with no expectation that
1 During the valedictory address, on 23 July 1988 in, Shelby Tucker, B urm a: The Curse o f Independence 
(London ; Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2001), 228.
2 Burma : The Curse o f Independence (London ; Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2001), 229.
3 "Remarks by President Obama at the University of Yangon".
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the naive commitment to Panglong would later become a curse. The agreem ent assured 
greater autonomy vested to frontier areas of these representing states. The unification 
of principalities is another example of continuous disintegration and re-integration that 
Myanm ar has experienced in various historical cycles over the past centuries. A quick 
overview of the past century shows that the last M yanm ar dynasty disintegrated during 
1824-1886, and meanwhile, re-integrated as a British colonized Burma until 1842.
Burma again fragmented during the horrific war between British-lndia and Japanese 
rule, and despite the Panglong Agreement and the internal ethnic disputes with the 
center, Myanmar remained fragmented until 1962. The military takeover in 1962 and its 
decades long rule ostensibly projected to re-unite a socially divided Myanm ar. However, 
the recent history of military rule itself left scars o f traum atic memories in the hearts 
and minds of the people o f Myanmar.
Since 2010 Myanmar has shown some flexibility to reform its praetorian  
structure of political system. Soon after gaining independence and establishing the 
union of states, the union became entangled with ethno-nationalist conflicts. To clarify, 
the notion of union remains differing to various socio-political groups and antagonistic 
interpretations "from quasi-centralized civilian rule, to authoritarian unitary military 
control, to minority proposed but rejected federal structures, to blatant secessionist 
attempts, to ambiguous relationships."4 The ambiguities are a result of the brief 
honeymoon phase of independence followed by ethno-nationalist feuds and political 
deadlocks, which provided justification for the military regime to take over power.
4 David I. Steinberg and Hongwei Fan, Modern China-Myanmor Relations : Dilemmas o f M utual 
Dependence (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2012), 3.
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Democratic institutions experienced decay at their nascent stage. Throughout the Cold 
W ar period until today, most of Myanmar's history has been dominated by the  
centralized rule of the military establishment. The military establishment has succeeded 
in enforcing rigid centralized power that engaged in a brutal war with its own people 
isolating itself from the rest of the world community, and becoming a pariah state.
The world community witnessed widespread repressive state policies, which 
caused human rights violations, political revenges, and endemic corruptions within the  
governance structure. Myanmar has an abundance of natural resources and is located in 
a geostrategic location between two of the world's largest populous and growing 
economies. Despite being blessed with a richness of resources and strategic pivot-ness, 
the people of Myanm ar face ultra-poverty conditions and meager economic growth due 
to a corrupted order established under the military junta. The relative deprivation and 
frustrations over human rights violations are exacerbated by a continuous downfall of 
the state's political, economic, cultural, and environmental capacities.
To date Myanmar has faced continuous political transitions since the period of 
high colonialism and then the Japanese occupation followed by independence, the Cold 
W ar, and obsoleting pariah state status until recent reform policy initiatives. The 
country's status as a pariah state began to be overcome when in late 2000s the 
international community welcomed the democratic commitment assured by the 
government of Myanmar. In October 2013, during the closing of the East Asia Summit, 
the president of M yanm ar/ Burma, Thein Sein, accepted the gavel of ASEAN affirming its 
positive commitments towards becoming a responsible member of the global
I l l
community. In November 2013, the government of M yanm ar released 69 political 
prisoners and affirmed that a committee is deliberating on granting amnesty to 
remaining prisoners by the end of 2013. It is im portant to remember that anti-change 
forces always resist reforms. Though the journey of transformation is long, a sincere job 
well done is only half done.
To understand the fracturedness of statehood in Myanmar and its regional 
implications, the study requires looking through historical trends. The historical 
episodes explain that Myanmar's colonial and postcolonial political processes resulted in 
the formation of a weak union. The union struggled from within because diverse ethnic 
groups were not formally constructed together as one nation, but rather sought their 
own security and the protection of individual communities from a larger or dominant 
one. Additionally, the decolonization period shows an apparent farewell to external 
powers. In reality external influence remained, continuing invisibly in the domestic 
affairs of Myanmar. The military regime was seen on a number of occasions undoing 
these external links or creating an image for society of detaching from history reminders 
of any external relations. Changing the name of Burma to Myanmar, and Rangoon to 
Yangon, are some examples found in recent years.
COLONIZATION TO DECOLONIZATION: END OF EUPHORIA AND BEGINNING OF 
INSTABILITY
During the mid-eleventh century, the Pagan Emperor Anawrahta Minsaw  
established a unified Buddhist empire by gradually absorbing the peripheral
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principalities of the Irrawaddy valley, which encompasses Myanmar's contemporary 
mainland. However, the Pagan Empire could not entirely incorporate the princely states 
of Kachin, Arakanese, and a few others facing external challenges. M any of the  
challenges primarily emanated from  the Arakanese, Mons, Mongols, Shans, and so 
forth. The decline of the Pagan Empire was initiated due to internal problems and 
centrifugal forces trying to break out, which eventually proved the empire's incapability 
to cope with domestic and external challenges.5
The Pagan Empire established the strong roots of Buddhism and religious 
tolerance in the culture of Myanmar. Eventually, this notion of tolerance provided 
conditions for external forces to control the region or perm it flexibility for ruling elites 
to establish despotic orders.6 The external powers found the domestic socio-political 
environment more conducive to micro-management in the political system and reaped 
the fruits of Myanmar's geographical "pivot-ness." Ultimately, by January 1st, 1886, the  
once Pagan Empire encompassing the majority of Burmans was annexed to British India 
as its province. Myanm ar became a British colony and lost its complete sovereignty in 
three phases, as a result of three conflicts, the Anglo-Burmese W ar of 1824-1826  
(gaining Assam, Manipur, Tenassrim and Arakan); the Second Anglo-Burmese war of 
1852 (with the annexation of Pegu province, which the British called "lower Burma"); 
and the Third Anglo-Burmese W ar of 1885 (complete annexation of the remaining upper
5 Michael Aung-Thwin, Pagan : The Origins o f Modern Burma (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1985), 28.
6 Alan Warren, Burma, 1942 : The Road from  Rangoon to Mandalay  (London ; New York: Continuum, 
2011), 4.
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Burma territory).7 There was a famous rumor after the third Anglo-Burmese w ar of 1885 
that the "Burmese King was not aware that a war had been begun until he heard gunfire 
just outside his palace closure."8 The annexation of upper Burma was not a casual 
business, as the British enjoyed a very calm situation in the aftermath of the two earlier 
Anglo-Burmese wars. It was reported that after the final conquest of 1885 British forces 
w ere welcomed as "deliverers from tyranny."9 M any women were reported to be 
harassed, young men executed for their resistance, and other Burmese psychologically 
tortured by the photographing of those executed.10 During the colonial interregnum, a 
political vacuum emerged resulting in a challenge of popular legitimacy to colonial rule, 
because the British accommodated Burma as a province of India and ignored its 
historical identity.11 The nature of British unpopularity can be traced through the people 
of upper Burma, who became rebellious; the guerilla forces targeted British military 
troops and their garrison posts.12 Despite a British reinforcement of 40,000 troops, 
tactics to shoot anyone found possessing arms, and threats to burn the entire village as 
punishment, such actions backfired.13
7 David I. Steinberg, B urm a/M yanm ar: W hat Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 27; Michael Aung-Thwin and Maitrii Aung-Thwin, A History o f M yanm ar since 
Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformatons (London, UK: Reaktion Books, 2012), 178-88; William J. 
Topich and Keith A. Leitich, The History o f Myanmar, The Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations 
(Santa Barbara, Calif.: Greenwood, 2013), 44-48.
8 Michael W . Charney, Powerful Learning : Buddhist Literati and the Throne in Burma's Last Dynasty, 1752- 
1885  (Ann Arbor: Centers for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 2006), 256.
9 Thant Myint-U, The Making o f Modern Burma (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 198.
10 Charney, Powerful Learning: Buddhist Literati and the Throne in Burma's Last Dynasty, 1 7 5 2 -1 8 8 5 ,157.
11 David 1. Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in M yanm ar (Norwalk, CT: East Bridge, 
2006), 49.
12 Christina Fink, Living Silence in Burma : Surviving under M ilitary Rule, 2nd ed. (Chiang Mai, Thailand; 
London ; New York: Silkworm Books; Zed Books, 2009), 13.
13 Myint-U, The Making o f Modern Burma, 198; Topich and Leitich, The History o f Myanm ar, 49.
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By 1890 British forces comprised of minority ethnic groups and Indian soldiers 
subdued the resistance. Over this period of Anglo-Burmese wars, colonial rule gradually 
altered Burma's political-economic and social system. After the second Anglo-Burmese 
war, colonial rule experienced a sudden rise of a rice exporting economy. In lower 
Burma, under British rule, there was a 600% increase in acreage under cultivation.14 A 
huge influx of domestic migration from upper Burma to Lower Burma took place in 
order to benefit economic gains. However, the new settlements had to follow colonial 
regulations, not the traditional accustomed village style of headman dealing villages. 
British rule appointed its own headman, called an agent. Under the "colonial village 
act," British rule modified a number of traditional practices. Among these changes, 
"Shiko," a traditional salutation supposed to be observed for sacred Buddha, monks and 
entitled elders, was now made mandatory for ordinary Burmese to perform to "British 
officers as recognition of submission to British mastery."15 In addition, the colonial 
village act also required obeying the appointed political agent; villagers would render 
duties as night watchmen in the assigned areas of village. Moreover, villagers were 
responsible for providing inter-village transportation, food, and other materials on 
arrival of British military or civil officials. Punishment of villagers w ithout trial was a 
normal judicial form at for political agents.16
In response to many exploitative acts, cultural and religious-driven factors 
became fundamental Burmese resentments that challenged British rule. These
14 Michael W. Charney, A History o f Modem  Burma (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 6.
15 A History o f Modern Burma (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 7.
16 Ibid.
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resentments later transformed into nationalist movements that created anti-colonial 
force towards independence of Myanmar. M any Buddhist Burmans referred to the  
colonial period as persistently distorting their cultural and religious identities. The influx 
of immigrants from other British colonial regions, like India and China, gradually 
changed the demographic structure of main cities. The consensus of 1872 shows that 
more than two-thirds of Rangoon's population was comprised of Burmese, and by the 
1920s the majority of residents were of Indian descent. By 1937 out of 400,000  
residents in Rangoon, only 127,000 residents were Burmese.17 In addition, many 
Christian missionaries were allowed to convert ethnic minorities at frontier areas to  
Christianity and promote the positive image of Europe.
In India, British rule was already working on educational reforms to adopt 
secular forms of education and encouraged similar patterns in Burma too. Secular 
education was either welcomed or encouraged among the colonial ruling elites to be 
trained. The repercussion was a Burmese society culturally, intellectually and politically 
divided between "British educated colonial elites and Buddhist traditionalist^]."18 
Historian Michael W. Charney (2009) emphasized the nature of external involvements 
that changed the domestic socio-political and economic dynamics of Burmese society. 
He writes that the colonial authority backed the "broad intrusion of foreign institutions 
and practices that regulated or interfered with rural life to a degree greater than any 
indigenous, central institution had attem pted in the pre-colonial past."19 Hence,
17 A History o f Modern Burma, 22; Topich and Leitich, The History o f Myanmar, 52-53.
18 The History o f Myanmar, 52-53.
19 Charney, A History o f Modern Burma, 8.
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Myanm ar in the past and present has persistently experienced foreign interference; 
however, the level of interference was higher during colonial times which resulted in the 
establishment of a mixture of a modern-traditional social milieu.
In 1906, Buddhist monks established the Young Men's Buddhist Association 
(YMBA), a model copying the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA). Initially the 
objective of YMBA was to address society's religious and social issues; however, with the 
passage of tim e, it transformed into a political movement. Many young lawyers,
Buddhist monks, and nationalists transformed YMBA into a political association called 
the General Council of Burmese Association (GCBA) to promote nationalistic 
objectives.20 Until the 1930s the domestic unrest and riots were well-directed by 
Buddhist monks. British officials agreed that Buddhist monks were chiefs among the 
resistance groups.21 Most Burmans believed that British rule not only transformed their 
culture to adjust a newly constructed social milieu but also became disrespectful to  
Buddhism. Instances show the blending of English words or practices into Burmese 
society started to alter the social structure. Terming Burma a new British-lndian 
province itself constructed a new identity over a historical one.22 M oreover, British 
officials or soldiers did not take off their shoes while entering pagodas, monasteries, or 
other Buddhist sacred places. Buddhist tradition calls for the respect of places of 
worship by entering with bare fee t.23 In 1916, an active member of YMBA and young 
lawyer U Thein Maung resisted the shoe question in response to the colonial authority's
20 Fink, Living Silence in Burma : Surviving under M ilitary Rule, 13.
21 Myint-U, The Making o f Modern Burma, 205.
22 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M yanm ar since Ancient Times: Traditions and  
Transformatons, 198.
23 Fink, Living Silence in Burma : Surviving under Military Rule, 13.
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erected banner stated that "No one is perm itted to  wear shoes in this Pagoda but 
Englishmen and Asiatic Europeans." In resistance Maung placed a banner that inscribed 
the banning of shoes in pagodas for everyone in order to replace a banner erected by 
the colonial authroities at Shwe Sandaw Pagoda in Prome.24
Two monks, U Ottama and U Wisara who had been exposed to Western culture 
and political norms due to foreign tours, decided to use political platforms to protect 
the threatened religious sanctity of Buddhism. Their political maneuvering did not align 
with colonial rule. They were imprisoned for anti-colonial speeches and actions. During 
imprisonment, U Wisara called for a hunger strike against the  colonial regulation that 
forbade the wearing of monk's robes. His strike lasted for 166 days, when he died on 
September 19th, 1929. As a result, a revolutionary mindset started to take shape across 
Burmese society, even those "Burmese who had not concerned themselves with politics 
before" stepped into the nationalist struggle against the colonial rule.25 The nationalist's 
movements accelerated its pace, and British rule experienced its first armed rural 
rebellion in 1930 under Hsaya (teacher) San. Hsaya San was a traditional-medical 
practitioner and active member of GCBA.26 During the rebellion he disguised himself as 
a monk named U Nyana to escape his arrest. The colonial force suppressed the rebellion 
and tried Hsaya San.27 He was sentenced to death, and on November 28th, 1931, hanged 
in Tharrawaddy jail.28 The U Wisara and Hsaya San events were significantly symbolic to
24 Charney, A History o f Modern Burma, BO.
25 Fink, Living Silence in Burma : Surviving under M ilitary Rule, 13.
26 Charney, A History o f Modern Burma, 13.
27 Andrew Selth, "Myanmar's Police Forces: Coercion, Continuity and Change," Contemporary Southeast 
Asia: A Journal o f International and Strategic Affairs 34, no. 1 (April 2012): 55.
28 Charney, A History o f Modern Burma, 17.
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gather nationalistic fervor, and the events were also substantially supported and 
published by the Burmese press.
To satisfy the Burmese nationalists, the Government of Burma Act of 1935 
separated Burma from India. It should be noted that Burmese nationalists developed a 
positive nationalist inspiration from political activities of the Indian Congress party and 
Mahatm a Gandhi; eventually the British realized the rise o f political protests in Burma 
too. It became one of factors that lead to the separation of Burma from  India.29 The act 
came into force in 1937. The Governor retained executive powers, and the new act 
established two legislative houses. However, the legislatures were subject to veto by the 
Governor and Secretary of State.30 In a way, Burma was separated from  India as a 
province, and gained a half-autonomy with less legislative or governing powers.
Unhappy young nationalists started to look for help from neighboring Asian countries. 
While 1939 saw the start of the Second World W ar, Dr. Ba M aw (who later held 
government position during the Japanese occupation) created the Burma Freedom Bloc 
Organization (BFBA) under the secretary-ship of Aung San. The objective of BFBA was to 
set a clear tim eframe for independence from British rule, as Britain was engaged in the 
Second World War, but the proposal for independence was turned down.31
In the following years, Aung San flew  to Japan and recruited his thirty comrades 
mainly from Burman ethnic group, which shows a division of Burmese ethnicities since 
the early days of independence. These thirty comrades w ere  trained under Japanese
29 Steinberg, B urm a/M yanm ar: What Everyone Needs to Know, 30.
30 Fink, Living Silence in Burma : Surviving under M ilitary Rule, 15; Charney, A History o f Modern Burma,
41.
31A History of Modern Burma, 48.
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authorities at Bangkok to learn "command, combat, espionage, guerilla warfare, and 
political tactics."32 It might be the reason that Burmans fe lt segregation from other 
ethnic groups as British rule always remained doubtful towards Burmans and used other 
ethnicities to maintain rule.33 Therefore, most of the nationalists, particularly Burmans, 
were striving to get more representation in the legislature because, by and large, 
Burmans believed that "British policy to dismiss Burmans from the armed forces 
(deliberately) segregated the races (see table 5)."34
Table 5: Ethnic Composition of the Armed Forces in Burma, 1931 & 1941
Ethnic Composition o f afce&rmed 
Forces in Burma, 1931
Ethnic Composition of the Aimed 
Forces «n Burma, 1941
Ethnic No. in Proportion Proportion No. in Proportion Proporl
Group Army of Army of Army of Army of
Burman 472 1 2 .3 0
Population
753L1 23.71
Populal
75 .11
inrfudiqjg r  ^ f-  ‘  ' “X . ' *
Shans and
japans
• * '
Karen 1.448 37.74 9.34 2,797 35.03 9.34
Chin 868 22.96 2 3 8 3&ES8 15.76 2.38
Kachin 881 22.96 1.05 852 10.61 1.05
Other 168 4 3 8 12.12 168 2 AO
M inorities
Yunnanese
Otinese
Indians
Total 3,837 100 100
32
m &r - 
2,578
0.04
32.29
a io
Source: Mary P. Callahan (2003). Making Enemies : War and State Building in Burma
32 Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies : W ar and State Building in Burma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), 48.
33 Steinberg, B urm a/M yanm ar: What Everyone Needs to Know, 29.
34 Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma, 35.
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The British, who neglected raising a Burmese Army and relied heavily on Indian 
forces, came too little too late in 1937 as they rushed to establish a "Burma Command," 
which eventually led to the loss of Burma to the Japanese.35 Even after the 
establishment of the Burma Command, the ethnic disparity was visible and divided the  
country suffering until now. For instance, in the Battalion of Burma Rifles to command 
more than 6,000 soldiers, out of tw enty-tw o officers and others ranked seven hundred 
and fifteen officers belonging to non-Burman ethnicities or foreigners deliberately 
ignoring the 65% of Burmans. This means almost 50% of officers were of Karen 
ethnicity, 25% Chin and 25% Kachin, while only 4 officers w ere of Burman ethnicity.36
Aung San established the Burma Independence Army (BIA) under Japanese 
training and assistance to liberate it from British rule. In December 1941, Aung San and 
his BIA entered Burma with the help of 60,000 Japanese troops that helped Japan to  
occupy Burma and wrest it from British rule. By 1942 the collapse of the colonial system 
of governance was complete and was replaced by a BIA administration of young 
nationalists under Japanese supervision. Crime rates reached their peak during the first 
half of 1942, as more than 15,000 convicted prisoners were released from jail.37 Over 
the years, the law and order situation could not be controlled under BIA, and the brief 
euphoria from self-governance faded away under Japanese occupation. BIA engaged in 
communal riots as they were collecting money and arms to  support BIA. Unfortunately,
35 Making Enemies : War and State Building in Burma, 40.
36 Ibid.
37 Making Enemies : W ar and State Building in Burma, 52.
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"they turned on everyone suspected of British sympathies;" in this regard, people in 
Karen suffered the most due to their allegiance to British rule.38
The Japanese banned BIA from addressing law and order situations and later 
disbanded BIA soldiers were remobilized as the Burma Defense Army (BDA) to support 
the Japanese campaign in the Second W orld W ar.39 However, the BDA's w ar office 
gradually became independent and Aung San more in control than the Japanese, which 
played a crucial role later in defeating the Japanese during anti-Japanese resistance. 
Interestingly, when many of the BIA officers were sent to OTS (Officers Training School) 
in Mingaladon, the Japanese instructors had some harsh attitudes towards the soldiers 
and slapped officers during training.40 These behaviors increased anti-Japanese 
sentiments among the cadre of officers at OTS, which eventually were vented during the 
war against the Japanese occupation along the United Front. In addition, the people in 
Burma noticed that the popular Japanese slogan "Asia for Asians" was no more honored 
in Burma, as it was propagated in China.41 Overall anti-Japanese sentim ent grew within  
the military and civilian circles in Burma.
During the last years of the Second World W ar between 1943-1945, the British 
and U.S. clandestinely armed and trained local guerillas to launch the attacks against the 
Japanese. As in the past, because the frontier areas of northern Burma with dense 
jungle remained problematic, relying on the local population was a good option to fight
38 Tucker, Burma : The Curse o f Independence, 43.
39 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M yanm ar since Ancient Times: Traditions and 
Transformatons, 235.
40 Callahan, Making Enemies : War and State Building in Burma, 63.
41 Donovan Webster, The Burma R oad: The Epic Story o f the China-Burma-lndia Theater in World W ar li 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 48.
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back. As Winston Churchill remarked, "the idea of fighting the Japanese in the jungles of 
northern Burma [is like] to a man going into the w ater to fight a shark."42 The United 
Front against the Japanese was comprised of Communist Party Cadres, the American 
Kachin Rangers, the British Kachin Levies, the Chines, the Socialists, the Indian Army, the 
British Fourteen Army, British Special Forces, the Anti-Fascist Organization Leaders 
(AFO, during post war period May 1945, the AFO renamed as Anti-Fascist People's 
Freedom League (AFPFL)), and young officers in the Tatmadaw (BIA) 43 During the post­
independence period, many of these groups would later start fighting over political 
power in a unified state of Burma.
Despite the important role of various factions that fought against the Japanese, 
the role of Aung San is crucial. San successfully established a future national army for 
Burma and also secretly raised anti-Japanese resistance in the shadows of Japanese rule. 
Lt. Gen. William Slim, commander of the Fourteenth Army acknowledged the astute 
maneuver by Aung San. During the anti-Japanese campaign, the terrible w ar in Burma 
caused enormous destruction. M ore than 80% of cities required rebuilding. The horrific 
war in Burma caused the deaths of 27,000 Anglo-Indian soldiers out of 606,000, while 
the death toll reached 73,909 due to wounds, tropical diseases, and lack of medication. 
Japan lost more soldiers; 144,000 were dead and 56,000 wounded. It is said that, when 
elephants fight, it is grass that suffers; similarly, the people of Burma were inflicted with
42 Edward M . Young, Meiktila 1945: The Battle to Liberate Burma (Botley, Oxford: Osprey, 2004), 8.
43 Callahan, Making Enemies : W ar and State Building in Burma, 70.
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the greatest rates of death. Over one million people died due to battles, war crimes, 
famine, and diseases during this war period.44
Despite all, the British fought back, getting Burma to  preserve and restore its 
imperial power in east (Asia), and slightly fading over due to  the decline of the British 
empire. Its global retrenchment sped up the wave of independence and em powered  
decolonization movements, becoming a turning point for the unification of Burma and 
its elevation as a sovereign state in January 1948.45 Before that, in January 1947, Aung 
San and the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee signed the Attlee-Aung San 
Agreement in London, which assured the independence of Burma in a year's tim e. In the 
meantime, the Karens also aspired to seek independence, while the Shans, Kachins, and 
Chins whom also wanted to be represented at the Attlee-Aung San talks w ere not 
allowed; therefore the agreement was not considered binding for them .46 Similarly, it 
can be noted that during the early years of nationalist moves, divided factionalism  
existed within the GCBA during 1930s.47 It was obvious to expect the division along 
ethnic lines when the entire region was on the course of independence, especially when 
the political destiny of each ethnic state was to be determined.
In response to grievances by frontier area people, Aung San led a delegation to  
meet representatives of the Shan, Khachin, and Chin groups at Panglong in Shan state 
(see the Appendix A for Panglong Agreement). The Panglong Agreement between Shan,
44 Frank McLynn, The Burma Campaign : Disaster into Triumph, 1942-45  (New Haven; London: Yale 
University Press, 2011), 1.
45 The Burma Campaign : Disaster into Triumph, 1942-45  (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 
2011), 456.
46 Tucker, Burma : The Curse o f Independence, 121.
47 Topich and Leitich, The History o f Myanmar, 55.
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Kachin, and Chin ethnic representatives and the Burmese government, signed on 
February 12th, 1947, allowed them  to join the union of Burma. Aung San assured the 
representatives a guarantee of representation, financial aid, and full autonomy under a 
transitional government that later became a curse fo r not knowing that the ethnicities 
would be fighting to protect their territories from the  central government.48 For many 
nationalists, they believe the Panglong agreement helped unify the divided union into a 
greater Burma; however, in contrast, many ethnic communities on frontier regions 
believe the Panglong agreement was the beginning of new ethnic troubles in the newly 
emerging state.
In retrospect, the Attlee-Aung San Agreement outlined a road map for the 
Panglong meeting. According to para 8 (b) of Attlee-Aung San agreement, "the leaders 
and representatives of the peoples of the Frontier Areas shall be asked ... to express 
their views upon the forms of association with the Government of Burma which they 
consider acceptable during the transition period [to independence]."49 The preamble of 
the Panglong agreement also reflects the provision of independence given to Frontier 
Areas, as the preamble notes that: "the members of the conference, believing that 
freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins and the Chins by their 
immediate co-operation with the Interim Burmese Government, have accordingly ... 
agreed..."50
48 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M yanm ar since Ancient Times: Traditions and 
Transformatons, 237.
49 Tucker, Burma : The Curse o f Independence, 123.
50 Ibid.
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The agreement, in return for cooperation to  joining the union, guaranteed full 
autonomy, as article (V) of the agreement ensured the "full autonomy in internal 
administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle (see the Panglong 
Agreement in appendix)." Shelby Tucker emphasizes and echoes the similar voice of 
Frontier Areas, who believed that "they were assenting to early independence from  
Britain and the perpetuation of their freedom from British and Burman interference in 
their internal affairs; that, whatever commitment, it was not to permanent and 
irrevocable integration in an independent Union of Burma ruled by Burmans."51
Interestingly, during the early years of independence, the Union of Burma faced 
great complications because, on the one hand, the original structure of the Union 
allowed Shan and Karenni to secede after 10 years, while on the other hand, it denied 
the same rights to the rest of the contending ethnic groups. Moreover, citizenship rights 
to Chinese and Indian and Muslim Rohingya populations w ere denied as non-native 
Burmese ethnicities.52 Furthermore, 10 years after independence, when the military 
took control as a caretaker it sensed that Shan and Kayak ethnicities were trying to 
secede and break away from the union, which eventually justified the military coup 
against U Nu's government.53 Therefore the Panglong agreement's com m itm ent to join 
the Union vindicated the fractures within the Union. Fracturedness of statehood 
ultimately witnessed a backlash to the democratic process and political developm ent in 
the new state.
51 Ibid.
52 Topich and Leitich, The History o f Myanmar, 72.
53 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M yanm ar since Ancient Times: Traditions and 
Transformatons, 246.
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After clinging to support from  Frontier Areas through the Panglong pact, Aung 
San became de facto head of tw o dominant organizations, the AFPFL political party and 
Burma National Army (BNA). The scheduled national elections of April 1947 gave a clear 
victory to Aung San's Anti-Fascist party, elected to the assembly. On June 1947, AFPFL 
passed a majority resolution to leave the Commonwealth, severing relations with the  
British Empire.54 Two months immediately after the elections, political rivals 
assassinated the thirty-two year old Burmese national hero, Aung San, along with six 
cabinet members, during a meeting of the executive Council at Secretariat building in 
Rangoon. These unwelcome political episodes gradually plunged the newly emerging 
state into political chaos, though the British, as agreed through Attlee-Aung San 
Agreement, granted independence to the Union of Burma on January 4 th, 1948. But the  
fate of the Frontier Areas within the Union was not clear, and it was the beginning of a 
new internal conflict by the newly constructed nation.
Prime Minister U Nu took charge of the fragile state that hosted diverse groups 
of fractured nationhood. Despite being the Prime Minister who replaced Aung San after 
his assassination, Nu gathered widespread support both in rural and urban corners for 
his determination to tackle issues of corruption and bad governance. But a persistent 
psychological threat of foreign intervention and domestic unrest, prompted by military 
institutions, motivated him to give the military a bigger role in politics. For instance, 
soon after independence, the Karen-Mon State demanded for more territories in 
Tennasserim area, some parts of Irrawaddy districts and claimed areas from lower
54 A History o f Myanm ar since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformatons, 237.
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Burma. Finally, in 1949 the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) actively 
engaged in an armed rebellion against the government and took control of most of 
Rangoon.55 U Nu's government faced tremendous challenges at multiple fronts including 
the issues of a weak federation and the breakout of civil w ar due to ethnic groups 
seeking autonomy or independence along ideological lines.56 Civil w ar was also 
aggravated by the armed struggle of communist party factions. The red flag communist 
faction, a splinter of Communist Party of Burma (CPB) had already launched their anti­
government struggle in March 1946 under the leadership Thakin Soe. The remaining 
CPB became the white flag communist party led by Thakin Than Tun and started armed 
struggle in March 1948, leading around 15,000 armed fighters declaring themselves the 
people's liberation Army of Burma. The CPB leadership and members believed that 
Burma has become a quasi-colonial and quasi-feudalistic society in the post­
independence period.57
The role of the CPB cannot be underestimated in understanding its role in setting 
back Myanmar's nascent democratic regime in the 1950s. The CPB enjoyed strong 
support by communist China, and w ithout a doubt, the democratization process in 
Myanmar is primarily reliant on Chinese attitudes as well.58 Because it has a long history, 
China plays the role of a big brother in trying to micro-manage Myanmar's policies, 
denying democratic voices true representation. In the early years of independence, 
despite Burma's warm relations with China, M ao considered the neutralist policy of
55 A History o f M yanm ar since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformatons, 239.
56 Topich and Leitich, The History o f Myanmar, 71.
57 Nakanishi, Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution : The State and M ilitary in Burma, 1962-1988, 51-52.
58 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations : Dilemmas o f Mutual Dependence, xviii.
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Burma as pro-W estern. China was not motivated that, in a tim e of polarized worlds, one 
can stay neutral. Therefore China's Communist Party (CCP) portrayed Aung San's 
nationalistic movement as traitorous and U Nu as a "running dog" of imperialism. The 
CCP supported Burma's Communist party as legitimate representation of a true  
revolutionary army. Mao believed that w ithout the CPB's revolutionary change, Burma 
would remain a semi-independent country.59
TATMADAW: IN THE MAKING OF A GARRISON AND PARIAH STATE
The effects of colonial policies of divide and rule could be witnessed in Myanmar, 
which are some of the fundamental factors o f fractured statehood. In addition, the 
protection of praetorian society by military junta became another prime factor that 
further weakened the state foundations in the post-colonial period. From 1962 to 2011, 
the military or low profile dictators directly or indirectly ruled Myanmar through two  
military coups, 1962 and 1988.60 However, the military involvement in politics has a 
history prior to independence, as was noted earlier when Myanmar's military 
organization (Tatmadaw) was established to seek independence. History and the role of 
the military before, during, and after independence became a perfect match for military 
elites to retain their influence during post-colonial times.
Once the military formally stepped in as a self-declared legitimate actor in 
domestic politics and sidelined the democratic forces, the foundation was laid for a 
garrison state. According to  Harold Lasswell, a garrison state is a "world in which the
59 Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas o f M utual Dependence, 13-14.
60 Nakanishi, Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution : The State and M ilitary in Burma, 1962-1988, 2.
129
specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society."61 This means the  
military as an institution is specialized in drills that function primarily through coercive 
applications, repression, and violence.62 Political suppression by any means cannot be 
neglected under military rule; in fact, political repression remains a useful tool to  
maintain the praetorian nature of political order by diminishing any possible resistance. 
Similarly, since 1962 onwards, civil society in M yanm ar experienced various episodes of 
human rights violations, even before (mentioned in the colonial section, the role of BIA 
during the Japanese occupation) and after independence, or military connivance 
towards violent unrest against minority groups. In a way, the military organization had a 
positive posture in the eyes of the people, who believed in the national sanctity of the  
military organization because of its founding father and national hero General Aung San. 
Though, after establishing the military organization, Aung San was assassinated six 
months before independence, his leadership succeeded in establishing a unified 
nationalist movement that had later helped liberate the country.
It is important to understand the active role of the military in the politics of 
Myanmar, which provides an intellectual base to analyze the praetorian structure and 
policies implemented in Myanmar. In this regard, Tatmadaw's (Myanmar's Armed 
Forces) role and actions need to be explored to better understand the harsh policies 
that Myanmar has witnessed over the past five decades. As Myanmar opens towards 
the rest of the world, many political mysteries will be unraveled. Hence, the political 
intricacies of Myanm ar can be portrayed through the famous words of form er US
61 Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," The American Journal o f Sociology 46, no. 4 (Jan. 1941): 455.
62 Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," 2.
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Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, that the world still is in a phase to distinguish 
between "known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns" about 
Myanmar's armed forces. Andrew Selth explained Myanmar's case since the first 
military coup of 1962 to recent developments. According to  Selth, on 1962's coup, much 
of the world community is informed and aware about "known knowns," however, "the 
Tatmadaw's role since the abortive 1988 pro-democracy uprising is still a large number 
of "known unknowns." Also, M yanm ar has its share of mysteries, and its armed forces 
continue to surprise observers, reflecting the many "unknown unknowns"."63
a. THE 1962 COUP: A FORMAL STEP TOWARDS THE MAKING OF A GARRISON STATE 
The episodes of known and unknown military ventures in domestic politics 
begins with General Ne Win, who was earlier involved in suppressing the rebellious 
armed struggle of KNDO in 1949, the military intervention that helped U Nu avert the  
collapse of his elected government.64 In fact, on September 26th, 1958, U Nu invited 
Gen. Ne Win and his military to form a caretaker setup to resolve the law and order 
situation and return power to civilian government. Moreover, the Tatm adaw  proclaimed 
its determination to overcome the existing corruption with police and administrative 
structure, eliminate local pocket armies of upcountry politicians, and lead operational 
control.65 Therefore, the military gained a much higher role in domestic politics; 
eventually, the warriors became state-builders not only during the 1950s, but rather
63 Andrew Selth, "Known Knowns and Known Unknowns: Measuring Myanmar's M ilitary Capabilities," 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal o f International and Strategic Affairs 31, no. 2 (2009): 273.
64 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M yanm ar since Ancient Times: Traditions and  
Transformatons, 239.
65 Callahan, Making Enemies : W ar and State Building in Burma, 181.
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justified the continued rule in the following decades.66 Despite U Nu's electoral win in 
1961, his regime did not reach the end of his term  because his regime was ousted 
through a military coup.
Earlier, many Burmese politicians believed that the 1958-1960 caretaker setup of 
Gen Ne Win was also an indirect military coup, but U Nu refused the popular notion, 
until his own elected government was ousted in 1962, and then he acknowledged that 
he was forced to declare a caretaker set up.67 Ne Win promulgated that U Nu's soft 
policy towards ethnic-minorities' demands for political reform had threatened the 
territorial integrity of the state.68 To control the damage, Gen. Ne Win arrested political 
leaders, dismantled the court system, forcibly retired many civil bureaucrats and 
abrogated the constitution, fearing that a judicial decree against his coup would 
threaten his actions.69 These steps helped the military under General Ne Win to justify 
the coup of March 2 ,1962  as a revolution to save the country and unify the fractured  
nation. Gen Ne Win became chairman of the Revolutionary Council responsible for 
administering the political system, with the council membership being comprised of 17 
military officers.70 A number of council members, such as Aung Gyi, Tin Pe, San Yu, and 
Sein Win, were active with Gen. Ne Win during the anti-colonial struggle. Later on many 
of them were purged because Ne Win was suspicious about them or used the purge as 
face saving of bad policies of his regime. The self-propagated, so-called revolution failed,
56 Making Enemies : W ar and State Building in Burma, 172-77.
67 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M yanm ar since Ancient Times: Traditions and 
Transformatons, 241.
68 Callahan, Making Enemies : W ar and State Building in Burma, 202.
69 Stephen McCarthy, The Political Theory o f Tyranny in Singapore and Burm a: Aristotle and the Rhetoric
o f Benevolent Despotism (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2006), 124.
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and instead made soldiers stronger, who then dominated domestic politics. The process 
of domination extended for over five decades because of the  amalgamation of three  
institutions, i.e. "dictatorship, party-state, and defense-state."71
Yoshihiro Nakanishi's (2013) work shares a reference to three kinds of 
dictatorships: personal, single-party, and military dictatorships, retaining authoritarian  
power on average for ten years, eight years, and three years respectively.72 Nakanishi 
argues that if the average mortality of authoritarian rule by military regimes is three  
years, then the case of Myanmar is an "outlying observation" in political science, or the  
military regime's prolonged endurance was due to an amalgamation of the three  
institutions mentioned previously.73 Furthermore, Nakanishi refers to the survey 
research conducted by Barbara Geddes, who focused on the mortality rate of 
authoritarian regimes from 1945-1994.
According to Nakanishi, Geddes' work concludes th at "the proportion of military 
regimes that fell during any particular five years between 1945 and 1994 was about 50 
per cent higher than the proportion of personalist regimes and about four times the 
proportion of single-party regimes."74 It shows that the military regime in M yanm ar 
prolonged its stay in power in contrast to the results shown in that research. It is 
significant to mention that military dictators alone cannot stay in power for a long 
period, so they cleverly adopt a civilian political garb or establish civilian support to
71 Nakanishi, Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution : The State and M ilitary in Burma, 1962-1988, 3.
72 Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution : The State and M ilitary in Burma, 1962-1988, 4.
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prolong their stay. General Ne Win adopted a similar policy, using a civilian posture to  
stay in power for decades until 1988.
W hat policies helped the military to strengthen its roots in the politics of 
Myanmar, and also entrench itself as an economic beneficiary? The policies can be 
looked at in tw o phases; first, during his despotic rule from 1962 to 1988, Gen Ne Win  
enjoyed absolute authority through his Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and 
used his own constructed ideology called “Burmese ways to Socialism." The events of 
1988 became not only the cause of the BSPP's collapse, but also a first step towards 
democratic transition. The second phase, 1988 to 2010, was another coup replacing Gen 
Ne Win, which considered whether a caretaker setup would handle the administrative 
affairs of M yanm ar until a constitutional regime was elected. The caretaker military 
power retained rule through the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC), later becoming the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). 
Moreover, the discussion under the them e "unmaking the political economy of Garrison 
state" helps draw attention to the economic benefits the military junta has been 
enjoying up until now.
During the first phase from 1962 to 1988, Ne Win avoided or abrogated all the  
policies of U Nu including U Nu's mission of making Myanmar a pure Buddhist country 
strictly following a Buddhist code of conduct. Ne Win feared that the continuation of U 
Nu's policies could draw some harsh condemnations and actions by the international 
community if Christian minorities became subject to discrimination. Ne win had a good 
reputation before the 1962 coup because of his active role during the anti-colonial
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struggle and subjugating the ethno-nationalist struggles in the early independence 
years. In later years he became a tyrant against his own people. It is commonly believed, 
and to an extent true, that "most of tyrants arise from  popular leaders who were  
trusted."75 Similarly, under Gen. Ne Win's rule, Myanm ar was tested by the limits of 
brutality against ethnic groups, a bad performing economy, the rise of a drug economy, 
the rise of corrupt and chronic authoritarian-political elites, transnational crimes, and 
geopolitical challenges.
Many of the issue areas identified above are discussed separately in later 
discussions. In many ways, Gen. Ne Win gained his absolute authority through brutal 
force and by purging many of the military and political elites, from whom he feared any 
set back. Popular political parties were forced to give up the ir activities in this regard, 
including their assets which were seized. Most political parties including popular AFPFL 
and other ethno-based political parties were required to follow one state political party 
modeled on Leninist lines, indoctrination social, economic and political policies, named 
the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). 76
Ne Win created a news agency to control domestic media and counter foreign 
media criticism and strongly propagate the "Burmese way to  Socialism" as policy. A 
popular belief among the people of Myanm ar was that freedom of expression was more 
defended and exercised during 1948 to 1962. However, many Colonial laws remained 
intact; even after independence the Official Secrets Act o f 1923 remained in practice,
75 McCarthy, The Political Theory o f Tyranny in Singapore and Burma : Aristotle and the Rhetoric o f 
Benevolent Despotism, 123.
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which provided the government a significant amount of control over inform ation.77 
Though after the 1962 coup new laws, such as the Printers and Publishers Act of 1962, 
established the Press Scrutiny Board, which enjoyed full authority to censor any material 
detrimental to the socialist system or state ideology.78
University students were arrested so as to stop any political resistance 
emanating from university campuses. Tragically, university campuses were closed for 
almost for two years from 1962 to 1964 to subdue any resistance. During these years,
Ne Win's policy legitimized the single party, when he resigned from his military post in 
1972 and was elected through a referendum  in 1974. Before the referendum , until 
1972, the military ruled the country directly, while from 1974 onwards the BSPP became 
an indirect way by which the military legalized a means to retain political power as a 
constitutional dictatorship.79
Ne Win also targeted military personnel, from  whom he felt insecure, or made 
them scapegoats for his bad governance. Listing a few  prominent military personnel 
who lost their positions goes back to 1948, during an internal mutiny within the  
Burmese Armed forces in which Karen and Kachin officers were forced to remove 
themselves, and Gen. Ne Win became head of the Tatmadaw. Following that in 1961 
top ranked military personal Brig. Gen. Maung Maung was removed due to suspicion of 
his ties with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Even after the military coup in 1964 
Gen. Ne Win's proclaimed successor Gen Aung Gyi was sacked for his public criticism of
77 Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar, 106.
78 Ibid.
79 Josef Silverstein, Burm a: M ilitary Rule and the Politics o f Stagnation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
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Gen. Ne Win's economic policies. In later years, Tin Pe was removed for believing his 
bad economic policies, and Tin Oo removed due to a conceived threat to Ne Win's 
power. Many of them  joined the democratic political struggle against Ne Win and faced 
imprisonment as well.
Ne Win prolonged his stay in power through the inclusion of some civilian or 
political personalities on his advisory bodies to justify the referendums and retain the  
position as head of state. Even in the BSPP single state party, by and large, the top 
portfolios remained in the hands of military personals. In the late 1980s his political 
opponents succeeded in launching a democratic movem ent for political change. In 
March 1988, a clash broke out between a university student group and a local youth 
group over preferences of a modern or traditional music in society at a local teashop.80 
The clash gradually gathered a huge mass of protestors, which eventually was supported 
by unhappy monks and a frustrated population against the socio-economic conditions 
generated by thirty years policies of the Burmese way of socialism.81 Thousands of 
protestors came out across the country, Ne Win ordered a crackdown, and as a result 
the entire world witnessed the brutality of the military, whom  killed around three  
thousand anti-regime demonstrators 82 Among them  dozens of university students were
80 Win Min, "Looking inside the Burmese Military," in Burma or M yanm ar?: The Struggle fo r  National 
Identity, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: W orld Scientific, 2010), 159-62.
81 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M yanm ar since Ancient Times: Traditions and 
Transformatons, 256.
82 Benedict Rogers, Than Shwe : Unmasking Burma's Tyrant (Chiang M ai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 
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killed. According to one incident report, almost 41 students died due to suffocating in 
locked police vans.83
Finally, the popular uprising of 8888 (Four-Eight Uprising), which was unhappy 
with the BSPP government, denounced Ne Win's authority and demanded his 
resignation 84 Ne Win agreed to step down and transfer power to a caretaker setup with 
a promise to  support a multi-party system. Unfortunately, he appointed the most 
detested person, U Sein Lwin, as his successor to look after the political transition. Sein 
Lwin was known as the "Butcher of Rangoon" because of his excessive use of force in 
response to demonstrations.85 On September 27th, 1988, the National League for 
Democracy (NLD) was established, and Gen Aung Gyi became chairman, Gen. Tin Oo 
vice chairman, and Aung San Suu Kyi Gen. Secretary to contest democratic elections. By 
early 1990, the NLD had reached 2 million members.
The May 27 ,1990  elections gave a crystal clear victory to the NLD, sweeping 82 
percent of the seats, while the military-backed National Unity Party (NUP) won only 2% 
of seats. The NLD demanded to provisionally restore the 1947 constitution so the new  
government could take charge and write a new constitution.86 However, the SLORC 
rejected the idea, and in July 1990 issued a council ruling (SLORC Order No. 1 /90) as a 
road map towards a future democratic transition. The ruling only authorized the elected
83 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M yanm ar since Ancient Times: Traditions and 
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representatives to draft a constitution for a future democratic state. W hile the SLORC 
retained power as the interim power to facilitate the process, it also gave priority and 
safeguarded the SLORC's responsibilities towards the following three domains:
1. The three national causes of prevention of disintegration of the union, 
prevention of disintegration of national unity, and perpetuation of 
sovereignty;
2. Prevalence of law and order and regional peace and tranquility, secure 
and smooth transport and communications, and easing of people's 
need for food, clothes, and shelter; and
3. Development of all national people in all of Myanmar.87
Unfortunately, it turned to be a false promise, and power shifted to a new
military leadership under SLORC, who further ignored the election results and justified 
that Myanm ar was not ready to be ruled under democratic governance. In 1994 the UN 
General Assembly suggested a Tripartite Dialogue between the regime and two  
oppositions including NLD and ethnic minorities, but now, the military regime remains in 
fear of losing power and does not want to see the empowering of ethnic minorities.88
87 Pedersen, Promoting Human Rights in Burma : A Critique o f Western Sanctions Policy, 130.
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b. RISE OF SLORC /  SPDC: A BROKEN PROMISE VIA SILENCING DEMOCRACY, UNDOING  
COLONIAL PAST AND THE MAKING OF A PARIAH STATE
The Rise of SLORC was a second phase of the direct continuation of military rule. 
It is highlighted above that the military continued to rule in various forms and at various 
tim e periods, whether it was as a caretaker setup in 1958, direct military coup in 1962, 
or self-legitimized adopted and enforced political garb under BSPP in 1974 to 1988, and 
even within military coups against each other. The impact of the first phase of military 
rule paved the way in the making of a garrison state, while the developments in the  
second phase of the 1988-90 coup tried to undo its colonial past through reviving or 
reinventing history. By the process of reinventing history the military establishment 
thought of gaining legitimacy in order to sustain popular support, in contrast, the 
totalitarian actions by the military created a pariah state, isolating itself from the global 
community and facing heavy political and economic sanctions.
The rise of SLORC was a broken promise to the people of Myanm ar. During the  
general elections, the people of M yanm ar overwhelmingly refused to vote for a military 
backed political party and preferred instead to support the NLD. SLORC completely 
gagged the democratic transition in revenge of its loss in the elections.
SLORC, which was comprised of 19 military leaders, made Gen Saw Maung its 
new commander-in-Chief and chairman. Interestingly, instead of a civilian regime which 
could revoke the political arrangements of the BSPP, the military under the platform of 
SLORC abolished the 1974 constitution, and BSPP was created under the military rule of 
Gen Ne Win. One of the reasons was that the military was not in a mood to be further
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patronized under political guidance, like the BSPP had done earlier. Despite the  
prolonged military rule, a divided and insecure military leadership seemed engaged in 
an internal coup against senior officers or purging of potential junior opposing military 
commanders. For instance, the NLD was expecting a possible power transfer to 
democratically-elected public representatives, but the hopes of NLD members and 
supporters were dashed when Gen. Saw Maung was relieved from his position and 
retired.
Gen Than Shwe, who planned the removal o f Saw Maung, succeeded in 
developing a case that Saw Maung had demonstrated some erratic behavior. It is argued 
that Gen Saw Maung believed that the famous Burmese king, Kyanzitta of the Pagan 
Dynasty, had returned through reincarnation in his form .89 Moreover, a number of Saw 
Maung's associates agreed that he had become delusional as a result of the military 
backed political party's loss to the NLD. However, military doctors believe that Saw 
Maung had been drugged.90 Finally, after consultation with Ne Win Gen, Saw Maung  
retired, while on March 30' 1992 Gen. Than Shwe, the second most senior official after 
Saw Maung, became Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the SLORC. Soon after, Than 
Shwe picked Gen Maung Aye as army chief who later became vice-chairman of the 
SLORC in 1994. Gen Maung Aye was a hardliner against ethnic minorities, which entailed 
negative ramifications for any possible peaceful settlement with ethnic conflicts in the  
country.
89 Steinberg, B urm a/M yanm ar: W hat Everyone Needs to Know, 83.
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The other case of purging top ranked military commanders is im portant to  
discuss here. It was Gen Khin Nyunt who was among the first members of the SLORC. 
Gen Khin Nyunt was one of Ne W in's closest aides. After 1992, Nyunt retained the 
position of prime minister tasked with looking after international dealings and 
countering any international pressure through his media watch. Though Than Shwe 
never trusted Khin Nyunt because he was a follower of Ne W in, simultaneously Gen 
Maung Aye was also not on good terms with Nyunt. A divide was shown due to a lack of 
trust between the armed command and intelligence command of Khin Nyunt. In 2004, 
after the death of Ne Win, Than Shwe and Maung Aye purged Khin Nyunt on corruption 
charges.91 Khin Nyunt denied the allegations, and he insisted that if he or any of his 
subordinates were believed to be corrupt, then it would be equally applicable to all 
members of the SPDC or ministers, because no one was exempted of the system and 
everyone enjoyed the same benefits. In fact, Than Shwe's involvement in corruption 
was not a hidden episode too, rather Than Shwe needed an excuse to purge Khin Nyunt. 
As an example, Than Shwe, before becoming dictator, and his family were not 
economically well off. His sister was running a grocery store at Kyaukse (town where his 
family lived). Once he became dictator, the military seized the property and bungalows 
of affluent people at Kyaukse; later, Shwe gave them to his sister, making her rich 
overnight.92
The decision to purge Khin Nyunt was not in favor of Myanmar's general interest 
for several reasons. Though Khin Nyunt was part o f the military junta, he understood
91 "Looking inside the Burmese Military," 172.
92 Rogers, Than Shwe : Unmasking Burma's Tyrant, 16.
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the importance of international interaction and the role of international agencies 
working for the development of Myanm ar. In contrast, Than Shwe and Maung Aye 
believed the INGO's were "potential foreign spies or neocolonists."93 In addition, Khin 
Nyunt was the architect of the cease-fire agreements with ethnic groups, while Maung  
Aye was a hardliner who believed that ethnic armed forces could be crushed easily with  
force. In fact, Gen Maung Aye violated on a number of occasions the cease-fire 
agreement.94
The SLORC was facing challenges on multiple fronts, for example, domestic mass 
resistance by those who voted for the NLD and pressure by the international community 
for violating human rights and depriving citizens from basic rights. Than Shwe adopted 
some policies to counter the mounting challenges. First, he ordered the establishment 
of a political platform like the BSPP so members could contest elections against political 
rivals of the democratic alliance. In this regard, a pro-military political platform was 
planned, and Than Shwe oversaw the establishment of the Union Solidarity and 
Development Association (USDA), which later won a controversial election in 2010. In 
the meantime, the SLORC morphed into the SPDC, which was working on a new  
constitution for the country.
Second, Than Shwe took a couple of measures to tackle domestic challenges, 
though most were of course criminal actions against his own people. His policies tried to 
divert the attention from domestic challenges, i.e. military repression, poor economic 
performance and to cover up with these challenges, he started to project a positive
93 Min, "Looking inside the Burmese Military," 173.
94 Ibid.
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image of the military and Myanmar's history by recalling the bad memories of its 
colonial past. Than Shwe exemplified the role o f the military against colonial rule. In 
addition, his rule glorified the history of its kings as great warriors, especially three kings 
who unified the state, namely Anawratha, Bayinnaung, and Alaungpaya. Tatm adaw  
massively engaged in rebuilding the historic palaces to  support their words of glorifying 
the past and undoing colonial legacies.95 At the capital Naypyidaw, Than Shwe raised 
giant statues of Anawrahta, Bayinnaung, and Alaungpaya to support his glorification of 
the history of Myanmar and holy warrior kings.96
In a process of re-inventing the past, the SPDC engaged in some projects that 
reflected the undoing of colonial initiatives. For instance, the name of the country 
Burma was replaced with Myanmar, Rangoon with Yangon, along with a list of name 
changes for cities, rivers, divisions, and states to im itate historical Burmese orthography; 
a tangible shift was moving the capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw.97 A deliberate  
attem pt was made to link Burma to colonial times and delinking it to adhere to 
populous support from non-Burmans, yet the spoken usage of Burma was in practice 
prior to colonial times. In addition, Tatm adaw wanted to give an impression that a 
unified Burma now as the Union of M yanm ar was not only for Burmans; rather it was a 
consensual political and geographical space for all ethnicities.
95 Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar, 102.
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Exceptionally, the NLD leadership, particularly Aung San Suu Kyi, rejected the 
change of the country's name and preferred to keep the older one.98 It arguably may be 
because either she wanted the name Burma to continue as it was during its 
independence period when her father was in the lead, or the notion that rejection 
meant not accepting the legitimacy and authority o f the military to decide a national 
m atter on its own. The debate also drew some divide across continents as neighboring 
countries, including organizations as the UN and ASEAN, accepted the change, while the 
United States, Canada, U.K and Australia retained the usage of the old name, and the  
European Union took a middle-way solution term ing it "Myanm ar/Burm a." 99
On November 4, 2005 the change of capital was completely a political decision. 
Though the name Yangon referred to the revival of an old name, the decision to relocate 
the capital to Naypyidaw, however, was for political and strategic reasons. The capital 
change not only physically relocated the capital, but also hundreds of civil servants and 
infrastructure. Interestingly, the SPDC kept the name of the new capital city secret, 
except ordering the relocation to a new place. Once most of the workforce had been 
transferred to the new city in February 2006, on March 26, 2006, the SPDC announced 
the name of the new capital Naypyidaw. Naypyidaw means the site of the royal country 
or royal city.100
The new capital city was located 320 KM north of Yangon, and the political
reason to shift the capital was previous political protests against military regimes mainly
98 Lowell Dittmer, "Burma Vs. Myanmar: What's in a Name?," in Burma or M yanm ar?: The Struggle fo r  
National Identity, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Singapore ; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2010), 2.
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100 Daniel Goma, "Naypyidaw Vs. Yangon: The Reasons Behind the Junta's Decision to M ove the Burmese 
Capital," ibid., 186.
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in Yangon. Moreover, Yangon was becoming more urbanized and populous, so it would 
be hard facing other massive rallies against the military. Ne W in witnessed students 
from Rangoon University leading the protest; therefore, among the military 
commanders was a common perception about "Yangon as an enemy." The SPDC even 
avoided considering the traditional capital Mandalay, which remained the center of 
Burmese culture and religion for centuries. Building a new city and capital was primarily 
to secure their own interest against political challenges.101
The second reason for changing the capital was based on geo-strategic 
considerations by the SPDC. The military commanders of Tatm adaw fe lt insecure in 
Yangon for any possible foreign invasion, keeping in mind the historical evidence of 
British invasions and possible attack on Yangon for its closeness to the shores. Earlier, 
after the 1988 democratic protest, a rumor about the US Navy's Seventh Fleet entering  
into Myanmar's waters led to fears by the Tatmadaw, who thought US forces had come 
to rescue the democratic forces.102 This persistent notion of fear that they may face 
possible attack remained in the back of the mind of the junta.
Similarly, after 9 /11 , when US forces launched attacks against Al-Qaeda 
operatives in Afghanistan, Tatmadaw feared Myanmar could become a possible target 
for its bad human rights record and brutal actions against democratic groups.103 
Therefore, pushing a new capital city in the heart o f Myanm ar was a psychological relief 
for the SPDC. In addition, the junta believed that in Yangon they w ere always under
101 "Naypyidaw Vs. Yangon: The Reasons Behind the Junta's Decision to Move the Burmese Capital," in 
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surveillance by foreign embassies and agencies.104 In recent years classified documents 
proved fear loomed among the SPDC members of a possible US attack. One account 
notes that Than Shwe had ordered his subordinates to "prepare for the worst and hope 
for the best;" in the case of a U.S invasion, the SPDC was ready to kill all imprisoned NLD 
members.105 In truth, apart from a sense of psychological insecurity, the new capital city 
was also built to benefit the junta and their families with luxurious life.
Than Shwe used all coercive tactics to  bridle any possible threat to his military 
rule, and, in fact, military leaders rem em bered from colonial days when Buddhist monks 
took the lead in provoking nationalistic fervor. Similarly, Buddhist Sangha once again 
became a resistant force against Than Shwe's bad socio-economic policies. The SLORC 
decided to bring the Buddhist Sangha's in its control, so it could avert any future  
resistance. Until the late 1980s the Buddhist Sangha's remained autonomous, and its 
members numbered almost 120,000 monks, 180,000 novices and 20,000 nuns. A 
strategy was adopted to register members of Sangha's and banned any new Buddhist 
Sangha organization to operate other than the nine approved by the military controlled 
State Clergy Coordination Com m ittee.106 Earlier, a similar natural step was taken when 
Ne Win tried to implement the registration of monks in the 1960s and faced resistance 
from them. He arrested more than 90 monks and forcibly executed the orders.107
The other domestic challenge for Than Shwe was popular democratic resistance 
from NLD leaders particularly Aung San Suu Kyi, who was blatantly criticizing the
104 "Naypyidaw Vs. Yangon: The Reasons Behind the Junta's Decision to  Move the Burmese Capital," 193.
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dictators over the massacre of 1988 and deprivation from making a democratic 
government. W ith the rise of the SLORC, Aung San Suu Kyi gained a prom inent public 
role, and she referenced her father, Aung San, to gain more credibility. The SLORC tried 
to undermine the rule and role of her father. Pictures of her father were removed from  
all buildings and a narrative constructed that his past political contributions w ere for his 
own political gains and interests.108 Moreover, Aung San Suu Kyi was kept under house 
arrest and hundreds of supporters were tortured.
It was the beginning of the end of a garrison state, becoming instead an 
authoritarian-pariah state, which violated international norms, promises, and the will of 
its people. The list of humanitarian crimes includes countless episodes of inhuman 
treatm ent by Than Shwe's despotic rule. Hundreds of people were killed through 
extrajudicial murders, and hundreds of women raped in front of their families and their 
husbands. Suspected political opponents and ethnic minorities were kidnapped and 
their mutilated and beheaded bodies dumped with signs of torture. M any body organs 
were missing, demonstrating the height of cruelty during the  torture. Ethnic cleansing 
and millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) were forced to leave their ancestral 
roots and kept on the run in the jungles. From 1992 to 2009 around 2100 political 
prisoners remained in detention as punishment for raising their voices for political 
rights.109
The military's governance record remains unpopular not only because it brutally 
suppresses its minority ethnicities, but also violates international norms through the
108 Steinberg, Burma: The State o f Myanmar, 75.
109 Rogers, Than Shwe : Unmasking Burma's Tyrant, 95.
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recruitment of underage soldiers. M yanm ar is on top  ranked country in the world in 
terms of young children recruited in the military. M any of these young boys are 
exploited and used in ethnic combats. According to a recent report published by The 
Washington Post, the recruitment process has developed into corrupt informal 
enterprises in which businessmen are involved in providing young recruits to the 
military. These businessmen receive a sum of $30 and a bag of rice in return for each 
young recruit they provide. These poor young boys between the ages of 14 to  16 end up 
working in military farms and forced to fight in conflict zones against armed rebels.
From the income of poor boys, a major percentage of their salaries is also taken by 
corrupt superior military ranked personnel.110 Due to  their poor economic backgrounds, 
the recruiters trap the young boys, and then their families never see them  for long 
periods of time or hardly know why their kids have disappeared.111 These policies are a 
glimpse of the heinous actions the military has been undertaking for decades against its 
own citizens, and these actions further isolate Myanm ar from  its earlier position as a 
non-aligned state to a pariah state, due to ongoing actions that go against the standards 
of global norms.
The international community imposed economic sanctions against the military 
rule, which completely ignored promises made to its public, continuous human rights 
violations, and the suppression of elected representatives in the post 1988 elections.
Due to a meager economic performance and harsh policies, the public becomes
110 "Myanmar Still Enlists Boy Soldiers Despite Reforms," The Washington Post December 2, 2013, para 5- 
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frustrated once again and the SPDC brutally crushed the peaceful demonstrators in 
September 2007, known as the Saffron Revolution. Persistent episodes of despotic 
actions against its citizens and minorities w ere no longer tolerable in the view of the  
United Nations. The majority of the world community condemned all actions by the 
SPDC. Being further isolated, Than Shwe's annoyed regime blamed W estern countries 
for sanctions as the cause of unrest instead of accepting the undemocratic steps it had 
taken against demonstrators. On October 24, 2007, with the release of UN remarks over 
the humanitarian crisis, Than Shwe's regime expelled Charles Petrie; he was head of the 
UNDP and the UN's resident Coordinator in M yanm ar.112
The international community eased the sanctions on humanitarian grounds due 
to the annihilation caused by Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. Importantly, Than Shwe and 
the SPDC realized they could not retain power based on violence, so a new constitution 
in 2008 promised general elections. Again, the SPDC facilitated a military-backed Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and won the elections. Apparently, the 2010  
election allowed symbolically a transfer of military power to  a so-called democratic 
government. However, with optimism for the openness of a pariah state, the new  
government of President Thein Sein is considered to be moderate and reformist, but in 
reality the military retains its share of power in the elected parliament. The unknown- 
unknowns about civil-military relations and democratic processes are yet to be explored 
in the months and years to come.
112 "Myanmar Still Enlists Boy Soldiers Despite Reforms," 1.
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UNVEILING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GARRISON STATE
The British at one tim e referred to Zimbabwe as "the jewel of Africa and the 
breadbasket of Africa;" similarly, Burma was known as "the rice bowl of Asia."113 The 
natural resources in Myanmar have been renowned since colonial times; its current 
notable resources include oil, gas, minerals, gems (jade, ruby), timber, and teak. 
Myanm ar is the largest Southeast Asia oil and gas exporter and the world's tenth largest 
in terms of natural gas reserves. Unfortunately, this was not the case during the post­
independence period; Burma became famous as a "beggar with a golden bowl" for 
being rich in resources but failing to harness them .114 Mismanagement and rapid 
nationalization policies by the military rulers became the core reasons for the country's 
fragile social and political economic conditions. However, in recent years, the growing 
financial potential of Myanmar's energy sector could become a resource curse, as 
rapidly growing economies are scrambling to obtain access to  Myanmar's energy 
resources.115
57 percent of Myanmar's economy is based on agriculture, employing over 70 
percent of its workforce in the agricultural sector, which makes it an overwhelmingly 
agro-based society. Over the years production has shown negative signs of growth; for 
instance, rice exports fell from 870,000 tons in 1983 to 600,000 tons in 1986.116 To meet 
the challenges of an economic downfall, though quite late, in 2003 the Burmese
113 Than Shwe : Unmasking Burma's Tyrant, 13.
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government formally announced the liberation of the rice sector. However, the rice 
trade was still under indirect state control and was unable to achieve its target to revive 
its image as the "rice bowl of Asia." Indeed it was the result of complete negligence of 
the agriculture sector; the government failed to provide fertilizers to farmers and 
offered no incentives to farmers, such as agricultural loans and proper irrigation 
systems, as more than 80 percent of agricultural land lacks an irrigational structure.117
The deficient policies became clear after the 1962 military coup. Previously, 
Myanm ar benefitted from the Cold War's bipolar engagements, owing to its non-aligned 
movement strategy. In a way, Myanm ar succeeded in securing funds and projects both 
from the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. However, in the post 1962 military period, 
Myanm ar inclined towards China for economic support as it became isolated from the  
rest of the world due to the aforementioned anti-democratic steps. For a brief m oment 
during the late 1960s, China and Myanm ar developed some rough diplomatic relations 
as a result of anti-Chinese riots, which broke out in June 1967 across M yanm ar. China 
blamed the Burmese Government for indirectly supporting the popular uprising that 
targeted Chinese nationals, which helped the military rulers support Burmese 
nationalism and also successfully divert popular attention from its economic failure 
within Myanm ar.118
Starting in 1962, Ne Win adopted a rapid nationalization process and advocated 
the notion of Burmanization. In contrast, Gen. Aung Gyi, who was Minister for trade and
117 Sean Turnell, "Myanmar’s Economy in 2006," in Myanmar: The State, Community and the 
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industry, was not in favor of the rapid nationalization of firms. He was purged in 
February 1963 due to the military's internal power struggle and lobbying, mainly 
because of his disagreements with Ba Nyein and Tin Pe's economic proposals. Tin Pe as 
new minister of commerce was catastrophic at facilitating a rapid nationalization 
process and had unfriendly policies towards foreign business nationals. Overall, Ne 
Win's nationalizations led to a systemic destruction of the private sector, as an 
estimated 15,000 firms, including heavy industries and banking, were nationalized. This 
also resulted in the takeover of foreign businesses, and the exodus of over 200,000  
Indians, largely from the business community.119
The impact was severe. The nationalization process broke the backbone of the  
economy, and Ne Win sensed the gradual growing frustration among the people. To 
curb economic problems, the military occasionally abolished banknotes and introduced 
new ones to artificially retain its value closer to the US dollar. The popular 1988 protest 
that broke out all over the country, leading to Ne Win's forceful resignation, was 
actually a result of economic frustrations, not democratic change. On September 5 
1987, the government suddenly announced the abolition of the 75-, 35-, and 25- Kyat 
banknotes in order to punish merchants for their undue profits and control the  
circulating currency in the black market. The demonetization happened before in May
119 Steinberg, B urm a/M yanm ar: W hat Everyone Needs to Know, 66; Renaud Egreteau, "India's 
Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," in Burma or M yanm ar?: The Struggle fo r National Identity, ed. Lowell 
Dittmer (Singapore ; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2010), 298; Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested 
Legitimacies in Myanmar, 100; Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M yanm ar since Ancient Times: 
Traditions and Transformatons, 249.
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1964 and in November 1985 as well, but each time the people were given a grace period 
to exchange the soon-to-be cancelled currency for other bills.120
By late 1980 Burma faced an acute financial crunch with a staggering debt of 
US$3.5 billion and only US$ 20 to 30 million in currency reserves. The UN Economic and 
Social Council stepped in and declared Myanmar's status as a Least Developed Country 
(LDC). The reaction to economic fallout was seen during 1988's massive protest to  
demand a fix for the economy. Though Ne Win's brutal retaliation tried to suppress the 
protestors, the mass mobilization forced the Burmese government to pass Foreign 
Investment Law (FLI) in November 1988, which eventually opened its market to outside 
investors. Retired Gen Aung Gyi openly criticized the flaws of Ne Win's socialist policies 
under "Burmese Way to Socialism" as the cause of economic failure.121 If we compare 
the overall economic performance of Myanmar, statistics show that the economy grew  
more during the period of parliamentary democracy (1948-1962) with a rate of 5.3 
percent per year, while during Ne Win's socialist period (1962-1988) the economy grew  
at a rate of 3.5 percent a year.122
The post-1988 period was expected to be a phase for setting up a democratic 
parliamentary system, which could help fix the economic fallouts from military rule. On 
the contrary, the military, under the umbrella of the SLORC/ SPDC, took over power. The 
economy remained heavily reliant on aid money, the heroin industry's contribution 
towards sustaining the economy, and more recently, the revenues from the energy
120 Nakanishi, Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution : The State and M ilitary in Burma, 1962-1988, 271.
121 Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship : Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia, 192.
122 Alexis Rieffel, Myanmar/Burma : Inside Challenges, Outside Interests (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2010), 9.
154
sector. SPDC rule in some ways tried to shift the country's heavy reliance on an illegal 
means of economic gains towards opening up the market to  attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI), particularly in Myanmar's rich energy sector. Despite an attem pt to  
revive economic activities under SPDC during 2003-2005 through FDI in energy sector, 
the shortfall remained between revenues and government overspending. In addition, 
to evaluate the performance of the regime throughout the military's rule from  1962 to
2010 remained a daunting challenge because the information made public by regime is 
biased, showing a lack of an accountable and transparent system that can provide an 
independent report. In other words, Burma's military has not published data on its 
overall fiscal position since 1999/2000; it has only published tax data, but no data about 
government spending.123 Even when there is any data made available to the public, it is 
either artificially created to mislead or hides the actual information.
Jared Bissinger (2012) has conducted thorough research on FDIs in Myanm ar 
from 1988 to 2011. The statistical explanation of his research expounds that during this 
period Myanmar succeeded in attracting US$36 billion in approved investments for 445 
projects. Out of the US$36 billion, almost US$ 20 billion alone was approved for 25 
megaprojects during fiscal year 2010-2011. In comparison, this means prior to 2010-
2011 the total approved FDI since 1988 was US$16 billion and much of this, almost US 
$6 billion, was approved for the construction of the Tasang Dam.124 A higher percentage
123 Turnell, "Burma's Poverty of Riches: Natural Gas and the Voracious State," 212.
124 The Tasang Dam almost 300 miles northeast of Rangoon will be first dam on the Salween River (Largest 
dam in Myanmar and tallest in Southeast Asia) and is planned to be completed by 2020. Thailand's MDX  
Group is the major investor of this multi-billion dollar project, which will cost US $6 billion. After 
completion, 85% of hydro-electricity is planned to export to Thailand as par initially understanding.
Though planned in 1990s and inaugurated in 2007, the project was delayed for various political reasons.
155
of the remaining investment was approved for projects during the mid-1990s, including 
the first natural gas exploration at the Yadana gas fields in the Andaman Sea.125
At the moment, most of the economic gains are projected because of the higher 
rate of investment in energy sector. Specifically, since early 2000 M yanm ar has 
increased the exploration of oil and gas resources. In fact, in addition to the noted US$ 
20 billion FDI approved for 2010-2011, between 2004 and 2007 M yanm ar also attracted  
a moderate amount of FDI (US$ 3.24 billion) for its energy sector. Since 2000, Myanm ar 
has signed agreements with thirteen countries, including Russia, China, India, South 
Korea, France, and the U.S.126 Most of these agreements were initiated between the  
national oil company, Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and Total Oil (France), 
Unocal (US), PTT Exploration and Production (PTTE, Thailand), Premier Oil (UK), Nippon 
Oil (Japan), Petronas (Malaysia), and other Chinese and Indian national oil and gas 
companies.
Ostensibly, from 1988 to 2011, the approved FDI and increased rates in trade 
show impressive economic gains. But, in actuality, the number is lower for the 1990s. 
Numerous political and economic events contributed towards Myanm ar receiving low 
FDI. After the events of 1988, it was expected that Gen Maung, then chairman of the 
SLORC, would transfer power to parliament. Instead, he was deposed. In the wake of 
the military retaking power under Than Shwe, foreign investors were discouraged. The 
SLORC gained some confidence to attract FDI, but unfortunately 1997's Asian financial
125 Jared Bissinger, "Foreign Investment in Myanmar: A Resource Boom but a Development Bust?," 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal o f International and Strategic Affairs 34, no. 1 (April 2012): 27-28.
126 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations : Dilemmas o f M utual Dependence, 167.
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crisis, along with US investment sanctions, drastically affected the investment plans.
W hen auditing the overall economic performance o f Myanmar, a researcher 
usually encounters two data sets, one provided by the military regime and the second 
by international financial or research institutions. Great discrepancies exist in both data. 
Military authority under the SPDC claimed that GDP under its rule remained in excess of 
10 percent a year. In February 2006, Myanmar's Minister o f National Planning and 
Economic Development, Soe Tha, announced that his country's growth rate for 2005 
would be 12.2 per cent. Turnell Sean contradicts the claim of above 10 percent for a 
decade long period. Sean argues rather that, if this was the case, then M yanm ar should 
have been considered the fastest and most consistently growing economy of the world; 
in contrast, it is considered to be a LDC with a highly malfunctioning economic 
society.127 Turnell Sean further presented two sets of statistical information for each 
year that explains the growth rate from 2000 to 2006. As per official data provided by 
the SPDC, the growth rate in the following years are; 1999(10.9 %), 2000 (13.7 %), 
2001(11.3%), 2002(10.0%), 2003(10.6% ), 2004(12.0% ), 2005(12.2% ), while in contrast, 
the actual growth estimate suggests that the GDP growth in the following years was 
2001 (5.3%), 2002(5.3%), 2003(-2 .0% ), 2004(-2 .7% ), 2005(3.7%), 2006(1.8% ). The data 
shows a clear difference between official data provided by the SPDC and actual data, 
making it an existing information hole patent in the country's system.128
Referring to Myanmar's rich resources and poor economic policies from military 
rule that closed the doors of official trade with most of the world raises the question:
127 Turnell, "Myanmar's Economy in 2006," 108.
128 "Myanmar's Economy in 2006," 110-11.
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how did the military rulers manage to sustain a fragile economy and its administrative 
machinery? On reasonable grounds, it can be argued that th e  meager foreign aid and 
minimum rate o f economic growth was indirectly supported through illicit trade and a 
narco economy. Most illicit trade in Myanm ar is concentrated in areas controlled by 
armed groups, areas that are facing a governance vacuum. The vacuum and chaos is 
sometimes lucrative for the "survival of [a] weak and unaccountable state may well be 
enhanced by its ability to capture or profit from illicit economies."129 In this regard, the 
illicit narco economy played a crucial role in funding a continuous w ar with various 
armed groups and also supported Myanmar's economic needs. Myanmar is the world's 
second largest illegal opium producer after Afghanistan. The famous golden triangle 
between Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand is the main source o f illegal drug trafficking, 
becoming a significant economic activity for the military in Myanmar. At the same tim e, 
the illicit trade and informal economies also contributed to the country's social and 
economic failure.130
Shan state, Kachin hill, and Wa hills are some popular areas that are involved in 
the poppy trade. In 1989 1.6 kg of opium packets were sold for 9600 kyats ($1000  
exchange rate in 1989). Villagers sold opium to Chinese traders, and most of Kachin 
opium goes to Myitkiyina and into further southern areas for refinery, as Kachin areas 
lack morphine factories or heroin refineries. In fact, Kokang and Wa opium goes to Shan 
state refineries like Mong Ko, Mong Horn, Nam Kyaun, Kunlong, and Kang Mong, then is
129 Clunan and Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era o f Softened 
Sovereignty, 187.
130 Bradley Babson, "Myanmar and North Korea: Informality in Asia's Pariah States," SAIS Review 21, no. 1 
(2001): 90.
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transported to Mandalay and Hong Kong. In addition, some of the W a and most of the  
Akha and Lahu opium are refined in Shan state sent to  Hong Kong and Thailand.131
A similar pattern, as noticed earlier regarding economic growth data, is the little 
reliable data that exists about the drug production. For instance, the official Burmese 
government's estimate of 247 tons of drug production in 1989-90 was less than what 
the U.S government estimated of 2,350 tons for 1990-91.132 As argued previously, 
Myanmar was an information vacuum for decades in which military rule completely 
isolated and reported fabricated information to hide the truth. Regarding drug 
production, it was obvious that drug production and trade was a worldwide illegal 
activity, and military rule never wanted to reflect an image that one of its main 
economic resources relied on the drug economy until the late 1990s.
Historical lessons from colonial times served Myanmar's military rulers 
specifically when the British opium trade was established to  meet the financial 
difficulties of British rule, which as a result led to the  Opium War of 1839-1842 (in which 
China had to pay indemnities equal to US $21 million and ceded Hong Kong Island as 
penalty) and the Arrow W ar of 1856-1858 (in which the British forced China to legalize 
the opium trade).133 British policies of using opium trade as a lucrative business to 
support its foreign expenses were historical examples for economic remedies, in a time  
when military rulers were in isolation creating a pariah state promising its people an
131 Ko-Lin Chin, The Golden Triangle : Inside Southeast Asia's Drug Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2009), 86; Tucker, B urm a: The Curse o f Independence, 160-61.
132 Ronald D. Renard, The Burmese Connection : Illegal Drugs and the Making o f the Golden Triangle, 
Studies on the Impact of the Illegal Drug Trade (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1996), 3.
133 The Burmese Connection : Illegal Drugs and the Making o f the Golden Triangle, Studies on the Impact 
of the Illegal Drug Trade (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1996), 18.
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ideal economic and peaceful society under military rule.
Not only did the military rely on getting perks and revenues from  drug 
production and trade, in fact, many ethnic armed groups relied on opium trade to fund 
their war with Tatmadaw. On many occasions Tatmadaw also encouraged its favorable 
rebel groups to become part of a counter strategy against rival armed groups. Therefore  
Tatmadaw supported and encouraged Wa rebels, and other armed groups, including 
defectors from Communist Party of Burma (CPB), to  produce more opium and ship it to 
the North American continent.134
Drug production and its trade was controlled and operated through drug lords, 
some of whom were rivals to the military and some whom were under the protection of 
government institutions. Among many drug lords, a few, such as Khun Sa (a CPB leader, 
drug lord, who fought against the military and lost thousands of his men in fights until 
1996, when he surrendered to the government), W ei Xuegang (in 1998, the U.S. 
Government announced US $2 million on his arrest), and Lo Hsin Han kingpin (who 
recently died (2013) as one of biggest business tycoons of the region) gained high 
ranking in the drug and heroin traffic in Southeast Asia.135
The Burmese government shielded these drug lords and facilitated drug money 
laundering. The money in many ways was channeled to state projects and international
134 The Burmese Connection : Illegal Drugs and the Making o f the Golden Triangle, 69.
135 Chin, The Golden Triangle : Inside Southeast Asia's Drug Trade, 89-91.
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dealings. According to Monique Skidmore, MOGE is mainly used for money laundering
of revenues earned from the drug trade.136 Skidmore further explains that:
In a deal signed with the French oil Giant Total in 1992, and later joined by 
Unocol, MOGE received a payment of US$15 million. Despite the fact that MOGE 
has no assets besides the limited installments of its foreign partners and makes 
no profit, and that the Burmese state never had the capacity to allocate any 
currency credit to MOGE, the Singapore bank accounts of this company have 
seen the transfer o f hundreds of millions of US dollars...Funds exceeding 
US$60million and originating from  Burma's most renowned drug lord, Khun Sa, 
were channeled through the company. Drug money is irrigating every economic 
activity in Burma ... and big foreign partners are also seen by the SLORC as big 
shields for money laundering."137
Myanmar government officials always denied the fact that there was any 
government involvement in the drug business and claimed to  not support any drug 
lords. However, popular drug lord Lo Hsin Han, a kingpin, received protection from  
Burma's military for helping them in repelling the CPB during a decisive fight at Kunlong 
Bridge, gaining the trust of the military. His drug convoys were given protection, and the 
military got their share from the partnership too. In 1973 the Thai police arrested him, 
and the U.S. declared a great victory against the drug war. The Thai governm ent handed 
him over to Burmese authorities; Lo Hsin Han was pardoned, and the Myanm ar 
government instead facilitated his narcotics business.138 He became a core security 
operator against an armed CPB faction, so the military benefitted in tw o ways, first by 
getting money, and second, crushing CPB fighters.
136 Monique Skidmore, Karaoke Fascism : Burma and the Politics o f Fear (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 91.
137 Quoted Dennis Bernstein and Leslie Kean in ibid.
138 Tucker, Burma : The Curse o f Independence, 173.
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In response to the illicit trade, the U.S. remained on the forefront to  curb the  
menace of the drug trade through UN agencies vis-a-vis offering M yanm ar direct 
assistance. Interestingly, over the years the persistent political events in M yanm ar have 
also softened U.S behavior towards Myanm ar. Shelby Tucker observed the following 
two statements were contradictory and in a way tried to exonerate the Myanm ar 
military for not being responsible of any illicit drug trade. For instance, in 1996 President 
Bill Clinton vehemently expressed that "the role of drug[s] in Burma's economic and 
political life and the regime's refusal to honour its pledge to  move to multiparty  
democracy are really two sides of the same coin, for both represents the absence of the 
rule of law."139 Yet in 1999 the U.S Departm ent of State's Bureau for International 
Narcotics reported that "there are persistent and reliable reports that officials, 
particularly corrupt army personnel posted in outlying areas, are either involved in the  
drug business or paid to allow the drug business to be conducted by others," which 
means some corrupt individuals are involved, while the Burmese government is not 
involved in the drug trade.140
There are several reasons that support the idea of the Burmese government 
under the military rule's being involved into the narco economy. Primarily, the Burmese 
government remained comprised of military officers, and the same military officers are 
responsible for enforcement of anti-drug laws. M ilitary officers get a share in drug 
revenue, and more importantly, revenue is required for the military institution to fight
139 Burma : The Curse o f Independence, 179.
140 Ib id .
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its decades long rebel conflict.141 A more im portant argum ent to evaluate the Burmese 
government's involvement can be made considering the country's staggering economic 
conditions and the government's overspending on modernizing its military and other 
expenditures, which certainly needed investment. M yanm ar, by and large, used hard 
currency earned from the narcotics trade for domestic and foreign procurements. By 
the late 1980s, more than 90 percent of Myanmar's revenue was absorbed by foreign 
debt, and it requested the status of LDC, which the UN generously awarded to protect it 
from further worsening its economic conditions. Soon after gaining LDC status, the IMF 
reported that the foreign exchange reserves were below US$30 million, which were  
insufficient to pay for one month's imports.142
Still under acute economic pressure, the Burmese government planned to spend 
extravagantly over the next decade. W ith a planned procurement of "approximately 
US$2 billion," Myanm ar initially purchased weapons worth US$ 20 million from  1988 to 
1997 and only $280 million in 1997. In addition the number of military "personnel 
increased from 200,000 in 1988 to 270,000 by 1992 with target of 500,000 and by 2007 
reached 400,000."143 The defense spending of Myanm ar during fiscal year 1991-92 was 
30.8 percent to 39.9 percent (3.4 percent of GDP) o f the state budget, while David 
Steinberg has noted that it was around 50 percent of the annual budget. Similarly in 
1997-98 the government allocated 31.6 percent of annual budget in defense
141 Burma : The Curse o f Independence, 180.
142 Burma : The Curse o f Independence, 183.
143 Ibid; Nakanishi, Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution : The State and Military in Burma, 1962-1988, 282.
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spending.144 Other big spending was recorded during the shift from the old capital 
Yangon to the newly constructed capital Naypyidaw, which absorbed huge investments 
to  plan, develop, and construct an entirely new city as a capital. In addition, in 2006  
there was a dramatic increase in the salaries of civil servants and military officers from  
500 percent to 1,200 per cent during a high-inflation economy.145
Finally, Tatmadaw was also found connected to an incident in which it persuaded 
and facilitated local farmers and even forced laborers "to grow opium instead of rice 
and beans and military guarding the routes leading to both the family's and the UWSA's 
(United W a State Army) refineries in the Doi Sam Sao, Soi Loilem and Doi Mak-on hills 
and Nam Yawn valley."146 Recent revelations from W a government documents prove 
that from 1990 to 1994 the local population was encouraged to cultivate poppy and 
become involved in the business of heroin refineries. The government collected 6 
million Yuan (US $ 730,000) tax from these refineries and some total 30 million Yuan (US 
$ 3.6 million) during the 1990-94 period. Due to state encouragement and the booming 
of the drug industry, the price of opium skyrocketed, a joi or viss147 of opium priced at
1,000 Yuan ($120) in 1993 soared to 4,000 Yuan (US$ 484) in 1994.148 All these reasons 
help develop a strong linkage between drug production and trade under the secret 
supervision of the Burmese government.
144 Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanm ar, 78.
145 Turnell, "Burma’s Poverty of Riches: Natural Gas and the Voracious State," 224-25.
146 Tucker, Burma : The Curse o f Independence, 183.
147 Choi or Joi in Mainland Southeast Asia and viss in Southern India and Burma used as standard unit of 
weight for opium, equivalent to  1.657 Kilograms or 3.652 pounds.
148 Chin, The Golden Triangle : Inside Southeast Asia's Drug Trade, 87.
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To curb the challenges of drug trafficking, from  1989 to 1992 the UN took the 
lead in forming a sub-regional arrangement between China, Thailand, and Burma to 
adopt strict measures to curtail the drug trafficking and production. Initially the  
discussion was carried out between the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control 
(UNFDAC) and the Burmese government. Later, from  1992 onward, the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDCP) and the three governments adopted a sub-regional 
strategy, including reducing trafficking in drugs and chemicals, eliminating opium  
cultivation at border areas through economic and social reforms, incentives to the local 
population, and reducing demand and consumption of drugs in affected areas.149 To 
eradicate opium production, in 2001 veterans of the Office o f Strategic Services (OSS- 
101), who lived in Burma's Kachin areas during the Second World W ar, launched Project 
Old Soldier (POS), a gesture of thanks to the Kachin people for their service during the  
war. The US congress appropriated funds for the veterans of OSS-101, who volunteered  
to train the local population to substitute poppy for cash crops, so the menace of poppy 
cultivation could be replaced with agro-products and provide a viable economic base for 
the local community. Tatmadaw was not comfortable with the project; in fact, a number 
of Kachin locals who were supervising the project were killed.150 This entire discussion 
demonstrates how over the decades the Burmese military's rule over a garrison state 
isolated the country from the global community and heavily engaged in illicit political 
and economic activities.
149 Renard, The Burmese Connection : Illegal Drugs and the Making o f the Golden Triangle, 85-86.
150 Tucker, Burma : The Curse o f Independence, 184.
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A booming energy sector and the recent lifting of US sanctions helped Myanm ar 
to concentrate on licit avenues of trade. The SPDC's signal to open up its market and 
promise to hold elections accelerated trade activities and built some trust with foreign 
investors. So far two countries, China and Thailand, control 75 percent o f Myanmar's  
economy, followed by Singapore and India. Fiscal year 2013/2014 has reached a record 
high total trade volume of nearly US$ 16 billion. According to official figures, in the first 
9 months of the 2013 fiscal year, trade volume has reached US$ 15.92 billion that is US$ 
3.65 billion more than last year's trade volume. Overall, Myanmar is expecting to m eet 
its target of US $ 25 billion in FY 2013 /14  (20% from border trade, while 80% from  
overseas trade).151
In sum, the history of Myanmar's political economy provides evidence of a 
wealthy past and the gloomy phase of ultra-poverty the country has endured under 
military rule since 1962. Military rule initially focused more on the exploitation of tim ber 
and teak, with no efforts towards its management and conservation. Unfortunately, a 
great resource was pushed towards decay and rapid deforestation. Many border 
communities, like Kachin, lament the loss of their resources with no gains, while the 
military engaged in misuse of resources and illegal trade. Similarly, the nationalization 
process harmed banking and the mining and energy sector. Despite all, recent economic 
gains have shown some promising outcomes. Still, the remnants of the old chronic 
political economy is in need of fixing within an institutional framework, so it can
151 "Myanmar's Trade Volume Nearly Hit Us$16bn," Eleven December 2013.
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contribute effectively towards economic development of the entire society as well as its 
integration into the region.
SOCIETAL DIVIDES ON ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DOMAINS: POLICIES OF 
ACCOMODATION, ASSIMILATION, OR EXCLUSION
Ethnic Burmans, or Bama, residing mainly on the mainland of the country, 
primarily dominate the Union of Myanmar, while eight main other ethnic minority 
groups can be further divided into 135 sub-groups. The general belief that diversity is 
strength has proven to be a bad augury for the Union of Myanmar's nation-building 
process since 1948. During independence in 1948, statistical composition records 
estimated Burmans/ Bama at 65-69 %, the Shan at 8.5 to 10 %, Karen 6.2%, Arakanese 
4.5 %, Mon 2.4 %, Chin 2.2 % Kachin 1.4%, and Wa at 1.4%, while the 1983 consensus 
projected the same numbers as recorded in 1948.152
The ethnic minorities in opposition reject this classification because they believe 
it repudiates the existence of many other ethnicities, so categorization on the basis of 
ethnic state is not acceptable.153 To note, a number of Myanmar's ethnicities have 
trans-border ethnic kinships in neighboring countries, for example, substantial "M on, 
Karen and Shan communities live in Thailand; Naga and Chin live in India; Kachin
152 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, The "Other" Karen in M yan m ar: Ethnic Minorities and the Struggle 
without Arms (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012), 21; "Beyond Armed Resistance: Ethnonational Politics in 
Burma (Myanmar)," (Honolulu, Hawaii2011), 3.
153 Tom Kramer, "Ethnic Conflict in Burma: The Challenge of Unity in a Divided Country," in Burma or 
M yanm ar?: The Struggle fo r National Identity, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: World  
Scientific, 2010), 52.
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(Jingpaw) can be found in India (Singpho) and in China (Jingpho)."154These ethnic 
groups are also in minority status in neighboring countries becoming a convenient 
source to be exploited by opposing regimes on both sides of the border for political 
gains.
The earlier sections discussed in detail the historical period during and after 
colonial times, which outlined the military's ventures against its own people in violating 
their basic political and human rights. Therefore, since independence, political unrest 
has remained a persistent characteristic of Myanmar's political landscape. M yanm ar has 
two dimensions of socio-political unrest, first, ethnic minorities fighting the center 
(Naypyidaw) for greater autonomy, and second, Muslim-Buddhist clashes due to 
historical grievances.
As noted before, ethnic-minority grievances started before and after the 
Panglong agreement. In fact, before the Panglong agreement, ethnic leaders from  
Kachin, Karen, and Muslims of Arakan, whom supported the British war against 
Japanese occupation during 1942-1945, were certain that "when the war ended the  
British would reward their loyalty, granting them independence from Burma."155 Issues 
of ethno-religious strife in Myanm ar have simultaneously accommodated, assimilated, 
and excluded a number of ethnic groups during the nation building process; similar 
patterns remained in practice before the independence of the country. In the post-
154 "Ethnic Conflict in Burma: The Challenge of Unity in a Divided Country," in Burma or M yanm ar? : The 
Struggle fo r National Identity, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Singapore ; Hackensack, NJ: W orld Scientific, 2010), 55.
155 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession : The Muslim Communities o f the Southern 
Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burm a/M yanm ar (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2002), 34.
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independence period, Myanm ar failed to develop a pluralistic and inclusive policy 
towards each single community living in the country.
The seeds of divide and rule were obviously sown during colonial times when 
British rule facilitated immigrants from the Indian sub-continent and China to take over 
office and business jobs. Also, statistical data quoted about colonial times indicates 
security personnel in higher percentages belonged to minority ethnic groups. One of the 
reasons for Burman exclusion was British distrust due to the Burmese resistance. The 
Burmans were irked for being segregated while other ethnicities actively worked for the 
British; this made minorities concentrate power against the majority.156 Soon after their 
independence, the minority ethnic groups, i.e. Karens, Mons, Kachins, Muslim  
Mujahideen from Arkan/Rakhine State and the CPB, lost administrative powers and 
started an armed struggle.
The situation became worse when the military regime under Ne Win adopted 
the policies of Burmanization forcing thousands of ethnic minorities to  flee or being 
forcibly expelled.157 Similarly, after Ne Win's resignation, the brutal era of Gen Than 
Shwe during the 1990s focused on reinventing Burman history, and other ethnicities 
became victims within their own land. That Tatm adaw under Than Shwe used brutal and 
destructive policies against other ethnicities was no surprise. Than Shwe, as noted 
earlier, was inspired by reviving the glorious past o f Burman kings. King Bayinnaung was 
his main inspiration, among others. King Bayinnaung, who ruled five hundred years ago, 
engaged in relentless, brutal war and destruction to  unify the peripheral areas from
156 Steinberg, B urm a/M yanm ar: What Everyone Needs to Know, 29.
157 Burma: The State o f Myanmar, 73.
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neighboring powers. Comparing the 500 year old repressive policies of King Bayinnaung, 
Benedict Rogers has quoted Thant Myint, who explains that "the Burmese army still 
sees itself, in [a] way, as fighting the same enemies and in the same places, subjugating 
the Shan hills or crushing Mon resistance in the South, their soldiers slugging their way  
through the same thick jungle, preparing to torch a town or press-gang villagers. His 
(Bayinnaung's) statues are there because the ordeal of welding a nation together by 
force is not just history."158
As a result of harsh state driven policies against ethnic minorities from  1962 until 
now, thousands from minority groups were forced to migrate to neighboring countries 
and were internally displaced due to fear of execution. 400,000 ethnic Indians were 
forced to leave the country under Gen Ne Win's rule in 1964. No compensation was 
given to families who had lived in Myanm ar for generations when they were  
uprooted.159 Similarly, more than 100,000 Burmese-Chinese left Burma under Ne Win's 
rule, and in a recent attem pt to take control of the Kokang minority area, Tatm adaw  
forced 35,000 refugees to flee to China.160 Since 1988 military actions under Gen Than 
Shwe, "refugees belonging to the Karen, the Shan, the Karenni, the Kachin, the W ah, the 
Rohingyas, and other ethnic groups of Burma, Mon refugees are among the more than
300.000 people who have fled Burma."161 a  recent report noted the miseries of around
130.000 Karens on the Thai border where refugees have been in need of urgent
158 Rogers, Than Shwe : Unmasking Burma's Tyrant, 166-67.
159 Topich and Leitich, The History o f Myanmar, 88.
160 Dittmer, Burma or M yanm ar?: The Struggle fo r National Identity, 6.
161 Victoria Armour-Hileman, Singing to the D ead : A Missioner's Life among Refugees from  Burma 
(Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 2002), ix.
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humanitarian attention to be accommodated and reintegrated in society.162 During 
these armed struggles thousands of people were killed, and a recent estimation 
emphasized that around 40,000 armed troops of various ethnic groups replicate a 
situation of a "contained balkanization" in Burma, in which armed conflict could resume 
at any m om ent.163
W ith the help of Government Organized NGO (GONGO), the M yanm ar Peace 
Center moved to broker peace with the rebels. In 1989 and the following years, various 
ethnic armed groups agreed for a tem porary ceasefire agreement between the military 
and different ethnic groups. The ceasefire agreem ent allowed the armed rebels to keep 
their arms and autonomy over their region. It also provided an option for those armed 
groups to facilitate development and economic activity in case of surrendering their 
weapons. Despite the ceasefire, so far the government has failed to reach any political 
settlement with the ethnic groups. Armed groups also wanted clarification over the 
terms and definitions of a rebel, because there are many ethnicities who do not seek 
independence, but rather seek a federal system th a t ensures the basic rights of citizens, 
the autonomy of the area, and an assurance for th e  due ownership rights over natural 
resources in their jurisdiction, which are being forcefully depleted under governments 
supervision.164 After all, there is still a lack of trust o f the military.
162 Mark Fenn, "Life Gets Harder on Thai-Myanmar Border," The Diplomat December 2, 2013.
163 Min Zin, "China-Burma Relations: China's Risk, Burma's Dilemma," in Burma or M yanm ar? : The 
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Apart from ethnic conflicts, episodes of religious clashes between Muslims and 
Buddhists have been aggravated since 2012. Almost 80 percent of the population in 
Myanm ar follows Buddhism in comparison to 4 percent of those following Islam. Most 
Muslims are settled in the Arakan/ Rakhine State; however, there are small percentages 
living in central Myanm ar or parts elsewhere. Two prominent Muslim ethnic groups are 
the Kaman and Rohingyas.165 In November 2013, an angry Buddhist mob attacked a 
Muslim village and stabbed a 94-year-old, paralyzed old lady, which saddened many 
inside and outside Myanmar.166
A history of communal clashes existed prior to Myanmar's existence and even 
before colonial rule. However, hatred intensified in the 1920s-1930s, when British rule 
encouraged immigrants from the sub-continent. Frustrated with low economic 
incentives for local Burmans, anti-Indian and anti-Muslim resentment existed among 
Burmans. This resentment was manifested in nationalist policies of the 1940s and 1960s 
which forced Indians to leave. Burmans used terms Kala (from "Kula" in Burmese for 
"foreigner" and in hindi/ urdu same "kala" is called for "black").167 Burmans also knew  
that most of the Muslims came from Chittagong to seek work and Arakan wom en, who
165 Kaman means bow, settled in 1660 along with Mugul Prince Shah Shuja, who escaped following defeat 
during a power struggle and served as special archer's unit to Arakan's king, in past, most of Kaman 
remained settled Ramree Island. Rohingya are also known as Rohiga or Roewengya, settld mostly in 
Northern Arakan. 1960's the total population of Rohingyas was estimated 300,000 and mostly Burmese 
consider them illegal immigrants, instead call them Bengali and reject to  hold them  with their identity.
See Yegar, Between Integration and Secession : The Muslim Communities o f the Southern Philippines, 
Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanm ar, 24-25.
166 Thomas Fuller, "Elderly Woman's Killing Lays Bare Myanmar's Religious Divisions," The Newyork Times 
November 9, 2013.
167 Egreteau, "India's Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," 297; Tucker, B urm a: The Curse o f Independence, 
29.
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later assimilated into the local cultures.168 During the nationalist struggle against 
colonial rule, Buddhist nationalists also spread anti-Indian and anti-Muslim slogans to  
encourage foreign immigrants to leave; the popular slogans strongly propagated that 
these foreigners are "exploiting our economic resources and seizing our wom en, [and] 
we are in danger of racial extinction." Subsequently, in July 1938, hundreds of Indians 
w ere killed during the riots, which occurred in Yangon.169 In addition, Muslims from  
Arakan/ Rakhine supported British forces, while Buddhists supported the Japanese, 
which forced Muslims to leave Southern Arakan and to settle in the north, w ith a similar 
movement by the Buddhist population towards the South. In a way, a divided Arakan/ 
Rakhine was carved in the 1940s.170
Recent observations show that the Muslim-Buddhist clashes have acquired a 
transnational nature. For example, Buddhists felt angry when the Taliban destroyed the  
Buddha statue in Bhamiyan in Afghanistan, and they began to target Muslims in central 
M yanm ar.171 Similarly, in response to 2012's Buddhist attacks, in May 2013, Indonesian 
police foiled a plot by Islamists planning to bomb the Myanmar embassy in Jakarta, and 
in July 2013, Islamists were blamed for bombing Bodh Gaya, one of the revered sites of 
Buddhism in India.172
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Islamophobia is rapidly growing among Buddhists, w ho believe that the Muslim  
population is growing fast in contrast to a decline in the population growth of Burmans. 
A general tendency found among Buddhists is that a rapid increase in the Muslim  
population would help the Islamic jihadists from surrounding countries to take over 
Myanmar. The Head of the Rakhine State has asked Muslims to reduce their population 
growth by limiting to tw o children. In this regard, Buddhist monks have initiated a 
number's campaign called the "969" m ovem ent.173 The 969 campaign is led by 
prominent Buddhist monks like Wirathu and W imala spreading similar messages as 
observed during the 1930s anti-Indian movement. These claims include the idea of a 
Muslim population's plan to take over the country with the help of jihadi infiltrators, 
seeking to get Buddhist women through marriage and then converting Buddhist women  
into Islam. To denounce the plot, the 969 movement is trying to strengthen Buddhist 
identity and practices by asking Burmans for a socio-economic boycott of Muslims and 
by demanding for laws to restrict inter-faith marriage.174
Growing fear has intensified tensions, and frequent attacks and counter attacks 
have no longer stayed limited towards Rohingyas. Other Muslim ethnic groups and 
mosques are being targeted, and similarly many Buddhists are killed and their places of 
worship burnt. In response to these events, and due to growing global pressure,
173 The 969 movement is started to counter the growing Muslim population in Myanmar. Muslims use a 
number 786 as a symbol of Halal meat at their shops or as a symbol to  express, "in the name of God." 
However, Buddhist cosmological calculations sum up the number 786= 7+8+6 =21, meaning Muslims 
planned to occupy Myanmar in the twenty-first Century. To counter this plot, the 969 movement required 
every Buddhist to place this number on their shops to identify them. The number campaign has severely 
affected the business of Muslims and made them feel isolated in their own country. The philosophy 
behind the 969 numbers is 9 attributes of Buddha, 6 attributes to Dhamma means Buddha's teaching and 
9 attributes to Buddhist Sangha.
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President Thein Sein on August 17, 2012 established an investigation commission, which 
included representatives from all parties. The commission's report includes some 
controversial aspects, particularly "the report [that] included the fact that it declined to 
use the term  Rohingya, instead adopting the government usage Bengali," which denies 
Rohingyas to claim their identity and recognition in the country.175
The prolonged ethno-nationalistic conflicts tem porarily came to  a halt when the  
military regime struck a deal with the core 17-armed groups in 1989. Despite the  
ceasefire agreements, the events of October 2012 show th at the military is still actively 
fighting the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) military wing of the Kachin Independence 
Organization (KIO), civil unrest between Rohingya Muslims and Buddhist in Arakan/ 
Rakhine State is allegedly backed by government forces, and there is ongoing conflict 
between minority groups of the Shan, Lahu, and Karen State with the government 
forces. There are a number of criticisms, doubts, and questions which still remain 
unanswered. The Tatm adaw reacted quickly in response to the Saffron revolution when  
monks peacefully protested against price hikes and bad economic conditions in 2007, 
resulting in the military using brutal force to  suppress protestors. Surprisingly, the  
military did not bother to take any action against those involved in religious riots. In 
fact, it creates doubt that either religious riots do not directly threaten the military's 
interests, or the military itself remains silent to derail the nascent democratic transition. 
In addition, Nobel Peace Laureate Aung Sang Suu kyi's silence over religious clashes has 
raised many questions that either she has made a compromise with the military to save
175 "The Dark Side of Transition: Violence against Muslims in Myanmar," 9.
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the democratic transition, or she is seeking a constitutional amendment to run for 
presidency. According to the new constitution, the military still retains 25 percent of 
reserved seats in legislation, and her eligibility is linked with the military's consent to 
amend the constitution, so she can run for presidential elections.
W ithout creating a new political landscape towards the inclusive and pluralistic 
nature of federative systems of union, it will be hard to foresee a long-term stability. An 
unstable Myanmar will have severe transnational effects, as some glimpses of the 
religious effects noted previously can already be observed.
GEOPOLITICAL FULCRUM OF EAST, SOUTH, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
There is no doubt about the significance and geographical pivot-ness of 
Myanmar in the Asian continent, and with rising economies such as China and India, the 
future geopolitical impact of M yanm ar gains a higher profile in global politics. Myanm ar 
is on a junction to provide a continental gateway for China and India due to its location 
at a junction that provides a land bridge to East, South, Southeast Asia, and an unbridled 
coastline along the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. In retrospect, during the 
colonial period, Myanmar was a key geographical unit for British rule to use as a shield 
against French colonizers reaching further towards the Indian sub-continent, as the 
French were enjoying the suzerainty over the Indo-China area. In addition, M yanm ar 
helped allied forces during the Second W orld W ar in defeating the Japanese forces.
Apart from the geopolitical importance of Myanm ar in contemporary politics, it 
is an abandoned country with valuable natural resources. Myanmar is blessed with large
176
oil and gas resources in the region along with gems, teak, and mineral resources. 
Regional in flu en tia l like China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other neighbors, 
including Thailand and Bangladesh, are vigilant towards the resources in Myanmar. 
Moreover, most of these countries are engaged in competition to gain influence over 
Myanmar vis-a-vis each other in order to gain more shares in resource exploitation.
The rising economies from  Asia specifically India and China, are believed to be 
seeking more of their interests in Myanm ar both for strategic and economic reasons. 
China, so far, is enjoying a greater leverage over India for being in better relations with  
Naypyidaw since the early days of the independence period, while India is a little 
frustrated, but hopeful it will win Naypyidaw's substantive trust and confidence. W hat 
specific geopolitical interests can be traced while comparing the historic Chinese and 
Indian rivals struggling to counter each other for resources in Myanmar? How is the 
geopolitics of Myanmar becoming a fulcrum between the East and South? More  
importantly analyzed is whether these external and internal geopolitical maneuverings 
are a cause of domestic instability in Myanmar. These questions help to understand that 
even though Myanmar is in an asymmetrical power relation in regards to India, China 
and others, it still holds leverage due to its geography and resources. Myanmar's 
military junta believes that in the contemporary period Myanmar is "caught in triangular 
rivalry between China, India and United States."176 Furthermore, the military leadership 
in Myanmar widely propagates that the U.S. is trying to use a "containment policy" to
176 Zin, "China-Burma Relations: China's Risk, Burma's Dilemma," 261.
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control China's rise, and in this regard, the geostrategic location of M yanm ar "is a loop 
in their containment policy."177
a. BEIJING'S GEO-STRATEGIC BUFFER ZONE
Looking at Beijing's interest in Myanmar's geopolitical setting takes us back to 
1954, the early years of Myanmar's independence period when the then Chinese 
Premier, Chou En Lai, paid his official visit to India and Myanm ar and affirmed China's 
commitment towards the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Both India and 
Myanmar signed these principles, which included the mutual respect of territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, policy of non-aggression, non-interference in domestic affairs, 
and projects of mutual benefit so that peaceful co-existence could be maintained. 
However, on many occasions, aggression and interventions have proven the 
commitments to be unfulfilled.
Myanmar shares a 1,384 mile long border with China's Yunnan province, and an 
asymmetrical power relationship has existed between the two countries for more than 
five decades. David I. Steinberg and Hongwei Fan (2012) note that since the beginning of 
the Cold War, "Beijing has regarded Burm a/ Myanm ar as a geo-strategic buffer zone, 
whether in its confrontation with the West, its rivalries with the Soviet Union and 
Vietnam, or its Peaceful rise strategy in the post-Cold W ar era."178
It is true that in the post-Cold W ar epoch China's geopolitical and economic 
interests in Myanmar have been no mystery. Myanm ar has become one of the crucial
177 "China-Burma Relations: China's Risk, Burma's Dilemma," 270.
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lifelines for China's supremacy in the region and its future economic growth. In late 
2009 the leaders of Myanm ar and China officially reaffirmed the continuation of their  
"paukphaw (fraternal) friendship," while the military junta in Myanmar, taking an 
additional step, considered the relationship as that of "blood relatives (swemyo 
paukphaw) that are argued to have existed since 1950."179 However, the relationship 
was never harmonious and without trouble, there were moments when both countries 
went to almost zero-level diplomatic ties. For instance, during Gen Ne Win's rule, there  
was indirect support to popular anti-Chinese uprising in Myanmar, which actually 
diverted the attention from its economic failure within Myanm ar and also to signal 
China that Myanm ar would not be influenced with forceful acts.180
In recent years, Myanm ar has significantly reduced its reliance on military and 
economic aid from China, but largely still relies on political and diplomatic protection for 
the regime's survival. The ruling military junta understands that China will not be 
comfortable with any attem pt to confine its geopolitical and economic influence in 
Myanmar. China's policy of peaceful rise and its apparent commitment through a new  
foreign policy of non-interference in other's domestic politics will be a litmus test to see 
whether China allows Myanmar to act on its own while choosing future partners.181 On 
the other hand, China's growing energy demand has made it the largest oil importing 
country in the world. To meet these energy demands, Chinese companies are heavily
179 Zin, "China-Burma Relations: China's Risk, Burma's Dilemma," 264.
180 Topich and Leitich, The History o f Myanmar, 88-92.
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engaged in pipeline and dam construction in M yanm ar to transport oil, gas, and power 
from the Middle East and the shores of M yanm ar to Yunnan province.
At the moment, 78% of China's electric-power needs are met through coal 
burning, while China plans to reduce electricity from coal production to 68% by 2010  
and to 60% by 2020, which is not yet accomplished.182 Therefore China is keen to look at 
hydropower electricity projects, which are ideal as a renewable energy resource. 
Similarly, India is very much keen to harness water resources at Chin State. Both India 
and China are independently in business to construct dams on rivers closer to their 
border areas so electricity can be transmitted to their countries. The investment in 
hydropower projects will counter the environmental challenges posed due to higher 
levels of carbon emission in China. Beijing has signed agreements with Naypyidaw to  
finance seven dams in Kachin State along the Ayeyarwady, N'Mai Hka, and Mali Hka 
Rivers to generate and transmit 13,360-m egawatt electricity.183
According to the EarthRights International report, there are 69 Chinese 
corporations actively involved in 90 major projects of hydropower, mining, oil, and 
natural gas explorations.184 Despite the one-sided leverage of Chinese corporations, 
there is a good sign that these projects will attract foreign investment in Myanm ar. 
During only 2008-2009 around US $856 million, or 87 %, of foreign investment was 
directed at the energy sector. China's three major oil corporations are dominating the  
most of energy exploration projects in Myanmar. China National Petroleum Corporation
182 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas o f Mutual Dependence, 195.
183 Ibid.
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(CNPC), China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC), and China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) have already established a strong presence in 
Myanmar. Having the largest natural gas resources in South-East Asia, M yanm ar faces 
other neighboring countries in the region as potential contenders in the exploration and 
sharing of energy resources, including India, China, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and 
Singapore. On many occasions, these contenders are not able to win contracts on the  
basis of merit; rather, contracts are awarded on the basis of political interests. For 
example, after the crackdown on Saffron revolution protestors in August 2007, Shwe gas 
reserves were sold to China's state owned CNPC at a lower price than to other bidders 
due to Chinese and Russian diplomatic protection provided at the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) when both vetoed a US led resolution for democratic and 
inclusive political culture in M yanm ar.185 The politically awarded contract to CNPC will 
allow the investment of 50.9 percent, the cost of tw o pipelines reaching Kunming 
(Yunnan) through Mandalay and Muse (Myanmar's border area with China). The 
approved oil pipeline and gas pipeline will cost US$1.5 billion and US$ 1.04935 billion 
respectively.186
On strategic grounds, these pipelines are expected to overcome Beijing's 
psychological perception over the insecurity of the Strait of Malacca called "Malacca 
dilemma." Almost 80% of Chinese oil flows into China through the Strait of Malacca. 
Therefore, China is heavily reliant on the U.S. to guarantee the safe passage of oil 
imports as well as overall other types of transits, through the Strait of Malacca. Beijing
185 "China-Burma Relations: China's Risk, Burma's Dilemma," 276.
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believes that if any disruption in the flow  of oil w ere to occur it would strangle China's 
growing economy. These disruptions are possible scenarios for Beijing due to any crisis 
over Taiwan or Beijing's crisis with other U.S. allies in Asia-Pacific.187 From a historical 
point of view, China knows the importance of Myanm ar, as during the Second World 
W ar years of the Sino-Japanese war, Chiang kaishek used Chungking (now known as 
Chongqing) as the capital for his legitimate authority and protection and relied on 
Myanm ar to connect to the outside world. Once the Japanese occupied Burma, he had 
to rely on airlift provision support of Allied powers, which strangulated the economy 
and transportation leading to failure. W ith the successful completion of pipelines, China 
believes it can mitigate its fear of the Malacca dilemma and counter India's growing 
influence in Myanmar. Additionally, China will maintain its "valuable geo-strategic buffer 
zone" that can counter any potential threat to Beijing's interest.188
b. DELHI'S "LOOK EAST" VENTURES THROUGH ITS "EXTENDED NEIGHBOR"
Comparing Beijing's interest in Myanmar, Delhi is not pleased to see its 
"extended neighborhood" further drifting away into a rival's camp. Historically, India 
and Myanm ar have experienced ups and downs in the diplomatic, economic, cultural, 
and people-people relations. At one time, India's liberation leaders w ere greater ideals 
to Myanmar's founding fathers, but the post-independence period under Gen Ne Win's 
military rule changed the scenario, forcing ethnic groups of Indian origin to leave the  
country. India's continued support for pro-democratic forces suffered a backlash,
187 Modem  China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas o f M utual Dependence, 168.
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annoying Myanmar's dictators and making them  sterner against India. During the Cold 
W ar the two countries supported the non-aligned m ovem ent (NAM) until 1979, when 
Myanm ar decided to leave NAM as a result of the growing relationship between India 
and the Soviet Union, and their request for Myanm ar to join the Commonwealth of 
Nations.
Naypyidaw and Delhi developed a higher level of mistrust when India voiced its 
support in favor of 1988's pro-democratic protests. In the following years, Delhi 
welcomed democratic groups to India, especially from ethnic minorities that were not 
well received by the military junta in Naypyidaw. Delhi's growing economy, over 
population, and need to fulfill its energy demands prompted India to cautiously 
compromise its traditional policies. A new "Look East" policy framed to reduce the trust 
deficit between its neighbors, particularly Myanm ar, where India not only foresees 
economic gains, but also addresses its rapidly rising energy requirements to counter 
growing Chinese influence.
Historically for Indians, Burma is called "suvarna Bhumi" meaning the "Golden 
Land" in Sanskrit, because, during colonial times, Burma became a land of opportunities 
for minority Indians to get rich and contribute to the Indian economy too .189 The historic 
notion of the "Golden Land" faded away during Ne Win's era. Indians in general may not 
be enthusiastic about the repeat of political episodes of Gen. Ne Win who expelled 
thousands of Indian business community. The Indian government was very critical of 
these heavy-handed gestures by Myanmar's military. Therefore, the Indian government
189 Egreteau, "India's Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," 297.
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remained one of the opposing proponents to military rule in Myanmar, resulting Delhi 
and Naypyidaw both supporting armed proxy groups on the border region against each 
other.
Similar to Myanmar's troubles with its ethnic minorities dominating border 
regions, India's northeast region, bordering Myanm ar, is one of the country's troubled  
regions that encompasses 40 million people, with 200 tribal groups in demarcated areas 
in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, 
Sikkim, and Tripura.190 Anti-India armed groups in the Northeast are also engaged in 
arms and drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion through using training camps and jungle 
bases in the Sagaing division and Kachin areas in Myanm ar. The military junta in 
Myanmar in fact showed connivance to these activities and used it as bargaining tool to 
get military assistance from  India to crack down on the armed groups. However, there  
was no honest action carried out in reality against groups fighting in India, though the  
Tatmadaw conducted military operations against Myanmar's own ethnic minority 
groups in these border regions. Similarly, Indian intelligence agencies helped train 
Kachin rebels to create a buffer zone between its Northeastern armed rebels and 
Tatmadaw. Other than providing a secretive support to armed groups, India widely 
supported the pro-democratic groups and highly welcomed Kachin and Chin groups in 
New Delhi, which further strained relations between India and Myanmar. Tatm adaw  
increased its support to anti-India groups like the People's Liberation Army of M anipur 
(PLA) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). In the late 1980s Tatmadaw's
190 Dominic J. Nardi, "Cross-Border Chaos: A Critique of India's Attempts to Secure Its Northeast Tribal 
Areas through Cooperation with Myanmar," SAIS Review 28, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 162.
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ceasefire agreement with ethnic armed groups prompted India to change its policies 
towards M yanm ar and softened its strict behavior towards the Tatm adaw.191
Finally, in 1995, India and Myanm ar agreed to launch joint operation "Golden 
Bird" against alleged armed groups on both sides including PLA, ULFA, and the tw o  
factions of National Socialist Council o f Nagaland (NACN) in Khaplang (NSCN-K) and 
Muivah (NSCN-M) and the Chin National Front (CFN). The unsuccessful plan faded away 
as Myanm ar w ithdrew in reaction to India conferring the Nehru Award to pro- 
democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi.192
As noted earlier, India's growing economic activities and domestic demands 
prompted Indian policy makers to change their traditional policy approaches. It is 
pertinent to observe that India always had a policy of self-reliance and supporting 
domestic output. Marie Lall (2006) notes that "India's age-old priority of swadeshi or 
"self-sufficiency" is no longer a feasible goal and regulating relations with states who 
can provide the badly needed gas and oil is seen as central to India's new foreign policy 
(particularly "Look East Policy")."193 In this regard, w ith Bangladesh a recalcitrant 
partner, India's Look East policy was targeted at opening markets in Southeast Asia and 
cooperation with Myanmar was important for its im plem entation.194 For the  
implementation of the "Look East" policy, during the 1990s India came up with a new  
regional strategic vision towards the east with an idea of an "extended neighborhood"
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in Burma. India's new vision primarily focused on three main areas: stabilizing India's 
troubled northeast region ("Golden Bird Operation 1995"), economic opportunities in 
Myanm ar ("Look East Policy of 1991") and counter-balancing the growing Chinese 
influence in Myanmar and the region as a whole (M ilitary Aid).195
Recently, like Beijing, Delhi is investing in a number o f mega projects in 
Myanmar. Myanm ar being a geographic pivot, India initiated the Bangladesh-lndia- 
Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC) agreement in 1997 and 
also the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) agreement in 2000. A similar initiative by 
Beijing, known as China's Kunming Initiative or Bangladesh-China-lndia-Myanmar (BCIM) 
in 1999, provided an avenue for Myanm ar to gradually come out of isolation as a pariah 
state and enjoy the benefits of regional diplomatic ties o ther than ASEAN.196 The earlier 
section of political economy highlighted the top four countries trading with M yanm ar 
and showed a recent increase in the high volume of trade between India and Myanmar,
Among India's many mega projects, prominent ones include the construction of 
highways and oil and gas pipelines connecting Myanmar w ith  India's Northeast region. A 
few  examples: In 2001, Former Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh inaugurated a 160 
KM long road, the India-Myanmar Friendship road (cost US $2.58 million), which 
connected the Indian Northeast and Mandalay.197 Delhi is also moving forward with its 
$400 million Kaladan "multi-modal" project; this project will link India's Mizoram and
195 Egreteau, "India's Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," 296-99.
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Assam to the southwestern port of Akyab in M yanm ar.198 Moreover, during the early 
2000s, Indian oil and gas firms, such as Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC), 
Gas Authority of Indian Limited (GAIL), and Essar Oil (a private Indian company) were  
allowed to exploit natural gas in the Arakan (Rakhine) fields.199
On strategic grounds, Delhi wanted to counter Beijing's growing influence in 
Myanmar. Delhi's bitter experience with the 1962 w ar with China and recent media 
reports propagating the notion of a "rise of China" is obsessing many Indian policy 
makers. As China is the main arms supplier to the military establishment of M yanm ar, a 
Chinese arms deal worth US$ lbillion and an additional $400 million in 1994 to  
modernize Tatmadaw has raised fears in India. India is also alarmed by suspicions that 
China is establishing a facility for surveillance and monitoring purposes at Great Coco 
Island, north of the Andaman archipelago.200 As a response, recently Delhi has been 
trying to play catch-up. In November 2013, on an official tour, the Indian Army chief 
General Bikram Singh shared India's plan to provide military aid, including supply of 
military equipment and spare parts, training and border cooperation, with President 
Thein Sein, Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin, and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defense Services, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. M yanm ar comfortably agreed to  
accept the offer and was willing to balance China's rule in Myanmar through welcoming 
Indian military trainers for training purposes, as well as agreeing to send 100 special
198 Thant Myint-U, Where China Meets India : Burma and the New Crossroads o f Asia, 1st American ed. 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 318-19.
199 Lall, "Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy," 429.
200 Egreteau, "India's Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," 306.
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forces yearly to acquire training at the Indian Army's counter-insurgency and jungle 
warfare school at Vairengte in M izoram .201
Despite Delhi being historically at odds with Naypyidaw, Delhi is slowly and 
steadily progressing towards restoring benign relations w ith Myanmar. Delhi needs to 
tackle troubling border issues immediately in order to gain long term and effective ties 
with Myanmar. As discussed earlier, other than armed struggles in the northeast, it is 
important to highlight the geographic reality of India's northeast, which is choked 
between Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh with a narrow link, a "chicken neck," 
connecting it to mainland India. It is a completely different case from that of China's 
Yunnan province, because India's northeast is a troubled zone and presents 
comparatively higher poverty problems. The armed groups like ULFA has bases in all 
neighboring countries around the region. In 2009 a bomb blast killed more than 60 
people and injured more than 300 in Assam by National Democratic Front of Bodoland 
(NDFB) due to political and economic grievances.202 India needs to resolve the 
grievances of its northeastern region; otherwise, India's dreams towards the east may 
face major problems.
c. OTHERS AS LYNCHPIN OF GEOPOLITICAL FULCRUM?
Other than India and China, Japan has been a long tim e silent donor and investor 
in Myanmar. In that sense, Japan has developed a soft image in the minds of the people
201 Rajat Pandit, "India Steps up Military Aid to Myanmar to Offset China's Might," The Times o f India 
November 1, 2013.
202 Myint-U, Where China Meets India : Burma and the New Crossroads o f Asia, 287-89.
188
of Myanmar. For Japan, the growing market economy of Myanmar is an economic 
strategic asset in the coming years. Bangladesh and Thailand are also contending 
neighbors in terms of gaining a share in energy and economic opportunities in 
Myanmar. Despite this, Myanmar enjoys its largest trading economy with Thailand, but 
Naypyidaw is always suspicious of Thailand's closeness to the  United States.
Highlighting some significant projects in Myanm ar, Bangladesh has shown its desire to  
join the economic revival through the construction of highways. In 2010 Bangladeshi 
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, during her visit to Kunming (Yunnan), agreed to construct 
a railway road connecting Chittagong to Kunming through Ramree (M yanm ar) to  
enhance communication and trade activities.203
Thailand and M yanm ar have planned a mega project to harness Myanmar's 
resources through the establishment of an industrial hub at the Tavoy/ Dawei area in 
the Tanintharyi Region (former Tenasserim Division). The initial investment is estimated  
at US$8.6 billion with an additional US$58 billion to follow. The industrial project will 
develop a deep-sea port, chemical plants, oil refinery, and highways connecting 
Thailand, China, Laos, Cambodia, and the rest of Southeast Asia, which would eventually 
reduce reliance on the usage of the Strait of Malacca. Unfortunately, these projects are 
planned at the cost of environmental devastation. Thailand plans to shift all industrial 
units that are harmful to this area, meaning in the future Myanmar will have to bear the 
environmental effects.204 Recently Myanmar's English newspaper "Eleven" gave 
coverage to protestors opposing the industrial projects. According to the newspaper, in
2°3 where China Meets In d ia : Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, 320.
2°4 where China Meets India : Burma and the New Crossroads o f Asia, 318-19.
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September 2013, residents of the Dawei area in Tanintharyi Division launched 
campaigns against the construction of the oil refinery and industrial projects that cause 
environmental damage to their area.205
The above discussion highlighting the competition over mega projects in 
Myanmar vindicates the valuable resources and geo-strategic location of Myanm ar. 
These examples support the notion that there is always a foreign involvement due to  
attraction to resources and creation of buffer zones for geo-strategic reasons. Similarly, 
in the past, it was the British-Japanese colonization and occupation episodes that are 
vivid examples of direct involvement by external powers. Whereas, most recently, 
regional powers like China and India are indirectly engaged in expanding their presence 
inside Myanmar. Moreover, the rise of democratic forces in Myanmar cannot be 
ignored, eventually involving Western forces, especially the United States, when it is in a 
process of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region. This external political 
engineering helps with the understanding that at large the local culture remains a great 
tool of exploitation for geopolitical and geo-economic reasons.
Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S has been the security guarantor 
of its Pacific allies, and rebalancing the rising in flu en tia l in the region is one U.S strategy 
to maintain the status quo. Therefore, the U.S. does not w ant to push Naypyidaw hard 
over human rights violations and democratic forces, as the U.S. tried in the wake of the 
1988 protests. The result then was Tatm adaw deciding Myanmar had to become closer 
to China. In addition, U.S. investors will not be happy with any forceful a ttem pt by
205 "Residents Protest the Building of Oil Refinery in Dawei," Eleven September 25, 2013.
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Washington towards Naypyidaw risking their recent investments, so Washington will be 
under pressure to deal cautiously w ith Naypyidaw. Additionally, the U.S. is also carefully 
observing the diplomatic maneuverings of Naypyidaw in the region, as Naypyidaw is 
active in choosing new partners and assigning projects to countries to  maintain its 
historical image of a non-aligned state.
A nuclear Myanm ar and any linkage with North Korea will of course be a m atter 
of concern for the U.S. and its allies within and outside the region. In the scenario of 
Myanmar going nuclear, this fractured zone of Asia-pacific will become one of the most 
dangerous shatterbelts of the world, where all hostile neighbors are equipped with  
nuclear weapons. Already China, India, Pakistan and North Korea share borders w ith no 
good relations, and if Myanmar decides to choose the nuclear camp, it will not be an 
ideal situation for global peace, let alone the future stability of the country itself. The 
controversial project about Myanmar's nuclear plan came to light after its defectors 
disclosed Myanmar's nuclear ambition. Many analysts believe it is potentially an 
inspiration from North Korea for strategic reasons. It obviously raised concerns of the  
West and its allies in the region.
According to Alexis Rieffel, "Myanmar's interest in a nuclear energy program has 
been made public, [and] the government has kept secret its plans to build an 
underground complex below Naung Laing Mountain (near Pyin Oo Lwin) in northern  
Myanm ar with possible North Korean help. This site is close to the civilian research 
reactor being assembled by Russia. Photographs taken of the complex between 2003  
and 2006 are reported to show more than 800 tunnels ... North Korea is suspected of
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having passed nuclear technology to M yanm ar."206 The suspected cooperation was 
brought to a halt when Myanmar foiled a North Korean attem pt to assassinate South 
Korean president Chun Doo-hwan in 1983 during his planned visit to Myanm ar. Kim II- 
Sung failed to restore relations with Myanm ar, until the historic mass protests o f 1988. 
As a result of mass mobilization, the relations seem to have been restored after 1988's 
pro-democratic protest, especially when Western diplomatic pressure for the transfer of 
power prompted SPDC (military junta) to join its old rogue block. Finally, in 2000, 
Myanmar's military regime made public its plans to purchase a small reactor from  
Russia.207
Seeing a possible nuclear proliferation in the region, in 2003 the then chairman
of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard G. Lugar, showed concern over
Myanmar's nuclear ambitions and referred to  it as a "source of instability throughout 
South and Southeast Asia."208 In 2007 Myanm ar agreed to terms with Russia to  
construct a nuclear reactor. The deal was actually discussed in 200, and stalled during 
2002 due to Myanmar's inability to make an advance payment. However, the booming 
energy industry is helping Myanm ar to accumulate its foreign reserves. As per the initial 
plan, the reactor will generate 10-megawatts of power. The cost of the project was not 
disclosed; however, according to Russian hints, it will be around US$500 million.209 Due 
to the recent rise of energy sector investments, Myanmar has apparently been silent on 
nuclear reactors for energy purposes; however, its threat perceptions cannot be ruled
206 Rieffel, Myanmar/Burma : Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, 143.
207 Myanmar/Burma : Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, 183-87.
208 Myanmar/Burma : Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, 188.
209 Turnell, "Burma’s Poverty of Riches: Natural Gas and the Voracious State," 226.
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out. If the promised reform policies fail and M yanm ar decides to return to its earlier 
status, the U.S. and its allies will need to retain better working relations with Tatm adaw  
until responsible civilian power takes the charge.
Overall, the geostrategic and geo-economic avenues have become favorable to  
Myanmar. Myanmar needs to propose friendly economic policies and move forward  
towards a democratic transition and economic developm ent of the entire country 
without being limited to a few groups and excluding the rest. In this regard, U.S. policy 
makers also understand that regional economic interdependence has strengthened the  
relations of China with other Asian countries; so, it is unlikely that the U.S. will block the 
Strait of Malacca. However, a reasonable assumption is the fear that if democratic 
forces are quelled or human rights violations persist in Myanmar, it may potentially 
threaten all the mega projects.210 The security of pipelines and roads are a serious 
m atter as most of these linkages are passing through ethnic minority areas, which are 
under the control of ethnic militias. It is a serious issue for China too, as the oil and gas 
pipelines of the Shwe Gas project will pass through 22 towns along 980 KMs (officially 
771-793 KMs) of Myanmar. For the protection of the pipelines, forty-four infantry and 
light infantry battalions are stationed, which demonstrates that w ithout resolving issues 
with ethnic minorities the security of these pipelines are at high risk.211 The construction 
of new roads and railroads across Myanm ar by India and China is itself the creation of a 
new Silk Road in the twenty-first century. Though M yanm ar connects tw o big world 
economies directly or indirectly to the rest of the world, critically Myanm ar would be
210 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations : Dilemmas o f Mutual Dependence, 170-80.
211 Modern China-Myanmar Relations : Dilemmas o f M utual Dependence, 178.
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accomplishing this task through odd connections through "vast hinterlands of India and 
China, much less visible to the outside, poor and w ith a spine of violent conflict running 
right through."212 W ithout resolving its domestic problems with ethnic minorities, 
mainly political and economic grievances, sooner or later the turmoil may turn  
Myanmar into a quagmire for the rest of the country and affect the economic 
opportunities of entire region.
CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
Suppressing its own people who rose up to seek their basic rights, M yanm ar has 
experienced one of the most brutal military regimes in recent history. Unfortunately  
historical and societal divides have given the military regime leverage to play with 
emotions and nationalistic fervors on those dividing lines. For a stable Myanm ar, the  
country needs to establish a federal army recruiting from all ethnic groups, not 
discriminating against others by recruiting only Burmans. In addition, Myanm ar, a 
geographical pivot state balancing between China and India, two im portant rising 
regional powers, has its own geopolitical and economic challenges, while the entire 
Southeast Asian region has been undergoing a process of transformation for the last 
two decades.
During the political and economic transformations, the military regimes in 
Myanmar consolidated the roots of a praetorian society. However it grappled with  
diverse political developments of regimes in its neighboring countries. For instance,
212 Myint-U, Where China Meets India : Burma and the New Crossroads o f Asia, 292.
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Vietnam and Laos became rapidly growing market oriented party-states, the Philippines 
and Indonesia experienced the transitions of post-developmental dictatorship 
democracies, Thailand became democratized but w ith an unstable democracy with a 
political monarchy, and Singapore and Malaysia enjoyed successful economic ventures 
under competitive authoritarian states. Meanwhile, Burma became economically 
stagnant seeking political direction under a military regime.213 The military regime 
continued its rule for five decades, and finally in 2010, the military agreed to transfer 
power to a so-called democratically elected regime.
The 2010 elections apparently provided a ray of hope towards a democratic 
transition and the establishment of rule of law that can respect the egalitarian rights of 
every member of Myanm ar through inclusive policies towards political settlements. 
During November 2013, on her visit to Australia, Aung San Suu Kyi said, "W e are just 
starting out on the road to democracy. W e are not there yet, as some people seem to 
assume ... w ithout amendments to the constitution, we can never become a truly 
democratic society."214 Along with the political transitions, the economic revival is seen 
as a sign of relief for Myanmar's impoverished people after decades of ultra-poor 
conditions due to its isolationists and bad economic policies by the military regime. The 
new projects about the economic, political, and social initiatives in Burma is expanding 
in the landscape of Myanmar, including the social "space, legal and political protections 
and opportunities for the poor, uneducated, unhealthy, malnourished, and
213 Nakanishi, Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution : The State and Military in Burma, 1962-1988, 4.
214 "Joint Press Conference with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; Visit to  Australia," (Canberra November 28,
2013).
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disenfranchised citizenry... [BUT]... there is no full consensus, much insider and outsider 
opinion prioritizes creating contending power centers able to  challenge the status of the 
military machine as the essential political actors."215 The reason for this is the status of 
the military machine a crucial actor; most information has to  be channelized through 
the regime under the influence of the military, and outside Myanmar, opinions are 
skeptical about the legality of any positive initiatives. Moreover, most countries', 
especially China and India, are solely concerned about the security of their investments 
in Myanmar. If Myanm ar fails to reach a political settlem ent with ethnic groups, then it 
may have negative repercussions on the mega projects started recently, and there will 
be no security guarantee for safe passage through economic corridors in the troubled  
zones.
At the moment, the entire world is predicting the prospects and challenges on 
the basis of known-knowns about Myanm ar, yet, there is an information black hole, so 
the unknown-unknowns need more time and patience so the  intentions of the regime 
and the outcomes of current ventures can be evaluated. Myanmar's existing fragile and 
weak diplomatic links, lack of stability, and inability to  be properly integrated into the  
regional and global stage is damaging to the aspirational growth of Asian countries, and 
its impacts will be negative to the rest of the world.
215 Ian Holliday, Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest fo r  Political Reform in M yanm ar (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011), 168.
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CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDY II - PAKISTAN: FROM NATION-BUILDING TO A HODGEPODGE OF CIVIL-
MILITARY RULE
Our Beloved country (Pakistan) is facing severe challenges of power outage/
Load shedding, rising cost (inflation), Mountain of Debts, unemployment,
Chaotic economic situation, despondency among youth, extremism and unrest, 
rising poverty, fractured government institutions, widespread corruption, and 
Pakistan's weak global image ... these are like a dense jungle of problems ... for 
his new government.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif1
Pakistan is the pivot of the world ... the frontiers on which the future position of 
the world revolves.
Founder and First Governor-General of Pakistan, M. A. Jinnah2
Pakistan is an enormous country; it is strategically an important country not just 
for the United States but also for the World. It's a country, whose people has an 
enormous potential, but it is also right now a country that within it has 
extremists elements... (The United States) engaged aggressively with Pakistani 
government to communicate that we (U.S) want nothing more than a stable, 
prosperous, peaceful Pakistan... (And) work with the Pakistani government in 
order to eradicate this extremism that we consider a cancer within the country 
that can potentially engulf the country."
President Barack Obama3
INTRODUCTION
A historic moment in the political history of Pakistan, May 11, 2013, saw for the  
first time a successful democratic transition of power from one democratically elected 
government to another. Despite the positive indicators of the democratization process,
1 During the maiden speech at parliament after electing third time Prime Minister of Pakistan in June 5th, 
2013.
2 During conversation with American wartim e correspondent Margaret Bourke-White in September 1947.
3 During official visit to India, and responding to a question asking, "W hy has the U.S reluctant to label 
Pakistan as a terrorist state?" In November 2010.
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Pakistan is still referred to as a deep state or security state, where its military is believed 
to be the most powerful institution that sways political processes, as opposed to other 
political institutions4 The political leadership is branded as incompetent, corrupt, and on 
many occasions a shadow of doubt has been cast on the loyalty of politicians to their 
country. Thus the politicians have remained less fortunate in Pakistan's political 
landscape, while the tw o colonial inherited institutions, the civil bureaucracy and the  
military, have taken charge of and penetrated deeply into the political system.5 The 
domestic power struggles for political authority and bargaining between political and 
military elites affected the establishment of any proper political and social order. On 
many occasions the country's constitution, which is believed to be the supreme law, has 
been abrogated via frequent coups. Every coup or military intervention was legitimized 
as in the greater interest of the nation-state. The effects of power competition between  
the political institutions led the "Pakistani masses in a state of semi-literacy, making 
them prone to adopt a religiously based culture of resentment while depriving them  of 
the theoretical and practical tools [of inclusive or participatory politics] that would allow  
them  to challenge the existing social order."6 Today, Pakistan is not in an ideal situation 
in terms of its social cohesion as a nation compared to its early days of nationhood, 
when it embarked on a journey of nation and state-building in the 1940s.
4 Shuja Nawaz, "Army and Politics," in Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State, ed. Maleeha Lodhi (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011), 79; Veena Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan : Political Processes, Conflicts 
and Crises (New D e lh i; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2003), 45.
5 Tariq AN, Can Pakistan Survive?: The Death o f a State, US ed. (London & New York: Verso Editions /  NLB 
1983), 197.
6 Frederic Grare, "Rethinking Western Strategies toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States 
and Europe," (Washington, D.C Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 8.
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The deeply polarized nation-state requires a complete overhaul. Over the last six 
decades the domestic and regional power politics have drastically affected the entire  
Pakistani nation, which is extremely polarized and fractured between the pro-liberal and 
anti-liberal camps under the colorful shades of revolutionaries, seculars, moderates, the 
religious, fundamentalists, ethno-nationalists, and so forth. Subsequently a huge portion 
of the bewildered population seems to be sandwiched between the contending poles.7 
This dangerous scale of polarization can be depicted in the perspective that for many 
Malala Yousafzai (a girl who was shot by Taliban for promoting and defending women's 
right to education) and Salman Taseer (killed for supporting the am endm ent of 
Blasphemy law) are heroes, while for fundamentalists they are agents of the W est. In 
fact, Islamists in the country see Osama Bin Laden and Mum taz Qadri (personal police 
guard and killer of Governor of Punjab Salman Taseer) as their heroes. M oreover, the  
state narrative of dealing with terrorism and extremism is lately based on the idea of a 
"good" and "bad" Taliban, or extremism itself creating a divide in society.
Polarization has gradually created great confusion and controversy among the 
citizens; if asked to define Pakistan's identity, it is quite easy to get multiple 
interpretations and definitions. It is true to accept that identity is shaped by narrative, 
and depends on the state's policies that have molded its identity during the nation- 
building process. Benedict Anderson writes that nations are "imagined communities," 
and with the passage of time, there is a persistent change process in social
7 Akbar Ahmed, "Why Jinnah Matters?," in Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State, ed. Maleeha Lodhi (New  
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 21.
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consciousness, therefore, "identity ... cannot be rem em bered, [and] must be narrated."8
In Pakistan's contexts, the identity of the nation is visible in various contending forms.
Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid has smartly sketched the various images of Pakistan's
identity through various viewpoints, as he writes that:
"the military defines Pakistani national identity defensively, in terms of the 
country's vulnerability, as a national security state, with a perm anent mistrust of 
India. The politicians in power have never seriously tried to challenge this 
isolating self-definition by offering alternative policies, such as promoting good 
neighborliness, ending support for Islamic extremism, fostering economic 
development, and providing education. The Pakistani Taliban, for their part, 
would define Pakistan in religious terms: they call for the establishment of a 
state based on Sharia or Islamic law and for a caliphate."9
The deep polarization of society has evolved around the "holy battles" between
secular or liberals and orthodox religious or anti-liberal groups; and in many ways these
societal drifts towards extremism are coxed by state policies countering regional
security challenges, pending unresolved political disputes and political interests. Over
the years, due to regional geopolitical maneuvering, there are occasions w here policies
directly and indirectly support certain divisive groups, which has from  tim e to  time
further widened the fissures of fragmentation in the societal structure with
overwhelmingly mind-numbing ramifications for the political development of the
nation-state.10 Diverse opinions and opposition exist in every political society, but the
lack of tolerance and empathy to accommodate minorities and the denial to accept each
other's rational viewpoints is a troubling factor in Pakistan's evolving political culture.
8 Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 204.
9 Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future o f America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (New York: 
Viking, 2012), 25.
10 Farzana Shaikh, Making Sense o f Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 83.
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Looking at the journey of nation-building in Pakistan, a British Pakistani w riter, 
Tariq Ali in his book Can Pakistan Survive? explains that the sequential political 
development involved the "triune influence of military dictatorships, failed populism  
and rural conservatism on the political development has reduced the country to a state 
of permanent crisis."11 However, in response to the prevailing alarming situations,
Anatol Lieven calls Pakistan a tough country which has shown resilience against all the  
"divided, disorganized, economically backward, corrupt, violent, unjust, often savagely 
oppressive towards the poor and women, and home to extremely dangerous forms of 
extremism and terrorism and yet it moves and is in many ways surprisingly tough and 
resilient as a state and a society."12
The holistic image of the country projects that Pakistan's weak but self-centered 
political elites are continuously confusing the entire nation, but the majority of citizens 
are seeking the proper direction that the country's founders envisioned (see the  
Appendix B for a glimpse of M r. Jinnah's vision). The entire nation is completely 
confused over its core interests and national agendas. W hile the situation on the ground 
is complex, the Pakistani people anticipate some bold and careful decisions to  reorient 
state narratives towards the forgotten ideals of the nation's founding father M r. Jinnah, 
who outlined the ideals during his historic speech delivered to the constituent Assembly 
of Pakistan on August 11, 1947.13
11 Ali, Can Pakistan Survive?: The Death of a State, 163.
12 Anatol Lieven, Pakistan : A Hard Country, 1st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 4.
13 Hafeez Malik, Pakistan : Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 5-6; Shaikh, Making Sense o f Pakistan, 68.
201
Due to geo-strategic and geopolitical reasons, mainly an Indian-centric 
existential fear, Pakistani political leadership immediately decided to become a Western 
ally so it could benefit from its bipolar politics for its own safety in the region.
Conversely, at the domestic level, nation-building was based frequently on religious 
ideals that possibly eschewed any secessionist or irredentist struggle. The decades long 
military rule signified a higher role of religion in political life, which helped military rulers 
fram e a "policy of tripod," meaning decision-making and outcomes centered around 
three priorities: religious nationalism, Indian centric foreign policy, and an alliance with  
the W est.14 The notion of religious nationalism gathered m ore space in civic and political 
public spheres. The implicit policies of facilitating non-state actors, especially during the 
Cold War, resulted in the indoctrination of ideas like Gazwa-e-hindi (Battle of India) 
establishing the caliphate in greater Khorasan, further cementing a confrontational 
ideology in the minds of conservatives. The past policies of supporting and facilitating 
radical groups created a social space that entertained and empowered extremely 
hardline religious leadership.15 These trends tend to  develop a confrontational mindset 
towards political and economic modernization, which unfortunately hollows the 
foundations of the state within. Sometimes the economic sanctions also isolate it from  
the rest of the world. However, the notion of isolation breaks away due to Pakistan's 
geographical pivot, such positioning always keeping it as one of the most im portant 
units in the geo-strategic structure of world politics.
14 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and M ilitary  (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace 2005), 15.
15 Ibid.
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The policies of manipulating religious nationalism seems to negate M r. Jinnah's
first presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11 ,1947 . In
his address Jinnah clarified that Pakistan was created as a country for Muslims, who
were politically marginalized. Keeping in mind the past memory of marginalization, the
role of religion in the governance of the state should be evaded in newly formed
Pakistan, he declared, and the governance structure should be relegated to the private
domain.16 As in his August 11 ,1947  speech, Jinnah fundamentally outlined the following
principles as the basis for a political culture for the newly established country (see the
entire speech in appendix B):
"You are free; you are free to go to  your temples, you are free to go to  your 
mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may 
belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business 
of the State... W e are starting in the days w here there is no discrimination, no 
distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between  
one caste or creed and another. W e are starting w ith this fundam ental principle 
that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State... Now I think we should 
keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time  
Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in 
the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in 
the political sense as citizens of the State."17
The fundamental guiding principles were im portant for Jinnah, because Jinnah 
did not want to see other religious minorities suffer or feel inferior, as Muslims had 
during the early colonial era. In this regard, an effective political order needed to be 
reoriented through a careful look at historical decisions. After all, reorientation is a
16 Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New  
York: Public Affairs, 2013), 23-24.
17 Malik, Pakistan : Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities, 6.
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challenging course of action to alter an established political culture, but the current 
times demand an effort be made to achieve the goal.
In the process of reorientating the state, Pakistani policy makers need to be 
prudent in observing the crucial period of 2013-2014. The reason it is a crucial phase of 
the tw enty first century is because it will be a defining m oment for Pakistan itself, the  
region, and the entire world to set an agenda for the rest of the century. The phase is 
specifically significant for Pakistan because the state is in a process of political transition. 
This transition helps with the maturing of the political system with democratic ideals, 
though the state struggles to put its political order on track. Additionally, Pakistan has a 
key role in the "global war on Terror," which has entered an important and conclusive 
stage of the war in Afghanistan. W hile presenting Pakistan's National Internal Security 
Policy (NISP) 2013-2018, the Interior Minister of Pakistan, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan 
categorically mentioned the "existential threat to the integrity and sovereignty of the  
state" is looming due to terrorism.18 The cost of the recent high magnitude of terrorist 
activities is high; cost can be witnessed through the loss of control of territory to foreign 
terrorists, who established their authority on ungoverned spaces within Pakistan's 
territorial jurisdiction and challenged the w rit of the state. Economically terrorism has 
cost $78 billion, and more importantly, civilian casualties have crossed the figure of 
48,994, including 5,272 security personnel, from 2001 to November 2013.19
If the existential threat becomes acute, then it will certainly prom pt the 
international community to be vigilant about Pakistan's nuclear assets, and the
18 Ismail Khan, "Pakistan Most Terror-Hit Nation," Dawn 02-23-2014, para. 2.
19 "Pakistan Most Terror-Hit Nation," Dawn 02-23-2014, para. 8.
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transnational effects across the region and the whole world. At the m om ent, the 
safeguard of nuclear weapons is protected under a strict command and control system, 
which satisfies international agencies. However, Pakistan's nuclear program was put and 
remains under an international watch list since the Pakistani government was alerted  
over A. Q. Khan's clandestine transfer of nuclear technology, a discovery which led to  
international observers and analysts to liken it to "a nuclear W alM art."20
Secondly, this phase of history is im portant for the region because Pakistan's two  
important neighbors, Afghanistan and India, will elect new governments. Therefore, the 
newly elected regimes in the region such as in Afghanistan, Iran, India and Pakistan will 
be seeking to achieve favorable win-sets to  preserve their political, geo-strategic, and 
economic interests. Also, the waves of instability across the Middle East are alarming 
and pose transnational challenges for Pakistan and its neighboring countries, forcing 
them to tackle complex issues on multiple fronts. Finally, Pakistan is located at a 
junction of the region which is unique as it converges South Asia, East Asia, Central Asia, 
and West Asia, providing a suitable base for potential global economic activities, i.e. the 
rise of Chinese and Indian economic markets and their regional influence. At the same 
tim e, the entire convergence zone is dangerously fractured from within, as it hosts three  
of the world's nuclear powers, China, India and Pakistan. The powers are also the  
world's top three arms importers, and they are hostile to each other and represent a
20 Christopher Clary, "Dr. Khan's Nuclear W alm art," (The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy,
2004), para. 2.
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bitter history of past wars and continuous border skirmishes.21 Preserving peace and 
stability and carrying out smooth political economic activities in the region is in the 
greater interest of the entire world.
The agenda of this chapter is to identify the core problems that Pakistan has 
witnessed during its journey of nation and state-building processes. W hat are the 
factors that facilitated in weakening state institutions, ineffectiveness, and 
unaccountable state-society relations, which subsequently undermined the rule of law? 
The discussion focuses on historical and contemporary analysis of four broader areas to 
explain the driving factors, i.e. security, political-economic, social, and geopolitical 
dimensions, to understand the evolution of violence, corruption, human rights abuse, 
and geo-strategic troubles in Pakistan.
DECOLONIZATION: A MOMENT OF EUPHORIA AND DYSPHORIA
The decline of the British Empire resulted in a speedy decolonization process 
across the world. The anti-colonial and independence movement in the Indian sub­
continent resulted in the creation of two states on the basis of the two-nation theory.22 
The notion of the two-nation theory advocated two separate states on the basis of 
religion, i.e. Hindu majority areas were to form India, while Muslim majority areas were  
to become Pakistan.23 The state's formation process was shaped by an act o f a surgical 
partition of the Indian sub-continent in August 1947. A population of 42 million lived in
21 Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman, "Trends in International Arms Transfer 2013,"
(Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 2014), 1.
22 Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 10.
23 Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan : Eye o f the Storm, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 14.
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East Pakistan, while 33 million resided in West Pakistan, based on their religious 
identity. Interestingly, India was located in between and divided both eastern and 
western wings with a territory stretched over 1,000 miles.24 Partition resulted in one of 
the largest human mobilizations in the history; more than one million people died, and 
ten million migrated as refugees. In fact, decolonization was a moment that brought an 
end to the British Empire, but left a legacy of hatred and violence in the region that 
continues to this day.25 Bruce Riedel, Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, 
notes that "India and Pakistan w ere born with a wound, and the wound has not healed 
in the decades since; instead it has become more infected, giving rise to terror and 
violence."26
As an outcome of the two-nation theory, Pakistan became the first country to be 
created in the name of religious ideology, later followed by Israel's creation on 
ideological grounds in 1948. Former President of Pakistan and military dictator Gen. Zia 
ul Haq compared Pakistan with Israel during an interview in The Economist in 1981, 
categorically pointing out that religion's role is pivotal in the existence of Pakistan. He 
affirmed if one were to "take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would 
collapse."27 Thirty years after his interview, the situation now is more complex, highly 
intolerant, and violent. Over the years, it has resulted in producing intolerance and
24 Bruce 0 . Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, Brookings 
Focus Books (2013), 47; Lieven, Pakistan : A Hard Country, 10; Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and 
Authoritarianism in South Asia : A Comparative and Historical Perspective, Contemporary South Asia 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 18.
25 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, 48.
26 Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, 47.
27 Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion : Pakistan as a Political Idea (USA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 4.
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disseminating hatred towards oriented ideals, in the name of religion, towards 
opponents for political gains by specific classes and for strategic reasons.
During the early days of Pakistan's independence, the  developing nation 
struggled to construct a national identity on ideological grounds. The founding political 
leadership "aspire(d) to Western constitutionalism" which to  the leaders seemed likely 
to address various issues of national identities and the territorial legitimacy of the state 
in becoming acceptable to all ethnic groups.28 Aspiration towards Western 
constitutionalism can be traced to Jinnah's vision for the newly born nation-state. Jinnah 
trusted that democratic ideals would be suitable for the constitution of the country, as 
for him, the Pakistani "soil is perfectly fertile for democracy" for its political 
orientations.29 Jinnah did not realize, however, that in the future many of the colonial 
legacies would hamper the democratic orientation of the country by strengthening its 
praetorian structure.
The moments of euphoria over independence faded away quickly with both 
domestic and external factors, as Pakistan scrambled with a number of socio-economic 
and geopolitical challenges. From its inception, these challenges caused Pakistan's 
fledgling political institutions to be established on weak and fragile foundations. Mainly  
on political grounds, the newly born nation-state was "lacking both a well-defined basis 
of nationhood and a sufficient administrative structure."30 On the economic front, the  
poor economic conditions did not promise to support the state's financial needs. After
28 Shaikh, Making Sense o f Pakistan, 1.
29 Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions : Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History o f Misunderstanding,
21.
30 "History Repeats Itself in Pakistan," Journal o f Democracy 17, no. 4 (2006): 115.
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independence, the exchequer of Pakistan was empty; the lack of funds to pay employee 
wages and salaries was a hard situation for the newly born country.
Ian Talbot writes that one of the reasons for Pakistan's economic challenges was 
the delay in receiving the share of assets from divided India. As per the partition plan, 
Pakistan was entitled to receive 17.5 per cent of the assets, including a share of the Rs. 
550 million cash balance, while India was willing to share a smaller percent to what was 
agreed in principle. An agreement was reached in December 1947 to share the cash 
balance. As India was already in shock to see a divided land, and due to the geopolitical 
conflict over Kashmir further cementing a higher level of distrust, India moved to  
withhold the transfer of the agreed cash balance, though the amount was released at 
later stages.31 However, the year's earlier unresolved political and geographic issues 
over Kashmir with India on its Eastern frontiers, and at the same tim e, Afghanistan's 
question over the Durand Line on its Western Frontiers, became a security challenge for 
years to come. Afghanistan's alignment with India quickly prompted the Pakistani 
security establishment and political elites to align with China for regional balancing, 
while opting towards the West for technological, military, and economic assistance.32 In 
order to counter two fronts, one at its eastern and the other on its western border, a 
policy to support non-state actors as proxies became active in order to fulfill the political 
and security agendas in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In recent decades this policy has
31 Ian Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, Expanded and updated ed. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), 98; Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South A s ia : A Comparative and Historical Perspective,
2 2 .
32 Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and Military, 15.
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backfired, and the non-state actors are now transformed into an anti-state force fighting 
against the Pakistani people and state institutions.
Another tragedy of the newly born nation was the early death of the founder of 
the nation-state, Mr. Jinnah (mainly known as Quaid-i-Azam, meaning "great leader") in 
1948. After his death, political events gradually receded from  the dreams built for the  
country's future to be a modern Islamic state that proclaimed pluralistic democratic 
norms through inclusiveness and the assimilation of every individual who lived in the  
country.33 In fact, state policies became more emphatic on promoting orthodox Islamic 
ideals as the unifying force for the nation and to deter the nationalistic issue of Bengalis 
in Eastern Pakistan, and Pashtun and Baluch nationalists in West Pakistan, which had 
already opened a number of domestic fronts for Pakistan to tackle. These issues 
gradually provided appealing circumstances for the military elites to take over power, 
whom had already established praetorian roots in the sub-continent under colonial rule.
Another setback to Pakistan's fledging democratic institutions was the 
assassination of its first Prime Minister Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan (also known as Quaid-i- 
Milat, meaning "leader of the nation") during a public speech in 1951. Police personnel 
on duty soon killed the assassin, and the reason behind the assassination was buried, 
along with the PM's corpse, as a mystery. After his assassination, the civil bureaucrats 
took complete command of governance, and later military coups completely sidelined 
the political leadership.34
33 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan : A t the Crosscurrent o f History (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 53.
34 Ali, Can Pakistan Survive?: The Death o f a State, 43.
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The hodgepodge of civil-military leadership constructed a new state narrative 
portraying Pakistan, which affirmed it was created in the name of Islam, should stand 
with the principles of religion. Over tim e, the "political commitment to an ideological 
state gradually evolved into a strategic commitment," which turned into a symbiotic 
relation between military and religious elites endorsing each other's acts.35 Systematic 
processes attem pted at various stages may explain the "attempts at Islamizing the state, 
at Islamizing the law, at Islamizing political life, at Islamizing the economic and banking 
system, at Islamizing Knowledge;" however, the degree of success for each attem pt 
varies depending on the type of regime in Pakistan.36 After the events of 1971's war, 
Pakistani state officials gave a serious look at recasting the state's history.37 History 
books and texts for schools and academic purposes were designed in a way that could 
support religion as a basis for Pakistan and its way of life.38 Since the late 1970s the re­
designed history books have included a subject called social studies; the subject has 
become mandatory and has been taught from primary schools to professional degree 
programs in universities, so future generations are embedded with the constructed 
narratives. It is important to note that the Pakistan history and social studies books 
describe that the independence struggle was not linked w ith British colonial times and 
an undivided India, but rather date back to 712 AD when Mohammad Bin Qasim, at the
35 Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and Military, 3.
36 Marc Gaborieau, "Religion in the Pakistani Polity," in Pakistan: The Contours o f State and Society, ed. 
Soofia Mumtaz, Jean-Luc Racine, and Imran Ali (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 44.
37 Ayesha ialal, "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining," International Journal o f Middle East 
Studies 27, no. 1 (1995): 74.
38 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle with M ilitant Islam (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007), 19.
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behest of Umayyad Caliphate, came from Baghdad and attacked Sindh (now part of 
Pakistan) to free some imprisoned Arab traders.39
The history of romanticism continues and includes the Mughal period of rule, the 
war of liberation of 1857 against British rule, and surprisingly the roles of M ehm ud  
Gaznawi (who ruled in 10th century over most of Afghanistan, some parts of Iran and 
today's Pakistan) and Ahmed Shah Abdali (father o f modern day Afghanistan) are also 
included in the spreading or preaching of Islam that eventually provided the basis for 
Pakistan. The historiography process through textbook curriculum includes chapters on 
Muslim rulers from the past to balance the religious rulers with authoritarian leadership. 
Through narratives, creating a nexus between religion and authoritarian rule provided 
an opportunity to use religion as a justifying factor that endorses rulers or their political 
actions; the ruling elites knew that Muslims become submissive when religious 
discourse is employed. Additionally, in recent times blasphemy laws have been used for 
political or personal reasons. Historian Ayesha Jalal quotes from one of Dogar's history 
books that shows how historical narratives were framed to  declare military rulers as 
true leaders following religious guidance and democratically elected Prime Minister 
Bhutto as a dictator; the Dogar's book referred the democratic regime of Bhutto as a 
"...cruel regime ... a worst dictatorship of a staunch Com m unist... Bhutto, a drunkard, 
characterless and an un-lslamic-minded man, was totally inclined to-wards the  
unnatural and anti-lslamic principles of Communism and Socialism. (W hile), the Islamic 
regime of Zia, (is) the blessed advent of the M artial Law regime of Pakistan under the
39 Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and Military, 40.
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blessed leadership of... General Muhammad Zia-ul-Huq, an Islamic-minded man, came 
on the blessed day of July 6 ,1 9 7 7 ."40
The re-writing of history also rebranded national heroes. In recent decades, Mr. 
Jinnah was portrayed as a staunch religious personality seeking a theocratic state. 
Looking at Jinnah's words, it is clear he did not imply the creation of a theocratic state. 
As M r. Jinnah says, "Make no mistake. Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. 
Islam demands from us the tolerance of other creeds and w e welcome in closest 
association with us all those who of whatever creed, are themselves willing and ready to 
play their part as true and loyal citizens of Pakistan."41 In fact, Mr. Jinnah adm itted that 
following core ethics of religion based on equality, inclusiveness, tolerance, and justice 
should be prevalent for all citizens w ithout any discrimination. For Jinnah, there were  
socio-economic and political priorities at the top of the list during Pakistan's struggle for 
nationhood. While addressing a gathering in Delhi in 1946, he asserted, "W hat are we  
fighting for? W hat are we aiming at? It is not a theocracy nor a theocratic state. Religion 
is there and religion is dear to us. All the worldly goods are nothing to us when we 
talking of religion: but there are other things which are very vital -  our social, our 
economic life."42 In contrast, lawmakers ignored the road map defined by Jinnah, 
especially in the 1980s, a tim e when Jihadis poured into the region from various parts of 
the Muslim world to fight against Soviets, help the ruling elites to re-construct
40 Jalal, "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining," 82.
41 "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining," 81.
42 Omar Asghar Khan, "Political and Economic Aspects of Islamization," in Islam, Politics, and the State : 
The Pakistan Experience, ed. Mohammad Asghar Khan (Totowa, N.J., USA: Zed Books, 1985), 144.
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narratives based on hagiographic and hyperbolic orientations put forward as ideal, and 
romanticized the nation about Islam's glorious pasts and adventures.
In a sense, Pakistan ignored the rich cultural diversity and history of 
heterogeneous communities dwelling on its soil for thousands of years in order to 
support the legitimacy of membership based on an idea of belonging to  a religious 
ideology.43 Implicit state policies to homogenize its heterogeneous communities did not 
work well; in fact, when diverse identities were ignored or forced to mold into a new  
identity, issues of polarization surfaced. Pakistani Historian Mubarak AM says, "history 
should not be influenced by religious beliefs since history has no religion. Pakistan came 
into being in 1947, but our history existed before this which cannot be deleted."44
In today's Pakistan, what is witnessed and observed is that it is high tim e to reset 
the political input and output procedures in the political system that allows the state 
narratives to evolve around value-consensus not by artificially framed or externally 
engineered for the benefit of any specific domestic group, class, institution, or external 
actor. Pakistan's form er Ambassador to the United States Ms. Maliha Lodhi writes that 
Pakistani policy is "devaluing (the actual) history for political and ideological reasons, 
Pakistan has found it difficult to project a national identity that can strike a sympathetic 
chord with its heterogeneous people...(Therefore, today) Pakistan is trying to define the 
inner and outer contours of its national identity."45
43 Devji, Muslim Zion : Pakistan as a Political Idea, 9.
44 "The Ideology of Thought Control in Pakistan," Dawn August 1, 2011, 8.
45 Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 11.
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Since the birth of Pakistan as a nation-state to the present, the paranoia of an 
existential threat has been deeply embedded in the mindset of policy makers. In some 
ways it could be true when one genuinely looks into earlier episodes of its post­
independence period, i.e. Afghanistan's denial to adm it Pakistan's UN membership and 
the conflict over Kashmir. But after the Cold W ar, Pakistani policy makers should have 
come out of this paranoia.46 Now the changing tendency is to believe that the global 
power's agenda is to disarm Pakistan's nuclear strength (as it is the only Muslim nuclear 
power) and dictate the terms of rule. Therefore, the dilemma of Pakistan's policy 
makers is that they are largely occupied with the Cold W ar politics trends of "ideological 
divide and enduring friendships or enmities ... (and) the major powers (mainly pointed 
towards India) of the world are out to destablise, if not destroy, Pakistan."47
Ms. Maliha Lodhi believes that it is important to understand five factors in order 
to know the history of political developments in Pakistan. These are, a) "the power 
asymmetry between political and non-political or unelected institutions, b) A feudal- 
dominated political order and culture that fosters clientelist politics, c) Reliance on an 
oligarchic elite that has growth based on borrowings and bailouts to address the 
country's chronic financial crises and its resistance to  taxing itself and its network of 
supporters, d) The intersection between efforts to leverage geography in pursuit of 
national security goals and the role of outside powers, e) The persistence of centrifugal
46 Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History o f Misunderstanding, 
23.
47 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Foreign Policy Dilemmas," The Express Tribune March 9, 2014, para. 1.
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forces and bitter ideological controversies over the role of Islam in the state and 
society."48
After 67 years of independence, the challenges are much higher in all domains 
whether it is political, social, economic or environmental. O ther than political and 
economic arenas, in the social domain Pakistan is among the  top risk societies which are 
dangerous to journalists, present deadly attacks against minorities, human right abuses, 
malnutrition, higher infant mortality rates, hosting and possible spreading polio virus (as 
in Syria the polio cases detected believed to be came from Pakistan49) and deadly 
attacks on polio workers, lack of proper health and educational facilities which further  
traps the country's fragile political economic situation. The energy short fall has already 
hampered industrial output, while ineffective governance has significantly nurtured the  
centrifugal actors or forces of fragmentation within the state in the form of non-state 
actors. Despite the fears of the burdens of its past, the country has great potential and 
resilience to revive due to its young and growing skilled human resources, natural 
resources, as a geographic pivot on both economic and geopolitical grounds, but w ith  a 
big if, meaning that the political leadership must reset its policies and strategies, 
diverting from traditional defense-oriented policies and fram e a balanced policy for 
symmetrical growth of the state's pillars i.e. parliament, judiciary, executive branches, 
and the emerging role of media in a vibrant, civil society.
48 Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 52.
49 Stephanie Nebehay, "Polio Virus Strain in Syria Confirmed as Being from  Pakistan," Reuters November 
11, 2013.
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EVOLUTION OF VIOLENCE: THE MAKING OF THE SECURITY STATE
Since the first day Pakistan was created, its journey of nation building was not an 
easy task. To resolve the political, economic, and security challenges, the civil and 
military bureaucracy supported the popularization of the  idea of having a strong 
national army that would keep the country moving ahead as a savior. Strengthening and 
investing on defense was justified with the assumptions of an Eastern border threat 
from India as a top national security threat and the Durand line issue with Afghanistan.50 
In this regard, Pakistan's engagement in Kashmir w ith India and in response to 
"Afghanistan's persistent interference in (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan by 
supporting liberation movements"51 provided a legitimate reason for the military 
establishment to strengthen its roots in the political decision-making process. Especially 
in the last thirty years the military leadership supported the narratives of the Afghan 
Jihad during the Cold W ar against the USSR, eventually culminating in domestic and 
regional violence. In continuity, Pakistani strategists heavily relied on the same 
strategies of relying "non-state actors to advance its fictional strategic interests has 
come full circle."52
While Pakistan is geographically a pivot and a militarily nuclear power with one 
of the largest standing armies, it is also ranked among the most fragile and weak states 
in the world. Today, Pakistan's tribal belt is considered the "epicenter of terrorism" and 
ungoverned space, which has mostly cost Pakistan at all fronts. And the global
50 Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 99.
51 Julian Schofield, "Diversionary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and the Sources o f the Pakistan-Afghan 
Confrontation," Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 17, no. 1 (2011): 43.
52 Talat Masood, "Pakistan's Drift Towards Isolation," The Express Tribune February 4th, 2014, para. 11.
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community is on alert about any mishap in the region which could badly affect global 
stability.53 By and large, Pakistan's India centric policy, countering ethno-nationalist 
struggles, coupled with a number of political events (namely the Afghan W ar of 1979, 
and the Iranian revolution of 1979) occurred in the neighborhood and intensified the 
level of violence in the country. Therefore, the evolution o f violence in Pakistan exists in 
different forms; the violence exists on ethno-nationalistic grounds, sectarian and 
religious grounds, and for geo-strategic reasons.
To understand the evolution of violence, it is significant to study the causes and 
effects of violence in the country. One of the major causes in making Pakistan a security 
or police state to deal with is the fear against India. Subduing nationalist trends through 
the use of force, using religious sentiments to diffuse nationalist tendencies, 
undermining progressive movements, and nurture of extrem e ideologies due to 
geopolitical reasons results in the emergence of various militant outfits posing an 
existential threat to Pakistan. Should recasting nationalist tendencies will reset the  
balance or repeat the history and allow irredentists to become active again? A rational 
approach to understanding Pakistan's praetorian society is an important factor, because 
out of 67 years of history, the military ruled for more than half of Pakistan's history, 
while civil bureaucrats only ruled a little more than one decade. Moreover, supporting 
non-state actors for use as proxies remains a core feature in the entire region, be it the 
case of Kashmir, Afghanistan, or Baluchistan. Therefore, the politics of South Asia is 
based on reactionary politics, first, by creating self-anxiety against each other and
53 Ishtiaq Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011  (Karachi: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 422.
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consequently establishing a niche between governments and non-state actors to 
achieve objectives based on the self-created anxieties.
The post 9 /11  era has changed the dynamics of proxy warfare in general, which 
is trying to move away from the state's traditional policies of supporting the non-state 
actors for strategic reasons. Despite a global shift in policy, the remnants of proxy 
warfare continue in various conflicts affecting the zones of fragile states like 
Afghanistan, Syria, and many African states which become fertile fields o f proxy warfare. 
Therefore, it is unfortunately not easy for many Third World states to exonerate 
themselves from web-traps woven for proxy warfare.
In order to reduce the severe effects of security challenges, Pakistan needs to  
prioritize its domestic and foreign policies so its negative image can be countered, and 
the role of the state can be regarded notably in regional and global contexts. Pakistani 
political and defense analyst Hasan Askari Rizvi suggests that Pakistan needs first to 
focus on its "internal political stability and cohesion, and economic resilience (which 
will) increase the capacity of a state to counter external pressures and increase its 
foreign policy options."54 An increase in state capacity will encourage greater economic 
integration that will potentially help Pakistan to defuse its diplomatic rows and pave the 
way towards effective regional and global integration.
Ahmed Rashid points out that there are four reasons which actually prevented 
the stabilization and social cohesion of Pakistan as a nation-state. First, Pakistan is still 
struggling to outline the proper definition as a nation, so there is a lack of clarity over
54 Rizvi, "Foreign Policy Dilemmas," para. 3.
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national identity. Second, there is a distinct divide over its security paradigm between  
the military's India centric policy and the political leadership's alternative outlook for 
restoring neighborly ties. Third, the abnormality of the state's continued support of non­
state actors or Jihadi groups, which is now psychologically affecting military personal, 
and many of these groups have become anti-state guerilla factions. Finally, the inability 
to accommodate ethnic groups into a political balance and access to a fair share of 
resources among provinces hampers a social and political cohesion among its 
nationals.55
W ith the prevalence of the above-mentioned factors, the future image of the  
entire region depicts a soaring level of violence. At the very least, to avert internal 
security threats, Pakistan essentially needs to fram e "visionary and integrated policies" 
that will help in "harmonizing external and internal policies."56 While admitting the  
national, regional, and global transformations and political transitions, Pakistan's 
Adviser to Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs and National Security M r. Sartaj Aziz 
emphasized a new policy outlook at the National Assembly of Pakistan, which will be a 
comprehensive national security policy through integrating internal security, defense 
security, and foreign policy with available economic resources. According to these new  
policies, Mr. Aziz assured the parliament that the new government is putting sincere 
efforts into the design and implementation of a policy on "Internal security and policy of 
non-interference; economic development through trade and not aid; fully benefiting
55 Rashid, Pakistan on the B rink: The Future o f America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, 25-28.
56 APP, "No Patch-Work: Sartaj Aziz Promises Na New Defence, Foreign Policies," The Express Tribune 
March 4th, 2014; Talat Masood, "Harmonising External and Internal Policies," ibid. March 5th, 2014.
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from geographical location; and promoting Pakistan's image by strengthening 
democracy and economic institutions in the country."57 The proposed policy is setting its 
agenda on the basis of neutrality, however, it needs to see the interest of traditional 
stakeholders; a clash of interest with stakeholders will potentially hamper any proposed 
collective wisdom. As in the past, many such proposals failed due to military adventures 
in the region (e.g. the Kargil conflict in 1999), military doctrines (e.g. Cold Start (Indian); 
Azm -e-Nau-lll (Pakistani)), or terrorist attacks (e.g. the Mumbai attack allegedly 
involving the support of Pakistan) causing severe setbacks to  political developments and 
lingering mistrust against each other.
PRAETORIANISM: THE WEAKENING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND STATE 
CAPACITY
The role of the military in Pakistani politics is central and retains a "quasi­
monopoly," being significantly influential in domestic politics vis-a-vis policy 
formulation.58 The origin of Pakistan's military can be traced back to before the creation 
of the country when it was formally established as the British-lndian colonial army. 
However, in the post-independence period, the evolution of the military strengthened  
its capabilities and established itself as a disciplined institution following the patterns of 
colonial legacies inherited by the British military, but also deepened its settings into the 
politics of the country, which led to frequent military coups and prolonged military rule
57 APP, "No Patch-Work: Sartaj Aziz Promises Na New Defence, Foreign Policies," ibid. March 4th, 2014.
58 Grare, "Rethinking Western Strategies toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and 
Europe," 8.
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over the country. The frequent interventions continued to  be legitimized in the interest 
of national security, and the military projected its actions "as an ultimate a rb itra to r... 
and eventual savior of the nation-state."59 The ramifications of military interventions 
and military rule, on the one hand, established a benign praetorian political system 
favoring the military elites; on the other hand, political institutions other than the 
military became ineffective. In general, praetorian societies primarily undermine 
democracy, equity, and economic growth, and their long-term effects suffer the political 
communities and democratic institutions of the state.60
Praetorianism in Pakistan's political system evolved through a number of factors 
which included institutional legacies inherited from colonial times, and domestic and 
regional factors that also provided opportunities for civil bureaucrats and military elites 
to institutionalize central authority in the political system. The institutionalized 
framework affirmed the notion of the military's "right to intervene" in domestic politics, 
remaining visible in various formats, i.e. as an arbitrator, paternal, or guardian's role to 
fix political troubles.61 It is hardly surprising that the continued role of the military and 
bureaucracy to act as guardian or arbitrator in politics is due to practices from colonial 
traditions. The colonial forces were not subservient to the elected representatives of the 
sub-continent, but rather directly subordinated to the governor-general. M ilitary elites 
were in the executive hierarchy of legislative process, in which the military had a more
39 Mazhar Aziz, M ilitary Control in Pakistan : The Parallel State  (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 42.
60 Kirk S. Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Developm ent: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin 
America (University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 4.
61 C. Christine Fair, "Addressing Fundamental Challenges," in The Future o f Pakistan, ed. Stephen P. Cohen 
(Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2011), 91.
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prominent role in the sub-continent than w hat was practiced in England.62 The similar 
patterns of military engagement in decision-making and political involvement continue 
after the decolonization as well; even after independence in 1947 the British generals 
and officers retained military command until 1951.
Obviously, after the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, both India and 
Pakistan primarily relied on colonial state methods, strictly following bureaucratic 
control and centralization.63 For instance, the colonial Government o f India Act of 1935 
was adopted (until the Objective Resolution of 1949 was passed) and provided a 
concrete base (known as steel fram e) for bureaucratic authority during British rule. The 
same act was inherited and adopted by both sides. South Asia historian Ayesha Jalal 
identifies the problem, noting that soon after the birth of the new independent states, 
there was a need of a "massive reorganization of the administrative apparatus of the  
colonial state to guarantee the supremacy of elected institutions" instead of providing a 
popular legitimacy "on the grounds of pragmatism and the need to maintain some sort 
of administrative continuity to cope with the massive dislocations and law and order 
problems that followed in the wake of partition."64
At the time of partition, Pakistan was too weak and faced strategic and 
institutional challenges. The notion of oneness of nation was already challenged on 
multiple fronts through sub-nationalist movements. To tackle the strategic challenges, 
mainly from India over Kashmir and Afghanistan over the Durand line, most of the
62 Aqil Shah, "Praetorianism and Terrorism," Journal o f Democracy 19, no. 4 (2008): 17-18.
63 Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia : A Comparative and Historical Perspective, 18.
64 Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia : A Comparative and Historical Perspective, 19.
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budget was invested in defense. To train a professional army, Pakistan employed almost 
500 British officers due to a shortfall of qualified Pakistan military officials.65 As Pakistan 
already inherited one-third of the British Indian army, meaning 30 percent of the army, 
40 percent of its navy, 20 percent of the air force, while only 17 percent of revenue, 
such a huge military and less economic provisions burdened the country.66 Due to the  
lack of resources and institutional strengthening, the Pakistani state avoided crucial 
areas of investment, like health and education, instead preferring to shield the safety 
and security of the state in suspicion of any possible hostility from much bigger and 
stronger neighbors.67 The state-building process fundamentally focused on defense 
capabilities, while political and apolitical state building capacities remained ignored; this 
gradually became visible in the form of asymmetrical power relations between state 
institutions.
In 1948 Pakistan is estimated to have allocated 75% of its budget on defense, 
which undermined other important sectors to provide basic social and political goods.68 
Despite a weak military and dilapidated economic base, India and Pakistan went to war 
soon after their birth in 1948 over Kashmir, resulting in the division of Kashmir that 
endures to this day.69 Pakistan's apparent decision to go to  war with the help of tribal 
militias was in reaction to India's decision to retain Hyderabad and Junagadh because
65 Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 99.
66 Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions : Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History o f Misunderstanding, 
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69 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, AT.
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Pakistan anticipated getting these tw o princely states in the  view of the June 1947 
partition plan. Pakistan's military repeated similar tactics o f 1948 to get Kashmir in the  
1965 war and in the 1999 Kargil conflict, but the outcome further increased distrust 
between the two states.
Interestingly, when the Indo-Pak conflicts over Kashmir of 1948 and 1999 [other 
than the tw o wars of 1965 (over Kashmir) and 1971 (over Bangladesh), because the  
military was already ruling during these years], are compared, it can be noted that each 
were on an occasion when a civilian government was in place. After an unsuccessful 
outcome, the military leadership and its cadre had grievances against the political 
leadership for being lenient and giving up on the wars, which the military always 
believed to  be going in their favor. The grievances by the military on both occasions 
were followed by military coup attempts, with the first case being unsuccessful, when 
"Major-General Akbar Khan, chief of the general staff and coordinator of the Kashmir 
campaign, unsuccessfully plotted the first military coup in 1951, citing as his main 
motive the mishandling of the Kashmir issue by civilians."70 While in 1999 Gen. 
Musharraf was successful in overthrowing PM Nawaz Sharif over a plane scandal, 
however, the military cadre was unhappy w ith PM Nawaz Sharif's decision to back up 
from Kargil heights, as the military command's belief it had a better control and position 
in the large area.71
Another important feature to bear in mind is how military interventions during 
post-colonial societies are linked to racial divides. It is important because military
70 Shah, "Praetorianism and Terrorism," 18.
71 Jones, Pakistan : Eye o f the Storm, 119.
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institutions are more influential in Third World societies, and "ethnic composition plays 
a major role in the country's politics," especially in regards to politics of ethnicities and 
power relations between a center and its provinces.72 During the British colonial period, 
colonial authorities raised local armies and picked soldiers from selected ethnic groups; 
as in Burma/ Myanmar, Burmans were ignored, and in Nepal the British enlisted 
Gurkhas as a martial race of the subcontinent to support its fight. Similarly in the Indian 
sub-continent when the British were planning on dismantling the "Bengal Army after 
1857's mutiny" or because of rebellions against British rule, colonial British rulers 
prudently recruited Pashtun and Punjabi Muslims (from today's Pakistan), Punjabi Sikhs 
(from today's India) into the military as ethnic martial races, while other Muslim  
populations or ethnicities were ignored.73 After the creation of Pakistan, the military 
trends continued the colonial legacy and in general ignored other ethnicities, while 
India, through a policy procedure, gradually controlled the disproportion of ethnic 
influence of Sikhs over its military. In Pakistan's case, since most of the inherited military 
personnel belonged to Western Pakistan, and the center remained in the hands of 
Western Pakistan, in that scenario, East Pakistan become a peripheral unit.
Recent statistics still show that the demographic representation in the military 
continued as inherited from colonial settings. According to military analyst Ayesha 
Siddiqa, 75 percent of military personnel are recruited from three to four districts of 
Punjab, called "Salt Range," 20 per cent from three to four districts of Khyber
72 Siddiqa-Agha, Military Inc. : Inside Pakistan's M ilitary Economy, 59.
73 Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State : The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab 1849-1947  
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Pakhtunkhwa, while 5 per cent from remaining tw o provinces, Sindh and Baluchistan.74 
To further break down the composition, a recent statistical data set indicates that 67 
per cent of the officer corps and 43 percent of the soldiery in the army is composed of 
Punjabis; around 25 percent of the officer corps and 22 percent of the soldiery in the  
army is Pashtun, while the remaining percentage is divided among other ethnic 
groups.75 In fact, the Cold W ar period also facilitated the colonial legacies of picking 
allies based on "racialist concepts," with Pakistan becoming "America's most allied ally" 
for joining hands with NATO partners South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO in 
1954) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO in 1955) to help the W est by providing 
bases in South Asia against the Soviet Union.76 The U.S administration under President 
Eisenhower assumed Pakistanis were Ghurkas who fought for the British colonial army 
and hoped Pakistanis would help in the fight against Communism.77 This became a 
reality in the 1980s, and eventually the world witnessed the demise of the Soviet Union.
The first decade of Pakistan's history was crucial as it actually molded the shape 
of political dynamics with the early death of its founding father, and the disintegration 
of political parties allowing bureaucrats to rule the country for 11 years. This was 
followed by military rule in 1958, which continued until the debacle of East Pakistan in 
1971 which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh as a new nation-state. The creation of
74 Siddiqa-Agha, Military Inc. : Inside Pakistan's M ilitary Economy, 59. Also see, Ahmed, Pakistan the 
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Bangladesh initiated serious debates about the performance of the military, the role of 
political leadership, and more importantly, flummoxed the entire nation with questions 
regarding the validity of its ideology. Religious ideology remained the essential factor in 
unifying the heterogeneous communities during the struggle for independence.78 One 
aspect of the argument debate, talked about the failure of the two-nation theory, which 
undermines the role of religion in retaining the national cohesion. The counter 
argument still proves that Bangladesh did not decide to re-join India, as half o f the  
Bengal ethnic Hindu majority still lives in India and India was a winning party that 
supported the people of East Pakistan's independence, but rather that Muslim Bengalis 
preferred to have an independent country on the basis of a religious divide. In response 
to the loss of the war and 90,000 military personnel held as prisoners of w ar (PoW), the 
Pakistani military was forced to give up power and provide a chance for Z. A. Bhutto's 
democratic government to control the system.
Referring back to 1958's martial law government and military rule, Gen. Ayub 
Khan promised the nation an immediate democratic election. Interestingly, later on 
Gen. Zia ul Haq in the late 1970s and Gen. Musharraf in the late 1990s followed the 
same pattern as their predecessor did regarding immediate and transparent democratic 
elections. Promises and pledges are always withered away shortly after coming into 
power, and each one's rule was prolonged for almost a decade. As in most Third World  
states, the waves of democratization were taking place, and by contrast "Pakistan's
78 "The Ideology of Thought Control in Pakistan," para. 4.
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democracy died" soon after authoritarian regimes replaced the democratic order.79
With the gradual influence over domestic and foreign policies, the role of the  
military also becomes effective in proposing and framing foreign policy. The military's 
superiority complexity over political elites believed that it has a better assessment of 
national, regional, and global threat perceptions. Therefore, the fact that most military 
rulers enjoyed strong and positive strategic relations with the U.S., and the U.S. heavily 
supported the militarization of Pakistan's army both through training and equipping 
with modern weaponry demonstrates how democratic institutions w ere given less 
attention. Intriguingly the global and regional geopolitical scenarios co-incidentally 
became significant during the tim e of military rule, which already focused and projected 
the geopolitical importance of Pakistan, and helped Pakistan become a beneficiary of 
the Cold W ar rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.80 The geopolitical situation 
prompted U.S. policy makers to pour economic and military aid into Pakistan. For 
example, during Gen. Ayub's rule (1958-1969), the U.S. relied on Pakistan to curtail the 
expansion of communism; the policy remained for Gen. Ayub's successor, Gen. 
Muhammad Yahya Khan (1969-1971). During Gen. Zia ul Haq's period (1977-1988), 
Pakistan became a frontline state in fighting against the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. Finally Gen. Pervez Musharraf's period (1999-2008) once again made 
Pakistan a frontline state; this tim e in the global W ar on Terror (WoT).
During the Cold War, Pakistan comfortably became the "West's eastern anchor
79 Riedei, Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, 55.
80 Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011, 3.
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in an Asian alliance structure."81 To cement the long term  strategic interests, in early 
1950 Gen. Ayub Khan, as Pakistan's army com m ander during his visit to the U.S., 
requested military assistance through Assistant Secretary o f State Henry Byroade, 
declaring, "I didn't come here to look at barracks. Our army can be your army if you 
want us. But let's make a decision."82 Pakistan was desperate to strengthen its military 
capabilities because geographical and existential fears and insecurities hovered 
continuously in the minds of Pakistan's military and political elites. Pakistan won the  
support of the United States' political and military leadership as it perceived India being 
inclined towards the Soviet block and Pakistan as an ally ready to allow use of its military 
bases against communism. Though Pakistan's political elites and military leadership did 
not make the sharing of Badaber airbase (near Peshawar) public.
The airbase became an issue when the Soviet Union shot down a U2 surveillance 
plane in 1960, making it the center of public attention and international politics.83 
Similar to its earlier period of military cooperation, in the post 9 /11  period Gen. 
Musharraf's rule also provided the military bases for operational matters, while in public 
it was told that Pakistani forces would not provide any base except in logistical support 
in the global war on terror as an ally. However, with the passage of tim e and unpopular 
drone attacks, political pressure built to seek answers about the provision of military 
bases and any agreements regarding drone attacks between the U.S. and Pakistan. The 
military remained in denial until U.S. Navy Seals hunted down Osama Bin Laden (OBL) in
81 Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History o f Misunderstanding, 
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Pakistan in 2011, and after the NATO airstrikes killed 25 Pakistani military personnel at 
Salala in November 2011, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. In protest o f Salala 
incident, Pakistan asked the U.S. to vacate Shamsi Airfield, also known as Bhandari 
Airstrip located in Baluchistan (actually leased to the UAE, after 9/11 the US took charge 
of Shamsi through a sub-lease, obviously w ith the consent o f Pakistan).84 In addition, 
Gen. Musharraf mentioned after his retirem ent tha t there was an agreem ent between  
the U.S. and Pakistan for limited drone strikes, and Shamsi airfield was one of the 
facilities in the region used for drone operations.85
The vicissitudes of the U.S. and Pakistan's alliance is based on a happy and 
unhappy marriage relationship, which are reflected in various diplomatic highs and lows 
and strategic ties. Such highs can be seen when on the diplomatic front Pakistan played 
a crucial role in bringing the U.S. and China closer, and President Nixon mentioned in his 
memoir after the trip to the region that he found India's leader Nehru "the least friendly 
leader," and showed his commitment to extend greater support towards Pakistan.86 A 
low is considered, however, when Pakistan faced severe economic sanctions in response 
to its nuclear program in the 1990s under civilian rule.87 An all-time low was witnessed 
after the Salala incident in November 2011. In protest Pakistan blocked NATO supply 
lines into Afghanistan that cost millions of dollars to  the U.S. as it forced an extremely 
expensive reliance on supply routes via Afghanistan's north and by air. The Salala
84 Salman Masood, "C.I.A. Leaves Base in Pakistan Used for Drone Strikes," The New York Times December 
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incident was proceeded by two earlier events, i.e. in January 2011, the arrest of CIA 
contractor Raymond Allen Davis in Lahore, and in M ay 2011, the U.S. Navy Seals' 
Operation Geronimo to hunt down Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, events which 
already indicated the emerging diplomatic gaps between the two states.88
Unlike Gen. Ayub's military regime, the post-1977 martial law period led by Gen. 
Zia ul Haq is known as the Islamization of Pakistan. Gen. Ayub's period is largely 
considered Pakistan's pro-modernization phase with a lesser tendency to find a relation 
between the military and the mosque.89 However, Gen. Ayub did facilitate tem porarily  
the use of religion for his electoral gains. Though the temporary support by religious 
groups cannot be singled out, it eventually strengthened the roots for religious 
ideologues and the decay of a democratic future. The full-fledged support and 
imposition of an orthodox Islam as a political ideology under Gen. Zia's period (1977- 
1988) became an ideal match for clerics and Islamists to deeply penetrate society's 
social structure as well as the state's institutions.
At the same time, during the late 1970s the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and the 
Western Allies and states from Middle East sent 35,000 holy warriors that further 
supported Gen. Zia's enthusiastic Islamic ideology of violent jihad narratives.90 In 
military and economic aspects Pakistan tem porarily benefitted from the bipolar conflict, 
but in the long run, its socio-political conditions suffered. Ms. Maleeha Lodhi explicitly 
draws the troubles inherited by Pakistan for its supporting of jihad in Afghanistan and
88 Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011, 415-29.
89 Jones, Pakistan : Eye o f the Storm, 18.
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Islamizing Pakistani society. Ms. Lodhi writes jihad ideology from Zia's tim e brought 
problems to Pakistan, which included the "induction of Islamic militancy, proliferation of 
weapons, spread of narcotics, exponential growth of madrasahs, growing violence and a 
large Afghan refugee population (three million during the w ar time and around tw o  
million today)... resulting Pakistan's own instability."91
Gen. Zia highly encouraged the reshaping of the state's law, educational system, 
and way of life according to conservative religious thoughts and imposition of Sharia as 
the rule of law for Pakistan. Ostensibly Gen. Zia, like his predecessors, promised to 
support an inclusive political system, but in reality his "single-minded com m itm ent to 
anti-liberal, anti-democratic, anti-minorities and anti-wom en agenda" was seeking a 
political and social order in which "administration, judiciary, banking, trade, education, 
agriculture, industry and foreign affairs are regulated in accordance with Islamic 
principles," consequently creating the monopoly of "an Islamic garrison in Pakistan."92 
Contrary to Zia's ideals, the actual teachings of religion demands inclusive, democratic, 
and equal rights for all w ithout any discrimination.
Zahid Hussain explains that in Zia's period, the Islamization of state and society 
occurred at two levels: a) "Changes were instituted in the legal system; b) Islamization 
was promoted through print media, radio, television and mosques."93 Religion was 
strictly indoctrinated in civil services, the armed forces, and the educational system.94 As
91 Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 48.
92 Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison S ta te : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011, 236.
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an instance to vindicate the argument, the introduction of Hudood Ordinance in legal 
affair that was promulgated in 1979 is a vivid example. The Hudood Ordinance outlined 
and defined the punishments for any immoral or unethical acts through traditional 
Islamic ways. Harsher punishments included death by stoning for adultery, 100 lashes 
for fornication, 100 lashes for false accusation for adultery, 80 lashes for drinking 
alcohol, amputation or cutting off the right hand for theft, whipping (ta'zir) and death 
for derogatory remarks against the Prophet.95 W ith the inclusion of a blasphemy law in 
1982 prohibiting anyone from using derogatory remarks against the Prophet, initially 
the maximum punishment was life imprisonment; an amendment to the blasphemy law 
in 1986 maximized the punishment to the death penalty for any derogatory stance.96 
Society became more hostile than before, and blasphemy laws became a political and 
revenge tool on many accounts.
To implement these laws religious clerics (ulema) w ere required to sit on the  
Shariat Benches of the High Courts, which were established in 1981. However, in 1986, a 
full-fledged Federal Shariat Court replaced the Shariat Benches.97 The outcome of 
promoting and infiltrating a religiously oriented political ideology threatens the 
cohesiveness of the state by creating divides between those who follow the ideology 
and those who do not. Over the period of time, once society is radicalized, then it
was to create an Islamic caliphate, as earlier Gen. Zia also envisioned. The coup's plan failed, and all the 
senior military officers were court martialed. This time the coup was planned by Gen. Zahirul Islam 
Abbasi, director general infantry corps at GHQ. GHQ became sensitive of the matter, and appointed a new 
ISI head, Gen Ashraf Qazi, to purge all those officers in military ranks who were highly inclined towards 
conservative Islam.
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anticipates sharing power with the center and aggressively demands and paints the  
entire society with a single color, which eventually undermines the diversity of opinion 
and diversification of society. As it happened in Afghanistan, when the religious regime 
led by the Taliban systematically destroyed Afghan society's rich culture, societal 
structure, and pre-lslamic heritage.98 Similarly, after 9 /11 , the Pakistani governm ent and 
its civil society faced challenges from various contending Islamist ideologies, and state 
institutions are still grappling with these ideational threats; these ideological bases are 
the creation of its own past and facilitated by geopolitical events of the Cold W ar.
Gen. Pervez Musharraf's period (1999-2008) is the latest military rule in the 
political history of Pakistan. Gen. Musharraf removed the democratically elected Prime 
Minister, Nawaz Sharif, in a military coup on October 12,1999. Unlike earlier military 
rule, Musharraf did not declare martial law or appoint himself as chief martial law  
administrator, but rather an "emergency" was imposed and Musharraf picked a 
corporate title called "chief executive" (later becoming president of the country), with  
powers equivalent to that of prime minister.99
By the time Gen. Musharraf took power, Pakistan was suffering under economic 
sanctions due to its May 1998 nuclear tests conducted in response to India's nuclear 
explosions. In addition, the Kargil conflict of 1999 brought a negative image to Pakistan 
on a global level. Finally, the overthrowing of a democratic government was also viewed  
negatively as another derailed chance at a democratization process. In fact, the UN
98 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle with M ilitant Islam, 43.
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Secretary General censured the military act of removing Sharif, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) decided to suspend its loans until democracy was restored.100 
Musharraf announced his seven point agenda in a tim e of national despondency and 
assured the people that it would help Pakistan to stabilize by: 1) "rebuilding national 
confidence and morale, 2) strengthening the federation w ith the removal of inter­
provincial disharmony, 3) revival of the economy and restoration of the investors' 
confidence, 4) ensuring law and order and dispensing speedy justice, 5) depoliticization 
of state institutions, 6) devolution of power to the grassroots level, and 7) ensuring swift 
and across the board accountability."101 The actualization of the wish list was not easy 
for a military ruler to achieve in smooth order while the country's diplomatic and 
economic standing was in a dilapidated condition. As noted previously, Pakistan always 
benefited from geopolitical conflicts, and once again the traumatic events of 9 /11  
changed the entire script of economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures on Pakistan. 
Pakistan once again became a frontline state, this tim e in the global w ar on terror. U.S. 
President George W. Bush quickly helped Pakistan by easing off its sanctions in response 
to Gen. Musharraf's commitment to become a pivotal partner in the w ar in Afghanistan. 
Through Musharraf's rule the U.S. provided more than $10 billion to Pakistan.
During most of this period Musharraf remained focused on the war on terror in 
Afghanistan, with a vague strategy about how to deal with the war, the gradual "spread 
of radicalization, intensification of violence and the further undermining of a febrile
100 Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan : Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises, 267.
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economy."102 Like Gen. Ayub, Musharraf is also considered a pro-modernization 
personality. Keeping in mind the changing global patterns o f globalization, Musharraf 
opted to re-shape Pakistan's image with his famous slogan "enlightened m oderation," in 
which he was determined to "repair Pakistan's image as a beacon of m oderate Islam;" 
he remained unsuccessful due to Pakistan's deep rooted Kashmir policy and support for 
jihadi factions who fought against Soviets in Afghanistan, Indians in Kashmir, and even 
the broader scale notion of a caliphate deep into central Asia.103 Unlike his military 
predecessors, Musharraf unprecedentedly opened the media, which became one of the 
most powerful institutions allowed to express public and political opinions. In addition, 
his reforms in higher education were revolutionary, a needed credit to Musharraf for his 
government's outstanding investments. However, during the last years of his rule, his 
decision to ban the media and his coup against the judiciary provided an opportunity for 
his political opposition to mobilize a political struggle and force him to resign as a head 
of state in early 2008.
Looking into the impact of praetorianism in the Pakistani political system, as 
mentioned above, a number of analysts argued that the role of the military in the  
colonial Indian sub-continent was given a high portfolio. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
see a continuation of the military's arbitrary role in a post-colonial setting. However, in 
Pakistan's case, the role of the military can be viewed in tw o  different periods, a) 1947- 
1971, b) 1977-2008. The first period of military interventions is considered to be like 
engaging the military in politics through an arbitrary role and is focused more on
102 Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 49.
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budgetary demands to strengthen the military's capabilities. Budgetary demands are 
always more appealing to military strategists, whom believe Pakistan was in need of 
securing its threatened borders to its east, as India opposed the recognition of Kashmir 
and the west, where Afghanistan supported an irredentist struggle against Pakistan.104 
The second period of the military's role in politics was a systematic institutionalization 
of the military in domestic politics. The institutionalization of strategic thinking in 
domestic polity helped the military not only to deal with the long term  limitations of 
military interventions but to identify its political way-out. Moreover, military personnel 
successfully stepped into corporate industry too.
According to Mazhar Aziz, in the post-1977 period the "institutionalization of 
military control, formally through introducing constitutional provisions, penetrating the 
public sector by appointing serving and retired military officers, and by occupying the 
economic space through its business activity, has made it increasingly difficult for the 
political elite to roll back its influence."105 As an example, during Gen. Zia's period of rule 
(1977-1988) two important steps em powered his authority and penetration into the  
civil-bureaucracy to safeguard the interests of the military. First, Gen. Zia amended the  
country's constitution and included article 58 (B) 2 through 8th amendment in 1985. 
Article 58 (B) 2 vested the president with power that allowed him to dismiss the national 
and provincial assemblies, and dissolve the parliament.
Interestingly, due to emerging differences, his own selected prime minister 
Muhammad Khan Junejo, became the first victim who was removed through the use of
104 Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison S ta te : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011, 323.
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58 (B) 2 powers. Later, the same article was invoked to dismiss all of the elected 
regimes. In addition, Gen Zia's plan to further em power his authority was to establish 
the National Security Council, although it did not come to fruition, while during 
Musharraf's military rule Musharraf succeeded in institutionalizing the supremacy of the 
military through his "Legal Framework Order (LFO)" which amended the constitution 
and allowed the military to look after the country's affairs through the establishment of 
the National Security Council (NSC) in April 2004.106 Already enjoying the powers of 58 
(B) 2, the establishment of the NSC strengthened Musharraf's authority and further 
cemented his rule through institutionalization.
At the grassroots level, Musharraf introduced monitoring cells that were  
supposedly meant to keep an eye on corruption in public offices, which in fact 
empowered deputed military officers over public offices. In his rule, Musharraf regime 
by 2004 there were about 150 serving and retired military officers "heading the 
government's major corporations, holding ministries, controlling education, leading 
police, subjecting Musharraf's opponents to accountability, running foreign missions, 
managing cricket, and so forth" this number is in addition to the regular 10% quota for 
military in civil services.107 In addition, a frequent posting of military personnel in the  
civil-bureaucracy was also noticed on a higher scale, which was rolled back in Gen. 
Kiyani's tenure as the new military Chief. Gen. Kiyani spent his tim e strengthening the 
image of the military in the public eye. The military had been significantly criticized
106 Aqil Shah, "Pakistan's Armored Democracy," Journal o f Democracy 14, no. 4 (2003): 28; Siddiqa-Agha, 
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during M usharraf s last years of rule. Musharraf's actions against the media and 
judiciary were widely criticized, directly affecting the military's public posture.
After President Musharraf's resignation in 2008, the PPP led a coalition 
government under the rule of President Zardari to once again amended the constitution 
and relieved the powers of president, who will not be able to  use 58 (B) 2 that has 
derailed the democratization processes. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, elected in 2013, 
passed a motion to change the structure of the  NSC. PM Sharif's government believed 
that since Pakistan has a parliamentary system, the NSC should be headed by the PM, 
not the president. Therefore, the new amendments empowered the PM as head of the 
NSC and included more civilian representatives in the council to create an equilibrium.
A second important initiative was the creation of a quota of reserved seats for 
military officers in the civil service or bureaucracy. It is important to rem em ber that the 
military's political weakness is its technical inability and skills to govern the political 
community; additionally, the lack of legitimacy always challenges the military rule. 
Although the military enjoys legitimacy for its interventions in most Third World  
societies but cannot prolong its rule, a professional military is trained for a different 
domain than retaining power in the political sphere.108 The colonial legacy of a quota for 
military personal continued in Pakistani polity. The first President of the country, Mr. 
Iskander Mirza, also became a bureaucrat through his military service career. The civil- 
bureaucracy is referred to as a steel frame in Pakistan's polity, having significant control 
over the planning and execution of national policies. The induction of military officers
108 Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan : The Parallel State, 39.
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through a quota helps military officers understand the political culture of society. It 
further provides an insight into political life and civic culture that helps military 
bureaucrats create a nexus between the military and society. In this way, military rulers 
tried to fill the vacuum of political leadership through the establishment of roots within  
the institutions and derive support from the public.
Finally, in recent years, it has been greatly debated that military coups and 
interventions into politics are a response by a military "defending its corporate and 
status and privileges."109 First of all, it needs to be acknowledged that economic 
opportunity costs provide a window of opportunity for military rulers to prove their 
interventions as pro-development, as the Turkey and Egypt military tried to prove. 
Following the pattern, Pakistan's military rulers engaged in development activities. 
Instead of showing any keen interest in political mobilization or participation, they 
invested in the industrial sector as a better payoff for country. This was in a way a 
positive sign, though at the same tim e military elites involved into economic 
activities.110 During his era in Pakistan, Gen. Ayub focused more on developm ent 
projects, eventually bringing the military into the corporate sector. For instance, public 
institutions, namely the Frontier Works Organization (FWO), the National Logistic Cell 
(NLC), and the Special Communication Organization (SCO) are linked under the military's 
supervision; these institutions are the largest of their nature to deliver services for 
construction, transportation, and communication services respectively in Pakistan.111
109 Ibid.
110 Siddiqa-Agha, Military In c .: Inside Pakistan's M ilitary Economy, 235.
111 Military In c .: Inside Pakistan's M ilitary Economy, 113-16.
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The military's other economic institutions, categorized as subsidiary 
organizations, like the Fauji Foundation (FF - Army), Army W elfare Trust (AWT - Army), 
Shaheen Foundation (AF -  Air Force), and Bahria Foundation, (BF - Naval) provide 
employment and welfare services to ex-servicemen and also provide em ploym ent 
opportunities to civilians who work at the industrial units. Under these subsidiary 
organizations, industrial investment in oil and gas, cement industry, pharmaceuticals, 
sugar mill, fertilizer mill, banking, insurance, housing schemes, overseas em ploym ent, 
and so forth are industries run under retired military personnel.112 Some of the  
industrial units are the largest handlers of their kind in the country and enjoy a greater 
share in economic activities across the country.
Apart from domestic resource extraction, the U.S., China, and Saudi Arabia have 
remained the main donors to Pakistan and its military. Ishtiaq Ahmed emphasized that 
"Pakistan can continue as a post-colonial garrison state as long as the donors are willing 
to provide it with the required resources and it can convince or coerce its population 
that the struggle for survival necessitates prioritisation of the allocation of scarce 
resources to security."113 On these grounds, it is obvious th at the praetorian roots in 
Pakistan's political system have settled firm ly. Despite the global political awakening, 
the geopolitical competitions and unresolved political disputes in the region will provide 
an advantage to Pakistan's military in retaining its traditional influence over national 
security, foreign policy, and obviously the safeguarding of its economic interests and 
privileges.
112 Military In c .: Inside Pakistan's M ilitary Economy, 117-28.
113 Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011, 24.
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DYNASTIC POLITICS: A COMPROMISED DEMOCRACY OR POLITICAL CORRUPTION?
Democracy is widely accepted as a suitable and popular form of governance 
throughout the world. Democracy on a broader scale shares some common norms, i.e. 
pluralistic tendencies based on inclusiveness, political trust, accountability, and will of 
the majority in the political system. Despite knowing the pros about democratic political 
systems, Third World countries are still troubled with issues of frequent military 
interventions, single party authoritarian rule, absolute monarchy, totalitarian regimes, 
rule by one family, rule by tribal lords or feudal lords, or in anarchic conditions, and rule 
by warlords. Interestingly, in most of cases these undemocratic structures promote 
dynastic politics. According to Farrukh Saleem dynastic politics is a "succession of rulers 
from the same family or line," dominating the quasi-democratic forms of governments 
and weakening the democratization process through compromises with undemocratic 
forces.114 The fragile and weak status of the Pakistani state is a suitable example of 
compromised democracy in which a nexus between civil-military elites engages in 
entertaining its own interests.
Looking back into Pakistan's history, the past script and political episodes reflect 
that the democratic initiatives have been given little chance to perform. Although on a 
few  occasions democracy was provided some space to flourish, it ended up as a political 
transition in domestic politics that was used as a bargaining chip or compromise 
between the troika, i.e. political elites, bureaucrats, and the military. The major dilemma
114 Farrukh Saleem, "Dynastic Politics," The News January 2, 2013, para. 2.
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with Pakistan's political elite is its roots in the feudal class, or the family fiefdom .115 This 
feudalism is blamed for equally affecting the political maturity of institutions and 
delinking the state from society for personal gain, the same reason why many analysts 
criticize non-democratic forces. Farruk Saleem highlights the correlation between  
dynastic politics and societal backwardness and political parochialism. Saleem argues 
that out of 1.7 billion poor, why is it that 51 percent of world's population lives in South 
Asia? He links the answer to dynastic politics or feudal structures that deliberately kept 
societies highly illiterate, poor and dependent on these family lineages, so that 
influential families retained their authority. W ith reference to continued argument, 
Larkana in Sindh is a vivid example, which produced two of Pakistan's most popular 
prime ministers, but illiteracy and ultra-poverty rates are high, while people still pledge 
allegiance to the same family authority, demonstrating the political parochialism and 
dependency of a controlled society.116
Historically, political power in Pakistan is derived from the biradari system 
(brotherhood, kinship group, clan) under the supervision of feudal landlords, which 
facilitated the dynastic politics. The biradari system is highly influential in Punjab, and it 
plays a pivotal role in the electoral process.117 For example, out of 342 seats for the  
National Assembly (272 General Seats, 60 reserved for women, 10 for minorities),
Punjab has 183 seats, making it alone eligible to form a national governm ent from only 
one province. The feudal elites use biradari for political mobilization during political
115 Aqil Shah, "Security, Soldier, and the State," in The Future o f Pakistan, ed. Stephen P. Cohen 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 203.
116 Saleem, "Dynastic Politics," para. 8.
117 Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 30.
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campaigns, and its influence spills over into urban politics as well. Therefore the social 
order influenced under landlords (biradari system) in Southern Punjab, W adero (title for 
feudal) in Sindh, Sardar (title for tribal leader) in Baluchsitan, Malik (title for Pashtun 
tribal leader) in KPK or Tribal Areas, have shaped the power dynamics both at a 
provincial and national level. Interestingly, many of the newly emerged feudal families 
in northern Punjab have no landowning background, however, some turned feudal due 
to an increase in urban property ownership or successful corruption through state 
services.118
During the colonial era, power was considered a symbol of pride, and mostly the 
landlords, civil servants or military elites enjoyed power, which further continued in the 
post-colonial setting. As noted, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. 
Over the years, the political oligarchy corrupted the power and resource sharing in 
Pakistan. According to a Pakistani political scientist Dr. Mohammad W aseem, "the 
pervasive nature of corruption in that country (Pakistan) can only be understood 
through a structural analysis of the legal, administrative and judicial fram ework of the  
state as it was inherited from colonial India and subsequently preserved and sustained 
by the ruling elite after independence."119 Ian Talbot's work highlighted three major 
criticisms towards feudalism: 1) "The bulk of the agricultural population has remained 
effectively depoliticized; 2) the perpetuation of feudal power relations has contributed 
to Pakistan's distinctive political culture of violence and intolerance; and 3) the parochial
118 Lieven, Pakistan : A Hard Country, 17.
119 Mohammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan : A Study o f the 2002 Elections (Karachi; Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 62.
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and personalist character of Pakistan's political parties with their rapid changing 
loyalties is rooted in this predominance of landlords."120
W ith the influence of dynastic politics, political leadership is drawn from  the 
feudal families and national politics stays around personality-based politics, which 
creates a leadership vacuum to thrive at the grassroots level. Most influential political 
families are the Bhutto family from Sindh and the Sharif fam ily from Punjab; both enjoy 
power and are likely to  continue their influence in the future politics of the country. 
Other influential families such as Gilanis, Khars, Dreshaks, Qureshis, Tamans, Khosas, 
Mazaris, Legharis, Mehars, Bijraniss, Rinds, Raisanis, Jhakaranis, Makhdums of Hala, 
Shahs of Nawabpur, the Khan of kalabagh's family, etc. continue to retain their dynastic 
political power over their respective jurisdictions and constituencies.121
In Pakistan's early years a number of initiatives were designed to carry out land 
reforms, which were thought to be able to restructure the social divide and political 
gaps within society. Prominent land reform initiatives of Z. A. Bhutto promised people 
that he would abolish feudalism, since his political slogan was based on Islamic socialism 
(food, shelter, cloth). Despite Bhutto's promise and comprehensive land reform plan 
(150 acre for irrigated land and 300 for non-irrigated land was set as a maximum limit), 
a comparatively better reform offer than Gen. Ayub's reform plan (maximum possession 
of 500 acre for irrigated and 1000 for non-irrigated land), Bhutto himself was a 
landowner.122 Therefore, anticipating effective outcomes was in vain. In short, most of
120 Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 31.
121 Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 57.
122 Jones, Pakistan : Eye o f the Storm, 253; Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 37.
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the parliamentary or democratic regimes in Pakistan are directly or indirectly influenced 
through feudal structures. Pakistan Peoples Party (Bhutto) retains a stronghold in rural 
Sind and Southern Punjab, while Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) retains influence over 
mercantilist and biradari system. Maleeha Lodhi writes that in the Pakistani polity feudal 
influence is a fault line, which needs to be addressed. She explains that there is a 
"Clientelist politics" between feudal lords and their subjects, in which the "governance 
is embedded in the notion of rewarding their clients rather than electorate. Their 
preoccupation with rulership rather than public service is in keeping with the  
patrimonial structures of traditional society."123
The patterns of politics in Pakistan's urban-rural settings have only em powered  
the influential, feudal families. In return, these oligarchic groups compromised the  
sanctity of citizens' votes in lieu of political and economic corruption. Political 
corruption not only hollowed out the foundations of true democracy and civilian rule, 
but also kept the doors open for military interventions and valid reasons against 
"corruption and bad governance heaped on Pakistan's popular politicians."124 A general 
tendency among the masses is to view their political elites as the most corrupt and less 
sincere with people and providing them political goods.
There is a deep nexus between corruption and the compromising of democracy 
that helps political elites, military rulers, and civil-bureaucrats to create a win-set, so 
each party can be comfortable without interfering into others' matters. However, the 
dilemma is that political elites are more divisive in their ranks than the military or
123 Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 56.
124 Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and Military, 327.
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bureaucrats, and their divisive opinion and opposition creates political space for the 
military to play a role as guardians to intervene. Unfortunately, the tw o tenures of P.M. 
Benazir Bhutto and P.M. Nawaz Sharif in 1980s and 1990s, respectively, w ere spent 
engaging over corruption charges through the establishment of accountability 
mechanisms against rival political parties and workers, while both were removed from  
power on corruption and bad governance charges.
The Bhuttos (branded to be secular) and the Sharifs (branded to be sympathizers 
to right wing parties) are today's two ruling families, and there is a chance that the  
family dynasty trend likely to continue. Like the Bhuttos and Sharifs' roles in national 
leadership, family dynasty is not a unique case in provincial set ups too. The personality- 
based polities are popular in the rest of Pakistan's provinces. In reference to the other 
provinces, the Bugtis, Maris, Mengals etc. dominate in Baluchistan; and the late Bacha 
Khan's family in KPK are some of the most vivid examples of family rule in the respective 
provinces. Meanwhile, both the Bhutto and Sharif families have sealed a historical 
rivalry. In 1972, then Premier Z.A. Bhutto's nationalization process had affected the 
family business of the Sharifs, and the Sharifs were disgruntled about the loss of their 
industry. Once Gen. Zia came to power in the late 1970s, he picked Bhutto's opposition 
members in his cabinet in order to diffuse any political pressure from the public. At the 
same tim e the Sharifs regained their business Ittefaq industries. The revenue from  the  
Sharifs' family business is more than $400 million. On returning to Pakistan in the 1980s, 
Benazir Bhutto, who was unhappy with the military because her father was executed 
under military rule, felt the Sharifs one of the close-linked parties to the military.
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Therefore, both Bhuttos and Sharifs remained opposed, while compromising the 
democratic transition with non-democratic forces.
During the early rule of Nawaz Sharif, the government alleged that in the past 
Benazir Bhutto's regime was involved in massive corruption activities including hiring 
thousands of party workers on state positions w ithout m erit and misusing state 
resources. Most of the allegations to Benazir were pointed towards her husband, M r. 
Asif Ali Zardari (who later became President of Pakistan after her assassination in late 
2008). Mr. Zardari was alleged to have received a percentage through kickback during 
the deals of foreign and domestic contracts; while he used "front men (the money) went 
to the Bhutto-Zardari combine."125
During Bhutto's first term as premier, her husband Mr. Zardari, "acquired a 
succession of nicknames: Mr. 5 Percent, Mr. 10 Percent, M r. 20 Percent, Mr. 30 Percent, 
and finally, in Bhutto's second term  when he was appointed minister of investments,
Mr. 100 Percent."126 The investigators estimated to "trace more than $100 million to 
Benazir's secret accounts in foreign banks."127 In addition to facing opposition from  
political opponents and corruption charges, the military also considered Ms. Bhutto a 
threat to strategic assets who doubted her plans were to rollback Pakistan's nuclear 
plan for economic bargains. W ith the fear of losing the nuclear program along 
corruption charges, Benazir Bhutto's government was toppled, and form er intelligence
125 Raymond W. Baker, Capitalism's Achilles H e e l: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market 
System (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 78.
126 Ibid.
127 Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011, 291.
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chief, Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani admitted in Pakistan Supreme Court about the bribing of 
political and religious parties in opposition against Ms. Bhutto.128
Similar to Ms. Bhutto's removal, Mr. Sharif was also removed from  his 
premiership in the same patterns. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan justified his action to  
dissolve Sharifs government on the basis that corruption charges cost Pakistan $20 
billion; he also accused M r. Sharifs government of extra-judicial killings, victimization of 
opposition, and so forth .129 Raymond W . Baker has thoroughly shared the statistical 
data on corruption charges and off-shore investments of both Bhutto-Zardari and 
Sharifs families. As a glimpse at the alleged accusations on premier Sharifs earlier 
terms, Baker mentioned contracts with Daewoo (a South Korean company). According 
to Baker:
"M r. Sharif authorized importation of 50,000 vehicles duty free, reportedly 
costing the government $700 million in lost customs duties. Banks were forced 
to make loans for vehicle purchases to would-be taxi cab drivers upon receipt of 
a 10 percent deposit. Borrowers got their "Nawaz Sharif cabs," and some 60 
percent of them promptly defaulted. This left the banks with $500 million or so 
in unpaid loans. Vehicle dealers reportedly made a killing and expressed their 
appreciation in expected ways. Under Sharif, unpaid bank loans and massive tax 
evasion remained the favorite ways to get rich. Upon his loss of power the 
usurping government published a list of 322 of the largest loan defaulters, 
representing almost $3 billion out of $4 billion owed to banks. Sharif and his 
family were tagged for $60 million. The Ittefaq Group went bankrupt in 1993 
when Sharif lost his premiership the first tim e. By then only three units in the 
group were operational, and loan defaults of the remaining companies totaled  
some 5.7 billion rupees, more than $100 million."130
During both civil and military rule, the ruling elites were quick in establishing 
accountability intuitions, e.g. in Sharifs tim e the Ehtesab (Accountability) bureau, and in
128 Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011, 281.
129 Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011, 287.
130 Baker, Capitalism's Achilles H ee l: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System, 83.
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Musharraf's period the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). But these bureaus were  
used for political scoring and victimizing the opposition and government opponents. In 
the early years of Musharraf's rule, he used NAB for all those who were involved in 
corruption, but dropped all corruption cases against political absconders who were  
living in self-exile and who returned home on the basis of a controversial ordinance 
decreed on November 2007 called the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). The 
NRO dropped all the cases between January 1 ,1 9 86  and October 12 ,1999 . This 
controversial ordinance, in a sense, indemnified the corruption in the country, and 
provided a source of strength to anyone who continued to violate the rule of law.
President Musharraf thought the NRO would help him retain another tenure as 
president, but he miscalculated and was forced to resign in 2008. In the post-Musharraf 
period, the PPP once again was given a chance to rule the country as a democratic 
regime. As President Zardari came to power, he gathered sympathy on the basis of his 
wife Ms. Bhutto's assassination. The PPP government under Zardari's rule was the first 
time any democratic government in the history of Pakistan successfully completed its 
term and transferred power to another democratic regime through elections in 2013.
The track record of corruption remained the same during this period (2008- 
2013), as a number of recent instances suggested that the scale of corruption and 
money laundering in billions was higher. During this period, on a number of occasions, 
the PPP-led government and its coalition political parties (Pakistan Muslim League-  
Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q) in Punjab, Awami National Party (ANP) in KPK, and M uttahida
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Qaumi M ovem ent (M Q M ) in Karachi) w ere charged with corruption charges for being 
involved directly or indirectly in some of the major state-owned corporations.
In 2010, the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, Hamid Saeed Kazmi (m em ber 
of the PPP) was charged in the Hajj (Pilgrimage) Scam. During the annual Hajj 
(Pilgrimage) the government charged each pilgrim about Rs. 230,000 ($2,700) for 
providing transport and accommodation in Saudi Arabia, earning Rs. 5.8 billion in 
revenue, but was blamed for providing poor lodging. The misappropriation of funds 
forced the minister to resign.131 Moreover, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) also 
accused Mr. Abdul Qadir Gilani, son of then Pakistani PM, Yousuf Raza Gilani, of 
receiving Rs. 20 million as kickbacks in the Hajj Scam. According to the Asia Times, the 
previous PPP government was plagued with corruption charges. Another son by Former 
PM Gilani, M r. Ali Musa Gilani, was charged in a drug scam during his father's rule. The 
Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) accused Musa Gilani of being involved in a Rs. 8 billion ($8 
million) drug scam (Ephedrine (poor m an’s cocaine) is used in manufacturing medicines 
to trea t common cold, flu, and asthma) rewarding a contract to tw o local 
pharmaceutical companies through the PM secretariat and form er PM's son.132
In 2011, the PML (Q)'s top leadership known as the Chaudhry Brothers 
(landowners from Punjab), Moonis Elahi was accused of looting Rs. 220 million in the  
National Insurance Company Limited (NILC) corruption scandal.133 Another case of the 
PML (Q)'s Chaudhry Brothers were also tried in court over Rs. 44 billion corruption
131 Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Pakistan Hajj Scam Inquiry: Top Official Kept on Remand," BBC November 20th, 
2010.
132 syed Fazl-e-Haider, "Gilani Son Named in Drug Scam," Asia Times April 12, 2012.
133 "Chaudhrys Panic after Nile Scam: Pml-N," The News January 29th, 2011.
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charges in Employees Old Age Benefit Institution's (EOBI) scandal.134 Railways M inister 
Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour (m em ber of the ANP, a coalition party to the PPP govt.) and 
railway officials were accused of a multi-billion dollar scrap scandal. The accused 
officials valued Rs. 300 to 600 million for 39,000 metric tons of scrap, which was actually 
valued at more than Rs. 3 billion.135 Similarly, the minister for ports and shipping, Babar 
Ghauri (an M Q M  member) is accused of overlooking the loss of 19,000 NATO containers 
from Karachi port during Mr. Ghauri's ministerial tenure. According to the Director 
General of the Sindh Rangers (a paramilitary force), these containers were carrying 
arms, which could be used in destabilizing and creating volatile conditions in Karachi, as 
it is the main port used for supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan.136
Political corruption has continuously existed in Pakistan; however, the political 
elites have devised more subtle ways to avoid corruption charges by engaging in 
legitimized corruption. The general public believes that political decisions to devalue the 
country's currency always benefits the political elites, whose bank accounts are in 
foreign banks or holding foreign currency, and w ithout any corruption involved like 
kickbacks, the currency depreciation preserves their profits. Moreover, after coming to 
power in 2008, the PPP government initiated a poverty reduction programme through 
an act of parliament to help the poor by providing m onetary benefits. Named after Ms. 
Bhutto, the programme was called the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). Yet, 
the BISP turned out to be a legitimate corruption scheme. As the programme itself
134 Arif Rana, "Eobi Scandal: Ex-Minister Implicated in Rs.44 Billion Scam," The Express Tribune October 28, 
2013.
135 Asad Kharal, "Embezzlement: Bilour Named in Multi-Billion Railways Scrap Scandal," ibid. March 7, 
2012.
136 "Missing Nato Containers: Mqm's Ghauri Seeks to Become Party in Case," Dawn September 10, 2013.
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gained wide popularity domestically and internationally for its pro-poor policies, under 
the garb of legitimacy and popularity, funds were given to political elites mainly 
associated with the ruling party or coalition to distribute to their constituencies and 
workers so future votes could be secured.137
Due to the mismanagement of funds and corruption, the new BISP officials 
under the Nawaz government have requested NAB officials to  conduct serious inquiries 
into fraudulent activities. According to NAB, the BISP has spent Rs. 165 billion, of which 
15 percent came through donors and interest based loans, and almost 85 percent 
directly from the government exchequer.138 An instance of mismanagement shows that 
the previous officials under PPP government during 2008-2013 spent more than Rs. 3 
billion on media campaigns, and the contracts awarded to the advertising company 
lacked any formal procedure.139
Pakistani masses are in a gradual process of understanding the factors and actors 
behind such political deprivation. The public understands that family dynasties and 
feudal lords are "pretentious, self-interested, unprincipled, reactionary snobs who  
constitute a major obstacle to social and democratic development."140 The hodgepodge 
of civil-military compromises and power struggle has transformed Pakistan into an 
"hourglass society," which means the "state and the public are mutually related through
137 Pamela Constable, Playing with Fire : Pakistan a t W ar with Itself, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 
2011), 269.
138 Khawar Ghumman, "Corruption Cases in Bisp to Be Probed," Dawn Jan. 12th, 2014.
138 Ibid.
140 Jones, Pakistan : Eye o f the Storm, 248.
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a minimum of institutional links, and people are generally disengaged from politics 
except for the occasional exercise of their right to vote."141
Political Scientist Aqil Shah has mixed feelings about the democratic viability and 
future of Pakistan, and he writes that "democracy in Pakistan is likely to remain stillborn 
unless the officer corps' praetorian norms and prerogatives undergo erosion and the  
military is brought under firm democratic-civilian control. The growing internal threat 
from terrorism, and the sense of public insecurity tha t it generates, do not augur well 
for democratic civil-military relations. For now, Pakistan's "resurrected civil society" will 
likely to come forward and ensure that the military has no real occasion openly to  
undermine or overthrow an elected governm ent."142 Ian Talbot has nicely concluded the 
political system and dynamics of Pakistan's quasi-democracy in the following statement:
"The political system and its practitioners in the 1990s appeared as 
ineffectual and bankrupt as their counterparts in the first troubled decade of 
independence. In both eras, politicians raised charges of corruption against their 
opponents while at the same time using patronage to secure power. The only 
difference is that with the passage of tim e both the resources available for 
corruption and the media's ability to uncover it have dramatically increased. 
Now, as during the 1950s, the disorderly struggle between opposition and 
government encourages military intervention in the political process. This very 
authoritarianism has in the past perpetuated the weakly institutionalized  
personalist politics which have become Pakistan's hallmark."143
The 2013 general elections were historic in many other ways besides being a
historic transfer of power from one civilian regime to other. They were significant also
because Pakistani society witnessed the rise of a new democratic party, the Pakistan
Tehreek-i-lnsaf (PTI led by a form er Cricket star, Imran Khan), which challenged the
141 Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan : A Study o f the 2002 Elections, 63.
142 Shah, "Praetorianism and Terrorism," 24.
143 Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 369.
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status quo of the traditional domination by tw o parties i.e. the PPP and PML (N). By and 
large, the educated youth joined PTI to bring change to the country. Following this 
trend, many influential political leaders, including some with powerful feudal 
backgrounds, quit the old parties and joined PTI. In a way, it is like old wine in new  
bottles, but the overall trend is positive and will eventually filter the political deadwood  
burdening the system. Remarkably, this positive trend can also be linked with provincial 
election results of 2013, in which Dr. Abdul Malik Baluch (a middle class and self-made 
politician) of the National Party (NP) changed the status quo of consecutive rule by tribal 
leaders. Similar trends can somehow be attributed to  PTI forming a government in KPK. 
In contrast the remaining tw o provinces, which hold a majority of the seats of 
representation in parliament and regional settings, retained the old political patterns.
The other features of the 2013 political change were the strengthening of the  
media and judiciary as important pillars of the state. Even before the 2013 elections, the 
rise of free media and the restoration of an independent judiciary is believed to have set 
in motion trends of accountability in Pakistan's political system. Both media and 
judiciary already played a crucial role in President Musharraf's forceful resignation, 
which may not have been anticipated a decade earlier. In addition, it is the first tim e in 
Pakistan's history that a military chief is facing a trial for treason for suspending the 
constitution during the imposition of a state of emergency under military rule. His 
political opponents struggled to indict him in four cases, the first a high treason case 
under "article 6 of constitution."144 Former President Musharraf was indicted by a court
144 Article 6 of Pakistan's Constitution: High Treason
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that accused him of abrogating and suspending the constitution through the imposition 
of an emergency and detaining superior court judges in November 2007; he was also 
indicted for unconstitutionally and unlawfully amending the constitution soon after 
imposing a state of emergency. Second, he was indicted in the assassination case of 
former premier Benazir Bhutto, third for the killing of Baluch nationalist leader Nawab 
Akber Bugti and fourth, for the Lai Masjid (Red Mosque) operation; all are possible 
attempts from his political opponents to place him on trial. Musharraf is defiant with  
the term high treason, as he responded in court after charges were leveled that 
"W hatever I did, I did for the country and its people. I am sad that I am being called a 
traitor," and in fact, for military elites are also upsetting to witness the politicized 
charges for a military chief who served the state for 45 years.145 Musharraf believes it is 
a political victimization and questions, why not put on trial all judges and politicians who 
endorsed his rule and enjoyed its perks? While witnessing a historical precedent being 
set against a form er military chief, there is a higher possibility that the military is set to 
intervene to avoid any further judicial trial of the form er military chief in various courts 
of the country.
(1) Any person who abrogates or subverts or suspends or holds in abeyance, or attempts or conspires to 
abrogate or subvert or suspend or hold in abeyance, the Constitution by use of force or show of force or 
by any other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason.
(2) Any person aiding or abetting [or collaborating] the acts mentioned in clause (1) shall likewise be guilty 
of high treason.
(2A) An act of high treason mentioned in clause (1) or clause (2) shall not be validated by any court 
including the Supreme Court and a High Court.
(3) [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] shall by law provide for the punishment of persons found guilty of high 
treason.
145 Peer Muhammad, "Treason Charges Indicted," The Express Tribune April, 1 2014.
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Along with the judiciary, the media's role was significantly realized, and yet at 
the same time, Pakistan is considered a dangerous country for journalists, having been 
victims of targeted killings, kidnappings, and terrorist attacks. Until last year, Pakistan 
retained the top rank as the most dangerous country for journalists, being surpassed 
due to the higher intensity of fighting in Syria. However, the situation still shows a 
positive trend in terms of the media gaining greater freedom  of expression and speech 
and establishing checks and balances, but there are many occasions which demand  
enforcement of media ethics as well so that the media does not become a party or 
manipulator. To strengthen democracy all pillars of the state have to support each other 
in order to bridle the traditional oligarchy and family fiefdoms.
SOCIETAL VIOLENCE: ETHNO-RELIGIOUS TERRORISM AS AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT
Pakistani society is facing multiple aspects o f violence. The nature of violence 
varies at different levels, which range from traditional violation of human rights on one 
side of the spectrum, to extreme violent ethno-religious insurgencies at the other end, 
which threatens the Pakistani social fabric and state security. In recent years Pakistani 
society has held a track record in protecting human rights, women's rights, the provision 
of education, proper healthcare and sanitation, religious freedom, freedom  of speech 
and expression.
During the last decade, persistent violence has been at the epicenter of socio­
political life. Pakistani lawmakers admit the acute intensity of the violent insurgency 
that is gripping the whole of Pakistani society poses a grave threat. As mentioned
258
previously, Pakistan's Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan notified the National 
Assembly about the real existential threat from ongoing severe terrorist activities. The 
rapidly deteriorating law and order situation and human insecurity challenge the  
meaning and duties of a nation-state in which loyal citizens seek returns for their 
allegiance, tied to social bonds and the contract between state and society. The m ulti­
layered violence and terror activities across the country are the end product of the 
evolution of violence in Pakistan, primarily started in the early years of independence 
that gradually intensified. Over the years, Pakistan has become a security state wrestling 
with pre-existing and self-created security issues, which became a reasonable 
justification for the military to interfere in domestic security threats with its highly 
transnational roots and engagements.
The roots of Pakistan's traditional violence in society and evolving episodes of 
terrorism are the outcome, or fallout, of national, regional, and global agendas. In other 
words, three factors contributed in the evolutionary process of Pakistani violence, 
namely evolving radicalization, unjust intra-provincial, political-economic policies; 
regional unresolved political disputes; and the global geopolitical struggle during the  
Cold War. The latter two factors are discussed later on in the section on geopolitics.
The multi-layered violence and terrorist activities are linked to various factors 
and ambitions. Unfortunately the Pakistani geographical space has become a useful 
shelter for various foreign and domestic militant and mafia groups, and each m ilitant 
group has its own agenda. James Piazza explains that fragile and risky societies have a 
higher probability of "experience terrorist attacks, have their citizens join in and
259
perpetrate terrorist acts, and see their territory used as bases from which to launch 
attacks abroad. This pattern occurs because failed and failing states are easier for 
terrorist movements to penetrate, recruit from, and operate within."146
There are more than 40 militant groups operating in various parts of Pakistan, 
some threaten and directly denounce the state's legitimacy and its constitution, some 
threaten society, and some threaten the integrity o f the state. The threat to state 
authority emanates from religious ideological groups, whose ambitions are not only in 
seeing Pakistan as a theocratic state, but also seek to spread transnational influence. 
Major groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliations with Al-Qaeda, and 
Islamic M ovem ent of Uzbekistan, etc. are vivid examples here. The threat to society is 
linked to all politically motivated or sectarian based groups threatening domestic peace 
and stability, e.g Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Sunni - LeJ) and an off-shoot of a banned Sunni 
organization, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), whose primary targets are Shia community, 
while Sipah-e-Muhammad (SMP), a banned Shia militant organization, counters the rival 
Sunni groups. The threat to state integrity is always generated from nationalists' 
movements; i.e. the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) poses the same threat as the  
creation of Bangladesh in 1971 that was through nationalistic struggle.
To understand the core reasons why religious groups became such powerful 
entities and established ungoverned spaces, particularly in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Afghan-Pakistan border region, it is necessary to revisit 
some of the earlier discussion on radicalization, or Islamization processes.
146 Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?," 471.
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In Pakistan's early years its political elites seems comfortable to  allow the benign 
conditions for religious groups to flourish, so the usage of religion can help to  
homogenize or promote the "ethnification" of diverse ethnic groups. The 
homogenization policies became divisive factors instead. W hen Prime Minister Liaquat 
Ali Khan rectified the Objective Resolution in 1949, it endorsed state sovereignty vested 
in God's authority. According to Ishtiaq Ahmed, the ulema /  religious clerics interpreted  
the reference of sovereignty under the Objective Resolution as endorsing Sharia law as 
the law of land, while P.M. Liaquat Ali Khan "did not mean a theocracy or a rejection of 
democracy and minority rights; rather, democracy and minority rights were to be 
sublimated in accordance with Islamic percepts."147 On the other hand, a number of 
political analysts believe that the notion of religion was used deliberately and cautiously 
as per the nature of the audience. Hussain Haqqani writes "when Liaquat Ali Khan 
addressed "Western audience ... his Islamic rhetoric was diluted by couching it in 
cultural terms", and domestically he continued to use the term  Islamic ideology 
providing a legitimate base for religious groups to assert the role of religion in 
determining state policies and actions.148
Using religion benefited the political elites in enforcing and legitimizing their 
powers. Rulers such as Gen. Ayub, Premier Z. A. Bhutto, and Gen. Musharraf, whom  
were believed to be pro-development and modernization rulers, also had adopted 
Islamization policies, while projecting slogans like "Pakistan Islam ka Qila hai (Pakistan is
147 Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947 -2011 ,106.
148 Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and Military, 32.
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a fortress of Islam)" and gaining political benefits.149 Earlier, when Ms. Fatima Jinnah 
contested elections against Gen. Ayub in 1965, Gen. Ayub relied on religious backing 
and sought out clerics to support and promulgate Fatwas (religious decree) against 
women's eligibility to run for office through religious interpretation.150 During Gen. Zia's 
rule in the 1980s his government was highly motivated in seeking an "Islamic 
renaissance," which turned out to be a perfect condition for the U.S. to take advantage 
of strategically against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, though the impact was 
disastrous for Pakistan's economic, political, and institutional future.151 The US backed 
anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan and Gen. Zia's Islamic renaissance became a perfect 
marriage, it allowed Gen. Zia's regime to patronize the political, ethnic, and sectarian 
groups to counter his political oppositions that gradually widened the fissures of social 
cohesiveness of society. Subsequently, Pakistani society witnessed the mushrooming of 
Madrasahs, sparking sectarian strife, an influx of foreign fighters and their permanent 
settlement in Pakistan's tribal areas (also disrupting tribal life), and an exodus of three  
million Afghan refugees that disrupted the local economy along with spreading drug and 
Kalashnikov culture.
Although after 9 /11  the waves of violence soared with insurgencies, suicide 
attacks and terrorist activities, it should be noted that the religious indoctrination 
process was started much earlier, and the seeds of militancy were already sowed. Since 
2001, waves of terrorism have killed more than 50,000 Pakistanis (See the table 6 for
149 Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011, 323.
150 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, 55.
151 Ziring, Pakistan : A t the Crosscurrent o f History, 218; Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 48.
details), while the intensity of violence has increased every passing year. By and large 
the deaths were due to an increase in suicide attacks, in which terrorists targeted  
government installations, places of worship, schools, and Western NGOs. W hen asked 
where terrorism's epicenter in Pakistan lies, general public opinion affirms that the 
tribal region near the Afghan-Pakistan border is the nexus of extremism and militancy. 
However, terrorist networks have lately been penetrating into urban settings like 
growing influence in biggest city Karachi. Pakistan is regularly being asked through 
diplomatic channels to "do more" in the tribal areas, but there is not much willingness 
to understand the tribal structure and its dynamics. It is the tribal areas that have 
suffered the most, and outsiders are forcefully terrorizing the locals and occupying 
these lands.
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Table 6: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2014
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It is recognized that as radicalization increased, acts of terrorism, intolerance and 
violence in Pakistan evolved concurrently. However, why the state could not succeed in 
controlling or tackling the root causes of terrorism must also be analyzed. One of the  
mostly overlooked prime factors is the institutional vacuum in certain areas, which 
provides an atmosphere for militants to flourish. The convergence of charged 
radicalized groups in areas of ineffective and decapitated political institutions empowers 
these outfits. For instance, Pakistan retained post-colonial laws, such as the Frontier 
Crimes Regulations (FCR), considered draconian laws, which empowered one 
government representative to imprison or punish a person without tria l.152 The FCR 
remains in effect in fifteen designated tribal areas, including the FATA region. In the  
vicinity of FATA, some tribal zones are ruled through the Provincial Administered Tribal 
Areas (PATA) system implemented in Malakand. The Peshawar high court in 1994 
repealed PATA, but its jurisdiction did not extend to FATA. As a result of this judicial 
vacuum, a local religious leader, Sufi Muham m ad, launched Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e- 
Muhammadi (TNSM) demanding Sharia law and courts for Malakand, which gradually 
spilled over into tribal areas and other parts of the country.153 Despite the fact that FCR 
is a draconian law, it performed a role of justice and established order w ithout leaving 
any political vacuum.
Today, FATA is considered one of the most dangerous zones in the world, 
terming it an ungoverned space and safe haven for global terrorists. The general 
tendency shows that "all major terrorist plots are now being hatched in Pakistan's tribal
152 Fair, "Addressing Fundamental Challenges," 92.
153 Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 59.
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belt."154 W hy is it that the tribal areas of Pakistan became an epicenter of global 
terrorist networks? First, the continuous religious penetration for the last three decades 
for geopolitical reasons helped to consolidate various m ilitant groups to establish their 
bases there; second, these external groups gradually dismantled the traditional power 
structure and created a political vacuum. M ilitant outfits quickly filled this political 
vacuum with their own legal standpoint in reference to Sharia law, regularly conducting 
targeted attacks within and beyond Pakistan's frontiers. Interestingly, various criminal 
networks, drug traffickers, and mafia groups with their extended financial interests 
joined militants in order to permeate the radicalization in other parts of the country, 
resulting in "the Islamization of criminal activity and criminalization of segments of 
Islamism in Pakistan."155
The tribal areas are historically famous for being difficult to tam e or subjugate by 
force, as earlier in history great powers like imperial Britain and Russia suffered too. 
Most of the population in the tribal areas are ethnically Pashtun, while the tribal 
Pashtun society is referred to as segmented by many authors, meaning it is "a subtype 
of what are technically known as acephelous or headless societies."156 The tribal belt is 
internally organized through diverse stratification. The tribal elders (Maliks), who serve 
as administrators under a tribal chief (or Khan), control the tribal system. "The elders 
represents lineage-base authority vest in the Jirga (council of elders), and expressed
154 Moeed Yusuf, "A Society on the Precipice? Examining the Prospects o f Youth Radicalization in 
Pakistan," in Reaping the Dividend Overcoming Pakistan's Demographic Challenges, ed. Michael Kugelman 
and Robert M . Hathaway (Washington, D.C: W oodrow Wilson International Center, 2011), 94.
155 Shaikh, Making Sense o f Pakistan, 173.
156 Ty L. Groh, "A Fortress without Walls: Alternative Governance Structures on the Afghan-Pakistan 
Frontiers," in Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era o f Softened Sovereignty, ed. 
Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 97.
266
through Puktunwali or Pashtunwali (tribe's code or the  way of the Pashtuns)" and follow  
"terms of the charter or Nikkat.157 The first and foremost aspect of Pashtunwali is about 
the honor (or Nang), meaning a tribe takes it as a prime honor to observe the tribal 
codes.158 The important tenets of Pashtunwali are hospitality to a traveller, guest, or 
stranger through the offering of food and shelter (known as melmastia or 
mehrmapalineh), risking life and property to  provide shelter and protection to any 
person, friend or enemy, who desires sanctuary (know as nanawatai), defending 
belongings, with property as pride (ghayrat), deference and respect (known as ehteram) 
to elders (called masharan), and deterrence through revenge or retaliation (known as 
badal), along with the traditional institution of the Jirga.159 Other codes, like 
tarboorwali, settls rivalries between male cousins and marriages between cousins, 
which shapes and preserves power, wealth, and authority within families and protects 
lineages.160
British colonial rule understood the importance of Pashtunwali for tribal peoples; 
considerately, the British introduced FCR, preserving the tribe's code, but also adding an 
influential pillar called the "political agent," the sole authority representing the colonial 
rule. After the creation of Pakistan, a third pillar also emerged, i.e. the role of the
157 Akbar S. Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone : How America's War on Terror Became a Global W ar on 
Tribal Islam (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 2013), 49.
158 Groh, "A Fortress without Walls: Alternative Governance Structures on the Afghan-Pakistan Frontiers," 
98.
159 Hilary Synnott, Transforming Pakistan : Ways out o f Instability, Adelphi, (Abingdon: Routledge for the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009), 107-08; Mohammad Taqi, "The Federally Abandoned 
Tribal Areas," Daily Times March 27, 2014; Groh, "A Fortress w ithout Walls: Alternative Governance 
Structures on the Afghan-Pakistan Frontiers," 98-99.
160 Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone : How America's W ar on Terror Became a Global W ar on Tribal 
Islam, 50.
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religious cleric and mosque. Pakistan, in fact, did less to integrate the tribal society into 
its mainstream political structure, but let it continue through colonial patterns, which 
helped Pakistan prevent the emergence of a de facto Pashtunistan with the help of 
Afghanistan. Therefore, since 1947, there were three sources of authority in the tribal 
structure: the first pillar being the tribal elders, or Malik, the second pillar with the 
religious leader, or Mullah, who has a lesser role in political decisions or in a traditional 
Jirga, but plays a pacifying role and diffuses violence, and the third pillar introduced 
through colonial settings the political agent, representing the central government with  
more authoritative powers.
W ith the influx of foreign fighters in the tribal area during the 1980s, the 
demographic structure gradually changed and even empowered and transformed locals 
into militant groups. These groups then started to challenge the traditional authorities 
of Jirga comprised of tribal elders. In fact, the Taliban killed most of the influential tribal 
elders, which replaced the tribal leadership with hardcore fundamentalists. Interestingly 
foreign fighters, especially the Al-Qaeda leadership, cleverly blended some tribal codes, 
like the nanawatai (seeking sanctuary) and using badal (revenge or retaliation) to  
achieve its own agenda. Over the years, Al-Qaeda tacitly adopted the "tribal codes 
called for revenge" into their interpretation of religion.161 Such effects can be observed 
with the terms like shura (religious term  for consulting or advisory body) replacing Jirga 
for meetings in tribal areas held by militant leaders. Subsequently, foreign and domestic 
militants poured into tribal areas for training and execution of terrorist plans. The
161 The Thistle and the Drone : How America's W ar on Terror Became a Global W ar on Tribal Islam, 96 .
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Taliban shura established its own courts, denying the legitimacy of Pakistani courts, law, 
and its constitution. The hardline religious schools in many parts of the country were  
used to recruit potential fighters and volunteers and to collect donations. To finance the  
insurgency and terrorist activities, "the militant groups have managed to generate a 
self-sustaining model that involves patronage from foreign groups like Al Qaeda, 
domestic and foreign charitable contributions diverted for their use, forced 
contributions, ransoms, shares in the narcotics trafficking from  Afghanistan, thefts in 
Pakistani cities."162
Facing rising militancy and sectarian violence, Pakistan lacked laws or policies 
capable of trialing militants. The other tactical problem with military operations was 
that Pakistan's military was by and large trained for conventional warfare against India 
on its eastern front. Thus, responding to guerilla warfare was a great challenge, which is 
why a higher number of causalities was initially inflicted when Musharraf formally  
launched operations in the tribal areas to hunt Al-Qaeda and other foreign militants. 
Currently Pakistan has 150,000 troops deployed in tribal areas out of the 500,000 strong 
army on its western border.163 Over the past 13 years the new battle zone provided 
training and preparedness for military personnel to  fight a guerilla campaign.
The impact of rising militancy in the tribal areas has affected the local population 
more than any once. The tribal areas became a launch pad for terrorists' attacks inside 
and outside of Pakistan. To tackle the militants, the local population became victims and
162 Yusuf, "A Society on the Precipice? Examining the Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan," 91.
163 Shuja Nawaz, "The Clash of Interests and Objectives," in The Future o f Pakistan, ed. Stephen P. Cohen 
(Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2011), 153.
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targets for allowing their territory to be used by militants. W ithout proper security 
provided by the state, it is difficult for locals to stand against militants. In fact, local 
tribes are unhappy with militants, who have brought great suffering to them and their 
families. The local population is sandwiched between military operations from Pakistan, 
terrorists' threats within the tribal areas, and CIA drone strikes.
The drone strikes have succeeded in eliminating high value targets since 2004, 
but at the same time became highly unpopular (also known as Angel of Death among 
local population - see the data about Drone strikes in table 7). There is great confusion 
over the accuracy of the data on the number of civilians and militants killed during 
drone strikes. In 2013, when Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar briefed senators about 
the statistics, the opposition parties boycotted the senate session and walked out in 
protest over the presentation, claiming the data was wrong, and demanded that the  
minister correct the data, while calling it a "pack o f lies."164 According to the Interior 
Minister "no civilians were killed in 235 drone strikes in 2012 and 84 attacks in 2013," 
while he agreed that the highest number of drone strikes were 115 in 2010, in which 
751 terrorists were killed while 2 civilians were killed.165 Militants and their political 
sympathizers used the images of civilian casualties to gain sympathy and seek legitimacy 
from the population. U.S.-based scholar and w riter Akber Ahmed, who was a form er 
political agent in the tribal areas and a retired Pakistani bureaucrat, explains in his 
recent book that "the tribal population is traumatized not only by American missiles
164 Umer Nangiana, "Upper House Proceedings: Pandemonium as Nisar, Rabbani Clash in Senate," The 
Express Tribune October 31, 2013.
165 Ibid.
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(drones) but also by national army attacks, suicide bombers, and tribal warfare, forcing 
millions to flee their homes to seek shelter elsewhere and live in destitute conditions as 
hapless refugees."166
Table 7: Drone Strikes in Pakistan
Ifear Numberof
Strikes SEF1 ISr
2004-2009 51 410 - 595 167 - 335 102 - 120 175 - 227
2009 52 465-744 # 0 -2 1 0
2010 128 751 -1 ,1 0 9  84 -1 9 6 1 9 -2 0  3 5 1 -4 2 8
2011 75 363 -666 2 6 -1 1 . 158-236
2012
2013
50
27
199 - 410 13 - 63 
# 8 -1 5 4  0 - 4
1 - 2  1 0 0 -2 1 2  
0 -1  43-SB9
Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2013, UK.
W ith the threat of terrorism, Pakistan has suffered greatly due to the lack of 
social cohesion. The issue of non-cohesiveness is due to the undermining of the diversity 
of opinion, belief, and existence. In general, it is noted that diversity is a source of 
strength, but unfortunately Pakistan is divided along ethnic, racial, and sectarian lines, 
which constantly weaken its statehood. People are persecuted for their affiliation with  
minority sects and religious beliefs. According to the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies 
(PIPS), sectarian violence caused the death of 687 people in 2013, which was a 22
166 A h m e d , The Thistle and the Drone : How America's W ar on Terror Became a Global W ar on Tribal
Islam, 4 -5 .
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percent increase in the number of sectarian causalities reported in 2012.167 The PIPS 
report predicted that trends of sectarian and racial violence will continue at a high ratio. 
From January to March 2014, 70 people were killed and 92 w ere injured in 26 sectarian 
related incidents reported by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). One of the reasons 
for the chaotic situation is the internal displacement of people due to military 
operations and the fight against militants. In 2009 alone, 3 million people were  
internally displaced due to military operation and fight with TTP. Large numbers of 
displaced groups moved to larger cities, with the change in demographic settings 
creating further tensions in various parts of country.
Besides sectarian divides, the other major issue that weakens Pakistan is the 
distrust over resource distribution and political economic competition at the intra­
provincial level, i.e. between Sindhis and Muhajirs (Urdu speaking groups) in Sindh, 
between Baluch and Pathans in Baluchistan, with Hindko speaking Hazara people 
seeking a new province in KPK, and the Saraiki belt in Punjab's demands for a new  
province in South Punjab leading to grievances within provinces, all of which continue to 
challenge and hamper building a national identity.168
Among all the provinces Baluchistan presents a serious challenge, as some of its 
ethno-nationalist groups, such as the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the 
Baluchistan Republican Army (BRA), are fighting for independence. The Baluch tribes' 
grievances are rooted in political economic complaints over the distribution of resources 
and demand for political autonomy. During Z.A. Bhutto's rule the military conducted
167 Abdul Zahoor Khan M arwat, "Challenges Not Insurmountable," The News March 17, 2014.
168 Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 64.
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operations against these groups in the 1970s. Since the 1970s, nationalist movements  
had been suppressed, but in early 2000, Baluch leader Nawab Akkber Khan Bugti re­
launched his political protest. This political protest was further supported by an incident 
in which an Army officer was blamed for raping a fem ale doctor posted in Baluchistan. 
Nawab Bugti demanded justice for violating tribal codes. Nawab Bugti and his fellow  
tribesmen took the arms as resistance. Musharraf issued the ultimatum to Bugti that 
"Don't push us. It is not the 70's (referring to  earlier military operation against 
nationalist insurgency in 1970), when you can hit and run, and hide in the mountains. 
This tim e, you w on't even know what hit you."169 In 2006, Nawab Bugti was killed in his 
mountain hideout. Baluch nationalists believe he was killed in a military operation, while 
military leadership denies it. Military reports claimed that local police forces, w ith the  
help of military elite forces the Special Services Group (SSG or Commandos), w ent into 
the hills in order to arrest Nawab Bugti, but he detonated the cave with explosives 
killing himself and scores of elite military personnel.
In the aftermath of Nawab Bugti's death, the nationalist groups, whose demands 
were for greater autonomy of the province and a greater share in resources, joined the  
Baluch groups whom were seeking full independence of Baluchistan. Unfortunately, due 
to anger over the military, BLA members began targeted killings, kidnappings, and the  
torturing of settlers (mainly from Punjab). At the same tim e, Baluch intellectuals, 
lawyers, doctors, and journalists also w ent missing and w ere found dead, their bodies
169 A h m e d , The Thistle and the Drone : How America’s W ar on Terror Became a Global W ar on Tribal
Islam, 1 36 .
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dumped in various locations, believed to be victims o f extra-judicial killings.170 Baluch 
liberation parties blamed Pakistani intelligence agencies, while Pakistan blames India for 
funding Baluch insurgents, who are believed to be hiding in Afghanistan.
The issues of missing persons are gaining attention in Pakistan, and many 
groups, including nationalist, religious, and civil society organizations are demanding 
legal action from the Supreme Court. So far, the blame has been leveled against 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies for the kidnapping of alleged terrorists.
There is a widely held perception among all ranks of law enforcement agencies that 
there is no proper legislation regarding the trial of terrorists or militants. Previously a 
number of terrorist suspects were presented in courts, but a lack of proper laws and 
unwillingness of eyewitnesses to appear in court, fearing death threats from militants, 
has led to the release of many high value terrorists. Believing the same will occur with  
other prisoners, law enforcement agencies refrain from keeping any such persons in 
custody.
Afterwards, in late 2013, due to mounting pressure from the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan, some missing persons appeared in court. The Court desired to see and hear 
about many other suspected missing persons. Upon failing to meet the demands of the  
court in March 2014, the court was assured to file a First Information Report (FIR) 
against serving army officials. Interestingly, at the same tim e, the government 
presented a controversial ordinance called "Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (PPO)" in
170 The Thistle and the Drone : How America's W ar on Terror Became a Global W ar on Tribal Islam, 1 37 .
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parliament for its endorsement.171 The government has justified that the proposed 
ordinance will help to fill a legal vacuum, which has allowed militants and mafia 
members to be released without trial and roam freely. The PPO was already approved 
by the President, Mr. Mamnoon Hussain in October 2013.The opposition parties and 
even PML (N) coalition parties, like Jamiat Ulema-e-lslam and the Fazal ur Rehman 
group (JUI - F), have resisted the move, stating it will allow further extra-judicial killings 
and also allow arresting people w ithout warrants.172 Despite the resistance from  
political parties and a walk out from  a National Assembly session, the majority of 
parliamentarians belonging to PML (N) passed the PPO in April 2014. Opposition parties 
are determined to challenge the PPO through the legal system. The ordinance may 
provide an escape or indemnity to persons, who are being accused of being involved in 
missing person cases.
To conclude, the Pakistani political elites, lawmakers, and civil society candidly 
agreed that the multiple types of violence in society have threatened its statehood. For 
the existence and survival of statehood, all the responsible stakeholders need to fram e  
short term  and long-term policies and mechanisms to eliminate the threat of terrorism.
In 2013, the All Parties Conference (APC) decided to give peace a chance by 
reaching out to militants and attempting to dialogue. The dialogue process was halted 
as a result of a U.S. drone strike that killed Pakistani Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud in 
November 2013. The peace talks resumed in the tribal areas with an agreed cease-fire.
171 Azam Khan, "Protection of Pakistan Ordinance: Govt Moves Controversial Bill in National Assembly," 
The Express Tribune April 3, 2014.
172 Ibid.
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Initially, two demands by the Taliban w ere the release of their comrades and family 
members and a demand of a peace zone in South W aziristan173 in the tribal areas, so 
that the mobility of Taliban members could be assured w ithout the threat of being 
targeted. The demand for establishing a peace zone means relinquishing the established 
authority of the state in the area and allowing non-state actors to form  a state within a 
state. It is unlikely that Pakistan will grant the demand for a peace zone, as the military 
lost a great number of its soldiers in its campaign to clear the area.
For many political elites like the PTI leadership, the peace talks are the only 
solution for stability, but they need to be reminded that there were six agreements 
established earlier between various militant factions and Pakistan, and these past 
agreements did not assure a long-term peace. Peace talks are a useful strategy to  
contain the level of violence but are not an end point. As long as militants receive 
foreign and domestic funding directed at radicalization and access to terror breeding 
units in radicalized madrassahs, short-term peace talks are not effective. For example, in 
2011 a U.S. diplomatic cable reported that Saudi and UAE financing of $100 million 
towards religious seminaries in Southern Punjab was approaching poor and multiple 
children families and providing free education, food, and shelter. Once these 
organizations seemed confident in the willingness of parents to send their sons, issues, 
and the importance of Martyrdom  in religion were also discussed, and in the case of
173 South Waziristan formerly in the hands of Taliban, during a major military operation in 2009  
codenamed Rah-e-Nijat routed out the Taliban from the area
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martyrdom of a son, the family would receive a remuneration of Rs. 500,000 ($6,500
according to the 2011 exchange rate).174
In this regard, the government should seriously consider its educational system.
The country is producing three social classes, namely a class of private schools (an upper
middle class), public schools (middle or lower middle class), and religious schools or
Madrassahs (enrolling poor with no incentives, no provisions, and no access to modern
day schools), which creates a social divide. Therefore, understanding the importance of
education is an integral part of a state's internal security and stability, requiring it to
revisit school syllabi or curriculums, and the entire educational system. The extremists
seek to demoralize those who wish to attend schools and lure those who are out of
school or destitute and desperate. By 2011, more than 6 million children between the
ages of 5 and 9 were out of school due to poverty.175
Investment in education is the most im portant factor for Pakistan's growth,
prosperity, viable change, and political stability. On the importance of education, the
youngest nominee for the Nobel Peace Price, Malala Yousafzai (who was shot by the
Taliban for seeking and promoting girls education) expressed her views at the United
Nations and challenged that "let us pick up our books and our pens, they are our most
powerful weapons. One child, one teacher, one book, one pen can change the world."176
W ith the exception of a few  madrassahs, which have proper domestic and
*
foreign sources of funding, the majority of the remaining religious seminaries are poor
174 "Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. Financing Extremism in South Punjab," Dawn May 21, 2011.
175 Riazul Haq, "Primary Education: Plan to Enrol 5m out-of-School Children by 2016 a Pipe Dream," The 
Express Tribune September 6, 2013.
176 Malala Yousafzai and Christina Lamb, I Am M alala : The Girl Who Stood up fo r Education and Was Shot 
by the Taliban, First edition, ed. (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2013), 310.
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and crowded. During his government, Musharraf tried to bring all madrassahs under 
government control through registration and offered incentives, but this policy program 
failed due to the influence of clerics fearing they would lose their sources of influence 
and power over villages and economic privileges. In addition, Madrassahs are becoming 
enterprises generating economic gains through the collection of donations in the name 
of religion. The new PML (N) government has shown interest and com m itm ent to enroll
22,000 religious madrassahs under government control.177 Reforming the educational 
sector and bringing madrassahs into the mainstream public educational system will pay 
long-term benefits to Pakistani society.
Arrested extremists and Taliban fighters have been indoctrinated; therefore, de- 
radicalization programs are essential. Pakistan's military, after some successful 
operations in some parts of the tribal areas, have established "de-radicalization 
emancipation programs (DREP)" also known as "Rehab". Hundreds of militants under 
the DREP program's rehabilitation process are re-educated as responsible people with  
civic consciousness, who undergo educational, moral, vocational, and psychological 
training to stay away from extremist elements, and also to accept their social 
responsibilities and not misuse religion for harmful acts.
After 13 years of fighting against militancy and terrorism, in early 2014, the  
Nawaz government finally agreed to push for a legal structure (PPO) and proper internal 
security policy (NISP) to deal with issues of violence and terrorism. The PPO has yet to 
be approved by parliament, which is considered controversial by opposition parties, so a
177 "Pakistan's Madrassas Reined in by Government," Al-Jazeera March 02, 2014.
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permanent law still needs to go through some refinement. However the NISP outlined 
the causes and ways to deal with terror-related activities including "organized anti-state  
actors; their use of religious ideology to garner local support and recruit from amongst 
the poor and vulnerable; use of mosques and madressahs to nurture hate-based 
narratives; external patronage and funding for terror; inadequate capacity and 
inefficient performance of law-enforcem ent agencies; an intelligence black hole due to  
lack of coordination; dysfunctional governance and criminal justice systems that neither 
incentivise citizens nor deter crime."178 The improvement NISP requires is to further 
categorize the levels and types of terrorist activities or organizations engaged in 
Pakistan because some have transnational roots, some regional, and some are sub­
national ethnic based terrorist or rebel groups. To im plem ent the NISP, the government 
reactivated and revamped the earlier established National Counter Terrorism Authority  
(NACTA). NACTA's job is to coordinate between national intelligence networks and law  
enforcement agencies, so as to improve efficiency. In addition, to support NACTA, the  
Counter Terrorism Rapid Deployment Force (CTRDP) will ensure a quick and effective  
response to any unexpected events. Still, Pakistan relies heavily on police forces in cities. 
Though the Frontier Constabulary (FC), or militia scouts are employed because of their 
law enforcement agency's better rapport with the local population, they unfortunately  
are less trained and incapable of dealing with militants. The proper training and 
equipping of these units is far more important than asking military or para-military  
forces to intervene all the time.
178 BabarSattar, "Finally a Policy to Decipher," Dawn March 3, 2014.
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W ith the successful implementation of proper anti-terror laws, Pakistan can 
improve domestic stability and project a positive image abroad. According to Hasan 
Askari, "Pakistan's negative image abroad cannot be countered unless the government 
controls religious and cultural extremism, and eliminates terrorism. The rhetoric of 
Pakistan being the victim of terrorism gives only one side o f the truth. The other side is 
that Pakistan is also a source of transnational terrorism. Furthermore, the terrorist 
groups in Pakistan are indigenous and will not give up violence until the Pakistan 
government adopts a tough policy to elim inate them ."179 The Pakistani nation has paid a 
high cost of war against terror; any delay in the proper formulation of law and policies 
and their implementation will bleed the nation and society, risking highly its existence as 
a nation.
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FRONTLINE STATE
Pakistan has remained a pivotal and "frontline state" since the Cold W ar, 
especially during the 1980s and the post 9 /11  period.180 On both occasions the flow  of 
foreign aid was high and stimulated economic growth in some sectors of the economy. 
However, the core concentration of aid was focused on the defense sector. In Pakistan, 
most of the economic troubles originate from three factors: a) a dominating feudal 
order, b) high defense expenditure, and c) debt burden.181 Over the last decade, the 
burden on the economy has also been aggravated by the rise in terrorism and domestic
179 Rizvi, "Foreign Policy Dilemmas."
180 Meekal Ahmed, "An Economic Crisis State," in Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, ed. Maleeha Lodhi 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 174.
181 Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan : Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises, 75.
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security issues and frequent natural calamities. Overall, the economic output of recent 
years shows a gloomy outlook. The core troubling aspect o f Pakistan's economy is its 
small tax base. The tax collection system is in disarray, as the richer, ruling elites avoid 
paying taxes, as well as small and medium class business elites, with only salaried 
employees sustaining the tax base through salary deductions.
Political elites take advantage of the domestic extraction of resources by direct 
and indirect taxation levied on the middle class, and also extract foreign resources in the 
name of foreign aid. Following these patterns, the tax evasion syndrome is deeply  
embedded in the domestic system. For example, due to the economic hardship of 
minimal foreign reserves during his rule in the 1990s, P.M Nawaz Sharif allowed tax 
evaders and corrupt elites to "whiten [the] ill-gotten income with no taxation and no 
fear of detection" for foreign currency deposits (FCDs).182 Therefore, the system lacked 
a proper tax collection mechanism, which resulted in huge deficits between spending on 
public goods and revenues.
Pakistan's 45 percent workforce is employed in the agricultural sector, and the  
lack of landownership and skewed distribution of resources have resulted in higher 
poverty in rural areas.183 Those who own the land are feudal and wealthy politicians, 
who mostly enjoy the exemption of direct taxes on agricultural land or income, because 
landowners argue that they are already paying implicit taxes through concessions to
182 Ahmed, "An Economic Crisis State," 176.
183 "Human Development in South Asia 2006 ", in Poverty in South Asia: Challenges and Response 
(Muhbub ul Haq Human Development Center, 2007), 121-22.
281
support the government's price system.184 The dilemma of Pakistan's political economic 
system is that individuals gain wealth, but collectively the state lacks the resources, 
eventually widening the rich and poor gap.
A historical overview of Pakistan's political economic performance and economic 
outlook in terms of growth or stagnation can be divided into four to five phases. These 
phases also show particular distinctions because of democratic and undemocratic 
periods of rule. M atthew  McCartney's work, focusing between 1951 and 2009, 
categorized the growth of the economy into five episodes: 1) episodes of growth  
1951/52 -  1958/59 (civil-bureaucratic rule) 2) episodes of growth 1960/61  -  1970 /71  
(military rule) 3) episodes of stagnation, 1970/71  -  1991 /92  (military rule) 4) episodes of 
stagnation 1992/ 93 -  2002/03 (democratic rule) 5) episode of growth 2 0 0 3 / 04 -  
2008/09 (military rule).185 Additionally, the post 2009 phase of democratic rule is 
considered a period of stagnation in terms of economic growth.
Along the general trends based on the growth or stagnation of Pakistan's 
economy, each historical phase of political economic performance is unique. Each of 
these unique trends can be characterized as: the fla t fifties, 1947 to 1958; the golden 
sixties (Gen. Ayub Khan's period), 1958 to 1969; the socialist seventies (P.M. Z.A.
Bhutto), 1971 to 1977; the revivalist eighties (Gen. Zia ul Haq), 1977 to 1988; the 
muddling nineties (civilian rule of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's era), 1988 to 1999;
184 Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 38.
185 M atthew McCartney, Pakistan-the Political Economy o f Growth, Stagnation and the State, 1951-2009, 
1st ed. (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2011), 6-10.
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and the reforming hundreds (Gen. Musharraf), 1999 to 2007 .186 It is noteworthy that
each phase of governance set different economic trends, which was either completely
changed by the following regime, or faced challenges due to earlier policies. Ayub's
period is recognized in many ways as a golden period, though his policies benefited the
ruling elites -  known as the tw enty-tw o ruling families. Soon after military rule ended,
Bhutto nationalized the system that drastically affected future economic trends. This
setback due to the nationalization process took years to rebuild Pakistan's economy.187
Instead of improving economic trends, Pakistan's volatile and unpredictable
domestic political scenario has severely affected the economy. Ishrat Hussain explains
the correlation between the domestic political conditions and Pakistan's economic
performance, as he writes:
"Pakistan, transitions from one political regime to another have been quite 
difficult, causing uncertainty and short-term reductions in the speed of economic 
growth. The transfer of power from the military to civilian regimes in 1971 ,1988  
and 2008 were marked with macroeconomic instability, a slow down in 
economic activities, rising unemployment and inflation and the adoption of a 
wait-and-see attitude by investors. But economic recovery has also been 
resilient; short-term losses caused by political volatility have not been large 
enough to offset the positive long-term secular economic m ovem ent."188
At the end of the day, Pakistan's journey as a nation-state thus far has been
marked by poor governance and bad economic output, which further poses challenges
to the larger economic sphere, i.e. "macroeconomic instability, high inflation, poor
public services, criminal neglect of the social sectors, widespread corruption, crippling
186 Ishrat Hussain, "The Role of Politics in Pakistan's Economy "Journal o f  International Affairs 63, no. 1 
(Fall/W inter 2009): 2.
187 Ahmed, "An Economic Crisis State," 172.
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power outages, growing unemployment, deepening poverty and a deteriorating debt 
profile."189 Moreover, the current economic challenges emanate and are interlinked 
with problems of terrorism, illegal trade, drug trafficking, IDPs and Afghan refugees, and 
many unheeded social problems that have deteriorated the security situation, deterring 
local and foreign investors.
Pakistan's fight against terrorism since 2001 to FY 2012-13 has cost it $98  
billion.190 However, on diplomatic and economic terms, the early years of the w ar on 
terror were favorable to Pakistan as it was under the shadow of economic sanctions, 
and its foreign reserves were around $1 billion.191 Pakistan's decision to support the  
U.S.-led W ar on terror helped increase its foreign reserves to  $ 4 billion with the flow of 
foreign capital under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) and strong remittances.192 Up 
until now, Pakistan's economy has highly relied on CSF and foreign remittances. The 
recent date shows that during the first half of FY 2014, Pakistan received a higher 
amount of foreign remittances in the amount of $7.9 billion, 9.4 percent higher than the  
previous year.193 Overall, since 2002, Pakistan has received an average of $825 million 
from the United States for economic assistance, and during the last 4 years, Pakistani 
expatriates have sent nearly $ 1 billion every month in remittances.194
W ith a full-scale military engagement in the tribal areas and other insurgency-hit 
areas, Pakistan's economy has been severely affected with imbalances between
189 Ahmed, "An Economic Crisis State," 169.
190 "Undue Pressure?: W ar on Terror Chapter Chucked out at Eleventh Hour," The Express Tribune June 
12, 2013.
191 "An Economic Crisis State," 177.
192 "An Economic Crisis State," 178.
193 "Remittances up 9.4% in First Half of Fyl4," The Express Tribune Jan 11, 2014.
194 Murtaza Haider, "Can Pakistan Survive w ithout Us Aid?," Dawn Feb 15, 2012, para. 8.
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revenues and its expenditures. In addition, the financial crisis of 2007-08 and increasing 
oil prices dealt a blow to Pakistan's economy. To survive in the face of economic 
difficulties, Pakistan convened a conference called Friends of Democratic Pakistan 
(FDOP), which was launched on September 26, 2008. FDOP includes Australia, Canada, 
China, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, the Republic 
of Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the UAE, UK, USA, and the  
Asian Development Bank. This conference's aim was to gain some economic support 
through donor countries and to promote a greater demand for Pakistani goods in the  
international market. The economic burden further increased when floods in Pakistan 
hit more than 14 million people in 2010. It destroyed infrastructure that forced internal 
displacement, destroyed cash.crops, livestock, and above all, led to the loss of a great 
number of human lives. The World Bank promised a $ 900 million loan for recovery from  
this natural calamity. In February 2012, the WTO also approved a pending bill that 
would give Pakistan a two-year waiver on 75 Pakistani products in the European market. 
The allowed items, mainly textiles, would amount to  900 million euros in im port value 
and accounts for 27 % of EU imports from Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan had already 
suffered the effects of a traumatic and massive earthquake to its northern regions, 
particularly Kashmir, in 2005. The effects of the 2010 flood, however, were far harsher 
than the earthquake on the Pakistani economy.
Pakistan's history reflects that regional geopolitical odds have tem porarily  
benefited Pakistan, but in the long run Pakistani society has to bear the burden 
entrusted upon them due to mismanagement and the wrong policies of its political-
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oligarchy. Example of regional odds includes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
which caused the exodus of millions of Afghans into Pakistan affecting Pakistan's socio­
economic and political dynamics. Today, there are officially more than 1 million, while  
unofficially 3 million Afghans integrated into Pakistani society. The new Afghan 
generation born in Pakistan has developed deeper roots in Pakistan. Until now Pakistan 
has reported that it has spent $200 billion on Afghan refugees since 1979.195 On the 
request of international agencies, Pakistan has extended the stay of officially registered 
Afghans until 2015. The added foreign demographic is upsetting the domestic system, 
ultimately affecting economic trends, and burdening the entire society.
Pakistan is facing tremendous challenges from its own demographic issues due 
to rising poverty and an increasing labor force. The fragile economic conditions make it 
difficult to accommodate the labor force, which keeps a high number of youths 
unemployed. By the year 2012-13, more than 3.5 million people are estimated to be 
unemployed.196 According to the International M onetary Fund (IMF), w ith a lower GDP 
growth rate in 2014, Pakistan's unemployment rate will continue to grow in the coming 
years. The unemployment rate in 2013 was 6.7 percent, and it is forecasted to be 6.9 
and 7.2 in 2014 and 2015 respectively.197 Past governments initiated a number of 
poverty reduction programs through economic activities, i.e. the Social Action 
Programme (SAP) in the 1990s which failed due to weak governance problems; the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in the 2000s adopted through social
195 "Burdened Economy: Pakistan Has Spent $200b on Afghan Refugees," The Express Tribune October 26,
2013.
196 Zubair Choudhry, "Analysis: Why Pro-Poor Strategies Have Failed," ibid. Oct 20, 2013.
197 "World Economic Outlook: Recovery Strengthens, Remains Uneven," (Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund, April 2014), 67.
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mobilization under the Rural Support Program Network (PRSN); and BISP in late 2000s 
(discussed earlier in the previous section).198 W ithout investment in human capital to 
prepare skilled labor, economic sustainability, and a reduction in poverty, the large 
population will continue to suffer.
Why should the Pakistani government worry about rampant unemployment?
The answer is that a high ratio of Pakistan's population is young, and gradually a greater 
number of youths are joining the ranks of the unemployed. Out of Pakistan's 
approximately 180 million people, 59 percent means 101.95 million people are below  
the age of 24. The number becomes approximately 116 million people, if one includes 
the age group below age 29.199 To delve into past terrorist and criminal activities during 
the last 10 years in Pakistan, most of the perpetrators are below the age of 30 .200 By and 
large, Third World countries have a higher percent of youth population. 60 percent of 
Egypt's population, like Pakistan's, is under the age of 30, while 74 percent o f Yemen's 
population is likewise below age 30; both countries are facing massive political 
unrest.201 Economic demands, especially unemployment, are propelling frustrated  
youths in Third World countries to come out into the streets and protest, or in many 
cases engage in illegal trade, drug trafficking, and terrorism. As an example, Karachi, 
Pakistan's economic hub, contributes more than 42 percent of Pakistan's GDP. For the  
last couple of years, Karachi has been plagued with ethnic, religious, and political 
violence and sectarian crises. GEO News, a private TV network, unearthed the realities
198 "Human Development in South Asia 2006 ", 122-25.
199 Yusuf, "A Society on the Precipice? Examining the Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan," 77.
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201 Patrick Kingsley, "Does a Growing Global Youth Population Fuel Political Unrest?," The Guardian March 
19, 2014.
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of black market and illegal economic activities in Karachi. According to the GEO News 
documentary, it cost the people of Karachi around $ 8.5 million per day for extortion, 
kidnap ransoms, loot, plunder and street crime.202 A more fearful scenario is predicted, 
when Mr. Altaf Hussain, the head of Karachi's largest political party M uttahida Quami 
Movem ent (M Q M ), categorically mentioned that the flow of terrorists in Karachi is 
going to make Karachi a global center for terrorism. Recently, Karachi and major cities in 
Pakistan have become a source of economic activities for terrorists. Karachi particularly 
faces a power struggle between radical groups that seek to dominate the city.
Frustrated and unemployed youth are easily entrapped for criminal activities in such 
instances.
The new government of P.M. Sharif has taken some initiatives to tackle 
economic problems. To address unemployment, P.M. Sharif has initiated the Youth 
Business Loan Scheme with the allocation of Rs. 3.7 billion; the scheme will provide
100.000 youth loans every year. The industrial sector has not been efficient lately, losing 
productivity due to a shortage of energy supplies. Currently Pakistan is dealing with a
7.000 M W  shortfall despite the fact that it contains the world's third largest coal 
reserves and utilizes less than 1 percent towards energy generation. On the other hand, 
the acute problem with power supply is the electricity theft and line losses. In March 
2013 then State Minister for W ater and Power, Tasnim Qureshi, informed the senate 
that over the last five years Pakistan had lost Rs. 59 billion (US $ 590 million) and Rs. 90
202 "'Kala Budget' Deprives Karachiites of Rs. 830 Million Daily," The News September 4, 2013.
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billion (US $ 900 million) respectively on account of theft and line losses.203 Lacking 
proper management and mechanisms to control huge losses is further corrupting the  
system. In order to meet the demands of energy shortfalls, like the previous PPP 
government (2008-13), the current government of PML (N) has shown a willingness to  
temporarily rely on rental power plants (RPP). In the  past, however, such RPP projects 
were highly plagued by nationwide scandals with the involvement of political authorities 
in corruption and kickbacks during the RPP deals tha t resulted in not meeting the target.
Finally, it is obvious that Pakistan has paid a high cost for fighting the w ar against 
terrorism; the direct and indirect costs have deterred investors. Exclusively, Pakistan has 
relied on foreign capital to pay its bills and debts. Reliance on foreign aid pampered the 
political elites, who artificially fix the economic crises, but in a longer period the real 
problem resurfaces. Pakistani policy makers could not succeed in harnessing the 
resources and opportunities for economic development. The first step to begin is to 
neutralize the militancy and insurgency in the country; doing so will boost the  
confidence of local and foreign investors. Higher economic investment leads to higher 
economic activity and benefits a larger portion of the population.
203 "Pakistan Lost Rs90 Billion in Electricity Theft, Line Losses," The News 2013.
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GEOPOLITICAL FULCRUM OF CENTRAL, EAST, WEST, AND SOUTH ASIA
Pakistan's geographic location is unique for economic, geopolitical, and geo­
strategic reasons; it is a convergence point and provides a gateway to Central Asia, East 
Asia, West Asia, and South Asia. This convergence point is one of the fundamental 
factors that make Pakistan a pivot state. The geographic features qualify Pakistan as 
high value for possessing natural resources, like its coal deposits at Thar, Sindh; copper- 
gold deposits in Chagai, Baluchistan; iron ore deposits in Deddar, Baluchistan, natural 
gas in Baluchistan, etc. Geopolitically, Pakistan is the most suitable economic corridor 
for trade and transit activities connecting the sub-regions of Asia with the rest of the 
world. As the geostrategic role of Pakistan remained important throughout the Cold 
W ar and in the post-Cold W ar so has its geographic position.
Pakistan is a neighbor to the im portant rising economies of India and China, 
which are experiencing an unprecedented increase in the domestic demand for energy 
consumption and the need for a more stable region, so that a smooth economic rise can 
be achieved and sustained in the long run. As discussed in Myanmar's chapter, China 
and India's energy thirst is leading them  to seek new fields and routes for energy 
pipelines. In regional context, India basically depends on oil and coal-based fuel 
supplies; almost 50 percent of India's power generation comes from coal-based fuel, 32 
percent from oil, and the rest of its energy production from natural gas, hydro, and 
nuclear programs. In 2006, India's total domestic demand for natural gas was 43 billion 
cubic meters and it soared to 110 billion cubic meters by 2010. India has been keen to  
materialize two important gas pipeline projects, which are designed to pass through
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Pakistan. These are the Iran-Pakistan-lndia gas pipeline (IPI) and Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI). The violence in Afghanistan and insurgencies in
Baluchistan and KPK provinces of Pakistan has stalled these projects.204
China's economic interest is very much linked to the geopolitical importance and
stability of Pakistan. Beijing and Islamabad have been in close friendly relations since the
1960s, and as a gesture of friendship, the mega project in the  1970s was the
construction of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) passing through Gilgit-Baltistan (GB),
which connects the tw o countries. China has always adm itted the diplomatic affinity
between Beijing and Islamabad. To explain the friendly relation between Beijing and
Islamabad, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Luo Zhaohui, in 2009, said:
"Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize New China. Ever since our 
diplomatic relations began in May 1951, we have enjoyed mutual understanding, 
respect, trust, and support and our friendship and cooperation have flourished. 
W e are truly good neighbors, close friends, trusted partners, and dear brothers. 
When China was in difficulty caused by the Western blockades in the 1950s and 
60s, it was Pakistan which opened an air corridor linking China with the outside 
world. In the 1970s it was Pakistan, which served as a bridge for the  
normalization of China-U.S. relations."205
The expanding Chinese interests in Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and 
Africa will keep China highly dependent on Pakistan. Both Beijing and Islamabad have 
reaffirmed their friendly relations calling it "higher than the Mountains and Deeper than 
the Oceans."206 Pakistan already handed over the most strategically located deep-sea 
port of Gwadar in Baluchistan to Chinese authority, who are looking after operational
204 Patrick, Weak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 182.
205 quoted in Mohan Guruswamy, "The China Factor," in The Future o f Pakistan, ed. Stephen P. Cohen 
(Wahington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2011), 123.
206 Ibid.
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matters. Gwadar, which is close to the Straits of Hormuz, is expected to be a game 
changer in terms of trade and transit in years to come that potentially will link China and 
landlocked Central Asia to the rest of the w orld.207
Similarly, the U.S. strategy proposed under form er U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton of undertaking the "New Silk Road Initiative," connecting Afghanistan and 
Central Asia with the global market to ease the sources of unrest and economic 
challenges, has a great potential link to the port of Gwadar.208 The objective of the U.S. 
strategy for connecting Afghanistan and landlocked Central Asia is due to a "missing link 
for the Modern Silk Road (MSR-1), a unified Eurasian continental trade and transport 
system that would enhance the prosperity and security for all involved."209
Apparently the individual agenda points of both the U.S. and China on Silk Road 
projects are plans to establish the sources of communications for the isolated and 
landlocked states in the region. But, at the same tim e, the U.S. policy of rebalancing 
towards Asia, and China's M aritim e Silk Route (MSR-2), potentially projects a competing 
feature in the Asian continent. China's MSR-2 provides a window of opportunity to 
"improve China's geo-strategic position in the world", but is linked with domestic 
stability in the region and its relations with other contending powers in the region210 
This is not to forget that in the Central and South Asian context Afghanistan is 
historically considered a buffer state between powers, and its recent extension to some
207 Christopher Ernest Barber, "The Pakistan-China Corridor," The Diplomat February 27, 2014.
208 Joshua Kucera, "The New Silk Road?," ibid. November 11, 2011.
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parts of Pakistan also shows symptoms of buffering to a m ajor power, though within the 
region all of the member states are balanced against each other. Therefore, any future  
clash of interest in the region will sooner or later become a direct or indirect foothold  
for a power clash.
With reference to Afghanistan as a historical buffer zone, and in the wake of the  
withdrawal of International Forces from Afghanistan in 2014, Anatol Lieven emphasized 
that "long after Western Forces have left Afghanistan, Pakistan's survival will remain a 
vital Western and Chinese interest. This should encourage cooperation between Beijing 
and Washington to ensure Pakistan's survival. By contrast, a Sino-US struggle for control 
over Pakistan should be avoided at all costs, as this would add enormously to  Pakistan's 
destabilization."211
Presumably, China will gradually connect "the string of pearls" around the Indian 
Ocean, creating a sense of fear and insecurity for India. Despite China's assurances, India 
is engaged in its own counter balancing of China in the region.212 Fearing China's 
growing maritime power through Gwadar, India is funding the Zaranj-Delaram highway 
connecting Afghanistan, Central Asian republics, and Iran's Chabahar port, so the  
highway and port can help reducing dependency on Pakistan.213 Yet India's investment 
will grant it leverage on the countries it is investing in "developing a competing port at
211 Lieven, Pakistan : A Hard Country, 477.
212 Holmes, "Gwadar and the "String of Pearls"," The Diplomat February 9, 2013.
213 Kaplan, The Revenge o f Geography: W hat the M ap Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle 
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Chabahar... is not as well situated as Gwadar for the continental trade" and transit in 
fu ture.214
Chinese to Pakistani geographic assets suddenly become easier to get hold as a 
result of Pakistan's deteriorating diplomatic relations with the  U.S. significantly over the 
hunt of Osama bin Laden and the Salala incident on the Afghan border. Pakistan's 
growing perception of the U.S. is closer to its traditional rival India, which further 
motivates Pakistan to strengthen its strategic relations w ith China.215 In this regard, a 
recent agreement between P.M. Sharif's government and Beijing will start a mega 
railway project connecting Gwadar to China's easternmost province of Xinjiang, proving 
the fast growing interdependency between both countries.216 China's interest of 
economic expansionism and Pakistan's response to create a corridor through its 
territory seeks to overcome Pakistan's prolonged economic vulnerabilities and shows 
the intensity of mutual-and-asymmetrical interdependency. Beijing has pledged to 
invest $50 billion in various projects in Pakistan.217 Most of these projects are building 
and upgrading highways, infrastructure development, fiber-optic cabling, and in the 
energy (mainly hydro and nuclear) sector.
Pakistan has also adopted the slogan and insists on reviving the Silk Road for 
trade and transit activities. While speaking to Asian leaders during the annual Boao 
Forum for Asia 2014 at South China's Hainan province, P.M . Sharif emphasized the  
revival of New Silk Road. Mr. Sharif noted that the steps taken between Beijing and
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Islamabad to establish the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor is actually the southern 
extension of the New Silk Road.218 He further stated that "[Pakistan's] geography links 
China and the New Silk Road to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the Persian 
Gulf. This is the linear dimension of our relevance w ith the Silk Road", and "Pakistan is at 
the confluence of China, the Eurasian land-bridge and the Middle East which enables it 
to be the route to a three-pronged economic corridor between China, Central Asia and 
the Middle East."219
The truth in economic benefits and leverages through the creation of the  
economic corridor is crucial for Pakistan, and the potential benefits are viable too. 
However, these economic opportunities are highly linked w ith resolving domestic 
security and political issues on the one hand, while addressing regional geopolitical 
dynamics on the other, requiring subtle approaches to avoid any impediments to the  
dream projects. On a domestic scale, the security related issues have already been 
discussed in earlier sections. However, tw o important instances are significant for 
Pakistan to address the future viability of creating an economic corridor. First, since 
1947, GB (a 72,971 sq. km or 28,174 sq. mile gateway or border zone of South Asia, East 
Asia and Central Asia located on extreme northern parts o f Pakistan) is a constitutionally 
deprived region of the country with no rights to participate in national elections or have 
representation in parliament and senate, while GB allows the KKH to pass through its 
territory. The fate of GB is linked to the Kashmir dispute. If Pakistani lawmakers
218 "'Instrument of Prosperity': Pm Calls for Unlocking Silk Road Potential," The Express Tribune April 11,
2014.
219 Ibid.
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continue to ignore addressing the issues of political deprivation of this region, then it 
will gradually evolve into a power vacuum and threaten Pakistan's greater interest in 
the region and beyond. After all, India claims GB as an integral part of greater Jammu 
and Kashmir. India's bid to get GB means cutting off China from Pakistan and gaining 
direct access to Central Asia's oil fields and markets. However, the situation on the 
ground is not in India's favor, as locals are highly integrated into the Pakistani system 
and structure, but political grievances and deprivation are basic sources for political 
movements.
The second domestic instance is the political settlem ent of grievances of ethnic 
Baluchs, who are seeking greater autonomy over the resources they possess (ethno- 
nationalist unrest is discussed in early sections). 80 percent of Pakistan's natural 
resources are located in Baluchistan, and more importantly the port of Gwadar exists in 
Baluchistan as well. A dominating perception among Baluch ethnic groups is that 
national policy is facilitating the non-local immigrant work force from other parts of the 
country, especially from Punjab. This changes the demographic ratio on the ground, and 
in fear of losing in the population ratio, a number of nationalist rebel groups are 
targeting non-local works and settlers. Therefore, focusing on political grievances of 
both GB and Baluchistan needs to be a priority because for an economic corridor to exist 
and be successful, both GB and Baluchistan will play simultaneously the role of entrance 
and exit for trade and transit activities in the region.
Another coming geopolitical anarchy between Pakistan and its neighbors will be 
its disputes over water, which is severe and given less attention. To elaborate, the issue
of Kashmir primarily has been argued around the notion of "integral part" claims on 
both sides in India and Pakistan. For decades, the political solution to Kashmir has 
remained unresolved. Similarly, to counter Pakistan's claim over Kashmir, India 
supported Afghanistan's claim over the Durand line issue, which eventually made them  
natural allies. Interestingly, to counter India, in 1963 Pakistan gave up its claim to over 
2,050 sq. miles of border area to China and agreed to accept china's offer to w ithdraw  
for only 750 sq. mile of land, helping Pakistan and China to  become allies and balancing 
India in the region. The issue of Kashmir will become serious not for demographic 
affinity or claims, but rather both Delhi and Islamabad now weigh the importance of 
Kashmir on the value of w ater resources. As a m atter of fact, Pakistan is a lower 
riparian, as Pakistan's four main rivers in Punjab other than the Indus river originate in 
Indian administered Indus Basin.
The rapidly growing population, agricultural, and energy demands have speed up 
the construction of mega dams on both sides. Pakistan has shown serious concern over 
construction of dams on Pakistan's allocated w ater resources, which may cause 
shortfalls to its agricultural sector and possible flooding during monsoon season. 
Similarly, on the Western front of the country, Pakistan is an upper riparian for 
Afghanistan's Kunar River, which eventually merges into the Kabul River, and re-enters 
Pakistan, making Kabul an upper riparian. Kabul has shown its concern to Pakistan for a 
number of dam projects that may affect its w ater resources, though there is no w ater 
treaty signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan, whereas in the case of India, both 
countries already signed an Indus w ater treaty under the auspices of the W orld Bank in
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the 1960. Despite the treaty and growing India's domestic demand, India has already 
started construction of number of dams. Pakistan has shown its worrisome and reached 
Permanent Court of Arbitration over India's construction of Baglihar dam and 
Kishanganga hydroelectric plant on River Chenab and the Jhelum River. Under Indus 
W ater Treaty three Western rivers of Indus system namely the Indus River, the Jhelum  
River and the Chenab rivers were exclusively allotted to Pakistan, while the three  
Eastern Rivers of Indus system, the Sutlej, the Beas, and the  Ravi w ere exclusively 
entitled for India. There is a high chance that if all parties do not pay attention to the  
water factor, and fail to conclude some terms, then the entire  region can be engulfed in 
high scale conflict over this resource.
The complex regional geopolitical dynamics of South Asia have evolved through 
weak links that have badly affected the political developm ent of the entire region. 
Mainly, the geopolitics of South Asia has been centered on the geographical disputes 
within the "Pakistan-China-lndia triangle."220 The politics o f triangular relations are quite 
common in the case of South Asia in its extension to  relationships with neighboring 
countries in the Middle East and East Asia, e.g. during the Cold W ar triangular relations 
between "China-Pakistan-U.S. vs USSR-Afghanistan-lndia" remained focal points.221 
Stepping out of triangular premises, on a greater scale Afghanistan and Pakistan have 
become the nexus points between two "shatterbelts [of the world], the South East Asia
220 Brzezinski, Strategic Vision : America and the Crisis o f Global Power, 162.
221 Graham Chapman, The Geopolitics o f South Asia from  Early Empires to the Nuclear Age (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2003), 279.
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and the Middle East."222 On some occasions, the South Asian region is also considered to 
be a shatterbelt, but more often it plays the role of fulcrum between tw o crush zones. In 
reality, South Asia "is internally fragmented, wracked by internal rebellions and tension 
between states," with a moderate scale foreign involvement existing to qualify it as a 
shatterbelt.223lndia's resistance, however, to allowing any foreign interference is the 
core factor that excludes the South Asian region from being considered a shatterbelt.224
Exclusion from being considered a shatterbelt does not imply that South Asia is 
not a violent region. Pakistan has lost more than 50,000 people just in the last decade; 
India has lost more than 22,000 soldiers over the course of a number of border 
skirmishes and domestic security challenges. Today Maoist rebels are considered the 
most high profile threat to India's security than any other entity. Bangladesh is in 
trouble with restoring relations with India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka experienced a bloody 
insurgency, Nepal is trying to shift its traditional pro-Indian policy to balance with 
Chinese ties, and Afghanistan continues to suffer as a failed state due to more than 
three decades of war. While the world has entered into the  twenty-first century with 
new aims and ambitions, most Third W orld countries have yet to cross this threshold, 
carrying unresolved disputes of the past that hamper political development.
According to the latest report published by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), during 2009-2013 the world's top three arms importers were 
India, China, and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have their arms imports increased by 111
222 The Geopolitics o f South Asia from  Early Empires to the Nuclear Age (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 
256.
223 Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography o f International Relations, 329.
224 Ibid.
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percent and 119 percent as compared to imports during 2004-2008.225 According to  the 
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), although Pakistan has already 
surpassed India in keeping a higher number of nuclear weapons due to fear of India's 
conventional strength over its own, lately Pakistan has been engaged in developing 
short-range tactical nuclear weapons. Theoretically speaking, Pakistani strategists 
believe this development creates a deterrent against any conventional w ar or is capable 
of inflicting heavy losses in case of an attack.226 W ith a highly a fractured region and low 
level of mutual trust, the potential for war between India and Pakistan, and of any 
nuclear war between the two would, according to the Nobel Peace Prize-winning 
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear W ar and Physicians for Social 
Responsibility, cause the deaths of 2 billion people, ending civilization, and causing 
famine in the entire region.227
Despite Pakistani political elite's choice of the United States as a security 
guarantor soon after its independence and the recipient of economic and military aid 
since 1951, Pakistan could not strengthen its democratic institutions. According to data 
compiled by the Center for Global Development, from 1951 to 2011, the United States 
provided $67 billion in aid to Pakistan. Although the flow of aid fluctuates, it remained 
higher in times of U.S. geopolitical interest in the region. Throughout this entire period, 
Pakistan has relied on external support, especially against India, and "most o f Pakistanis 
believe that Americans are not aware of India's longstanding hegemonic goals and the
225 wezem an and Wezeman, "Trends in International Arms Transfer 2013," 6.
226 Reuters, "Pakistan's "Battlefield" Nukes Risk Nuclear War: I.I.S.S. Think Tank," The Express Tribune 
September 13, 2013.
227 "Indo-Pak Nuclear W ar to 'End Civilisation' with Famine: Study," Dawn  December 11, 2013.
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dangers to Pakistani and U.S. interests that they entail."228 In recent years, the United 
States has increased its diplomatic and economic ties with India and other Asian 
countries, in reference to a general belief about the twenty-first Century as an Asian 
Century. Pakistani strategists worry about U.S. inclinations towards India and approving 
a civil nuclear deal with India. Pakistan is seeking a similar deal on the transfer of 
nuclear technology for peaceful usage. Pakistan noticed that U.S. apprehensions about 
nuclearization were not focused on disarmament, but nuclear terrorism.229 Keeping in 
mind security concerns and issues of nuclear terrorism, Pakistan under a new  
government presented once more its case to acquire a nuclear deal for peaceful usage 
at the third National Security Summit (NSS) in the Hague in March 2014. The Pakistani 
premier assured attendees about the security of its program under five pillars: "a) a 
strong command and control system led by the National Command Authority; b) an 
integrated intelligence system; c) a rigorous regulatory regime; and d) a comprehensive 
export control regime; and active international cooperation."230 Overall, Pakistan 
received positive appreciation for its nuclear arsenal's safety measures, but U.S. 
lawmakers shifted the focus of institutional building and aid support towards education, 
health, and civil-society in Pakistan. In fact, the Kerry-Lugar bill pledged $7.5 billion split 
over 5 years in a program supporting socio-economic domains and other possible 
avenues to support energy issues instead of agreeing to a civil-nuclear program.
228 Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States : Riding 
the Roller Coaster (Washington, DC: United States institute of Peace, 2011), 17.
229 Shamshad Ahmad, "A 'Cloaked' Nuclear Security Process," The Express Tribune March 28, 2014.
230 "Hague Summit: Nawaz Makes Case for Civil Nuclear Energy," ibid. March 25, 2014.
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American lawmakers are cautious about transferring nuclear technology, 
especially in the case of an unstable situation where nuclear technology can be leaked 
to any rogue forces, which could be highly detrimental to regional and global peace. 
Recently, there was controversy when media reports surfaced regarding Saudi Arabia's 
likely demand for Pakistani nukes if Iran goes nuclear.231 Pakistan denied such 
revelations. However, another controversy is still unfolding about Saudis seeking 
Pakistani arms (mainly anti-aircraft and anti-tank rockets) and human resources to  
support Islamists and rebels against Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria.232 Pakistani 
officials have denied any weapons to be sent to rebels, but agreed that it has been 
selling weapons to different countries including in M iddle East way before Syrian civil 
w ar started. The Saudis have pondered their discomfort over the U.S.'s reconciliation 
policy with Iran and Syria due to their ideological differences and decided to reach out 
to other possible options and actors to carry on its own policy against the Assad regime 
and indirectly against Iran.
In early 2014, frequent visits by high officials from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have 
already grabbed attention in Pakistan. To great surprise, Pakistan's Finance M inister 
announced that Saudi Arabia has donated $1.5 billion and another $ 1.5 billion will be 
gifted at a later stage.233 Analysts and opposition leaders are doubtful about Pakistan's 
Middle East policy, and a number of predictions suggest that the $1.5 billion gift is 
payment for arms against Assad and other demands. The Nawaz government has denied
231 "Saudi Nuclear Weapons ’on Order1 from Pakistan," BBC November 6, 2013.
232 "Saudis 'Seek Pakistani Arms for Syrian Rebels'," Dawn February 24, 2014.
233 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Middle East Puzzle," The Express Tribune March 24, 2014.
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these speculations and assured that Pakistan maintains balanced relations with all 
Middle Eastern states. However, if Pakistan becomes a "partisan in intra-Arab conflicts," 
then all hostile neighbors, including Iran, Afghanistan and India, will pose multiple scale 
security challenges to Pakistan.234 As a result, it will be the beginning of another wave of 
extra-regional geopolitical proxy conflict based on ethnic and sectarian violence 
affecting the entire society.
Despite the row over a number of security issues, both Washington and 
Islamabad know the value of each side. Pakistan still depends on military and economic 
aid from the U.S. to complete other mega projects and certainly needs investments 
from the World Bank and IMF. W ithout U.S. support it will be hard to obtain loans and 
aid. Reciprocally, the U.S. understands the importance of Pakistan in the region, 
especially when the U.S. is preparing to conclude its offensive mission in Afghanistan, 
which is considered to be one of the largest mobilizations of war machinery since the  
Second World W ar. In that sense, Western Allies are anticipating Pakistani support in 
the withdrawal and commitment for restoring peace in the region once international 
troops have departed. Therefore, Pakistan needs to  deal w ith its security issues and 
stabilize its domestic challenges so it can help to respond effectively to geopolitical and 
geo-strategic challenges.
234 "Pakistan’s Policy Tilt in the Middle East," The Express Tribune February 23, 2014.
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CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
Over the past 67 years, Pakistan has been ruled under a political oligarchy 
through dynastic family, civil bureaucracy, and military rule. The political oligarchy 
adopted the colonial structures of power and retained power for a long span of tim e. 
Most importantly, Pakistani political elites have utilized their geographic status as a 
frontline state over and over again, and the benefits remain distributed among the  
members of the oligarchy.235 The military enjoys authority as a guardian of the entire 
nation and system, but seems hesitant to relinquish this role. In the same way the  
inherited British colonial "steel frame," i.e. the bureaucracy, "still carry the burden of 
maintaining a colonial bureaucracy that is crippling the nation down to its core, [so 
there is a need to] decolonise [Pakistani] bureaucracy from the colonial mindset, and 
make it performance based and accountable."236 Ironically, the dynastic family, feudal 
structure, and political elites or rulers remaining in "power have always been obsessed 
by self-interest rather than national interest," and the rest of nation is being fooled with 
the notion that waiting for God's miracle will bring justice and fix the system.237 
Pakistani society is politically tamed into a subjective-parochial political culture and has 
impacted the overall social cohesion of the state.
W eak socio-political cohesion has gradually hollowed out Pakistan's political 
culture's foundations. Mainly, political elites have allowed subjective parochial political 
system functions through centralized and controlled political systems, while the overall
235 Grare, "Rethinking Western Strategies toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and 
Europe," 43.
236 Hussain Nadim, "Decolonising Our Civil Services," The Express Tribune April 4, 2014.
237 Christina Lamb, Waiting fo r Allah : Pakistan's Struggle fo r  Democracy (New Delhi; New York: Viking, 
1991), 295.
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system lacks the social cohesion in society.238 The resulting higher level of corruption 
provides room for dictators to intervene and stay in power for a longer period, which 
keeps the institutions weak, and repatrimonialization in the system. Times have 
changed; the population nowadays is becoming more informed and "the resilience o f a 
population is frustrated with corruption and civil disorder, and determined to  do 
something about it," so a viable political order needs to be established.239 Otherwise, if 
the state is not cured, then as usual one will see the vicious circle repeating: the 
"political condition of weak states often propel the military into government as the only 
organization possessing the power and/  or the national legitimacy to hold the state 
together," and democratic institutions will gradually face a political decay.240
Pakistan has been temporarily benefiting from all o f these odd events by taking 
advantage of its status as a frontline state, but these benefits did not last long enough. 
The consequences of becoming a frontline state, particularly with the use of religious 
ideologies, have backfired for Pakistan. Pakistani lawmakers now understand the limits 
of religious ideology as it failed to preserve unity in 1971.241 The viability of Pakistan's 
stability demands policies that respect and protect diversity and the opinions of others. 
By doing so, Pakistan can be in a position to overcome the issues of a weak and feeble  
civil society.
238 Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda fo r  International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W ar Era, 
66 .
239 Tonya Langford, "Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the Politics o f Intervention," International Studies 
Review 1, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 63.
240 Buzan, People, States, and F ear: An Agenda fo r  International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W ar Era, 
98.
241 Schofield, "Diversionary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and the Sources of the  Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation," 
46.
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Pakistan is entangled with multiple challenges emanating from security, political, 
economic, and social realms. But Pakistani society is so resilient that it has the capacity 
to  emerge again as a stable and responsible state. Seth Kaplan writes that although 
Pakistan is facing conditions of state fragility, "dealing with Pakistan is not a hopeless 
option. Pakistan has a significance experience with competitive elections, a court system 
and legal profession that prize their independence, a reasonably free and critical media, 
and a strong opposition."242 The capacity and capability of a stable Pakistan depends on 
a political order that respects the rule of law, treats every member of the state on equal 
terms, finds a balance between its defense and non-defense spending, and restores 
friendly ties with neighbors, the path towards stability and prosperity. W ith a successful 
leap, both the citizens of Pakistan and the global community will respect the positive 
image, credibility, and legitimacy of Pakistan.
242 Kaplan, Fixing Fragile States : A New Paradigm fo r Development, 159.
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Around the world today, we still see children suffering from hunger and disease. 
W e still see run-down schools. W e still see young people without prospects for the  
future. Around the world today, men and wom en are still imprisoned for their political 
beliefs, and are still persecuted for what they look like, and how they worship, and who  
they love.
President, Barack Obam a1
Democracy is the Best Revenge.
Benazir Bhutto2
W e cannot make the world safe for democracy w ithout first making the world 
safe for diversity.
The Aga Khan3
INTRODUCTION
W hy study fragile or weak pivot states? Does the study of fragility m atter in a 
highly interdependent world when extra-territoriality or deterritoriality enable 
individuals, groups, firms, and organizations to carry overlapping loyalties beyond the  
state of origin? First of all, the notion of state fragility resonates with the global fear 
about transnational effects on global peace and stability. Cracks in the state system 
permeate with a higher frequency of insecurity. Now, these cracks are emanating from  
state fragility, referring to those states with poor performance in terms of an
1 Remarks by President Obama at Memorial Service fo r Former South African President Nelson Mandela, 
December 10, 2013.
2 Declan Walsh, "My Mother Said Democracy Is Best Revenge - Bhutto Son," Guardian December 30th, 
2007.
3 The Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, quotes the Aga Khan, while welcoming His Highness the 
Aga Khan at Canada's Parliament, February 27, 2014.
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inefficiency to provide political goods to citizens, unsatisfactory economic output, 
domestic instability, and socio-political insecurities which threaten state and regional 
harmony. As described in chapter two, Robert Rotberg (2004) argued that as these 
insecurities challenge the "legitimacy and creditability of state," the value of the social 
bond between citizens and the state gradually fades.
The coming security and humanitarian challenges are alerted by statistical data, 
which most likely emanate from fragile societies and their growing instabilities: as 
highlighted, 2.5 billion poor live in weak societies, and the majority live in zones of 
conflict.4 According to a World Bank estimate, approximately 1.5 billion people live in 
fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS). By 2015 the FCS will host 32 percent of 
world's poor, and this number will reach 40 percent by 2030. The W orld Bank report 
suggests that such fragile conditions due to weak institutions, poor governance, 
political, and social instability are often accompanied by continuous endemic violence, 
which eventually impedes developmental agendas in these fragile parts of the world. 
The track record on human rights is highly worrying in FCS, and most of these countries 
are in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These regions are lagging behind the Millennium  
Development Goals (MDGs). Most of the conflict-affected fragile societies in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America are spending an average US $22 billion a year on arms, and most of 
the small arms are accessible to violent groups endangering the peace in their 
respective regions. Appropriating the same amount towards some of the MDGs will help 
the states achieve some targets, such as universal primary education and the reduction
4 Sachs, The End o f Poverty: Economic Possibilities fo r  Our Time; Collier, The Bottom Billion : Why the 
Poorest Countries Are Failing and W hat Can Be Done About It.
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of infant and maternal mortality, estimated at US $ 10 billion and US $12 billion 
respectively.5 The resolution of health and educational problems can overcome most 
political and security issues. As an instance, Boko Haram, a Nigerian radical terrorist 
group, is actively fighting the pursuit of education. The Boko Haram insists that western 
education is illegal, and a similar pattern persists in Pakistan in which some target 
schools and resist the development of a knowledge-based and responsible society. This 
notion infers that the higher ignorance, the higher the chance of clash; in contrast, the  
higher the knowledge base, the more society can pave the way for a more civilized 
orientation that reduces any expectation of clash.
Most prominent explanations rely on domestic factors as the root cause of 
fragility; however, looking beyond domestic reasoning, this study adds one external 
dimension to the study of state fragility. Therefore, at the domestic or endogenous 
scale, the evidences show that the weakness of the state arises from political, security, 
economic, and social domains. All of these domains are interdependent, meaning that 
failure in one aspect can cause the failure of all. In most of the cases of state fragility 
identified in the case studies, weak and fragile states "display a paradox: they are at 
once strong in the category of despotic power, but weak in infrastructural power."6 The 
literature and case studies emulate the existence of a political vacuum, political 
oligarchy, and kleptocracy, which become prominent factors of the ineffectiveness of 
institutions and governance. The exogenous factors are linked with geopolitics, which
5 Hillier and Wood, "Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough international Arms Control," 4.
6 K. J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State o f W ar (Cambridge ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 104.
309
cause a burden on the state due to its position and resources. The addition of the  
geopolitical factor expounds upon an enduring and valid discussion; w hether during 
colonial times or in the post-colonial era, these geographical pivots have remained  
zones of importance for regional and major powers.
The "birth of [the] paradigm" of state fragility or failure surfaced after the end of 
the Cold War, highlighted the "risks [that] were posed by the fragility of state structures 
and recommended profound shifts" in security and foreign policies. The paradigm 
mainly suggested military interventions in weak states, considering them  to be 
"factories of volatility," the interventions whittled down the intensities of "chaos, 
violence, and grievances."7 Global interventions based on lack of commitment, 
geopolitical interests, and shortterm  policies retained the worsening conditions of state 
fragility, and in many situations like Iraq, conditions become highly volatile. Similar 
patterns are yet to seen in a number of fragile states, i.e. Nigeria, Sudan, Yemen, and 
many other geographical pivots, which are highly volatile islands of chaos that need 
more than externally engineered interventions. For instance, in the post 9 /11  period, 
international forces in Afghanistan and the U.S. intervention in Iraq focused on "state 
building and counterinsurgency (COIN)" agendas, presuming they could help overcome 
fragile statehood conditions and curtail the magnitude of violence. Over the years, 
however, the notion of state-building in these weak states has received less attention, 
with the focus remaining on dealing with COIN options.8
7 Michael J. Mazarr, "The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm," Foreign Affairs 93, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 
2014).
8 Ibid.
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The problem of dealing and ignoring issues of state fragility in a number of 
violent situations was the lack of understanding of the actual root causes of fragility and 
weakness; even if the causes were tracked, they would be compromised for security 
reasons in battling against insurgents and terrorists. Therefore, in recent decades, the  
hype about threats posed by weak states took flight very quickly, but simultaneously 
lost momentum. It is not unique to observe the high amount of attention given to  
terrorism instead of state-building, because the contemporary threat paradigm  
emanates from transnational terrorist activities instead of any fear of a state attacking 
another state. Though traditional security threat perceptions retain their weightage, 
scenarios like Russia's move into Georgia and Ukraine validate the conventional 
explanations about security threats.
This research doubts and questions the idea about the rise and fall of the 
paradigm of state fragility within the scope of the last two decades, because the history 
of weak and strong societies existed before. There is always an asymmetrical power 
relationship between the weak and the strong, and states that seek maximum gain 
through dealing with each other via buffering, balancing, and bandwagoning. It appears 
that fragility and weakness are not new sources of threats or problems both on the 
conceptual and contextual scale. In fact, traditional concepts such as small states, small 
powers, and weak societies were replaced with the contemporary usage of concepts like 
weak, fragile, failing, quasi-state, failed, and collapsed state. In general, both historical 
and contemporary narratives still seek to  fix the domestic issues of the state and its 
institutional weaknesses. Most importantly, the core difference between then and now
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is the compression of tim e and space, resulting in the height of a security threat, which 
may not be possible to perceive in early years at the same scale. In reference to Jared 
Diamond's argument, cited in chapter II, that in the contemporary tim e period the world 
cannot stay safe witnessing societies collapse in isolation, the ripple effects of collapse 
are more severe today than ever. For example, as discussed in chapter IV, India and 
Pakistan fought several wars in the past, which had less of an impact on regional and 
global peace. But now the scenario has changed, and a full scale nuclear war between  
these two countries will cause the deaths of or affect nearly 2 billion people, wipe an 
entire civilization off the region, and trap millions into hunger and struggles with 
displacement, a humanitarian situation beyond one's imagination. Overall, the severity 
of the problem is higher, which prompts a serious examination of how to fix such fragile 
states.
TWO CASE STUDIES: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This chapter is focused on the comparative analysis o f the tw o case studies, 
Myanmar and Pakistan. The analysis seeks an answer derived from contributions from  
earlier chapters on conceptual framework and evidence. Earlier chapters thoroughly 
investigated an answer to the research question, "under w hat conditions do weak states 
continuously fail to perform?" They also expand the debate into an issue of fixing 
fragility and posit that traditional fixation is linked with different forms of interventions. 
Therefore, should it be accepted that interventions are the only solution to deal with  
the continuous fragile conditions of these tw o cases, or should weak states make it their
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own responsibility to tackle problems of stability and viability of their loose statehoods? 
The explanation is drawn over two hypothetical statements mentioned earlier; 1) The 
absence of an effective political order (institutional ineffectiveness and bad governance) 
causes a gradual decay of state structure, 2) The burden of geography and geopolitics is 
more likely to affect state fragility. W ithin the parameters of these hypothetical 
statements, the previous chapters discussed thoroughly how the core factors of fragility, 
colonial legacies, the effects of corruption on governance, and geopolitical 
maneuverings, gradually dwindle statehood.
A positive indicator of the contemporary, complex, and interdependent world is 
the decline of inter-state wars, but at the same tim e, the propensity of conflicts is rising 
at the intra-state level. Domestic conflicts in affected societies are contagious; as one 
can see from the ramifications of the Syrian civil war that has multifold contagious 
affects involving the entire region. The seeds of similar intra-state conflicts exist in most 
weak and fragile states, just waiting for fertile situations for reaction. For example, since 
independence, the security apparatuses in Pakistan and Myanmar have been 
continuously engaged in fighting against insurgents, rebel nationalist groups, and lately 
the intensity has increased to the extent that a political will is needed to resolve the 
problem for the betterm ent of both societies.
Keeping in mind the violent situation in both countries, the overall trends of 
state performance in Myanmar and Pakistan are not positive. According to the Failed 
State Index, in 2009 Myanm ar and Pakistan were ranked at number 10 and 13 
respectively. Myanmar's commitment to democracy and path to openness substantially
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changed the situation. Similarly in Pakistan, though the security situation is still at risk, 
political transitions are promising. Compared to 2009, the latest Failed State index of 
2013 ranked Myanm ar and Pakistan 13th and 26th respectively.9 The trend suggests a 
slow and steady recovery, as the democratic transitions in tw o  countries are promising 
features that eventually overcome major domestic challenges and strengthen 
institutions. Still, the rankings remain in the high-risk category of fragility.
HYPOTHESIS I: THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ORDER (INSTITUTIONAL 
INEFFECTIVENESS AND BAD GOVERNANCE) CAUSES A GRADUAL DECAY OF STATE 
STRUCTURE
In the rapid decolonization process during the 1950s and 1960s, the phenomena  
of political order remained a focal point for a number of political scientists, including 
Samuel Huntington, whose work on Political Order in Changing Societies outlined 
challenges and opportunities for newly independent states. Huntington argued that 
newly independent countries confuse the modernization process as a way out for their 
fragile statehood, rather he emphasized the pursuit of political development ultimately  
helping those weak states in their nation-building processes. But what is observed in 
many weak states, for example Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan that soon after 
independence they either quickly started to  seek economic gains due to an im m ediate  
economic crunch and paid less attention to the political development of their 
institutions, or the institutional legacies established during the colonial times continued
9 "The Failed States Index," (2013).
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to rule the complex and heterogeneous political communities. Jeffrey Herbst called the  
decolonization process granting sovereignty to  many decolonizing states "little more 
than legal fiction."10 Herbst's idea in many ways reverberates with the idea of Gerald B. 
Helman and Steven R. Ratner (1992), who argued that ill-planned and quick 
decolonization that do not prepare the newly establishing states for their future  
responsibilities cause state failure, Guinea for example.
These arguments seem appealing; almost all newly decolonized states struggled 
with political, economic and societal challenges. As discussed in chapter IV, soon after 
independence Pakistan suffered economically, as it lacked funds to pay the salaries of 
state servants. Contrary to Herbst's idea about sovereignty as legal fiction, William  
Zartman (1995) argues that the legality of the sovereign state is in fact granted and 
assured by the international community, so it should not be fictitious; rather, the 
problem of weakness and state fragility completely depends on the weakness and 
performance of state institutions. Similarly noted before, Daron Acemoglu and James 
Robinson (2012) built their argument around the importance of institutions, as they  
negate the notion that culture, history, and geography cause nations to fail; it is 
institutions.11
Acemoglu and Robinson's argument has partial strength, but as this study shows, 
geography cannot be ignored. Culture matters too: for instance, in the context of the 
Indian sub-continent, we can evaluate the role of culture allowing political participation 
and democratic transitions in post-colonial tim e. Three political parties were established
10 Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," 118.
11 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations F a il: The Origins o f Power, Prosperity and Poverty.
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during British Colonial tim e, namely the Indian National Congress (1885), All India 
Muslim League (1906), and Young Men's Buddhist Association (1906), and all three  
parties led nationalist political struggles against colonialism and created three  
independent countries, India, Pakistan, and Burma (now Myanmar). Is there any 
individual, sociocultural influence on these organizations th a t at a later stage inflicted 
any cultural norm on the political processes in the countries and their respective 
political systems? Michael Ignatieff agreed that multiple reasons cause state fragility 
instead of only a single factor causing decay. As Ignatieff writes about state fragility, 
"sometimes the cause is the colonial legacy; sometimes it is maladministration by an 
indigenous elite; sometimes, failure is a legacy first of interference by outside powers, 
and then abandonm ent... and most important, many failed or failing states are poor 
and have suffered from the steadily more adverse terms of trade in a globalized 
economy."12
Deliberating on the institutional dimension, Daron Acemoglu and James 
Robinson's argument about the importance of "inclusive institutions" for the viability of 
society is convincing, if focused on domestic factors of fragility and the weakening of 
political order. Douglass North explains institutions as they "are the rules of the game in 
a society or, more formally, are the human devised constraints that shape human 
interaction."13 Pointed out in chapter II, there are three sets of institutions significantly 
important to enforce the political order, i.e. the state, the rule of law, and an 
accountable government (democracy). The enforcement of order has remained
12 Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," 118.
13 North, Institutions, institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 3.
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ineffective in both Myanm ar and Pakistan, because institutions remained unstable, and 
on a number of accounts, states become "predatory" against their own citizens with 
lesser accountability on actions they have taken.
The first core factor in the weakness of fragile states is the idea of colonial 
legacies that accounted for the asymmetrical growth of institutions, in which 
authoritarian regimes eventually become powerful and state institutions become 
weaker. The colonial legacy not only allowed authoritarian powers to rule, but 
completely undermined the heterogeneity and diversity of society. Similar patterns 
w ere adopted in post-colonial times, when state machinery forcefully engaged in 
"homogenization" and "ethnification" processes without offering agreeable bargains to  
pluralistic communities. The artificial process of ethnification is being resisted in weak 
states that have internal violence. For example, the Kachins are fighting against the 
Burmese army believing they only represent ethnic Burmans, who tried to occupy their 
land and resources; this case is not different from how Baloch nationalist groups feel 
about Pakistan's military for its major population ratio drawn from ethnic Punjabis. 
Harris Mylonas emphasized that the process of homogenization is a way of excluding 
non-core groups or re-orienting a new identity. Still, it is important to rem em ber that 
the ethnic groups are always conscious of their national and ethnic differences, and in 
modern times, consciousness is supported by the idea of self-determination. Therefore, 
based on the state's policies of assimilation, the accommodation and elimination of 
non-core ethnic groups has caused great uproar in many accounts o f weak states. 
Fearing problems with heterogeneity, the state engages in forceful homogenization, in
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which non-core groups seek the popular, political incentive of self-determination. As 
violence grows, the non-core or minority groups start seeking support from various 
external forces, and the provision of "safe havens" is the main "good" that one state can 
provide against the rival. Similarly the enemy state looks for similar groups unhappy 
with the state, so it can utilize them in reciprocity (a tit-fo r-ta t policy) for what rival state 
is doing against it.14 In an instance in the case studies, Myanm ar blames India for 
supporting Kachin rebels, and India blames M yanm ar over its shelter and support for 
rebels from India's northeast province; in a similar situation, Pakistan and India blame 
each other for supporting insurgent groups in India's administered Kashmir and 
Pakistan's Baluchistan regions respectively.
Therefore, in the "paradox of Decolonization, (for instance)... heterogeneous 
political heritage was brushed aside in the rush by nationalists to seize the reins of 
power of the nation-states as defined politically and geographically" by the colonial 
rulers.15 Particularly, Nigeria, which has more than 250 ethnic groups, these groups 
were forced to join state as a process of colonization and decolonization outcomes.
Their diverse and past history is ignored, which allowed a number of centrifugal forces 
to join anti-state and terrorist groups. As one of the country's richest in energy 
resources, and with the highest fertility rate, Nigeria faces huge internal security threats 
with transnational linkages between terrorist networks.
Another similar account is the Asian context, where in the case of Myanm ar, a 
total of eight major ethnic minority groups and 135 sub-groups under the umbrella of
14 Mylonas, The Politics o f Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities, 35-36.
15 Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," 120.
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core ethnic groups, were forced to join the union during the British period, and were  
later trapped into internal war between the center and periphery. In many accounts, 
weak and fragile states learned to dominate small or non-core groups as ethnic 
minorities. As highlighted, in Myanmar the Burman majority (composition 70%) 
dominates other non-Burman ethnic groups, and in Pakistan, the province of Punjab 
dominates over other provinces based on its high ethnic and political domination. Barry 
Buzan (2007) has referred to these societies as "imperial states," in federative structure, 
in which one ethnic group dominates the other and continues to keep internal 
fragmentation and power struggles among diverse ethnic groups; this consequently 
weakens the social cohesion of the nation-building process.
Francis Fukuyama described the tw o ways th a t contribute to the political decay 
of a political system; 1) ineffectiveness of institutions, and 2) Repatrimonalization.
About institutions, Fukuyama writes that "institutions wouldn't be institutions that is, 
stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior -  if they were not further reinforced by 
strong social norms, rituals, and other kinds of psychological investments in them...in  
case of disjunction (in investment process) cause political decay or 
deinstitutionalization."16 The second form of political decay, in which ruling elites allow  
favoring family, and friends to retain power through lineages, which "constantly put the 
pressure to repatrimonialize the system."17 Here, Pakistan's model is a most suitable 
scenario; its many institutions remain dysfunctional with dynastic politics embedded in 
the repatrimonialization of political culture.
16 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rder: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 452.
17 The Origins o f Political O rder: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 453.
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If looking at conditions for why political institutions are weak in fragile states, the 
literature and evidence suggest that one reason is the prolonged rule of authoritarian  
rule establishing praetorian hierarchical structures that gradually cause the decay of 
political institutions. As aforementioned, the paradox of weak states is that they are 
powerful in the category of despotic power and its coercive capabilities, while weak in a 
non-coercive state capacity. In Myanm ar and Pakistan, the vacuum of political 
leadership (at the landscape of the political process) allowed military regimes to fill the 
gap. For instance, in 1947, a few  months before the independence of Myanm ar, national 
hero Aung San was assassinated; comparably Pakistan's founding father, who wished to 
see a democratic Pakistan with equal rights for all the citizens, died soon after its 
independence. These events plunged the newly independent countries into political 
chaos, providing military elites the opportunity to take political charge.
The patterns of military interventions are common across all the fragile states, 
when they witnessed political chaos soon after their freedom  and engaged in political 
strife. The earlier postcolonial glimpse of Nigeria shares the common faith that military 
intervention occurred in less than a decade of independence and continued its influence 
until 1998. Should it be assumed that the colonial rulers trusted the military elites to  
retain social cohesion through the use of force, instead of allowing an evolutionary 
process via democratic transitions? Since 2001 in Afghanistan, the international 
community has allocated a huge amount of investment in resetting the  fragmented  
societal cohesiveness. After a decade of political and economic management, the  
international community is charging Afghans to take care of their fu tu re— mainly the
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country's newly raised 350,000 security personnel. The comparative imbalance between  
strong Afghan security and weak government institutions suggests that the future threat 
is not from terrorist or internal political divides but from a "coming military coup" based 
on belief, as in post-colonial times, that the militarily must intervene to save the  
democracy.18 The case of a military coup in Afghanistan against the historic democratic 
transitions right now developing will prove the traditional trends of the past, when most 
newly independent weak states faced military interventions. These interventions 
gradually hollowed the effectiveness of the institutions.
Ironically, the military elites always legitimize their domestic political ventures. 
Now legitimacy at large does not mean the "civil society's acceptance of the military's 
role, but to the mechanism through which military justifies its political influence."19 For 
example, Former Pakistan Army Commander Gen. Khalid Mahmud Arif argues that the  
Army's take-over of democratically-elected governments is in a way to avoid political 
instability. Gen. Arif emphasized that Pakistan inherited political instability as part and 
parcel since independence. It is because Pakistan completely lacked the proper 
structure of a state; the flow of millions of Muslim refugees from India; the early death 
of founding father (a leadership vacuum); nascent political system and internal disorder 
further weakened the system; and inexperienced, inefficient, or not properly trained 
politicians caused the derailment of democratic system in country.20 Despite the fact 
that the military always institutionally seeks justification for its interventions as an
18 Paul D. Miller, "Afghanistan’s Coming Coup? The Military Isn’t Too W eak - It’s Too Strong," Foreign 
Affairs (April 2, 2014).
19 Siddiqa-Agha, Military Inc .: Inside Pakistan's M ilitary Economy, 36.
20 Malik, Pakistan : Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities, 19.
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appropriate step to tackle existing problems of political development, it is significantly 
important to understand that "political disorder as a cause of the military's 
intervention" as well.21
The duplicity in words and actions of praetorian guards have gradually lost the  
confidence of people's opinions about any promises made regarding democratic 
transitions or handing over power to civilian regimes. Meaning, by and large, military 
interventions have promised immediate free and fair elections and a transfer power.
But, in contrast, once military elites come to power, either they forget the promise or 
enjoy political power, showing less inclination to handover the power. In 1958 Gen.
Ayub Khan's martial law in Pakistan and in 1962 Gen. Ne Win's military rule in Myanm ar 
promised elections, as similarly their military predecessors followed the patterns of 
offering electoral pledges, but when it came to the elections, either the elections w ere  
rigged or did not oblige with results. In fact, during the electoral campaigns, the military 
elites themselves became candidates to contest elections, as in 1960's Gen. Ayub 
contest against Ms. Fatima Jinnah (sister of Pakistan's founding father); and in the case 
of Myanm ar military-backed retired generals contents against Aung San Suu Kyi 
(daughter of national hero and founding father) after the revolution of 8888.
In both instances, in Myanm ar and Pakistan, the state machinery was utilized to 
undermine the populous support for civilians. For example, in Pakistan, clerics were  
asked to promulgate religious decrees (Fatwa) against the eligibility of the female  
contestant (Ms. Jinnah). These actions were planned to subside her popularity and avoid
21 Aziz, M ilitary Control in Pakistan : The Parallel State, 59.
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any support she could have gained, as her blood relation to the country's founding 
father Mr. Jinnah. Likewise, in Myanm ar, Aung San Suu Kyi gained popular support and 
used her father Aung San for more credibility. The military rule under the SLORC tried to 
undermine the rule or posture of her father. Pictures of her father were removed from  
all buildings and a narrative was constructed that his past political contributions were  
for the gain of his own political interests.
Fearing the rise of democratic voices, military regimes always avoid free and fair 
elections and prefer controlled referendums and legal approval from supreme courts.
To avoid populous resistance, military regimes in M yanm ar and Pakistan moved their 
capitals from urban and populous centers to newly built capitals close to military 
headquarters. Pakistan shifted its capital from Karachi to Islamabad, and Myanm ar 
shifted from Yangon to Naypyidaw. The official explanation argues that it was in the 
strategic interests for the transfer of capitals.
Another interesting commonality between M yanm ar and Pakistan is the state's 
role in reorienting the state's narrative based on identity and ideology. As pointed out 
and discussed in detail as evidence in chapters III and IV, military rulers in Myanm ar 
started to revive glory of past famous kings and erected their statues at various public 
places. A parallel instance was mentioned before that the Pakistani ruling elites, 
especially during the 1980s, re-invented past religious glory introducing Arab, Central 
Asian, and other Muslim warriors into the educational curriculum. They believed these 
actions would allow them  to gain popularity among the people, but in Pakistan's case, 
many of the policies backfired and redirected public a support for religious narratives
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based on reviving orthodox thoughts on establishing caliphate. Today, many 
conservative groups nurture these principles and embedded with these ideas as a core 
agenda to establish global caliphate. Results of these actions have flared up communal 
and sectarian violence against minorities in Myanm ar and Pakistan.
The military elites in Myanm ar and Pakistan believe that it is their responsibility 
to protect the integrity of the state, so it has the legitimate right to decide which 
domestic actor is more reliable. To protect the national interest, it is observed that 
military regimes have supported stateless actors, as Tatm adaw is allegedly involved in 
supporting drug lords, whom in return supported the economy of M yanm ar during the 
times of sanctions, supported financing energy ventures, and also helped Myanmar's 
security forces to fight against domestic ethnic rebels. The case of Tatm adaw is not 
different; if compared to Pakistan's geopolitical role in the first Afghan war in 1979 
supporting Islamist Jihadist to fight against Soviets. Later the same jihadists perceived as 
a useful tool to seek its "strategic mirage" or so-called strategic depth and countering 
irredentists in KPK and Baluchistan. To clarify, the nationalist groups fighting against the 
center in Myanm ar and Pakistan are for political rights and over resource distribution; 
while, in contrast, the stateless geostrategic assets of the past have developed an 
ideological motive seeking its implementation as the rule o f law, like Taliban and 
likeminded factions in Pakistan are asking for the imposition of Sharia law and challenge 
the legal validity of constitution of Pakistan through their way of religious perspectives.
However, the problem becomes severe when states craft laws that are used on 
political grounds against minorities. As, under the military regime in the 1980s evolved
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Pakistan's blasphemy law that awarded the maximum death penalty. The law has 
recently become a main tool to  target minorities or individuals with different views on 
various social and political issues. Alarmingly, the level of intolerance has grown, and 
even lawyers and judges now fear dealing with legal petitions that are linked with  
blasphemy related matters. Scores of judges and lawyers are killed e.g. in 1996, Justice 
Arif Bhatti (killed in Lahore, after clearing a case on blasphemy) and many who have 
tackled the cases simply left the country: such as, for example, Justice Pervez AM Shah, 
who issued a death sentence on M um taz Qadari a security official who killed Governor 
Salman Taseer for his views to amend the law.22
It proves all three sets of institutions, the state, the rule of law, and an 
unaccountable government is on loose practice, which does not allow an enforcing 
political order to retain a social cohesion in the state. In Myanmar, the military has been 
ruling since the early 1960s: the recent democratic transition is a sham, and is, in fact, 
an armored democracy run by retired military officials. In the case of Pakistan, the  
political system has established a "compromised democracy" between military and 
civilian political elites. Military rulers promised to fix socio-economic and political 
problems, while alleging that these problems are the outcome of inefficient political 
elites and their chronic corruption. When the pledges are not fulfilled, it is because 
military elites themselves found governing through the same political elites, as the  
military has never been strong enough to endure its political rule w ithout endorsement 
from quasi-parliaments (and referendums) and judiciary. Ultimately parliament is drawn
22 Babar Sattar, "Judiciary and Tolerance," Dawn April 21, 2014.
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from the same feudal or traditional political elites, whom have been blamed for 
repeated involvement in political corruption.23 The recurrence of similar patterns, 
involving the repatrimonialization of the system, allows the corrupt political elites to  
enjoy power through lineages or dynastic politics.
In Myanmar's case, the current ruling party is actually a king's party, and the 
opposition party is on a compromising stage because Aung San Suu Kyi seeks 
amendments in the constitution allowing her to run for head of government in next 
elections, as her deceased husband's foreign nationality disqualifies her. She also seems 
compromising over the military's weight in the assembly. In addition, many form er 
military elites, who were purged during the power struggle within the military brass are 
still in leadership problems with Aung San Suu Kyi. Therefore, Myanmar's case is still an 
unknown situation with many political mysteries.
Constitutionally or theoretically Pakistan's military, compared to Myanmar's, is 
accountable to the Prime Minister's office, but the "administrative control of the armed 
forces and general military planning are areas where the armed forces do not allow any 
interference."24 In 1999, when then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif planned military 
downsizing and reduced the military's influence in politics, he was sacked. Similarly, in 
2008, the government of Pakistan's People Party (PPP) tried to shift the control of Inter- 
Services Intelligence (ISI) under the ministry of interior; this turned out be a bad plan, as 
PPP government back tracked from their decision within 24 hours. They decided to
23 Lieven, Pakistan : A Hard Country, 24.
24 Aziz, M ilitary Control in Pakistan : The Parallel State, 52.
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continue the old structure, in which theoretically ISI will report to Prime Minister's 
office.25
The problem of domestic politics is not only with military intervention, but the  
competing dynastic politics and rival feudal families dominate the national political 
parties. Therefore, they allow the military elites to form alliances with them  from  tim e  
to tim e. By doing so, the political decaying of institutions and repatrimonializing of the 
political system goes hand in hand. The dilemma of Pakistan's politics is that military 
interventions are successful because oppositional political parties support the loss of 
the ruling political party, and "a large politicized citizens are not offended by the  
government's demise, if not positively delighted w ith its overthrow."26 For instance, 
when Gen. Musharraf removed Nawaz Sharif, a number o f Pakistan's political parties 
remained quiet and comfortable. No one resisted the undemocratic step taken by the  
military, and even the late Benazir Bhutto rather blamed "Sharif of antagonizing and 
provoking the military against his own government."27 Unless there is a thorough shift in 
political processes in these fragile states, institutions will have to rely on compromises 
and power struggles between groups. Until then the leadership and political vacuum will 
continue to benefit and sustain the traditional status quo.
As noted in chapter II, with reference to Samuel Huntington's (1968) work, 
mentions that praetorianism has historical roots in various forms i.e. oligarchical to  
radical praetorianism. Historical oligarchical praetorianism had decapitated the state
25 Jones, Pakistan : Eye o f the Storm, 247.
26 Eric Nordlinger in Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and Military, 129.
27 Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan : Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises, 265.
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and created an institutional vacuum, so societies highly remained oligarchic and feudal. 
Huntington further argued that the oligarchical praetorianism evolved into radical 
praetorianism, which dominates social forces and destroys the indigenous political 
institutions.28 To balance and mitigate the direct role of the  military in domestic politics, 
Huntington's other (1957) classic work on the Soldier and the State: The Theory and  
Politics o f Civil-Military Relations, tried to deal with questions regarding civilian control 
of the military. Huntington argued that the  professionalization of the military is 
necessary and the neutrality of the military in politics is much needed to ensure civil 
control of the military. The military's focus on external borders will also keep them  away 
from domestic politics, so civil leadership can engage in evolving the social cohesion.
This process will require "equilibrium," if not, the military will always find ways to  
intervene.29
Despite the fear that the military establishments in Myanmar and Pakistan are 
likely to continue their influence on domestic politics, the military elites understand the 
dynamics of the contemporary political landscape is changing. Myanmar's constitution, 
written under military rule, still provides 25 percent of weightage for the military in 
parliament, which eventually retain its influence. In the case of Pakistan, the military has 
a compromising structural adjustment with political elites who manage the power like a 
musical chair game. A gradual awakening of political consciousness is in progress, which 
is ultimately the challenge of the traditional repressive systems and subjective parochial 
political culture. As Christian Denvorpt agreed, traditionally the "closed, unresponsive,
28 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 198-99.
29 The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics o f Civil-Military Relations, 94.
328
paranoia inducing governments run by a few individuals (i.e., autocracies) w ere the ... 
systems believed to use repression in an effort to protect leaders as well as elites who  
w ere otherwise incapable of staying in power, (but now) political leaders carefully weigh 
the costs and benefits of coercive action," as the rapidly growing media and judicial 
watchdogs have prompted to reduce the frequent usage of coercive measures, though 
not completely controlled yet.30
Finally, the political decay of institutions can be controlled and mended if 
inclusive and accountable political systems are put emplace to make sure the rule of law 
is implemented and respected at all levels. In doing so, chronic problems of corruption  
and internal violence are curtailed, and the maturity of the political system will build a 
favorable and guaranteed investment environment as well.
HYPOTHESIS II: THE BURDEN OF GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS IS MORE LIKELY TO 
EFFECT STATE FRAGILITY
Geography is an important variable that persistently engages the statesmen's 
perceptions originating from tangible and intangible sources of power and security 
concerns. The literature on weak and fragile states has generally ignored the geographic 
factor that becomes a burden on statehood. As discussed in earlier chapters human 
societies have clashed for geographical gains, whether their struggle remained focused 
on the hegemon's engagements into "the periphery of the earth" (Hans J. Morgenthau); 
or for the "heartland-dominated land power" (Halford Mackinder); or to gain control
30 Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," 4.
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over "maritime-oriented Rimland" (Nicholas John Spykman). Many of these struggles 
have become a cause of "state death." The colonial rulers conquered and caused a 
number of small and medium states to die, and later colonial powers combined these 
small entities into single nation-states during the decolonization process. Tanisha Fazal 
(2007) has argued that state death has declined after 1945 because there are now few  
opportunities of direct conquest for land, or hardly any colonization process is in place 
tha t could directly occupy a territory. In the post-1945 period, however, there is "an 
increase in interventions to replace regimes and leaders when conquest is prohibited, 
and also an increase in the number of state collapses as leaders exploit state resources 
knowing that they face little or no risk o f conquest."31
W hat does theory tell? A point noted earlier was that weak and fragile states as 
rational actors weigh the cost and benefit through their asymmetrical power 
relationship with the stronger one. States tend to balance against the immediate 
proximate threat, because "if states bandwagon with proximate powers, spheres of 
influence come into being; if they balance, a checkerboard system of alliance arises."32 
W hat we see in many parts of the Third World is most states having disputes and 
conflicts with their immediate neighbors. They are persistently engaged in balancing 
each other, while preferring to provide a buffer zone or bandwagon with an external 
player. For instance, Afghanistan and Pakistan tried to balance against each other, 
similar to India and Pakistan, or India and China, and so forth, but at the same tim e
31 Fazal, State Death : The Politics and Geography o f Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation, 8.
32 Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, 17.
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Afghanistan and India aligned with the form er Soviet Union, while Pakistan aligned with  
United States, buffering their territories against immediate neighbors.
Another important dimension of geographical significance is geopolitics. If the  
state is on the crossroads of a major power's interest, it is hard to escape or change 
reality until the state itself is internally stable and understands how to utilize its 
geographical importance as a strength. Jakub Grygiel explains that "states cannot alter 
geopolitics to match their interests, or at best they are very limited in their capacity to  
do so. A change in geopolitics involves a change in routes or in the location of resources, 
and a state cannot single-handedly effect such a change."33 Strategist A. T. Mahan's 
emphasis on controlling sea-lanes can project the superiority of states' power, but it 
should not undermine the value of historical land routes. For instance, the traditional 
silk route helped connect East Asia to Europe. In later years, the oil and gas pipeline and 
railways became changing patterns of connection. Moreover, the new ways of air routes 
provided a possible way to reach geographic points but remained an expensive option. 
Geopolitics takes time to change, and it changes along the alterations introduced 
through establishing new routes. For example, Panama and the Suez Canal completely 
changed the geopolitical importance of the surrounding area.34
It is pertinent to clarify that many political elites in weak and fragile states are in 
search of excuses and strategic scapegoats, so they can blame others or external forces 
to cover up their own domestic mistakes. According to Holsti, strategic scapegoating 
generally invokes an "irrational hatred against others" and it involves "carefully
33 Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, 25.
34 Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, 28-29.
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calculated strategies by political leaders ... to distract their publics from gross 
mismanagement at home by point to  the [Others] as the source of their problem ."35 By 
finding strategic scapegoats, political elites try their best to preserve "the state, and 
guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to  ... find a common enemy 
whom (the subjects) can make common cause."36 This study has avoided those 
instances, which may show that the idea of using geography is to find a strategic 
scapegoat. In fact, the study based on "weak pivot states" justifies the geopolitical 
significance of the cases, which engage major powers in the region. In the cases of 
Myanm ar and Pakistan, both countries reside on a "crush zone" or Cold W ar 
"shatterbelt," which indirectly engaged the two super-powers during the Cold W ar. Still, 
today the high fragmentation and increasing level of violence exists in the region.
W hy is geography an im portant variable? Stewart Patrick concludes his book 
Weak Links, Fragile States, Global Threat, and International Security, while answering 
the question, "Which weak states matter?" He answered that those weak and fragile 
states are most worrisome, "in terms of their recent connection to transnational 
terrorism, W M D  proliferation, transnational crime, energy insecurity, an infectious 
disease."37 Ironically Patrick narrows down his fears of state fragility: out of fifty-six 
weak and fragile states, only a handful of them  are said to cause real problems.
W hether these problems are related to the opium trade in Afghanistan (Golden 
Crescent) and Burma (Golden Triangle); proliferation issues in North Korea and Pakistan;
35 Ole R. Holsti, To See Ourselves as Others See U s : How Publics Abroad View the United States a fter 9 /11  
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 186.
36 Quoting French Philosopher Jean Bodin in ibid.
37 Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 245.
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of global energy supply, with only 7 percent coming from these weak states; 
transnational terrorist related threats from Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and 
Yemen with lesser scale support to terrorist from Iraq, Bangladesh, Mali, and 
Mauritania. Patrick's explanation of considering a few  and handful of weak and fragile 
states could have more of an impact among a large group of weak states, which 
implicitly links the argument with the approach on geopolitics. As Patrick agrees to 
notify a few names like instability in Iraq, Nigeria, Angola, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan 
can disrupt energy supply and price control, which vindicates the importance of 
geographical pivots, though the author has not explicitly made the argument in 
reference of geographical pivot-ness.38
Looking at the cases, both M yanm ar and Pakistan are geopolitical linchpin states 
due to their geopolitical and geostrategic premises in Asia. Zbigniew Brzezinski's 
emphasis on the new "global Balkans," form er U.S. President G.W. Bush's initiative on 
the "greater Middle East" and form er Sectary of State Hillary Clinton's inclusion of the  
Indian sub-continent in the definition of "Asia-Pacific," tim e and again show that the  
selected cases Myanmar and Pakistan reside on in drawing geographic pivots.39 Both are 
immediate neighbors to regional powers India and China, which are also highly 
dependent on the greater stability of and positive relations with M yanm ar and Pakistan. 
Conversely Myanmar and Pakistan's balanced and friendly policies towards India and 
China help stabilize their political, security, and economic challenges.
38 Weak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 245-46.
39 Brzezinski, Second Chance : Three Presidents and the Crisis o f American Superpower, 154; Marina  
Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, "The Greater Middle East Initiative: O ff to  a False Start," (Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, March 2004), 2; Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," 57.
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Overall, it is widely argued that the twenty-first century is the Asian Century 
during which the economic shift towards Asia will allow Asian in fluentia l to gain 
leverage and balance the other regional power centers o f the  world. Despite such talks, 
there are many Asian countries that struggle with core economic and political 
challenges. In addition, domestic challenges are supplemented with interstate 
geographical disputes, internal security issues in the entirety of Asia; for example, 
geographical disputes between China, Japan, Vietnam, Philippines, and other 
neighboring countries have always caused an optimum of distrust between regional 
members. As China seeks to gain a leadership role in its Near Seas (Yellow Sea, East 
China Sea, and South China Sea), the U.S. is rebalancing in Asia to keep its post war 
leadership in the region.
W hile the Chinese policy of encircling the entire region through strings of pearls 
persists for economic reasons, simultaneously the U.S and its allies have initiated a 
twelve nation regional trade pact called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). China 
considers the TPP a U.S. strategy of containment towards China; however, the U.S. and 
its allies will seek to establish a maritime code and trade alliance to bridle any 
geostrategic assertiveness emanating from China. M ore specifically, China claims its 
sovereign rights over Senkaku Islands, while Japan disputes it, under article 5 of the 
U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty; any future clash between Japan and China will be 
directly or indirectly bound and will engage U.S. involvement in the region. In April 2014, 
during President Obama's tour of the Asian region, he reaffirmed the long-term security 
guarantee of its allies and affirmed that "America is and always will be a Pacific nation,"
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and the United States will continue to hold the leading role.40 Similar to the Pacific 
region, geopolitical and security challenges have expanded elsewhere, including South 
Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Severe problems in one state or region will 
affect all. Therefore, fixing the problems of weaker members of Asia and finding 
peaceful solutions for unresolved geopolitical disputes assures a brighter future for the  
Asian Century.
Economic prospects through M yanm ar and Pakistan are promising, if the tw o  
countries are provided with, or emerged as, an economic and energy corridor to their 
powerful economic neighbors and the entire region. As discussed in chapters III and IV, 
China has invested billions of US dollars on projects, and at the moment Chinese 
companies have been supervising more contracts. 80 percent of China's oil flows 
through Strait of Malacca, and 60 percent of China's energy supply comes from the  
Middle East. As mentioned earlier, establishing new routes, also changing the  
geopolitics, similarly to China's plan to become less dependent of Strait o f Malacca 
through establishing new ports and oil and gas pipeline through M yanm ar and Pakistan, 
will make it less dependent on routes that are under U.S. regulation or supervision. 
Tracking the changing dynamics in the region demonstrates how the U.S. and India have 
developed greater economic and diplomatic ties. For China, growing U.S. ties with India 
is less worrying factor, "so long as their [the Chinese] trading routes remain opened and
40 "Q&A: Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun Interviews President Obama," Washington Post April 23, 2014.
335
their identity respected — including a territorial integrity about which they are likely to 
remain most intransigent."41
On the ground, both Myanm ar and Pakistan have a long history of fighting with  
ethno-nationalists groups and recently religious groups as well; China is carefully dealing 
with the growing insurgency in Xinxiang and lately a suicidal attack in Yunnan province. 
China is not feared about balancing arch-rivals in the region only but is seriously 
concerned about pivotal neighbors like Myanm ar and Pakistan; should any "go astray or 
fall apart in a radical surge of Islamic fervor or in the counterrevolutionary takeover of a 
nationalist army," it will shatter China's dreams of becoming a rising power.42
Democracies, such as the U.S. and India, have also shifted their policies towards 
Myanmar; they have realized that in the past supporting openly democratic forces 
prompted the military regime drifting towards China, North Korea, and even towards 
Russia with nuclear ambitions. Keeping the tone low, the new policies tried to work 
along the military backed Thein Sein's Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), 
who came into power after 2010's election. India's "Look East policy" is trying to 
counter China through investment in the energy and communication sectors and offers 
defense equipment along with training facilities. New Delhi believes that Beijing's 
"effort to establish an economic and political presence in Myanmar's and Pakistan's 
Indian Ocean ports are strategic ambitions of China to encircle India."43 India is 
observing the growing influence of China around its waters, as Beijing is engaged in
41 Serfaty, "The Folly of Forgetting the West," 42.
42 A World Recast: An American Moment in a Post-Western Order, 75.
43 B rze z in sk i, Strategic Vision : America and the Crisis o f Global Power, 1 6 3 -6 4 .
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helping to build or upgrade a number of ports around India: in Kyaupyu, Burma; 
Chittagong, Bangladesh; Hambantota, Sri Lanka; and Gwadar, Pakistan, and 
interestingly, most of these are not free from violent troublesome activities.44
Compared to Myanmar, Pakistan has become more violent in recent years, as 
Baluch nationalists fight over economic and political grievances, and Pashtun's suffer in 
FATA with the flow of various radical and terrorist networks occupying their areas. 
Following recent elections, new governments in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan should 
seize this opportunity to take a fresh start; otherwise: staying in the past will maintain 
the burden of history and geography for the entire region. There are many other serious 
issues that need attention, especially the acute problem of the scarcity of w ater a 
potential source of full-scale conflict. Pakistan has already gone to international 
arbitrary courts over India's construction of the Baglihar dam and Kishanganga electric- 
power plant on Chenab and Jhelum River. The flow of the rivers makes India an upper 
riparian, but water of these two rivers are exclusively allotted to Pakistan through Indus 
W ater Treaty on 1960. In addition, prolonging the Kashmir dispute and playing the 
blame game over proxy support to rebels and insurgents on both sides have widened 
the trust gap. The result was Pakistan's elected cabinet deciding to award India with 
MFN status, but a lack of trust withheld it.
Finally, the first case Myanm ar is trying to employ a policy of not becoming 
dependent on one state, so it is carefully picking and selecting partners as everyone is 
putting their bid. Myanm ar is welcoming FDI, projects, and development. However, its
44 Kaplan, The Revenge o f Geography; W hat the M ap Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle 
against Fate, 250.
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harsh stance towards ethnic minorities and Rohingya is deplorable. Internally  
Myanmar's geographical units are for the tim e being quiet due to a tem porary ceasefire. 
The sooner the fight starts, the more foreign investors feel insecure, similar to  w hat is 
happened to Pakistan since 2005, where the height of terror and suicide attacks badly 
affected the economy.
The second case Pakistan can benefit from its resources and provide an 
economic corridor to the region, but it must put its house in order. Changing dynamics 
in the Middle East are scary too. As the intensity of sectarian fighting is gaining 
momentum, Pakistan can play a geostrategic role, between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as 
Pakistan did between Washington and Beijing during the Cold War. If these issues are 
not resolved, Pakistan will be badly affected, not through transnational affects, but from  
within its own sectarian groups.
IS CONTINUOUS STATE FRAGILITY MENDABLE?
Fixing fragile states requires a serious strategy. The socio-economic, political, 
and security conditions are more deplorable for those who live in violent situations than 
those who fear the intensity of threat. The spillover effects are worrisome for regional 
countries and beyond, but humanitarian conditions are m ore threatened by the affected 
population. The performance of weak states has been poor since the decolonization 
period and should be considered a structural problem. If so, then Samuel Huntington's 
work strongly advocated a path of political development, while ignoring the 
modernization process.
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Assessing Huntington's argument with reference to contemporary times shows 
that economic development and modernization are essential features enhancing and 
strengthening political and administrative capacities of state. Francis Fukuyama suggests 
that political development takes the lead in stabilizing institutions, i.e. state building, 
rule of law, and democratic accountability enforce the political order. However, 
Fukuyama further argues that "beyond the establishment o f a state tha t provide for 
basic order, greater administrative capacity is also strongly correlated with economic 
growth."45 Fukuyama links higher scale corruption in institutions to low salaries and 
incentives in poor and weak states.
How to fix the problem? James Piazza has synthesized recommendations of 
earlier works on state fragility, as the earlier contributions suggest various options 
"favor of robust multi- or unilateral intervention to prevent state failure and proscribe a 
range of policy courses, such as: building stable democratic institutions, increasing 
economic assistance, multilateral military intervention."46 These options are valid, but 
the geopolitical troubles and unresolved regional political disputes still risk peace and 
stability.
First of all, the duty of the state is to provide political goods to the population, 
which includes security and the freedom of expression of its citizens. The state is 
responsible for maintaining order and the supremacy of the law; if it fails, the integrity 
of nation-hood is in question. In a number of cases like East Timor, Sudan, Rwanda, and 
many others, poor performing states have experienced foreign interventions and
45 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rder: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 469.
45 Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?," 470.
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peacekeeping forces to safeguard the human rights abuse on humanitarian grounds. 
Now, every weak or low performing state does not necessarily require peacekeeping 
forces or interventions. In many cases, interventions are also resisted based on issues of 
sovereignty; article 2 (7) of United Nations (UN) Charter avoids intervention in the  
domestic affairs of any state. However, the UN has made interventions when  
responding to humanitarian crises such as mass scale genocide, famine situations, and 
natural disasters.
Francis Fukuyama and many others have suggested that if there is a large-scale 
humanitarian crisis and human rights violations persist, then the international 
community has "not just the right but the obligation to intervene."47 In Pakistan, when a 
massive earthquake hit in 2005 and disastrous floods ravaged the human settlements 
and destroyed the crops in 2010, Pakistan allowed the flow of foreign aid and 
humanitarian interventions to help with rescue operations, rehabilitation processes, and 
capacity building of affected populations. In contrast, we have cases like in Myanm ar, 
where according to the UN, thousands of Rohingya people are suffering from  
malnutrition and health problems, and hundreds of thousands of refugees belonging to 
Karen, the Shan, the Karenni, the Kachin, the Wah, the Mon, the Rohingya groups are 
displaced due to internal war. They are seeking humanitarian interventions, which the  
state does not allow due to its own security reasons. Therefore, interventions have their 
own limitations.
47 Fukuyama, State-Building : Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 97; Ignatieff, "Intervention 
and State Failure," 119.
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Foreign aid has been the main tool of providing assistance and helping weak and 
fragile states sustain their institutional capacities. Some authors suggest that foreign aid 
is ineffective, while other believe foreign aid is helpful if allocated in the right direction 
and the right place. Umar Wahedi and Marina Rabinowitz argued that "foreign aid is 
ineffective with respect to economic performance... (Because) economically weak states 
may strongly fail to enhance private economic activity through the provision of good 
institutions."48 The work of Umar Wahedi and Marina Rabinowitz has analyzed under 
what conditions foreign aid becomes ineffective: first, those "countries that are prone 
to insurgencies and have conditions such as the presence o f rough terrain which allows 
insurgents to form their movement w ithout being destroyed at an early stage," and 
second, "when there is an inequitable distribution of resources or the control of local 
assets w ithout participation of benefit;" e.g. the author refers to the Chinese 
construction of deep-sea port at Gwadar, which will become a dispute between  
Islamabad and Baluch nationalists over the issue of the inequitable distribution of 
revenue and resources 49 A problem of a similar nature is gradually arising in the Dawei 
area of the Tanintharyi Region (former Tenasserim Division) in Myanmar, where  
Thailand is building a huge industrial hub, a deep-sea port to  connect Thailand, China, 
Laos, and Cambodia with the rest of the region. Local resistance has already started not 
for resource distribution, but mainly environmental damages for the area.
48 Ayesha Wahedi and Marina Arbetman, "Will Foreign Aid Help Curb Terrorism in Pakistan?," in The 
Performance o f Nations, ed. Jacek Kugler and Ronald L. Tammen (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2012), 197.
49 "Will Foreign Aid Help Curb Terrorism in Pakistan?," in The Performance of Nations, ed. Jacek Kugler 
and Ronald L. Tammen (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), 198.
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Burcu Savun and Daniel C. Tirone suggest that foreign aid is helpful if the  
program supports the democratization process in weak societies. Suvan and Tirone 
argued and analyzed that foreign aid investment in democratic programs have 
experienced less chance of internal violence or civil war then those that did not receive 
the aid for democracy. The spending on democracy promotion program under the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) has climbed from $121 million to $722  
million per year during 1990 to 2003."50 Suvan and Tirone share the example of 1999, 
when the USAID played a key role during the political transition in Indonesia, in which 
the power shifted from Suharto's regime to democracy. USAID ensured the 
implementation of democratic reforms, the decentralization of power, protection of 
minorities, and the accountability of political systems at the grassroots level, which 
helped to avert any backlash in the power transition.51 However, with Pakistan one of 
largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid, then why is the situation still volatile? Which of 
Umar Wahedi and Marina Rabinowitz's tw o explanations should apply in a Pakistani 
context? The problem with Pakistan's case is that the foreign aid is mostly spent in the  
defense sector, not the civilian. If there is a plan to spend the aid in civil society projects, 
the political elites extract foreign aid as a resource for personal gains.
Facilitating democratic transitions in weak and fragile states will be a suitable 
stride towards the political maturity of a system. Instead of interventions to contain 
contagious effects, ideally the global community should step forward and facilitate the
50 Burcu Savun and Daniel C. Tirone, "Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does 
Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?," American Journal o f Political Science 55, no. 2 (2011): 234.
51 "Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?," 
American Journal o f Political Science 55, no. 2 (2011): 235.
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process. It is argued, "the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of 
enlargement—enlargement of the world's free community o f market democracies."52 
Indonesia has experienced a prolonged dictatorship under Suharto, but soon an 
Indonesian transition determined to adopt democratic values and market economy will 
positively change Indonesia's course of action. Since the transition has begun in 1999, 
Indonesia has leaped from its then position of the world's twenty seventh largest to  
today's sixteenth largest economy, and in the coming decade, Indonesia is expected to  
surpass leading economies like Germany and the UK.53 It shows that the democratic 
"formula of that linked democracy with peace, and peace with prosperity, appeared to  
work well enough" as the rest of the world feels politically conscious that democratic 
values are the most reliable way out of the clutches of authoritarian rule and poor 
performing economies.54
It is important to facilitate the growing political consciousness of weak and 
fragile societies so a long term  bond can grow out of it and evolve a mutual trust 
towards the facilitator, rather than as a perceived as intervention. Analyzing the impact 
of successful transitions in weak societies, Larry Diamond explains that "Improving 
governance effects directly the strengthening state capacity; liberalizing and 
rationalizing economic structures; securing social and political order while maintaining 
basic freedom; improving horizontal accountability and controlling corruption."55
52 Justin Logan and Preble Christopher, "Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing 
Nation-Building Office," in Policy Analysis (CATO Institute, 2006), 2.
53 Abdul-Latif Halimi, "The Regional Implications of Indonesia's Rise," The Diplomat April 10, 2014.
54 Serfaty, A World Recast: An American M om ent in a Post-Western Order, 14.
55 Larry Jay Diamond, Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997), xxiii.
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Diamond informs that most Third World states practice "delegative democracies," 
meaning they lack "horizontal accountability and provides benign condition for 
corruption. Absence of accountability in a state engages in power struggle between  
institutions and flares up other social and ethnic issues. Effective pluralistic democratic 
political culture assures the protection of individual's rights, respecting and ensuring 
rule of law, safe guarding the citizen's interest, assimilating marginalized groups, and 
institutionalizing the horizontal accountability of different branches of officeholders to  
one another (check and balances), and abolishing the reserved and self-legitimized 
domains of power exercised by either military or other social and political forces that 
has no problem of encountering the accountability to the electorate."56
The argument that successful democratic transitions in weak states brings 
domestic peace and stability should be analyzed w ith the idea of w hether democracy 
precedes stability or if first stability is necessary to initiate democratic initiatives. To 
respond to the argument, the general tendency is to believe that democracies do not 
fight against democracies, which vindicates the idea that democratic institutions help 
stabilize society and enhance levels of cooperation with other democracies in the region 
and beyond the region. During the period of decolonization, most weak and fragile 
states were polarized due to a bipolar world, and most of the newly independent states 
faced military interventions and dictatorships. The great powers maintained the status 
quo and continued to support undemocratic regimes, until recently when the politically 
awakened world challenged the status quo in some parts of the Third W orld. Another
56 Ib id .
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explanation informs that the growing "demographic insecurities," due to "youth bulge,"
will severely provoke political unrests in risky societies. This means that the countries
with current turmoil have a population with more than sixty percent below 24 years of
age. The recent study shows that out of 7.2 billion of the world's population, 44 percent
is below 24 years of age and 26 percent is below 14 years of age; interestingly, 82
percent of this youth live in weak and fragile states specifically in sub-Saharan Africa and
Asia.57 The unsatisfied youth are demanding change from leadership; therefore
investment in education for democracy will payoff well; otherwise, ongoing political
unrests and growing unemployment could be a more serious issue. For example, Egypt,
whose population includes 60 percent below 30 years of age, has in recent years
gathered hundreds of thousands against 30 years of dictatorial rule; these political
transitions are serious in s nature and should be dealt accordingly.58 Other alarming
instances include the forcing of young children to work as soldiers in conflicts in Africa
and Asia; according to an estimate out of 300,000 children soldiers, Myanmar's military
regime is believed to recruit highest number: 70,000 boys serve in the military and are
lured through economic incentive and forced to join military.59
An attem pt to traditionally support dictatorial rule through interventions will
cause more trouble to the interest of great powers and the region itself and will allow
the "rise of illiberal democracy" w ith weak institutions and poor governance structures.
Foreign aid programs, like the Kerry-Lugar Bill, primarily focus on civil society programs
37 "Is Youth Bulge a "Magic Indicator" for the Failed States Index?," Wilson Center,
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/10/youth-bulge-magic-indicator-failed-states-
index/#.U0WCIfldV8E.
58 Kingsley, "Does a Growing Global Youth Population Fuel Political Unrest?."
59 Hillier and Wood, "Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control," 48.
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such as health and education which preferably become fruitful decisions for promoting  
global norms of inclusive democracy. Before coming to the office of President, Obama 
had established his "Soft Security Agenda" to  avoid war or conflict-oriented 
peacemaking and nation-building processes. Then Senator Obama believed that bases 
of Soft Security Agenda would facilitate to "serve our (US) long-term security interests 
then we will have to go beyond a more prudent use of military force. W e will have to  
align our policies to help reduce the spheres of insecurity, poverty, and violence around 
the world, and give more people a stake in the global order that has served us so 
w ell."60
CONCLUSION
For centuries, politics has been in transition, but in recent decades, the pace of 
transition has been accelerated. During these transitions political societies are 
continuously witnessing the birth, growth, peak, senescence, and decay of societies, 
either due to God-made or man-made reasons. The difference between earlier epochs 
of transitions and today's political activities reside in a bit o f different settings of tim e. 
For instance, compared to the past, today's societies cannot ignore a state decaying in 
isolation. The scale of the ramifications is much higher than ever before.
To answer the research question of this project, literature on a conceptual 
framework helped to understand the role, duties, and responsibilities o f states in the  
contemporary tim e period. The hypothetical discussions based on endogenous and
60 Michael O'Hanlon, "Obama's W eak and Failing States Agenda," The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 4 
(2012): 68.
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exogenous factors allowed the address of challenges and conditionalities of 
contemporary weak, but pivot states in terms of state fragility. The discussions draw  
some conclusions through seeking explanations regarding going back to the colonial 
episodes of weak states to contemporary era challenges.
First, most of today's weak and fragile states are grappling with the number of 
domestic and regional issues that are actually remnants o f being colonial past. The 
formation of nations and then states through surgical processes in various parts of the 
Third World immediately became a source of conflicts. There are three important areas 
that cause weak and fragile states to suffer: 1) ethnic compositions w ere done on the  
basis of geopolitical interests, which forcefully divided or included independent states 
into a bigger dominion, e.g. in Nigeria, Myanmar, Pakistan, and a number of other cases 
faced the challenges of irredentist struggles based on ethno-nationalism. Therefore, 
authors such as Jeffery Herbst term  the creation of such states as nothing more than a 
legal fiction that challenged the vertical authority and legitimacy of statehood most of 
the time 2) the geographical disputes continued, as colonial rulers allowed the newly 
independent states to decide on such claims with their neighbors; this gave birth to  
conflicts in the region over resources and land, e.g. the Kashmir dispute lingers for 
decades and became more complex and dangerous due to  the nuclearization of the 
region. 3) The continuation of colonial legacies or institutions that enabled authoritarian 
regimes and dynastic politics to take over the political process further weakening the  
institutions and accountable systems of governance.
Second, feeble socio-economic conditions due to bad governance and wrong
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policies turned into a poverty trap for the population. For instance, the Buddhist 
Socialism in M yanm ar under Gen. Ne Win in 1960s and Islamic Socialism in Pakistan 
introduced under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1970s rapidly nationalized the  
institutions and industries in the two countries that forced foreign and domestic 
investors to suffer at their peaks, while the decision weaved the poverty web for their 
own people. The downfall of economic transitions can be measured through falling 
economic output, as a result of early years' nationalization processes that eventually 
turned Myanmar's status as "the rice bowl of Asia" to a "beggar with a golden bowl." 
Likewise, Pakistan's golden days of economic progress stumbled into murky economic 
days.
Third, during the Cold W ar period many weak states were governed by dictators, 
and for geostrategic reasons and positions of states at the crossroads of major powers' 
interests, the global powers maintained the status quo through allowing dictators to  
rule these countries. This resulted over the period of time in the support of 
undemocratic forces to strengthen the roots of praetorianism and led to an 
asymmetrical growth of institutions that lacked checks and balances.
The consequences of the above-mentioned developments are prevailing 
frustrations and political deprivations in weak states reflected through the  
unprecedented rise of violence, widening rich and poor gap, corruption, lack of proper 
justice, and absence of punitive measures for criminals encouraging crime and violence, 
high mortality rates, spreading epidemic diseases, human rights violations, and growing 
intolerance against non-core groups. In order to reduce the intensity of threats and
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violence, the study recommends creating spheres of socializations at intra-state and 
interstate levels.
At the intra-state level, spheres of socialization allow the democratization  
process at the grassroots level, which will help to own the system and develop  
synchronization between domestic values and global norms of democracy. In this 
regard, if external support takes the role of facilitation to advocate education for 
democracy, it will become a beacon of equality and inclusiveness for all the citizens. The 
role of facilitator is a proactive approach to dealing with issues of fragility, instead of 
waiting for the worst scenario and becoming interventionist to address the problem. 
Facilitation can improve a positive relation on the basis of mutual respect, while in 
opposite scenarios the adversaries always w ait to exploit the situation. Here the natural 
calamities are exceptions, which anticipates humanitarian interventions as a last minute 
call from nature.
Successful transitions eventually support a political culture that cultivates 
tolerance, political trust, and a willingness to compromise on diverse opinions. These 
processes of political development support the enhancement of capacities of state, its 
institution, and the entire political system. As Larry Diamond has nicely portrayed the 
effectiveness of the social contract between a participatory citizen and state in following 
lines ,:
....the "citizens of new democracies form judgments about their political systems 
based not only on what they deliver economically, but also on the degree to 
which they deliver valued political goods: freedom, order, a rule of law, 
accountability, representativeness, and overall efficacy... citizens expect their 
democracies to govern democratically, in compliance with the constitution and
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the laws, and to govern efficaciously, in term s of choosing and implementing
policies that address the most important problems the  society confronts."61
At the interstate level, the spheres of socialization allow the weak states, 
especially the pivot states, to integrate themselves into the market economy, facilitate 
economic interdependency through transparency, and integrate into sub-regional, 
regional, and then the global level to tackle the burden of geography, which can become 
opportunity. Both cases, Myanm ar and Pakistan are right now at the crossroads of a 
major power shift. New economic corridors are going to shift geopolitical dynamics, and 
accordingly power politics will shift as well. Both states success in creating spheres of 
socialization with a greater integration will be beneficial; becoming partisan or choosy 
may cause fragility to continue.
Finally, the study finds room for further research in the analysis of the conditions 
of state fragility in the future. W hat we see in most of the weak and fragile states is a 
struggling with the fundamentals of a nation-state, like issues of identity, nation- 
building, and state-building. Looking ahead at years to come, one may affirm a unique 
junction point of human history: First, more than fifty percent of world's pollution will 
start to leave urban areas; this will change the traditional supply and demand balance, 
core and periphery debate, and raise issues and norms for cosmopolitan systems of 
states and societies. Second, growing environmental challenges and the scarcity of 
resources are turning into potential threats, mostly looming in weak societies. Last but 
not least, the emerging issues of demographic insecurities as briefly highlighted demand 
more research and additions to the literature.
61 Diamond, Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, xxiv.
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APPENDIX B: Mr. JINNAH'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
OF PAKISTAN AUGUST 11, 1947
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen!
I cordially thank you, with the utmost sincerity, for the honour you have 
conferred upon me - the greatest honour that is possible to  confer - by electing me as 
your first President. I also thank those leaders who have spoken in appreciation of my 
services and their personal references to me. I sincerely hope that w ith your support 
and your co-operation we shall make this Constituent Assembly an example to the 
world. The Constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the 
very onerous and responsible task of framing the future constitution of Pakistan and the 
second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the Federal Legislature 
of Pakistan. W e have to do the best we can in adopting a provisional constitution for the 
Federal Legislature of Pakistan. You know really that not only we ourselves are 
wondering but, I think, the whole world is wondering at this unprecedented cyclonic 
revolution which has brought about the clan of creating and establishing two  
independent sovereign Dominions in this sub-continent. As it is, it has been 
unprecedented; there is no parallel in the history of the world. This mighty sub­
continent with all kinds of inhabitants has been brought under a plan which is titanic, 
unknown, unparalleled. And what is very im portant with regards to it is that we have 
achieved it peacefully and by means of an evolution of the greatest possible character.
Dealing with our first function in this Assembly, I cannot make any well- 
considered pronouncement at this moment, but I shall say a few things as they occur to 
me. The first and the foremost thing that I would like to emphasize is this: rem em ber 
that you are now a sovereign legislative body and you have got all the powers. It, 
therefore, places on you the gravest responsibility as to how you should take your 
decisions. The first observation that I would like to make is this: You will no doubt agree 
with me that the first duty of a government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, 
property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State.
The second thing that occurs to me is this: One of the  biggest curses from which 
India is suffering - 1 do not say that other countries are free from it, but, I think our 
condition is much worse - is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. W e must put 
that down with an iron hand and I hope that you will take adequate measures as soon 
as it is possible for this Assembly to do so.
Black-marketing is another curse. Well, I know that black-marketeers are 
frequently caught and punished. Judicial sentences are passed or sometimes fines only 
are imposed. Now you have to tackle this monster, which today is a colossal crime 
against society, in our distressed conditions, when we constantly face shortage of food 
and other essential commodities of life. A citizen who does black-marketing commits, I 
think, a greater crime than the biggest and most grievous of crimes. These black- 
marketeers are really knowing, intelligent and ordinarily responsible people, and when 
they indulge in black-marketing, I think they ought to be very severely punished,
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because the entire system of control and regulation of foodstuffs and essential 
commodities, and cause wholesale starvation and want and even death.
The next thing that strikes me is this: Here again it is a legacy which has been 
passed on to us. Along with many other things, good and bad, has arrived this great evil, 
the evil of nepotism and jobbery. I want to make it quite clear that I shall never tolerate  
any kind of jobbery, nepotism or any any influence directly of indirectly brought to bear 
upon me. W henever I will find that such a practice is in vogue or is continuing anywhere, 
low or high, I shall certainly not countenance it.
I know there are people who do not quite agree w ith  the division of India and 
the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Much has been said against it, but now that it 
has been accepted, it is the duty of everyone of us to  loyally abide by it and honourably 
act according to the agreement which is now final and binding on all. But you must 
remember, as I have said, that this mighty revolution that has taken place is 
unprecedented. One can quite understand the feeling that exists between the two  
communities wherever one community is in majority and th e  other is in minority. But 
the question is, whether it was possible or practicable to act otherwise than what has 
been done, A division had to take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there  
are sections of people who may not agree with it, who may not like it, but in my 
judgement there was no other solution and I am sure future history will record is verdict 
in favour of it. And what is more, it will be proved by actual experience as we go on that 
was the only solution of India's constitutional problem. Any idea of a united India could 
never have worked and in my judgement it would have led us to terrific disaster. Maybe 
that view is correct; maybe it is not; that remains to  be seen. All the same, in this 
division it was impossible to avoid the question of minorities being in one Dominion or 
the other. Now that was unavoidable. There is no other solution. Now w hat shall we do? 
Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous, we should 
wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the 
masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the  
hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit 
that everyone of you, no m atter to what community he belongs, no m atter what 
relations he had with you in the past, no m atter w hat is his colour, caste or creed, is 
first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, 
there will be on end to the progress you will make.
I cannot emphasize it too much. W e should begin to work in that spirit and in 
course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the 
Hindu community and the Muslim community, because even as regards Muslims you 
have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have 
Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on, will vanish. Indeed if 
you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain the 
freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free people long long 
ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in 
subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody 
could have continued its hold on you for any length of time, but for this. Therefore, we  
must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are
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free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan.
You may belong to any religion or caste or creed th a t has nothing to do w ith the 
business of the State. As you know, history shows th at in England, conditions, some time 
ago, were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and 
the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence 
where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class.
Thank God, we are not starting in those days. W e are starting in the days w here there is 
no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no 
discrimination between one caste or creed and another. W e are starting with this 
fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people 
of England in course of tim e had to face the realities of the situation and had to 
discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them  by the government of their 
country and they w ent through that fire step by step. Today, you might say with justice 
that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist; what exists now is that every man is 
a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain and they are all members of the Nation.
Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that 
in course of tim e Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be 
Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, 
but in the political sense as citizens of the State.
Well, gentlemen, I do not wish to take up any more of your tim e and thank you 
again for the honour you have done to me. I shall always be guided by the principles of 
justice and fairplay w ithout any, as is put in the political language, prejudice or ill-will, in 
other words, partiality or favouritism. M y guiding principle will be justice and complete 
impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and co-operation, I can look forward  
to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest nations of the world.
Source: Columbia University Web site:
http://www.colum bia.edu/itc/m ealac/pritchett/OOislam links/txt jinnah assembly 1947
.html. Feb 11th, 2014.
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